<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf, branch v6.12.96</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:52:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moses</name>
<email>p@1g4.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-05T23:43:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c5ff816d5f13900c3f1f3298cfcc61339e056e56'/>
<id>c5ff816d5f13900c3f1f3298cfcc61339e056e56</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b9452b594fd3aecbfd4aa0a6a1f741330a37dab7 upstream.

btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD,
and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements
into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields().

The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation
in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to
pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array
capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the
array.

Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields
and reject impossible counts.

Fixes: 797d73ee232d ("bpf: Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moses &lt;p@1g4.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260605234301.1109063-1-p@1g4.org
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b9452b594fd3aecbfd4aa0a6a1f741330a37dab7 upstream.

btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD,
and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements
into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields().

The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation
in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to
pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array
capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the
array.

Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields
and reject impossible counts.

Fixes: 797d73ee232d ("bpf: Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moses &lt;p@1g4.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260605234301.1109063-1-p@1g4.org
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Restore sysctl new-value from 1 to 0</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:52:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dawei Feng</name>
<email>dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-03T10:53:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=70328bbd504ad51dd9123a97b9e70ac3d18dc387'/>
<id>70328bbd504ad51dd9123a97b9e70ac3d18dc387</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2566c3b24219c5b30e35205cba029ff34ff7c78b upstream.

Commit 4e63acdff864 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value
helpers") changed the success return value to 0, but failed to update the
corresponding check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
bpf_prog_run_array_cg() now returns 0 on success, the legacy ret == 1
condition is never satisfied. As a result, the modified value is ignored,
and bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() fails to replace the write buffer.

Fix this by checking for a return value of 0 instead, so cgroup/sysctl
programs can correctly replace the pending sysctl buffer.

This bug was discovered during a manual code review. Tested via a
cgroup/sysctl BPF reproducer overriding writes to a target sysctl.
Pre-fix, bpf_sysctl_set_new_value("foo") was silently ignored: the write
returned 8192 and the value remained "600". Post-fix, the BPF replacement
buffer properly propagates: the write returns 3 and the value updates to
"foo".

Fixes: f10d05966196 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err instead of allow boolean")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan &lt;zilin@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng &lt;dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-4-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2566c3b24219c5b30e35205cba029ff34ff7c78b upstream.

Commit 4e63acdff864 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value
helpers") changed the success return value to 0, but failed to update the
corresponding check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
bpf_prog_run_array_cg() now returns 0 on success, the legacy ret == 1
condition is never satisfied. As a result, the modified value is ignored,
and bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() fails to replace the write buffer.

Fix this by checking for a return value of 0 instead, so cgroup/sysctl
programs can correctly replace the pending sysctl buffer.

This bug was discovered during a manual code review. Tested via a
cgroup/sysctl BPF reproducer overriding writes to a target sysctl.
Pre-fix, bpf_sysctl_set_new_value("foo") was silently ignored: the write
returned 8192 and the value remained "600". Post-fix, the BPF replacement
buffer properly propagates: the write returns 3 and the value updates to
"foo".

Fixes: f10d05966196 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err instead of allow boolean")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan &lt;zilin@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng &lt;dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai &lt;xukuohai@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-4-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:52:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhao Zhang</name>
<email>zzhan461@ucr.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-02T08:43:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c5b4f5efcb55c1af3fe44ff712d31b7fb098a831'/>
<id>c5b4f5efcb55c1af3fe44ff712d31b7fb098a831</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa496720618f1a6054f1c870bf10b4f6c99bf656 upstream.

Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.

For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.

Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().

Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP.

Fixes: e624d4ed4aa8 ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang &lt;zzhan461@ucr.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/21c2d153dd25603d359069a02bf06779b51f6423.1780385378.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aa496720618f1a6054f1c870bf10b4f6c99bf656 upstream.

Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.

For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.

Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().

Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP.

Fixes: e624d4ed4aa8 ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang &lt;zzhan461@ucr.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/21c2d153dd25603d359069a02bf06779b51f6423.1780385378.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer</title>
<updated>2026-07-04T11:43:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dawei Feng</name>
<email>dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-03T10:53:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=838fe9c28121777c59a9406710a68fcf77bb8017'/>
<id>838fe9c28121777c59a9406710a68fcf77bb8017</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.

proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.

Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.

Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000  SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4  PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
   __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
   ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
   ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
   ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
   vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
   ...
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.

Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan &lt;zilin@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng &lt;dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.

proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.

Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.

Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000  SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4  PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
  ...
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
   __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
   ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
   ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
   ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
   vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
   ...
   &lt;/TASK&gt;

With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.

Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen &lt;jiayuan.chen@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan &lt;zilin@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng &lt;dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>remove pointless includes of &lt;linux/fdtable.h&gt;</title>
<updated>2026-06-09T10:25:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-06-03T03:58:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eff91d0885a12e9b1d86702e15b518d89fe0180f'/>
<id>eff91d0885a12e9b1d86702e15b518d89fe0180f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit be5498cac2ddb112c5bd7433d5e834a1a2493427 ]

some of those used to be needed, some had been cargo-culted for
no reason...

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Stable-dep-of: ea5fe6a73ca5 ("net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit be5498cac2ddb112c5bd7433d5e834a1a2493427 ]

some of those used to be needed, some had been cargo-culted for
no reason...

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Stable-dep-of: ea5fe6a73ca5 ("net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Validate node_id in arena_alloc_pages()</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Puranjay Mohan</name>
<email>puranjay@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-17T15:21:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=31d3b4b28e55835646d6829d60023f730dd34e85'/>
<id>31d3b4b28e55835646d6829d60023f730dd34e85</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2845989f2ebaf7848e4eccf9a779daf3156ea0a5 ]

arena_alloc_pages() accepts a plain int node_id and forwards it through
the entire allocation chain without any bounds checking.

