<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v6.4.7</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Repeat check_max_stack_depth for async callbacks</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:56:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-17T16:15:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=275d5743f622d2db18cc6e03208df2e22b9adcc1'/>
<id>275d5743f622d2db18cc6e03208df2e22b9adcc1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b5e9ad522c4ccd32d322877515cff8d47ed731b9 ]

While the check_max_stack_depth function explores call chains emanating
from the main prog, which is typically enough to cover all possible call
chains, it doesn't explore those rooted at async callbacks unless the
async callback will have been directly called, since unlike non-async
callbacks it skips their instruction exploration as they don't
contribute to stack depth.

It could be the case that the async callback leads to a callchain which
exceeds the stack depth, but this is never reachable while only
exploring the entry point from main subprog. Hence, repeat the check for
the main subprog *and* all async callbacks marked by the symbolic
execution pass of the verifier, as execution of the program may begin at
any of them.

Consider functions with following stack depths:
main: 256
async: 256
foo: 256

main:
    rX = async
    bpf_timer_set_callback(...)

async:
    foo()

Here, async is not descended as it does not contribute to stack depth of
main (since it is referenced using bpf_pseudo_func and not
bpf_pseudo_call). However, when async is invoked asynchronously, it will
end up breaching the MAX_BPF_STACK limit by calling foo.

Hence, in addition to main, we also need to explore call chains
beginning at all async callback subprogs in a program.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230717161530.1238-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b5e9ad522c4ccd32d322877515cff8d47ed731b9 ]

While the check_max_stack_depth function explores call chains emanating
from the main prog, which is typically enough to cover all possible call
chains, it doesn't explore those rooted at async callbacks unless the
async callback will have been directly called, since unlike non-async
callbacks it skips their instruction exploration as they don't
contribute to stack depth.

It could be the case that the async callback leads to a callchain which
exceeds the stack depth, but this is never reachable while only
exploring the entry point from main subprog. Hence, repeat the check for
the main subprog *and* all async callbacks marked by the symbolic
execution pass of the verifier, as execution of the program may begin at
any of them.

Consider functions with following stack depths:
main: 256
async: 256
foo: 256

main:
    rX = async
    bpf_timer_set_callback(...)

async:
    foo()

Here, async is not descended as it does not contribute to stack depth of
main (since it is referenced using bpf_pseudo_func and not
bpf_pseudo_call). However, when async is invoked asynchronously, it will
end up breaching the MAX_BPF_STACK limit by calling foo.

Hence, in addition to main, we also need to explore call chains
beginning at all async callback subprogs in a program.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230717161530.1238-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix subprog idx logic in check_max_stack_depth</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T06:56:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-17T16:15:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5e13be2071acbfb45c23c2b73f1ee62fa649b4ad'/>
<id>5e13be2071acbfb45c23c2b73f1ee62fa649b4ad</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ba7b3e7d5f9014be65879ede8fd599cb222901c9 ]

The assignment to idx in check_max_stack_depth happens once we see a
bpf_pseudo_call or bpf_pseudo_func. This is not an issue as the rest of
the code performs a few checks and then pushes the frame to the frame
stack, except the case of async callbacks. If the async callback case
causes the loop iteration to be skipped, the idx assignment will be
incorrect on the next iteration of the loop. The value stored in the
frame stack (as the subprogno of the current subprog) will be incorrect.

This leads to incorrect checks and incorrect tail_call_reachable
marking. Save the target subprog in a new variable and only assign to
idx once we are done with the is_async_cb check which may skip pushing
of frame to the frame stack and subsequent stack depth checks and tail
call markings.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230717161530.1238-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ba7b3e7d5f9014be65879ede8fd599cb222901c9 ]

The assignment to idx in check_max_stack_depth happens once we see a
bpf_pseudo_call or bpf_pseudo_func. This is not an issue as the rest of
the code performs a few checks and then pushes the frame to the frame
stack, except the case of async callbacks. If the async callback case
causes the loop iteration to be skipped, the idx assignment will be
incorrect on the next iteration of the loop. The value stored in the
frame stack (as the subprogno of the current subprog) will be incorrect.

