linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf, branch linux-4.17.y

bpf: hash map: decrement counter on error

2018-08-24T11:06:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit ed2b82c03dc187018307c7c6bf9299705f3db383 ]

Decrement the number of elements in the map in case the allocation
of a new node fails.

Fixes: 6c9059817432 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Vasquez B 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, sockmap: fix bpf_tcp_sendmsg sock error handling

2018-08-15T16:10:57+00:00

commit 5121700b346b6160ccc9411194e3f1f417c340d1 upstream.

While working on bpf_tcp_sendmsg() code, I noticed that when a
sk->sk_err is set we error out with err = sk->sk_err. However
this is problematic since sk->sk_err is a positive error value
and therefore we will neither go into sk_stream_error() nor will
we report an error back to user space. I had this case with EPIPE
and user space was thinking sendmsg() succeeded since EPIPE is
a positive value, thinking we submitted 32 bytes. Fix it by
negating the sk->sk_err value.

Fixes: 4f738adba30a ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: John Fastabend 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf, sockmap: fix leak in bpf_tcp_sendmsg wait for mem path

2018-08-15T16:10:57+00:00

commit 7c81c71730456845e6212dccbf00098faa66740f upstream.

In bpf_tcp_sendmsg() the sk_alloc_sg() may fail. In the case of
ENOMEM, it may also mean that we've partially filled the scatterlist
entries with pages. Later jumping to sk_stream_wait_memory()
we could further fail with an error for several reasons, however
we miss to call free_start_sg() if the local sk_msg_buff was used.

Fixes: 4f738adba30a ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: John Fastabend 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix references to free_bpf_prog_info() in comments

2018-08-03T05:47:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit ab7f5bf0928be2f148d000a6eaa6c0a36e74750e ]

Comments in the verifier refer to free_bpf_prog_info() which
seems to have never existed in tree.  Replace it with
free_used_maps().

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix multi-function JITed dump obtained via syscall

2018-08-03T05:47:46+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4d56a76ead2fcd856e677cdc9445ad331a409b8c ]

Currently, for multi-function programs, we cannot get the JITed
instructions using the bpf system call's BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
command. Because of this, userspace tools such as bpftool fail
to identify a multi-function program as being JITed or not.

With the JIT enabled and the test program running, this can be
verified as follows:

  # cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
  1

Before applying this patch:

  # bpftool prog list
  1: kprobe  name foo  tag b811aab41a39ad3d  gpl
          loaded_at 2018-05-16T11:43:38+0530  uid 0
          xlated 216B  not jited  memlock 65536B
  ...

  # bpftool prog dump jited id 1
  no instructions returned

After applying this patch:

  # bpftool prog list
  1: kprobe  name foo  tag b811aab41a39ad3d  gpl
          loaded_at 2018-05-16T12:13:01+0530  uid 0
          xlated 216B  jited 308B  memlock 65536B
  ...

  # bpftool prog dump jited id 1
     0:   nop
     4:   nop
     8:   mflr    r0
     c:   std     r0,16(r1)
    10:   stdu    r1,-112(r1)
    14:   std     r31,104(r1)
    18:   addi    r31,r1,48
    1c:   li      r3,10
  ...

Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: undo prog rejection on read-only lock failure

2018-07-22T13:16:09+00:00

commit 85782e037f8aba8922dadb24a1523ca0b82ab8bc upstream.

Partially undo commit 9facc336876f ("bpf: reject any prog that failed
read-only lock") since it caused a regression, that is, syzkaller was
able to manage to cause a panic via fault injection deep in set_memory_ro()
path by letting an allocation fail: In x86's __change_page_attr_set_clr()
it was able to change the attributes of the primary mapping but not in
the alias mapping via cpa_process_alias(), so the second, inner call
to the __change_page_attr() via __change_page_attr_set_clr() had to split
a larger page and failed in the alloc_pages() with the artifically triggered
allocation error which is then propagated down to the call site.

Thus, for set_memory_ro() this means that it returned with an error, but
from debugging a probe_kernel_write() revealed EFAULT on that memory since
the primary mapping succeeded to get changed. Therefore the subsequent
hdr->locked = 0 reset triggered the panic as it was performed on read-only
memory, so call-site assumptions were infact wrong to assume that it would
either succeed /or/ not succeed at all since there's no such rollback in
set_memory_*() calls from partial change of mappings, in other words, we're
left in a state that is "half done". A later undo via set_memory_rw() is
succeeding though due to matching permissions on that part (aka due to the
try_preserve_large_page() succeeding). While reproducing locally with
explicitly triggering this error, the initial splitting only happens on
rare occasions and in real world it would additionally need oom conditions,
but that said, it could partially fail. Therefore, it is definitely wrong
to bail out on set_memory_ro() error and reject the program with the
set_memory_*() semantics we have today. Shouldn't have gone the extra mile
since no other user in tree today infact checks for any set_memory_*()
errors, e.g. neither module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro() for module
RO/NX handling which is mostly default these days nor kprobes core with
alloc_insn_page() / free_insn_page() as examples that could be invoked long
after bootup and original 314beb9bcabf ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks") did neither when it got first introduced to BPF
so "improving" with bailing out was clearly not right when set_memory_*()
cannot handle it today.

Kees suggested that if set_memory_*() can fail, we should annotate it with
__must_check, and all callers need to deal with it gracefully given those
set_memory_*() markings aren't "advisory", but they're expected to actually
do what they say. This might be an option worth to move forward in future
but would at the same time require that set_memory_*() calls from supporting
archs are guaranteed to be "atomic" in that they provide rollback if part
of the range fails, once that happened, the transition from RW -> RO could
be made more robust that way, while subsequent RO -> RW transition /must/
continue guaranteeing to always succeed the undo part.

Reported-by: syzbot+a4eb8c7766952a1ca872@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d866d1925855328eac3b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 9facc336876f ("bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock")
Cc: Laura Abbott 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: don't leave partial mangled prog in jit_subprogs error path

2018-07-22T13:16:07+00:00

commit c7a897843224a92209f306c984975b704969b89d upstream.

syzkaller managed to trigger the following bug through fault injection:

  [...]
  [  141.043668] verifier bug. No program starts at insn 3
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
                 bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.047355] CPU: 3 PID: 4072 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4+ #51
  [  141.048446] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
  [  141.049877] Call Trace:
  [  141.050324]  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  [  141.050324]  dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  [  141.050950]  ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.2+0x52/0x52 lib/dump_stack.c:60
  [  141.051837]  panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
  [  141.052386]  ? add_taint.cold.5+0x16/0x16 kernel/panic.c:385
  [  141.053101]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x148/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:537
  [  141.053814]  ? __warn.cold.8+0x117/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:530
  [  141.054506]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.054506]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [  141.055163]  __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:538
  [  141.055820]  ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
  [  141.055820]  ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
  [...]

What happens in jit_subprogs() is that kcalloc() for the subprog func
buffer is failing with NULL where we then bail out. Latter is a plain
return -ENOMEM, and this is definitely not okay since earlier in the
loop we are walking all subprogs and temporarily rewrite insn->off to
remember the subprog id as well as insn->imm to temporarily point the
call to __bpf_call_base + 1 for the initial JIT pass. Thus, bailing
out in such state and handing this over to the interpreter is troublesome
since later/subsequent e.g. find_subprog() lookups are based on wrong
insn->imm.

Therefore, once we hit this point, we need to jump to out_free path
where we undo all changes from earlier loop, so that interpreter can
work on unmodified insn->{off,imm}.

Another point is that should find_subprog() fail in jit_subprogs() due
to a verifier bug, then we also should not simply defer the program to
the interpreter since also here we did partial modifications. Instead
we should just bail out entirely and return an error to the user who is
trying to load the program.

Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: syzbot+7d427828b2ea6e592804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: sockmap, consume_skb in close path

2018-07-22T13:16:07+00:00

commit 7ebc14d507b4b55105da8d1a1eda323381529cc7 upstream.

Currently, when a sock is closed and the bpf_tcp_close() callback is
used we remove memory but do not free the skb. Call consume_skb() if
the skb is attached to the buffer.

Reported-by: syzbot+d464d2c20c717ef5a6a8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1aa12bdf1bfb ("bpf: sockmap, add sock close() hook to remove socks")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: sockmap, fix crash when ipv6 sock is added

2018-07-22T13:16:06+00:00

commit 9901c5d77e969d8215a8e8d087ef02e6feddc84c upstream.

This fixes a crash where we assign tcp_prot to IPv6 sockets instead
of tcpv6_prot.

Previously we overwrote the sk->prot field with tcp_prot even in the
AF_INET6 case. This patch ensures the correct tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot
are used.

Tested with 'netserver -6' and 'netperf -H [IPv6]' as well as
'netperf -H [IPv4]'. The ESTABLISHED check resolves the previously
crashing case here.

Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support")
Reported-by: syzbot+5c063698bdbfac19f363@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend 
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: reject any prog that failed read-only lock

2018-07-22T13:16:06+00:00

commit 9facc336876f7ecf9edba4c67b90426fde4ec898 upstream.

We currently lock any JITed image as read-only via bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro()
as well as the BPF image as read-only through bpf_prog_lock_ro(). In
the case any of these would fail we throw a WARN_ON_ONCE() in order to
yell loudly to the log. Perhaps, to some extend, this may be comparable
to an allocation where __GFP_NOWARN is explicitly not set.

Added via 65869a47f348 ("bpf: improve read-only handling"), this behavior
is slightly different compared to any of the other in-kernel set_memory_ro()
users who do not check the return code of set_memory_ro() and friends /at
all/ (e.g. in the case of module_enable_ro() / module_disable_ro()). Given
in BPF this is mandatory hardening step, we want to know whether there
are any issues that would leave both BPF data writable. So it happens
that syzkaller enabled fault injection and it triggered memory allocation
failure deep inside x86's change_page_attr_set_clr() which was triggered
from set_memory_ro().

Now, there are two options: i) leaving everything as is, and ii) reworking
the image locking code in order to have a final checkpoint out of the
central bpf_prog_select_runtime() which probes whether any of the calls
during prog setup weren't successful, and then bailing out with an error.
Option ii) is a better approach since this additional paranoia avoids
altogether leaving any potential W+X pages from BPF side in the system.
Therefore, lets be strict about it, and reject programs in such unlikely
occasion. While testing I noticed also that one bpf_prog_lock_ro()
call was missing on the outer dummy prog in case of calls, e.g. in the
destructor we call bpf_prog_free_deferred() on the main prog where we
try to bpf_prog_unlock_free() the program, and since we go via
bpf_prog_select_runtime() do that as well.

Reported-by: syzbot+3b889862e65a98317058@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9e762b52dd17e616a7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman