linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch v4.4.232

bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack

2018-12-17T20:55:15+00:00

commit af86ca4e3088fe5eacf2f7e58c01fa68ca067672 upstream.

Detect code patterns where malicious 'speculative store bypass' can be used
and sanitize such patterns.

 39: (bf) r3 = r10
 40: (07) r3 += -216
 41: (79) r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)   // slow read
 42: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -72) = 0  // verifier inserts this instruction
 43: (7b) *(u64 *)(r8 +0) = r3   // this store becomes slow due to r8
 44: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)   // cpu speculatively executes this load
 45: (71) r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 +0)    // speculatively arbitrary 'load byte'
                                 // is now sanitized

Above code after x86 JIT becomes:
 e5: mov    %rbp,%rdx
 e8: add    $0xffffffffffffff28,%rdx
 ef: mov    0x0(%r13),%r14
 f3: movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)
 fb: mov    %rdx,0x0(%r14)
 ff: mov    0x0(%rbx),%rdi
103: movzbq 0x0(%rdi),%rsi

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Add verifier_env parameter to check_stack_write()
 - Look up stack slot_types with state->stack_slot_type[] rather than
   state->stack[].slot_type[]
 - Drop bpf_verifier_env argument to verbose()
 - Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf/verifier: Pass instruction index to check_mem_access() and check_xadd()

2018-12-17T20:55:15+00:00

Extracted from commit 31fd85816dbe "bpf: permits narrower load from
bpf program context fields".

Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf/verifier: Add spi variable to check_stack_write()

2018-12-17T20:55:15+00:00

Extracted from commit dc503a8ad984 "bpf/verifier: track liveness for
pruning".

Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: support 8-byte metafield access

2018-12-17T20:55:15+00:00

commit cedaf52693f02372010548c63b2e63228b959099 upstream.

The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in
struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming
struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs.
Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access.
The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs.
They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix references to free_bpf_prog_info() in comments

2018-08-06T14:24:37+00:00

[ Upstream commit ab7f5bf0928be2f148d000a6eaa6c0a36e74750e ]

Comments in the verifier refer to free_bpf_prog_info() which
seems to have never existed in tree.  Replace it with
free_used_maps().

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()

2018-03-22T08:23:32+00:00

commit 95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f upstream.

Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.

This patch differs from the mainline one because the verifier's internals
have changed in the meantime. Mainline tracks register values as 64-bit
values; however, 4.4 still stores tracked register values as 32-bit
values with sign extension. Therefore, in the case of a 32-bit op with
negative immediate, the value can't be tracked; leave the register as
UNKNOWN_VALUE (set by the preceding check_reg_arg() call).


I have manually tested this patch on top of 4.4.122. For the following BPF
bytecode:

        BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 1),
        BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 1, 1),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

        BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 1),
        BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, 1, 1),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

        BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, -1),
        BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, -1, 1),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

        BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, -1),
        BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_1, -1, 2),
        BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 42),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN(),

        BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 43),
        BPF_EXIT_INSN()

Verifier output on 4.4.122 without this patch:

0: (b7) r1 = 1
1: (15) if r1 == 0x1 goto pc+1
3: (b4) (u32) r1 = (u32) 1
4: (15) if r1 == 0x1 goto pc+1
6: (b7) r1 = -1
7: (15) if r1 == 0xffffffff goto pc+1
9: (b4) (u32) r1 = (u32) -1
10: (15) if r1 == 0xffffffff goto pc+2
13: (b4) (u32) r0 = (u32) 43
14: (95) exit

Verifier output on 4.4.122+ with this patch:

0: (b7) r1 = 1
1: (15) if r1 == 0x1 goto pc+1
3: (b4) (u32) r1 = (u32) 1
4: (15) if r1 == 0x1 goto pc+1
6: (b7) r1 = -1
7: (15) if r1 == 0xffffffff goto pc+1
9: (b4) (u32) r1 = (u32) -1
10: (15) if r1 == 0xffffffff goto pc+2
 R1=inv R10=fp
11: (b4) (u32) r0 = (u32) 42
12: (95) exit

from 10 to 13: R1=imm-1 R10=fp
13: (b4) (u32) r0 = (u32) 43
14: (95) exit


Signed-off-by: Jann Horn 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd

2018-02-03T16:04:25+00:00

[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]

Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context
via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we
also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.

The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or
BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than
that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add
test cases as well for BPF selftests.

Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero

2018-02-03T16:04:25+00:00

[ upstream commit 68fda450a7df51cff9e5a4d4a4d9d0d5f2589153 ]

due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode
for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register
before doing the check

Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT")
Fixes: 7a12b5031c6b ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.")
Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it

2018-02-03T16:04:24+00:00

[ upstream commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f ]

The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:

  0: (18) r0 = 0x0
  2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
  3: (cc) (u32) r0 s>>= (u32) r0
  4: (95) exit

Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix branch pruning logic

2018-02-03T16:04:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467 ]

when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman