<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v6.12.91</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix NULL deref in map_kptr_match_type for scalar regs</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mykyta Yatsenko</name>
<email>yatsenko@meta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-16T18:08:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0a36c1f72888bca0237295a4da19cd91821a90be'/>
<id>0a36c1f72888bca0237295a4da19cd91821a90be</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d0a375887ab4d49e4da1ff10f9606cab8f7c3ad ]

Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local
kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel()
before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr
slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg-&gt;btf) call dereferences
NULL.

Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg-&gt;btf
access.

Fixes: ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr")
Reported-by: Hiker Cl &lt;clhiker365@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416-kptr_crash-v1-1-5589356584b4@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d0a375887ab4d49e4da1ff10f9606cab8f7c3ad ]

Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local
kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel()
before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr
slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg-&gt;btf) call dereferences
NULL.

Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg-&gt;btf
access.

Fixes: ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr")
Reported-by: Hiker Cl &lt;clhiker365@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416-kptr_crash-v1-1-5589356584b4@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Allow instructions with arena source and non-arena dest registers</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Emil Tsalapatis</name>
<email>emil@etsalapatis.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-12T17:45:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8837c1605fb37718fe3b2087e438d3601417aee2'/>
<id>8837c1605fb37718fe3b2087e438d3601417aee2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ac61bffe91d4bda08806e12957c6d64756d042db ]

The compiler sometimes stores the result of a PTR_TO_ARENA and SCALAR
operation into the scalar register rather than the pointer register.
Relax the verifier to allow operations between a source arena register
and a destination non-arena register, marking the destination's value
as a PTR_TO_ARENA.

Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260412174546.18684-2-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ac61bffe91d4bda08806e12957c6d64756d042db ]

The compiler sometimes stores the result of a PTR_TO_ARENA and SCALAR
operation into the scalar register rather than the pointer register.
Relax the verifier to allow operations between a source arena register
and a destination non-arena register, marking the destination's value
as a PTR_TO_ARENA.

Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;song@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260412174546.18684-2-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Enforce regsafe base id consistency for BPF_ADD_CONST scalars</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-10T23:26:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=13c02881e49aac4c82b261faa26db9edf2567231'/>
<id>13c02881e49aac4c82b261faa26db9edf2567231</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2f2ec8e7730e21fc9bd49e0de9cdd58213ea24d0 ]

When regsafe() compares two scalar registers that both carry
BPF_ADD_CONST, check_scalar_ids() maps their full compound id
(aka base | BPF_ADD_CONST flag) as one idmap entry. However,
it never verifies that the underlying base ids, that is, with
the flag stripped are consistent with existing idmap mappings.

This allows construction of two verifier states where the old
state has R3 = R2 + 10 (both sharing base id A) while the current
state has R3 = R4 + 10 (base id C, unrelated to R2). The idmap
creates two independent entries: A-&gt;B (for R2) and A|flag-&gt;C|flag
(for R3), without catching that A-&gt;C conflicts with A-&gt;B. State
pruning then incorrectly succeeds.

Fix this by additionally verifying base ID mapping consistency
whenever BPF_ADD_CONST is set: after mapping the compound ids,
also invoke check_ids() on the base IDs (flag bits stripped).
This ensures that if A was already mapped to B from comparing
the source register, any ADD_CONST derivative must also derive
from B, not an unrelated C.

Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.")
Reported-by: STAR Labs SG &lt;info@starlabs.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260410232651.559778-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2f2ec8e7730e21fc9bd49e0de9cdd58213ea24d0 ]

When regsafe() compares two scalar registers that both carry
BPF_ADD_CONST, check_scalar_ids() maps their full compound id
(aka base | BPF_ADD_CONST flag) as one idmap entry. However,
it never verifies that the underlying base ids, that is, with
the flag stripped are consistent with existing idmap mappings.

This allows construction of two verifier states where the old
state has R3 = R2 + 10 (both sharing base id A) while the current
state has R3 = R4 + 10 (base id C, unrelated to R2). The idmap
creates two independent entries: A-&gt;B (for R2) and A|flag-&gt;C|flag
(for R3), without catching that A-&gt;C conflicts with A-&gt;B. State
pruning then incorrectly succeeds.

Fix this by additionally verifying base ID mapping consistency
whenever BPF_ADD_CONST is set: after mapping the compound ids,
also invoke check_ids() on the base IDs (flag bits stripped).
This ensures that if A was already mapped to B from comparing
the source register, any ADD_CONST derivative must also derive
from B, not an unrelated C.

Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.")
Reported-by: STAR Labs SG &lt;info@starlabs.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260410232651.559778-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Relax scalar id equivalence for state pruning</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Puranjay Mohan</name>
<email>puranjay@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-03T16:51:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=647585dcafd451a68bd315c325b3fd4219859e51'/>
<id>647585dcafd451a68bd315c325b3fd4219859e51</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b0388bafa4949bd30af7b3be5ee415f2a25ac014 ]

Scalar register IDs are used by the verifier to track relationships
between registers and enable bounds propagation across those
relationships. Once an ID becomes singular (i.e. only a single
register/stack slot carries it), it can no longer contribute to bounds
propagation and effectively becomes stale. The previous commit makes the
verifier clear such ids before caching the state.

When comparing the current and cached states for pruning, these stale
IDs can cause technically equivalent states to be considered different
and thus prevent pruning.

For example, in the selftest added in the next commit, two registers -
r6 and r7 are not linked to any other registers and get cached with
id=0, in the current state, they are both linked to each other with
id=A.  Before this commit, check_scalar_ids would give temporary ids to
r6 and r7 (say tid1 and tid2) and then check_ids() would map tid1-&gt;A,
and when it would see tid2-&gt;A, it would not consider these state
equivalent.

Relax scalar ID equivalence by treating rold-&gt;id == 0 as "independent":
if the old state did not rely on any ID relationships for a register,
then any ID/linking present in the current state only adds constraints
and is always safe to accept for pruning. Implement this by returning
true immediately in check_scalar_ids() when old_id == 0.

Maintain correctness for the opposite direction (old_id != 0 &amp;&amp; cur_id
== 0) by still allocating a temporary ID for cur_id == 0. This avoids
incorrectly allowing multiple independent current registers (id==0) to
satisfy a single linked old ID during mapping.

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-5-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 2f2ec8e7730e ("bpf: Enforce regsafe base id consistency for BPF_ADD_CONST scalars")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b0388bafa4949bd30af7b3be5ee415f2a25ac014 ]

Scalar register IDs are used by the verifier to track relationships
between registers and enable bounds propagation across those
relationships. Once an ID becomes singular (i.e. only a single
register/stack slot carries it), it can no longer contribute to bounds
propagation and effectively becomes stale. The previous commit makes the
verifier clear such ids before caching the state.

When comparing the current and cached states for pruning, these stale
IDs can cause technically equivalent states to be considered different
and thus prevent pruning.

For example, in the selftest added in the next commit, two registers -
r6 and r7 are not linked to any other registers and get cached with
id=0, in the current state, they are both linked to each other with
id=A.  Before this commit, check_scalar_ids would give temporary ids to
r6 and r7 (say tid1 and tid2) and then check_ids() would map tid1-&gt;A,
and when it would see tid2-&gt;A, it would not consider these state
equivalent.

Relax scalar ID equivalence by treating rold-&gt;id == 0 as "independent":
if the old state did not rely on any ID relationships for a register,
then any ID/linking present in the current state only adds constraints
and is always safe to accept for pruning. Implement this by returning
true immediately in check_scalar_ids() when old_id == 0.

Maintain correctness for the opposite direction (old_id != 0 &amp;&amp; cur_id
== 0) by still allocating a temporary ID for cur_id == 0. This avoids
incorrectly allowing multiple independent current registers (id==0) to
satisfy a single linked old ID during mapping.

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-5-puranjay@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 2f2ec8e7730e ("bpf: Enforce regsafe base id consistency for BPF_ADD_CONST scalars")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix variable length stack write over spilled pointers</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-24T21:59:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d45781c5fadedbdc57774988b2fe4dcd45b79b54'/>
<id>d45781c5fadedbdc57774988b2fe4dcd45b79b54</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4639eb9e30ab10c7935c7c19e872facf9a94713f ]

Scrub slots if variable-offset stack write goes over spilled pointers.
Otherwise is_spilled_reg() may == true &amp;&amp; spilled_ptr.type == NOT_INIT
and valid program is rejected by check_stack_read_fixed_off()
with obscure "invalid size of register fill" message.

Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access")
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260324215938.81733-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4639eb9e30ab10c7935c7c19e872facf9a94713f ]

Scrub slots if variable-offset stack write goes over spilled pointers.
Otherwise is_spilled_reg() may == true &amp;&amp; spilled_ptr.type == NOT_INIT
and valid program is rejected by check_stack_read_fixed_off()
with obscure "invalid size of register fill" message.

Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access")
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260324215938.81733-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix u32/s32 bounds when ranges cross min/max boundary</title>
<updated>2026-04-11T12:24:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eduard Zingerman</name>
<email>eddyz87@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-04T08:14:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ded1ea20d0b77d511ed16bbf14766a9d354bde8b'/>
<id>ded1ea20d0b77d511ed16bbf14766a9d354bde8b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fbc7aef517d8765e4c425d2792409bb9bf2e1f13 ]

Same as in __reg64_deduce_bounds(), refine s32/u32 ranges
in __reg32_deduce_bounds() in the following situations:

- s32 range crosses U32_MAX/0 boundary, positive part of the s32 range
  overlaps with u32 range:

  0                                                   U32_MAX
  |  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]              |
  |----------------------------|----------------------------|
  |xxxxx s32 range xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxx|
  0                     S32_MAX S32_MIN                    -1

- s32 range crosses U32_MAX/0 boundary, negative part of the s32 range
  overlaps with u32 range:

  0                                                   U32_MAX
  |              [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]  |
  |----------------------------|----------------------------|
  |xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxxxxxxx s32 range |
  0                     S32_MAX S32_MIN                    -1

- No refinement if ranges overlap in two intervals.

This helps for e.g. consider the following program:

   call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];
   w0 &amp;= 0xffffffff;
   if w0 &lt; 0x3 goto 1f;    // on fall-through u32 range [3..U32_MAX]
   if w0 s&gt; 0x1 goto 1f;   // on fall-through s32 range [S32_MIN..1]
   if w0 s&lt; 0x0 goto 1f;   // range can be narrowed to  [S32_MIN..-1]
   r10 = 0;
1: ...;

The reg_bounds.c selftest is updated to incorporate identical logic,
refinement based on non-overflowing range halves:

  ((x ∩ [0, smax]) ∩ (y ∩ [0, smax])) ∪
  ((x ∩ [smin,-1]) ∩ (y ∩ [smin,-1]))

Reported-by: Andrea Righi &lt;arighi@nvidia.com&gt;
Reported-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aakqucg4vcujVwif@gpd4/T/
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260306-bpf-32-bit-range-overflow-v3-1-f7f67e060a6b@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fbc7aef517d8765e4c425d2792409bb9bf2e1f13 ]

Same as in __reg64_deduce_bounds(), refine s32/u32 ranges
in __reg32_deduce_bounds() in the following situations:

- s32 range crosses U32_MAX/0 boundary, positive part of the s32 range
  overlaps with u32 range:

  0                                                   U32_MAX
  |  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]              |
  |----------------------------|----------------------------|
  |xxxxx s32 range xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxx|
  0                     S32_MAX S32_MIN                    -1

- s32 range crosses U32_MAX/0 boundary, negative part of the s32 range
  overlaps with u32 range:

  0                                                   U32_MAX
  |              [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u32 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]  |
  |----------------------------|----------------------------|
  |xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxxxxxxx s32 range |
  0                     S32_MAX S32_MIN                    -1

- No refinement if ranges overlap in two intervals.

This helps for e.g. consider the following program:

   call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];
   w0 &amp;= 0xffffffff;
   if w0 &lt; 0x3 goto 1f;    // on fall-through u32 range [3..U32_MAX]
   if w0 s&gt; 0x1 goto 1f;   // on fall-through s32 range [S32_MIN..1]
   if w0 s&lt; 0x0 goto 1f;   // range can be narrowed to  [S32_MIN..-1]
   r10 = 0;
1: ...;

The reg_bounds.c selftest is updated to incorporate identical logic,
refinement based on non-overflowing range halves:

  ((x ∩ [0, smax]) ∩ (y ∩ [0, smax])) ∪
  ((x ∩ [smin,-1]) ∩ (y ∩ [smin,-1]))

Reported-by: Andrea Righi &lt;arighi@nvidia.com&gt;
Reported-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aakqucg4vcujVwif@gpd4/T/
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260306-bpf-32-bit-range-overflow-v3-1-f7f67e060a6b@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add third round of bounds deduction</title>
<updated>2026-04-11T12:24:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
<email>paul.chaignon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-04T08:13:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58d4c4a257ad4a46a3220877f360d3e97777e07c'/>
<id>58d4c4a257ad4a46a3220877f360d3e97777e07c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5dbb19b16ac498b0b7f3a8a85f9d25d6d8af397d ]

Commit d7f008738171 ("bpf: try harder to deduce register bounds from
different numeric domains") added a second call to __reg_deduce_bounds
in reg_bounds_sync because a single call wasn't enough to converge to a
fixed point in terms of register bounds.