Validate node_id before passing it down the allocation chain in
arena_alloc_pages().

Fixes: 317460317a02 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260417152135.1383754-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2845989f2ebaf7848e4eccf9a779daf3156ea0a5 ]

arena_alloc_pages() accepts a plain int node_id and forwards it through
the entire allocation chain without any bounds checking.

Validate node_id before passing it down the allocation chain in
arena_alloc_pages().

Fixes: 317460317a02 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.")
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260417152135.1383754-1-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: allow UTF-8 literals in bpf_bprintf_prepare()</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yihan Ding</name>
<email>dingyihan@uniontech.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-16T12:01:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf5c43e90b9276f07e371dcf43c2230a03899e1e'/>
<id>bf5c43e90b9276f07e371dcf43c2230a03899e1e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b960430ea8862ef37ce53c8bf74a8dc79d3f2404 ]

bpf_bprintf_prepare() only needs ASCII parsing for conversion
specifiers. Plain text can safely carry bytes &gt;= 0x80, so allow
UTF-8 literals outside '%' sequences while keeping ASCII control
bytes rejected and format specifiers ASCII-only.

This keeps existing parsing rules for format directives unchanged,
while allowing helpers such as bpf_trace_printk() to emit UTF-8
literal text.

Update test_snprintf_negative() in the same commit so selftests keep
matching the new plain-text vs format-specifier split during bisection.

Fixes: 48cac3f4a96d ("bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf")
Signed-off-by: Yihan Ding &lt;dingyihan@uniontech.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416120142.1420646-2-dingyihan@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b960430ea8862ef37ce53c8bf74a8dc79d3f2404 ]

bpf_bprintf_prepare() only needs ASCII parsing for conversion
specifiers. Plain text can safely carry bytes &gt;= 0x80, so allow
UTF-8 literals outside '%' sequences while keeping ASCII control
bytes rejected and format specifiers ASCII-only.

This keeps existing parsing rules for format directives unchanged,
while allowing helpers such as bpf_trace_printk() to emit UTF-8
literal text.

Update test_snprintf_negative() in the same commit so selftests keep
matching the new plain-text vs format-specifier split during bisection.

Fixes: 48cac3f4a96d ("bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf")
Signed-off-by: Yihan Ding &lt;dingyihan@uniontech.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416120142.1420646-2-dingyihan@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix NULL deref in map_kptr_match_type for scalar regs</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mykyta Yatsenko</name>
<email>yatsenko@meta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-16T18:08:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a36c1f72888bca0237295a4da19cd91821a90be'/>
<id>0a36c1f72888bca0237295a4da19cd91821a90be</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d0a375887ab4d49e4da1ff10f9606cab8f7c3ad ]

Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local
kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel()
before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr
slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg-&gt;btf) call dereferences
NULL.

Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg-&gt;btf
access.

Fixes: ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr")
Reported-by: Hiker Cl &lt;clhiker365@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416-kptr_crash-v1-1-5589356584b4@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d0a375887ab4d49e4da1ff10f9606cab8f7c3ad ]

Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local
kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel()
before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr
slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg-&gt;btf) call dereferences
NULL.

Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg-&gt;btf
access.

Fixes: ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr")
Reported-by: Hiker Cl &lt;clhiker365@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416-kptr_crash-v1-1-5589356584b4@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix OOB in pcpu_init_value</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lang Xu</name>
<email>xulang@uniontech.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-02T07:42:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e0378419b0e20178b5d100b27c9cc7e51064202e'/>
<id>e0378419b0e20178b5d100b27c9cc7e51064202e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 576afddfee8d1108ee299bf10f581593540d1a36 ]

An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the
same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes.

The issue happens when:
1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to
   8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes)
2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes)
3. Update element in 2 with data in 1

pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes,
and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the
assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source
may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb-&gt;data.
the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not
the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the
source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8.

Fixes: d3bec0138bfb ("bpf: Zero-fill re-used per-cpu map element")
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei &lt;kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/14e6c70c.6c121.19c0399d948.Coremail.kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/420FEEDDC768A4BE+20260402074236.2187154-1-xulang@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Lang Xu &lt;xulang@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 576afddfee8d1108ee299bf10f581593540d1a36 ]

An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the
same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes.

The issue happens when:
1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to
   8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes)
2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes)
3. Update element in 2 with data in 1

pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes,
and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the
assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source
may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb-&gt;data.
the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not
the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the
source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8.

Fixes: d3bec0138bfb ("bpf: Zero-fill re-used per-cpu map element")
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei &lt;kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/14e6c70c.6c121.19c0399d948.Coremail.kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/420FEEDDC768A4BE+20260402074236.2187154-1-xulang@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Lang Xu &lt;xulang@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Allow instructions with arena source and non-arena dest registers</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Emil Tsalapatis</name>
<email>emil@etsalapatis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T17:45:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8837c1605fb37718fe3b2087e438d3601417aee2'/>
<id>8837c1605fb37718fe3b2087e438d3601417aee2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac61bffe91d4bda08806e12957c6d64756d042db ]

The compiler sometimes stores the result of a PTR_TO_ARENA and SCALAR
operation into the scalar register rather than the pointer register.
Relax the verifier to allow operations between a source arena register
and a destination non-arena register, marking the destination's value
as a PTR_TO_ARENA.

Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260412174546.18684-2-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ac61bffe91d4bda08806e12957c6d64756d042db ]

The compiler sometimes stores the result of a PTR_TO_ARENA and SCALAR
operation into the scalar register rather than the pointer register.
Relax the verifier to allow operations between a source arena register
and a destination non-arena register, marking the destination's value
as a PTR_TO_ARENA.

Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260412174546.18684-2-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
