linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/verifier.c, branch linux-6.17.y Linux kernel stable tree bpf: account for current allocated stack depth in widen_imprecise_scalars() 2025-11-24T09:37:36+00:00 Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com 2025-11-14T02:57:29+00:00 57e04e2ff56e32f923154f0f7bc476fcb596ffe7 [ Upstream commit b0c8e6d3d866b6a7f73877f71968dbffd27b7785 ] The usage pattern for widen_imprecise_scalars() looks as follows: prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, ...); queued_st = push_stack(...); widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st); Where prev_st is an ancestor of the queued_st in the explored states tree. This ancestor is not guaranteed to have same allocated stack depth as queued_st. E.g. in the following case: def main(): for i in 1..2: foo(i) // same callsite, differnt param def foo(i): if i == 1: use 128 bytes of stack iterator based loop Here, for a second 'foo' call prev_st->allocated_stack is 128, while queued_st->allocated_stack is much smaller. widen_imprecise_scalars() needs to take this into account and avoid accessing bpf_verifier_state->frame[*]->stack out of bounds. Fixes: 2793a8b015f7 ("bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks") Reported-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251114025730.772723-1-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit b0c8e6d3d866b6a7f73877f71968dbffd27b7785 ]

The usage pattern for widen_imprecise_scalars() looks as follows:

    prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, ...);
    queued_st = push_stack(...);
    widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);

Where prev_st is an ancestor of the queued_st in the explored states
tree. This ancestor is not guaranteed to have same allocated stack
depth as queued_st. E.g. in the following case:

    def main():
      for i in 1..2:
        foo(i)        // same callsite, differnt param

    def foo(i):
      if i == 1:
        use 128 bytes of stack
      iterator based loop

Here, for a second 'foo' call prev_st->allocated_stack is 128,
while queued_st->allocated_stack is much smaller.
widen_imprecise_scalars() needs to take this into account and avoid
accessing bpf_verifier_state->frame[*]->stack out of bounds.

Fixes: 2793a8b015f7 ("bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks")
Reported-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251114025730.772723-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Use tnums for JEQ/JNE is_branch_taken logic 2025-11-13T20:36:46+00:00 Paul Chaignon paul.chaignon@gmail.com 2025-08-20T13:18:06+00:00 d945a3c33977a4b76f306f2ea14b707732ac7d3e [ Upstream commit f41345f47fb267a9c95ca710c33448f8d0d81d83 ] In the following toy program (reg states minimized for readability), R0 and R1 always have different values at instruction 6. This is obvious when reading the program but cannot be guessed from ranges alone as they overlap (R0 in [0; 0xc0000000], R1 in [1024; 0xc0000400]). 0: call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7 ; R0_w=scalar() 1: w0 = w0 ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) 2: r0 >>= 30 ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0x3)) 3: r0 <<= 30 ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xc0000000)) 4: r1 = r0 ; R1_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xc0000000)) 5: r1 += 1024 ; R1_w=scalar(var_off=(0x400; 0xc0000000)) 6: if r1 != r0 goto pc+1 Looking at tnums however, we can deduce that R1 is always different from R0 because their tnums don't agree on known bits. This patch uses this logic to improve is_scalar_branch_taken in case of BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE. This change has a tiny impact on complexity, which was measured with the Cilium complexity CI test. That test covers 72 programs with various build and load time configurations for a total of 970 test cases. For 80% of test cases, the patch has no impact. On the other test cases, the patch decreases complexity by only 0.08% on average. In the best case, the verifier needs to walk 3% less instructions and, in the worst case, 1.5% more. Overall, the patch has a small positive impact, especially for our largest programs. Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/be3ee70b6e489c49881cb1646114b1d861b5c334.1755694147.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit f41345f47fb267a9c95ca710c33448f8d0d81d83 ]

In the following toy program (reg states minimized for readability), R0
and R1 always have different values at instruction 6. This is obvious
when reading the program but cannot be guessed from ranges alone as
they overlap (R0 in [0; 0xc0000000], R1 in [1024; 0xc0000400]).

  0: call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7  ; R0_w=scalar()
  1: w0 = w0                     ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
  2: r0 >>= 30                   ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0x3))
  3: r0 <<= 30                   ; R0_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xc0000000))
  4: r1 = r0                     ; R1_w=scalar(var_off=(0x0; 0xc0000000))
  5: r1 += 1024                  ; R1_w=scalar(var_off=(0x400; 0xc0000000))
  6: if r1 != r0 goto pc+1

Looking at tnums however, we can deduce that R1 is always different from
R0 because their tnums don't agree on known bits. This patch uses this
logic to improve is_scalar_branch_taken in case of BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE.

This change has a tiny impact on complexity, which was measured with
the Cilium complexity CI test. That test covers 72 programs with
various build and load time configurations for a total of 970 test
cases. For 80% of test cases, the patch has no impact. On the other
test cases, the patch decreases complexity by only 0.08% on average. In
the best case, the verifier needs to walk 3% less instructions and, in
the worst case, 1.5% more. Overall, the patch has a small positive
impact, especially for our largest programs.

Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/be3ee70b6e489c49881cb1646114b1d861b5c334.1755694147.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Reject negative offsets for ALU ops 2025-10-15T10:04:14+00:00 Yazhou Tang tangyazhou518@outlook.com 2025-09-30T15:04:33+00:00 21167bf70dbe400563e189ac632258d35eda38b5 [ Upstream commit 55c0ced59fe17dee34e9dfd5f7be63cbab207758 ] When verifying BPF programs, the check_alu_op() function validates instructions with ALU operations. The 'offset' field in these instructions is a signed 16-bit integer. The existing check 'insn->off > 1' was intended to ensure the offset is either 0, or 1 for BPF_MOD/BPF_DIV. However, because 'insn->off' is signed, this check incorrectly accepts all negative values (e.g., -1). This commit tightens the validation by changing the condition to '(insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1)'. This ensures that any value other than the explicitly permitted 0 and 1 is rejected, hardening the verifier against malformed BPF programs. Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com> Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com> Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Fixes: ec0e2da95f72 ("bpf: Support new signed div/mod instructions.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_70D024BAE70A0A309A4781694C7B764B0608@qq.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 55c0ced59fe17dee34e9dfd5f7be63cbab207758 ]

When verifying BPF programs, the check_alu_op() function validates
instructions with ALU operations. The 'offset' field in these
instructions is a signed 16-bit integer.

The existing check 'insn->off > 1' was intended to ensure the offset is
either 0, or 1 for BPF_MOD/BPF_DIV. However, because 'insn->off' is
signed, this check incorrectly accepts all negative values (e.g., -1).

This commit tightens the validation by changing the condition to
'(insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 1)'. This ensures that any value
other than the explicitly permitted 0 and 1 is rejected, hardening the
verifier against malformed BPF programs.

Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Fixes: ec0e2da95f72 ("bpf: Support new signed div/mod instructions.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_70D024BAE70A0A309A4781694C7B764B0608@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Skip scalar adjustment for BPF_NEG if dst is a pointer 2025-10-15T10:04:14+00:00 Brahmajit Das listout@listout.xyz 2025-10-01T19:17:38+00:00 b9ef4963227246b9222e1559ddeec8e7af63e6c6 [ Upstream commit 34904582b502a86fdb4d7984b12cacd2faabbe0d ] In check_alu_op(), the verifier currently calls check_reg_arg() and adjust_scalar_min_max_vals() unconditionally for BPF_NEG operations. However, if the destination register holds a pointer, these scalar adjustments are unnecessary and potentially incorrect. This patch adds a check to skip the adjustment logic when the destination register contains a pointer. Reported-by: syzbot+d36d5ae81e1b0a53ef58@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d36d5ae81e1b0a53ef58 Fixes: aced132599b3 ("bpf: Add range tracking for BPF_NEG") Suggested-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev> Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das <listout@listout.xyz> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251001191739.2323644-2-listout@listout.xyz Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 34904582b502a86fdb4d7984b12cacd2faabbe0d ]

In check_alu_op(), the verifier currently calls check_reg_arg() and
adjust_scalar_min_max_vals() unconditionally for BPF_NEG operations.
However, if the destination register holds a pointer, these scalar
adjustments are unnecessary and potentially incorrect.

This patch adds a check to skip the adjustment logic when the destination
register contains a pointer.