This leads to incorrect checks and incorrect tail_call_reachable
marking. Save the target subprog in a new variable and only assign to
idx once we are done with the is_async_cb check which may skip pushing
of frame to the frame stack and subsequent stack depth checks and tail
call markings.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230717161530.1238-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix max stack depth check for async callbacks</title>
<updated>2023-07-23T11:53:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi</name>
<email>memxor@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-05T14:47:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7fa7ac28bd85fd7f8f124c986b89d5134aa872f1'/>
<id>7fa7ac28bd85fd7f8f124c986b89d5134aa872f1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5415ccd50a8620c8cbaa32d6f18c946c453566f5 ]

The check_max_stack_depth pass happens after the verifier's symbolic
execution, and attempts to walk the call graph of the BPF program,
ensuring that the stack usage stays within bounds for all possible call
chains. There are two cases to consider: bpf_pseudo_func and
bpf_pseudo_call. In the former case, the callback pointer is loaded into
a register, and is assumed that it is passed to some helper later which
calls it (however there is no way to be sure), but the check remains
conservative and accounts the stack usage anyway. For this particular
case, asynchronous callbacks are skipped as they execute asynchronously
when their corresponding event fires.

The case of bpf_pseudo_call is simpler and we know that the call is
definitely made, hence the stack depth of the subprog is accounted for.

However, the current check still skips an asynchronous callback even if
a bpf_pseudo_call was made for it. This is erroneous, as it will miss
accounting for the stack usage of the asynchronous callback, which can
be used to breach the maximum stack depth limit.

Fix this by only skipping asynchronous callbacks when the instruction is
not a pseudo call to the subprog.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705144730.235802-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5415ccd50a8620c8cbaa32d6f18c946c453566f5 ]

The check_max_stack_depth pass happens after the verifier's symbolic
execution, and attempts to walk the call graph of the BPF program,
ensuring that the stack usage stays within bounds for all possible call
chains. There are two cases to consider: bpf_pseudo_func and
bpf_pseudo_call. In the former case, the callback pointer is loaded into
a register, and is assumed that it is passed to some helper later which
calls it (however there is no way to be sure), but the check remains
conservative and accounts the stack usage anyway. For this particular
case, asynchronous callbacks are skipped as they execute asynchronously
when their corresponding event fires.

The case of bpf_pseudo_call is simpler and we know that the call is
definitely made, hence the stack depth of the subprog is accounted for.

However, the current check still skips an asynchronous callback even if
a bpf_pseudo_call was made for it. This is erroneous, as it will miss
accounting for the stack usage of the asynchronous callback, which can
be used to breach the maximum stack depth limit.

Fix this by only skipping asynchronous callbacks when the instruction is
not a pseudo call to the subprog.

Fixes: 7ddc80a476c2 ("bpf: Teach stack depth check about async callbacks.")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705144730.235802-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eduard Zingerman</name>
<email>eddyz87@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-13T15:38:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae3c237881581e74dd911eb919771ee9c419fc5f'/>
<id>ae3c237881581e74dd911eb919771ee9c419fc5f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1ffc85d9298e0ca0137ba65c93a786143fe167b8 ]

Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier:

1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 &gt; r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 &gt; X) goto ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1ffc85d9298e0ca0137ba65c93a786143fe167b8 ]

Make sure that the following unsafe example is rejected by verifier:

1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 &gt; r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 &gt; X) goto ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Use scalar ids in mark_chain_precision()</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eduard Zingerman</name>
<email>eddyz87@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-13T15:38:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=919dcc2e958a44fb531b26d6b5a55c8977283c0f'/>
<id>919dcc2e958a44fb531b26d6b5a55c8977283c0f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 904e6ddf4133c52fdb9654c2cd2ad90f320d48b9 ]

Change mark_chain_precision() to track precision in situations
like below:

    r2 = unknown value
    ...
  --- state #0 ---
    ...
    r1 = r2                 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID
    ...
  --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
    ...
    if (r2 &gt; 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1
    ...
  --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
    r3 = r10
    r3 += r1                // need to mark both r1 and r2

At the beginning of the processing of each state, ensure that if a
register with a scalar ID is marked as precise, all registers sharing
this ID are also marked as precise.

This property would be used by a follow-up change in regsafe().

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230613153824.3324830-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: 1ffc85d9298e ("bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 904e6ddf4133c52fdb9654c2cd2ad90f320d48b9 ]

Change mark_chain_precision() to track precision in situations
like below:

    r2 = unknown value
    ...
  --- state #0 ---
    ...
    r1 = r2                 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID
    ...
  --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
    ...
    if (r2 &gt; 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1
    ...
  --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} ---
    r3 = r10
    r3 += r1                // need to mark both r1 and r2

At the beginning of the processing of each state, ensure that if a
register with a scalar ID is marked as precise, all registers sharing
this ID are also marked as precise.

This property would be used by a follow-up change in regsafe().

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230613153824.3324830-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: 1ffc85d9298e ("bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Marchevsky</name>
<email>davemarchevsky@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-02T02:26:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d906d1b940b9dbf0a3e821d6b32a51c369273d91'/>
<id>d906d1b940b9dbf0a3e821d6b32a51c369273d91</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7793fc3babe9fea908e57f7c187ea819f9fd7e95 ]

This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.

Consider the following program:

  n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */

  bpf_spin_lock(&amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;t, &amp;n-&gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;l);

It's incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn't
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node's lifetime. Therefore
the node's refcount can be decr'd to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free'd, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.

Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complaint from the kernel (without this patch's changes):

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 207 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  CPU: 1 PID: 207 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G           O       6.3.0-rc7-02231-g723de1a718a2-dirty #371
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Code: 6f 64 f6 02 01 e8 84 a3 5c ff 0f 0b eb 9d 80 3d 5e 64 f6 02 00 75 94 48 c7 c7 e0 13 d2 82 c6 05 4e 64 f6 02 01 e8 64 a3 5c ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 7a ff ff ff 80 3d 38 64 f6 02 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7
  RSP: 0018:ffff88810b9179b0 EFLAGS: 00010082
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000202 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff857c3680
  RBP: ffff88810027d3c0 R08: ffffffff8125f2a4 R09: ffff88810b9176e7
  R10: ffffed1021722edc R11: 746e756f63666572 R12: ffff88810027d388
  R13: ffff88810027d3c0 R14: ffffc900005fe030 R15: ffffc900005fe048
  FS:  00007fee0584a700(0000) GS:ffff88811b280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00005634a96f6c58 CR3: 0000000108ce9002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   bpf_refcount_acquire_impl+0xb5/0xc0

  (rest of output snipped)

The patch addresses this by changing bpf_refcount_acquire_impl to use
refcount_inc_not_zero instead of refcount_inc and marking
bpf_refcount_acquire KF_RET_NULL.

For owning references, though, we know the above scenario is not possible
and thus that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed. Some verifier
bookkeeping is added to track "is input owning ref?" for bpf_refcount_acquire
calls and return false from is_kfunc_ret_null for bpf_refcount_acquire on
owning refs despite it being marked KF_RET_NULL.

Existing selftests using bpf_refcount_acquire are modified where
necessary to NULL-check its return value.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230415201811.343116-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com/

Fixes: d2dcc67df910 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7793fc3babe9fea908e57f7c187ea819f9fd7e95 ]

This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.

Consider the following program:

  n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&amp;mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */

  bpf_spin_lock(&amp;l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&amp;t, &amp;n-&gt;rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&amp;l);

It's incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn't
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node's lifetime. Therefore
the node's refcount can be decr'd to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free'd, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.

Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complaint from the kernel (without this patch's changes):

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 207 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  CPU: 1 PID: 207 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G           O       6.3.0-rc7-02231-g723de1a718a2-dirty #371
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Code: 6f 64 f6 02 01 e8 84 a3 5c ff 0f 0b eb 9d 80 3d 5e 64 f6 02 00 75 94 48 c7 c7 e0 13 d2 82 c6 05 4e 64 f6 02 01 e8 64 a3 5c ff &lt;0f&gt; 0b e9 7a ff ff ff 80 3d 38 64 f6 02 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7
  RSP: 0018:ffff88810b9179b0 EFLAGS: 00010082
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000202 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff857c3680
  RBP: ffff88810027d3c0 R08: ffffffff8125f2a4 R09: ffff88810b9176e7
  R10: ffffed1021722edc R11: 746e756f63666572 R12: ffff88810027d388
  R13: ffff88810027d3c0 R14: ffffc900005fe030 R15: ffffc900005fe048
  FS:  00007fee0584a700(0000) GS:ffff88811b280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00005634a96f6c58 CR3: 0000000108ce9002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   bpf_refcount_acquire_impl+0xb5/0xc0

  (rest of output snipped)

The patch addresses this by changing bpf_refcount_acquire_impl to use
refcount_inc_not_zero instead of refcount_inc and marking
bpf_refcount_acquire KF_RET_NULL.

For owning references, though, we know the above scenario is not possible
and thus that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed. Some verifier
bookkeeping is added to track "is input owning ref?" for bpf_refcount_acquire
calls and return false from is_kfunc_ret_null for bpf_refcount_acquire on
owning refs despite it being marked KF_RET_NULL.

Existing selftests using bpf_refcount_acquire are modified where
necessary to NULL-check its return value.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230415201811.343116-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com/

Fixes: d2dcc67df910 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Set kptr_struct_meta for node param to list and rbtree insert funcs</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Marchevsky</name>
<email>davemarchevsky@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-02T02:26:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8885bfcff915a89ff5cb17d065eafe1a0f8b4eb6'/>
<id>8885bfcff915a89ff5cb17d065eafe1a0f8b4eb6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2140a6e3422de22e6ebe77d4d18b6c0c9c425426 ]

In verifier.c, fixup_kfunc_call uses struct bpf_insn_aux_data's
kptr_struct_meta field to pass information about local kptr types to
various helpers and kfuncs at runtime. The recent bpf_refcount series
added a few functions to the set that need this information:

  * bpf_refcount_acquire
    * Needs to know where the refcount field is in order to increment
  * Graph collection insert kfuncs: bpf_rbtree_add, bpf_list_push_{front,back}
    * Were migrated to possibly fail by the bpf_refcount series. If
      insert fails, the input node is bpf_obj_drop'd. bpf_obj_drop needs
      the kptr_struct_meta in order to decr refcount and properly free
      special fields.

Unfortunately the verifier handling of collection insert kfuncs was not
modified to actually populate kptr_struct_meta. Accordingly, when the
node input to those kfuncs is passed to bpf_obj_drop, it is done so
without the information necessary to decr refcount.

This patch fixes the issue by populating kptr_struct_meta for those
kfuncs.

Fixes: d2dcc67df910 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-3-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2140a6e3422de22e6ebe77d4d18b6c0c9c425426 ]

In verifier.c, fixup_kfunc_call uses struct bpf_insn_aux_data's
kptr_struct_meta field to pass information about local kptr types to
various helpers and kfuncs at runtime. The recent bpf_refcount series
added a few functions to the set that need this information:

  * bpf_refcount_acquire
    * Needs to know where the refcount field is in order to increment
  * Graph collection insert kfuncs: bpf_rbtree_add, bpf_list_push_{front,back}
    * Were migrated to possibly fail by the bpf_refcount series. If
      insert fails, the input node is bpf_obj_drop'd. bpf_obj_drop needs
      the kptr_struct_meta in order to decr refcount and properly free
      special fields.

Unfortunately the verifier handling of collection insert kfuncs was not
modified to actually populate kptr_struct_meta. Accordingly, when the
node input to those kfuncs is passed to bpf_obj_drop, it is done so
without the information necessary to decr refcount.

This patch fixes the issue by populating kptr_struct_meta for those
kfuncs.

Fixes: d2dcc67df910 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-3-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Remove anonymous union in bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Marchevsky</name>
<email>davemarchevsky@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-10T21:30:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=85ed55cffb6e0474d8b86993a62fc40a6f6ec111'/>
<id>85ed55cffb6e0474d8b86993a62fc40a6f6ec111</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d585f48ee6b38c54c075b151c5efd2ff65f8ffd ]

For kfuncs like bpf_obj_drop and bpf_refcount_acquire - which take
user-defined types as input - the verifier needs to track the specific
type passed in when checking a particular kfunc call. This requires
tracking (btf, btf_id) tuple. In commit 7c50b1cb76ac
("bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc") I added an anonymous union with
inner structs named after the specific kfuncs tracking this information,
with the goal of making it more obvious which kfunc this data was being
tracked / expected to be tracked on behalf of.

In a recent series adding a new user of this tuple, Alexei mentioned
that he didn't like this union usage as it doesn't really help with
readability or bug-proofing ([0]). In an offline convo we agreed to
have the tuple be fields (arg_btf, arg_btf_id), with comments in
bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta definition enumerating the uses of the fields by
kfunc-specific handling logic. Such a pattern is used by struct
bpf_reg_state without trouble.

Accordingly, this patch removes the anonymous union in favor of arg_btf
and arg_btf_id fields and comment enumerating their current uses. The
patch also removes struct btf_and_id, which was only being used by the
removed union's inner structs.

This is a mechanical change, existing linked_list and rbtree tests will
validate that correct (btf, btf_id) are being passed.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230505021707.vlyiwy57vwxglbka@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230510213047.1633612-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 2140a6e3422d ("bpf: Set kptr_struct_meta for node param to list and rbtree insert funcs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d585f48ee6b38c54c075b151c5efd2ff65f8ffd ]

For kfuncs like bpf_obj_drop and bpf_refcount_acquire - which take
user-defined types as input - the verifier needs to track the specific
type passed in when checking a particular kfunc call. This requires
tracking (btf, btf_id) tuple. In commit 7c50b1cb76ac
("bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc") I added an anonymous union with
inner structs named after the specific kfuncs tracking this information,
with the goal of making it more obvious which kfunc this data was being
tracked / expected to be tracked on behalf of.

In a recent series adding a new user of this tuple, Alexei mentioned
that he didn't like this union usage as it doesn't really help with
readability or bug-proofing ([0]). In an offline convo we agreed to
have the tuple be fields (arg_btf, arg_btf_id), with comments in
bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta definition enumerating the uses of the fields by
kfunc-specific handling logic. Such a pattern is used by struct
bpf_reg_state without trouble.

Accordingly, this patch removes the anonymous union in favor of arg_btf
and arg_btf_id fields and comment enumerating their current uses. The
patch also removes struct btf_and_id, which was only being used by the
removed union's inner structs.

This is a mechanical change, existing linked_list and rbtree tests will
validate that correct (btf, btf_id) are being passed.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230505021707.vlyiwy57vwxglbka@dhcp-172-26-102-232.dhcp.thefacebook.com

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky &lt;davemarchevsky@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230510213047.1633612-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 2140a6e3422d ("bpf: Set kptr_struct_meta for node param to list and rbtree insert funcs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: fix propagate_precision() logic for inner frames</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-05T04:33:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=660663763c72c4c46c7373ad786bcb379412f641'/>
<id>660663763c72c4c46c7373ad786bcb379412f641</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f655badf2a8fc028433d9583bf86a6b473721f09 ]

Fix propagate_precision() logic to perform propagation of all necessary
registers and stack slots across all active frames *in one batch step*.

Doing this for each register/slot in each individual frame is wasteful,
but the main problem is that backtracking of instruction in any frame
except the deepest one just doesn't work. This is due to backtracking
logic relying on jump history, and available jump history always starts
(or ends, depending how you view it) in current frame. So, if
prog A (frame #0) called subprog B (frame #1) and we need to propagate
precision of, say, register R6 (callee-saved) within frame #0, we
actually don't even know where jump history that corresponds to prog
A even starts. We'd need to skip subprog part of jump history first to
be able to do this.

Luckily, with struct backtrack_state and __mark_chain_precision()
handling bitmasks tracking/propagation across all active frames at the
same time (added in previous patch), propagate_precision() can be both
fixed and sped up by setting all the necessary bits across all frames
and then performing one __mark_chain_precision() pass. This makes it
unnecessary to skip subprog parts of jump history.

We also improve logging along the way, to clearly specify which
registers' and slots' precision markings are propagated within which
frame. Each frame will have dedicated line and all registers and stack
slots from that frame will be reported in format similar to precision
backtrack regs/stack logging. E.g.:

frame 1: propagating r1,r2,r3,fp-8,fp-16
frame 0: propagating r3,r9,fp-120

Fixes: 529409ea92d5 ("bpf: propagate precision across all frames, not just the last one")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f655badf2a8fc028433d9583bf86a6b473721f09 ]

Fix propagate_precision() logic to perform propagation of all necessary
registers and stack slots across all active frames *in one batch step*.

Doing this for each register/slot in each individual frame is wasteful,
but the main problem is that backtracking of instruction in any frame
except the deepest one just doesn't work. This is due to backtracking
logic relying on jump history, and available jump history always starts
(or ends, depending how you view it) in current frame. So, if
prog A (frame #0) called subprog B (frame #1) and we need to propagate
precision of, say, register R6 (callee-saved) within frame #0, we
actually don't even know where jump history that corresponds to prog
A even starts. We'd need to skip subprog part of jump history first to
be able to do this.

Luckily, with struct backtrack_state and __mark_chain_precision()
handling bitmasks tracking/propagation across all active frames at the
same time (added in previous patch), propagate_precision() can be both
fixed and sped up by setting all the necessary bits across all frames
and then performing one __mark_chain_precision() pass. This makes it
unnecessary to skip subprog parts of jump history.

We also improve logging along the way, to clearly specify which
registers' and slots' precision markings are propagated within which
frame. Each frame will have dedicated line and all registers and stack
slots from that frame will be reported in format similar to precision
backtrack regs/stack logging. E.g.:

frame 1: propagating r1,r2,r3,fp-8,fp-16
frame 0: propagating r3,r9,fp-120

Fixes: 529409ea92d5 ("bpf: propagate precision across all frames, not just the last one")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-7-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: maintain bitmasks across all active frames in __mark_chain_precision</title>
<updated>2023-07-19T14:35:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-05T04:33:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=41ad047df201696b8bc28cb9d518553b8b235fb7'/>
<id>41ad047df201696b8bc28cb9d518553b8b235fb7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1ef22b6865a73a8aed36d43375fe8c7b30869326 ]

Teach __mark_chain_precision logic to maintain register/stack masks
across all active frames when going from child state to parent state.
Currently this should be mostly no-op, as precision backtracking usually
bails out when encountering subprog entry/exit.

It's not very apparent from the diff due to increased indentation, but
the logic remains the same, except everything is done on specific `fr`
frame index. Calls to bt_clear_reg() and bt_clear_slot() are replaced
with frame-specific bt_clear_frame_reg() and bt_clear_frame_slot(),
where frame index is passed explicitly, instead of using current frame
number.

We also adjust logging to emit affected frame number. And we also add
better logging of human-readable register and stack slot masks, similar
to previous patch.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f655badf2a8f ("bpf: fix propagate_precision() logic for inner frames")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1ef22b6865a73a8aed36d43375fe8c7b30869326 ]

Teach __mark_chain_precision logic to maintain register/stack masks
across all active frames when going from child state to parent state.
Currently this should be mostly no-op, as precision backtracking usually
bails out when encountering subprog entry/exit.

It's not very apparent from the diff due to increased indentation, but
the logic remains the same, except everything is done on specific `fr`
frame index. Calls to bt_clear_reg() and bt_clear_slot() are replaced
with frame-specific bt_clear_frame_reg() and bt_clear_frame_slot(),
where frame index is passed explicitly, instead of using current frame
number.

We also adjust logging to emit affected frame number. And we also add
better logging of human-readable register and stack slot masks, similar
to previous patch.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-6-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: f655badf2a8f ("bpf: fix propagate_precision() logic for inner frames")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
