linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf, branch v5.19.2

bpf: fix potential 32-bit overflow when accessing ARRAY map element

2022-08-17T13:14:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit 87ac0d600943994444e24382a87aa19acc4cd3d4 ]

If BPF array map is bigger than 4GB, element pointer calculation can
overflow because both index and elem_size are u32. Fix this everywhere
by forcing 64-bit multiplication. Extract this formula into separate
small helper and use it consistently in various places.

Speculative-preventing formula utilizing index_mask trick is left as is,
but explicit u64 casts are added in both places.

Fixes: c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715053146.1291891-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix subprog names in stack traces.

2022-08-17T13:14:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9c7c48d6a1e2eb5192ad5294c1c4dbd42a88e88b ]

The commit 7337224fc150 ("bpf: Improve the info.func_info and info.func_info_rec_size behavior")
accidently made bpf_prog_ksym_set_name() conservative for bpf subprograms.
Fixed it so instead of "bpf_prog_tag_F" the stack traces print "bpf_prog_tag_full_subprog_name".

Fixes: 7337224fc150 ("bpf: Improve the info.func_info and info.func_info_rec_size behavior")
Reported-by: Tejun Heo 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Acked-by: Yonghong Song 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220714211637.17150-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, x86: fix freeing of not-finalized bpf_prog_pack

2022-08-17T13:14:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1d5f82d9dd477d5c66e0214a68c3e4f308eadd6d ]

syzbot reported a few issues with bpf_prog_pack [1], [2]. This only happens
with multiple subprogs. In jit_subprogs(), we first call bpf_int_jit_compile()
on each sub program. And then, we call it on each sub program again. jit_data
is not freed in the first call of bpf_int_jit_compile(). Similarly we don't
call bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() in the first call of bpf_int_jit_compile().

If bpf_int_jit_compile() failed for one sub program, we will call
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() for this sub program. However, we don't have a
chance to call it for other sub programs. Then we will hit "goto out_free" in
jit_subprogs(), and call bpf_jit_free on some subprograms that haven't got
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() yet.

At this point, bpf_jit_binary_pack_free() is called and the whole 2MB page is
freed erroneously.

Fix this with a custom bpf_jit_free() for x86_64, which calls
bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() if necessary. Also, with custom
bpf_jit_free(), bpf_prog_aux->use_bpf_prog_pack is not needed any more,
remove it.

Fixes: 1022a5498f6f ("bpf, x86_64: Use bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc")
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2f649ec6d2eea1495a8f
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87f65c75f4a72db05445
Reported-by: syzbot+2f649ec6d2eea1495a8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+87f65c75f4a72db05445@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Song Liu 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706002612.4013790-1-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, x64: Add predicate for bpf2bpf with tailcalls support in JIT

2022-08-17T13:14:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 95acd8817e66d031d2e6ee7def3f1e1874819317 ]

The BPF core/verifier is hard-coded to permit mixing bpf2bpf and tail
calls for only x86-64. Change the logic to instead rely on a new weak
function 'bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void)', which a capable
JIT backend can override.

Update the x86-64 eBPF JIT to reflect this.

Signed-off-by: Tony Ambardar 
[jakub: drop MIPS bits and tweak patch subject]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220617105735.733938-2-jakub@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix KASAN use-after-free Read in compute_effective_progs

2022-08-17T13:13:52+00:00

commit 4c46091ee985ae84c60c5e95055d779fcd291d87 upstream.

Syzbot found a Use After Free bug in compute_effective_progs().
The reproducer creates a number of BPF links, and causes a fault
injected alloc to fail, while calling bpf_link_detach on them.
Link detach triggers the link to be freed by bpf_link_free(),
which calls __cgroup_bpf_detach() and update_effective_progs().
If the memory allocation in this function fails, the function restores
the pointer to the bpf_cgroup_link on the cgroup list, but the memory
gets freed just after it returns. After this, every subsequent call to
update_effective_progs() causes this already deallocated pointer to be
dereferenced in prog_list_length(), and triggers KASAN UAF error.

To fix this issue don't preserve the pointer to the prog or link in the
list, but remove it and replace it with a dummy prog without shrinking
the table. The subsequent call to __cgroup_bpf_detach() or
__cgroup_bpf_detach() will correct it.

Fixes: af6eea57437a ("bpf: Implement bpf_link-based cgroup BPF program attachment")
Reported-by: 
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Cc: 
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=8ebf179a95c2a2670f7cf1ba62429ec044369db4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220517180420.87954-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Add flags arg to bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write APIs

2022-07-08T08:55:53+00:00

Commit 13bbbfbea759 ("bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write")
added the bpf_dynptr_write() and bpf_dynptr_read() APIs.

However, it will be needed for some dynptr types to pass in flags as
well (e.g. when writing to a skb, the user may like to invalidate the
hash or recompute the checksum).

This patch adds a "u64 flags" arg to the bpf_dynptr_read() and
bpf_dynptr_write() APIs before their UAPI signature freezes where
we then cannot change them anymore with a 5.19.x released kernel.

Fixes: 13bbbfbea759 ("bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_read and bpf_dynptr_write")
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220706232547.4016651-1-joannelkoong@gmail.com

bpf: Make sure mac_header was set before using it

2022-07-07T18:13:13+00:00

Classic BPF has a way to load bytes starting from the mac header.

Some skbs do not have a mac header, and skb_mac_header()
in this case is returning a pointer that 65535 bytes after
skb->head.

Existing range check in bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper()
was properly kicking and no illegal access was happening.

New sanity check in skb_mac_header() is firing, so we need
to avoid it.

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 28990 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 28990 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00865-g4874fb9484be #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/29/2022
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2785 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bpf_internal_load_pointer_neg_helper+0x1b1/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:74
Code: ff ff 45 31 f6 e9 5a ff ff ff e8 aa 27 40 00 e9 3b ff ff ff e8 90 27 40 00 e9 df fe ff ff e8 86 27 40 00 eb 9e e8 2f 2c f3 ff <0f> 0b eb b1 e8 96 27 40 00 e9 79 fe ff ff 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000309f668 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000000118 RBX: ffffffffffeff00c RCX: ffffc9000e417000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81873f21 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffff8880842878c0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffff88803ac56c00 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f5c88a16700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdaa9f6c058 CR3: 000000003a82c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:

____bpf_skb_load_helper_32 net/core/filter.c:276 [inline]
bpf_skb_load_helper_32+0x191/0x220 net/core/filter.c:264

Fixes: f9aefd6b2aa3 ("net: warn if mac header was not set")
Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220707123900.945305-1-edumazet@google.com

bpf: Fix insufficient bounds propagation from adjust_scalar_min_max_vals

2022-07-01T19:56:27+00:00

Kuee reported a corner case where the tnum becomes constant after the call
to __reg_bound_offset(), but the register's bounds are not, that is, its
min bounds are still not equal to the register's max bounds.

This in turn allows to leak pointers through turning a pointer register as
is into an unknown scalar via adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().

Before:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
  1: (b7) r3 = 0                        ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  2: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  3: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  4: (47) r3 |= 32767                   ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
  5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1       ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  6: (95) exit

  from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1    ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  8: (95) exit

  from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  9: (07) r3 += -32767                  ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))  <--- [*]
  10: (95) exit

What can be seen here is that R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff;
0x8000)) after the operation R3 += -32767 results in a 'malformed' constant, that
is, R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)). Intersecting with var_off has
not been done at that point via __update_reg_bounds(), which would have improved
the umax to be equal to umin.

Refactor the tnum <> min/max bounds information flow into a reg_bounds_sync()
helper and use it consistently everywhere. After the fix, bounds have been
corrected to R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) and thus the register
is regarded as a 'proper' constant scalar of 0.

After:

  func#0 @0
  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  0: (b7) r0 = 1                        ; R0_w=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0))
  1: (b7) r3 = 0                        ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  2: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  3: (87) r3 = -r3                      ; R3_w=scalar()
  4: (47) r3 |= 32767                   ; R3_w=scalar(smin=-9223372036854743041,umin=32767,var_off=(0x7fff; 0xffffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881)
  5: (75) if r3 s>= 0x0 goto pc+1       ; R3_w=scalar(umin=9223372036854808575,var_off=(0x8000000000007fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  6: (95) exit

  from 5 to 7: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  7: (d5) if r3 s<= 0x8000 goto pc+1    ; R3=scalar(umin=32769,umax=9223372036854775807,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x7fffffffffff8000),s32_min=-2147450881,u32_min=32767)
  8: (95) exit

  from 7 to 9: R0=scalar(imm=1,umin=1,umax=1,var_off=(0x1; 0x0)) R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0)) R3=scalar(umin=32767,umax=32768,var_off=(0x7fff; 0x8000)) R10=fp(off=0,imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))
  9: (07) r3 += -32767                  ; R3_w=scalar(imm=0,umax=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x0))  <--- [*]
  10: (95) exit

Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Acked-by: John Fastabend 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-2-daniel@iogearbox.net

bpf: Fix incorrect verifier simulation around jmp32's jeq/jne

2022-07-01T19:56:27+00:00

Kuee reported a quirk in the jmp32's jeq/jne simulation, namely that the
register value does not match expectations for the fall-through path. For
example:

Before fix:

  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (b7) r2 = 0                        ; R2_w=P0
  1: (b7) r6 = 563                      ; R6_w=P563
  2: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  3: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  4: (4c) w2 |= w6                      ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
  5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1        ; R2_w=P571  <--- [*]
  6: (95) exit
  R0 !read_ok

After fix:

  0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (b7) r2 = 0                        ; R2_w=P0
  1: (b7) r6 = 563                      ; R6_w=P563
  2: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  3: (87) r2 = -r2                      ; R2_w=Pscalar()
  4: (4c) w2 |= w6                      ; R2_w=Pscalar(umin=563,umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x233; 0xfffffdcc),s32_min=-2147483085) R6_w=P563
  5: (56) if w2 != 0x8 goto pc+1        ; R2_w=P8  <--- [*]
  6: (95) exit
  R0 !read_ok

As can be seen on line 5 for the branch fall-through path in R2 [*] is that
given condition w2 != 0x8 is false, verifier should conclude that r2 = 8 as
upper 32 bit are known to be zero. However, verifier incorrectly concludes
that r2 = 571 which is far off.

The problem is it only marks false{true}_reg as known in the switch for JE/NE
case, but at the end of the function, it uses {false,true}_{64,32}off to
update {false,true}_reg->var_off and they still hold the prior value of
{false,true}_reg->var_off before it got marked as known. The subsequent
__reg_combine_32_into_64() then propagates this old var_off and derives new
bounds. The information between min/max bounds on {false,true}_reg from
setting the register to known const combined with the {false,true}_reg->var_off
based on the old information then derives wrong register data.

Fix it by detangling the BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE cases and updating relevant
{false,true}_{64,32}off tnums along with the register marking to known
constant.

Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Acked-by: John Fastabend 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220701124727.11153-1-daniel@iogearbox.net

bpf: Limit maximum modifier chain length in btf_check_type_tags

2022-06-15T17:32:12+00:00

On processing a module BTF of module built for an older kernel, we might
sometimes find that some type points to itself forming a loop. If such a
type is a modifier, btf_check_type_tags's while loop following modifier
chain will be caught in an infinite loop.

Fix this by defining a maximum chain length and bailing out if we spin
any longer than that.

Fixes: eb596b090558 ("bpf: Ensure type tags precede modifiers in BTF")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Yonghong Song 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220615042151.2266537-1-memxor@gmail.com