With patch "bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from
this series, Eduard noticed that calling __reg_deduce_bounds twice isn't
enough anymore to converge. The first selftest added in "selftests/bpf:
Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement" highlights the need for a third
call to __reg_deduce_bounds. After instruction 7, reg_bounds_sync
performs the following bounds deduction:

  reg_bounds_sync entry:          scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_bound_offset:             scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))

In particular, notice how:
1. In the first call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg32_deduce_bounds
   learns new u32 bounds.
2. __reg64_deduce_bounds is unable to improve bounds at this point.
3. __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds derives new u64 bounds from the u32 bounds.
4. In the second call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg64_deduce_bounds
   improves the smax and umin bounds thanks to patch "bpf: Improve
   bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from this series.
5. Subsequent functions are unable to improve the ranges further (only
   tnums). Yet, a better smin32 bound could be learned from the smin
   bound.

__reg32_deduce_bounds is able to improve smin32 from smin, but for that
we need a third call to __reg_deduce_bounds.

As discussed in [1], there may be a better way to organize the deduction
rules to learn the same information with less calls to the same
functions. Such an optimization requires further analysis and is
orthogonal to the present patchset.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aIKtSK9LjQXB8FLY@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79619d3b42e5525e0e174ed534b75879a5ba15de.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5dbb19b16ac498b0b7f3a8a85f9d25d6d8af397d ]

Commit d7f008738171 ("bpf: try harder to deduce register bounds from
different numeric domains") added a second call to __reg_deduce_bounds
in reg_bounds_sync because a single call wasn't enough to converge to a
fixed point in terms of register bounds.

With patch "bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from
this series, Eduard noticed that calling __reg_deduce_bounds twice isn't
enough anymore to converge. The first selftest added in "selftests/bpf:
Test cross-sign 64bits range refinement" highlights the need for a third
call to __reg_deduce_bounds. After instruction 7, reg_bounds_sync
performs the following bounds deduction:

  reg_bounds_sync entry:          scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_deduce_bounds:
      __reg32_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=0xeffffeee,umin=umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,smax32=-146,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg64_deduce_bounds:      scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
      __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds:  scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e)
  __reg_bound_offset:             scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))
  __update_reg_bounds:            scalar(smin=-655,smax=smax32=-146,umin=0xfffffffffffffd71,umax=0xffffffffffffff6e,smin32=-783,umin32=0xfffffcf1,umax32=0xffffff6e,var_off=(0xfffffffffffffc00; 0x3ff))

In particular, notice how:
1. In the first call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg32_deduce_bounds
   learns new u32 bounds.
2. __reg64_deduce_bounds is unable to improve bounds at this point.
3. __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds derives new u64 bounds from the u32 bounds.
4. In the second call to __reg_deduce_bounds, __reg64_deduce_bounds
   improves the smax and umin bounds thanks to patch "bpf: Improve
   bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary" from this series.
5. Subsequent functions are unable to improve the ranges further (only
   tnums). Yet, a better smin32 bound could be learned from the smin
   bound.

__reg32_deduce_bounds is able to improve smin32 from smin, but for that
we need a third call to __reg_deduce_bounds.

As discussed in [1], there may be a better way to organize the deduction
rules to learn the same information with less calls to the same
functions. Such an optimization requires further analysis and is
orthogonal to the present patchset.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aIKtSK9LjQXB8FLY@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79619d3b42e5525e0e174ed534b75879a5ba15de.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Improve bounds when s64 crosses sign boundary</title>
<updated>2026-04-11T12:24:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
<email>paul.chaignon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-04T08:10:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7d7b4879d9944c696d7ded7629f86f9e37d9e84'/>
<id>d7d7b4879d9944c696d7ded7629f86f9e37d9e84</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 00bf8d0c6c9be0c481fc45a3f7d87c7f8812f229 ]

__reg64_deduce_bounds currently improves the s64 range using the u64
range and vice versa, but only if it doesn't cross the sign boundary.

This patch improves __reg64_deduce_bounds to cover the case where the
s64 range crosses the sign boundary but overlaps with the u64 range on
only one end. In that case, we can improve both ranges. Consider the
following example, with the s64 range crossing the sign boundary:

    0                                                   U64_MAX
    |  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]              |
    |----------------------------|----------------------------|
    |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxx|
    0                     S64_MAX S64_MIN                    -1

The u64 range overlaps only with positive portion of the s64 range. We
can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges.

    0                                                   U64_MAX
    |  [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx]                               |
    |----------------------------|----------------------------|
    |  [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx]                               |
    0                     S64_MAX S64_MIN                    -1

The same logic can probably apply to the s32/u32 ranges, but this patch
doesn't implement that change.

In addition to the selftests, the __reg64_deduce_bounds change was
also tested with Agni, the formal verification tool for the range
analysis [1].

Link: https://github.com/bpfverif/agni [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/933bd9ce1f36ded5559f92fdc09e5dbc823fa245.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 00bf8d0c6c9be0c481fc45a3f7d87c7f8812f229 ]

__reg64_deduce_bounds currently improves the s64 range using the u64
range and vice versa, but only if it doesn't cross the sign boundary.

This patch improves __reg64_deduce_bounds to cover the case where the
s64 range crosses the sign boundary but overlaps with the u64 range on
only one end. In that case, we can improve both ranges. Consider the
following example, with the s64 range crossing the sign boundary:

    0                                                   U64_MAX
    |  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]              |
    |----------------------------|----------------------------|
    |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx]                       [xxxxxxx|
    0                     S64_MAX S64_MIN                    -1

The u64 range overlaps only with positive portion of the s64 range. We
can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges.

    0                                                   U64_MAX
    |  [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx]                               |
    |----------------------------|----------------------------|
    |  [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx]                               |
    0                     S64_MAX S64_MIN                    -1

The same logic can probably apply to the s32/u32 ranges, but this patch
doesn't implement that change.

In addition to the selftests, the __reg64_deduce_bounds change was
also tested with Agni, the formal verification tool for the range
analysis [1].

Link: https://github.com/bpfverif/agni [1]
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/933bd9ce1f36ded5559f92fdc09e5dbc823fa245.1753695655.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: reject direct access to nullable PTR_TO_BUF pointers</title>
<updated>2026-04-11T12:24:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qi Tang</name>
<email>tpluszz77@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-02T09:29:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=70abd9d118da2f56beb4ec22e3a29becae373535'/>
<id>70abd9d118da2f56beb4ec22e3a29becae373535</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b0db1accbc7395657c2b79db59fa9fae0d6656f3 ]

check_mem_access() matches PTR_TO_BUF via base_type() which strips
PTR_MAYBE_NULL, allowing direct dereference without a null check.

Map iterator ctx-&gt;key and ctx-&gt;value are PTR_TO_BUF | PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
On stop callbacks these are NULL, causing a kernel NULL dereference.

Add a type_may_be_null() guard to the PTR_TO_BUF branch, matching the
existing PTR_TO_BTF_ID pattern.

Fixes: 20b2aff4bc15 ("bpf: Introduce MEM_RDONLY flag")
Signed-off-by: Qi Tang &lt;tpluszz77@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260402092923.38357-2-tpluszz77@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b0db1accbc7395657c2b79db59fa9fae0d6656f3 ]

check_mem_access() matches PTR_TO_BUF via base_type() which strips
PTR_MAYBE_NULL, allowing direct dereference without a null check.

Map iterator ctx-&gt;key and ctx-&gt;value are PTR_TO_BUF | PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
On stop callbacks these are NULL, causing a kernel NULL dereference.

Add a type_may_be_null() guard to the PTR_TO_BUF branch, matching the
existing PTR_TO_BTF_ID pattern.

Fixes: 20b2aff4bc15 ("bpf: Introduce MEM_RDONLY flag")
Signed-off-by: Qi Tang &lt;tpluszz77@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260402092923.38357-2-tpluszz77@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix regsafe() for pointers to packet</title>
<updated>2026-04-11T12:24:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexei Starovoitov</name>
<email>ast@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-31T20:42:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7241da033fdc507b920e092dab1f97b945cb0370'/>
<id>7241da033fdc507b920e092dab1f97b945cb0370</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a8502a79e832b861e99218cbd2d8f4312d62e225 ]

In case rold-&gt;reg-&gt;range == BEYOND_PKT_END &amp;&amp; rcur-&gt;reg-&gt;range == N
regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with
valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug.

Fixes: 6d94e741a8ff ("bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung &lt;ameryhung@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260331204228.26726-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a8502a79e832b861e99218cbd2d8f4312d62e225 ]

In case rold-&gt;reg-&gt;range == BEYOND_PKT_END &amp;&amp; rcur-&gt;reg-&gt;range == N
regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with
valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug.

Fixes: 6d94e741a8ff ("bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung &lt;ameryhung@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260331204228.26726-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