Reported-by: syzbot+d36d5ae81e1b0a53ef58@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d36d5ae81e1b0a53ef58
Fixes: aced132599b3 ("bpf: Add range tracking for BPF_NEG")
Suggested-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Brahmajit Das <listout@listout.xyz>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251001191739.2323644-2-listout@listout.xyz
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: dont report verifier bug for missing bpf_scc_visit on speculative path 2025-10-15T10:03:35+00:00 Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com 2025-09-16T21:22:50+00:00 3861e7c4324aa20a632fb74eb3904114f6afdb57 [ Upstream commit a3c73d629ea1373af3c0c954d41fd1af555492e3 ] Syzbot generated a program that triggers a verifier_bug() call in maybe_exit_scc(). maybe_exit_scc() assumes that, when called for a state with insn_idx in some SCC, there should be an instance of struct bpf_scc_visit allocated for that SCC. Turns out the assumption does not hold for speculative execution paths. See example in the next patch. maybe_scc_exit() is called from update_branch_counts() for states that reach branch count of zero, meaning that path exploration for a particular path is finished. Path exploration can finish in one of three ways: a. Verification error is found. In this case, update_branch_counts() is called only for non-speculative paths. b. Top level BPF_EXIT is reached. Such instructions are never a part of an SCC, so compute_scc_callchain() in maybe_scc_exit() will return false, and maybe_scc_exit() will return early. c. A checkpoint is reached and matched. Checkpoints are created by is_state_visited(), which calls maybe_enter_scc(), which allocates bpf_scc_visit instances for checkpoints within SCCs. Hence, for non-speculative symbolic execution paths, the assumption still holds: if maybe_scc_exit() is called for a state within an SCC, bpf_scc_visit instance must exist. This patch removes the verifier_bug() call for speculative paths. Fixes: c9e31900b54c ("bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges") Reported-by: syzbot+3afc814e8df1af64b653@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/68c85acd.050a0220.2ff435.03a4.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916212251.3490455-1-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit a3c73d629ea1373af3c0c954d41fd1af555492e3 ]

Syzbot generated a program that triggers a verifier_bug() call in
maybe_exit_scc(). maybe_exit_scc() assumes that, when called for a
state with insn_idx in some SCC, there should be an instance of struct
bpf_scc_visit allocated for that SCC. Turns out the assumption does
not hold for speculative execution paths. See example in the next
patch.

maybe_scc_exit() is called from update_branch_counts() for states that
reach branch count of zero, meaning that path exploration for a
particular path is finished. Path exploration can finish in one of
three ways:
a. Verification error is found. In this case, update_branch_counts()
   is called only for non-speculative paths.
b. Top level BPF_EXIT is reached. Such instructions are never a part of
   an SCC, so compute_scc_callchain() in maybe_scc_exit() will return
   false, and maybe_scc_exit() will return early.
c. A checkpoint is reached and matched. Checkpoints are created by
   is_state_visited(), which calls maybe_enter_scc(), which allocates
   bpf_scc_visit instances for checkpoints within SCCs.

Hence, for non-speculative symbolic execution paths, the assumption
still holds: if maybe_scc_exit() is called for a state within an SCC,
bpf_scc_visit instance must exist.

This patch removes the verifier_bug() call for speculative paths.

Fixes: c9e31900b54c ("bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges")
Reported-by: syzbot+3afc814e8df1af64b653@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/68c85acd.050a0220.2ff435.03a4.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916212251.3490455-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bpf: Reject bpf_timer for PREEMPT_RT 2025-09-10T19:34:09+00:00 Leon Hwang leon.hwang@linux.dev 2025-09-10T12:57:39+00:00 e25ddfb388c8b7e5f20e3bf38d627fb485003781 When enable CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT, the kernel will warn when run timer selftests by './test_progs -t timer': BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 In order to avoid such warning, reject bpf_timer in verifier when PREEMPT_RT is enabled. Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250910125740.52172-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
When enable CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT, the kernel will warn when run timer
selftests by './test_progs -t timer':

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48

In order to avoid such warning, reject bpf_timer in verifier when
PREEMPT_RT is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250910125740.52172-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: Check the helper function is valid in get_helper_proto 2025-08-15T09:16:56+00:00 Jiri Olsa olsajiri@gmail.com 2025-08-14T20:06:55+00:00 e4414b01c1cd9887bbde92f946c1ba94e40d6d64 kernel test robot reported verifier bug [1] where the helper func pointer could be NULL due to disabled config option. As Alexei suggested we could check on that in get_helper_proto directly. Marking tail_call helper func with BPF_PTR_POISON, because it is unused by design. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202507160818.68358831-lkp@intel.com Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reported-by: syzbot+a9ed3d9132939852d0df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250814200655.945632-1-jolsa@kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202507160818.68358831-lkp@intel.com 
kernel test robot reported verifier bug [1] where the helper func
pointer could be NULL due to disabled config option.

As Alexei suggested we could check on that in get_helper_proto
directly. Marking tail_call helper func with BPF_PTR_POISON,
because it is unused by design.

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202507160818.68358831-lkp@intel.com

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+a9ed3d9132939852d0df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250814200655.945632-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202507160818.68358831-lkp@intel.com
bpf: Fix memory leak of bpf_scc_info objects 2025-08-02T16:04:57+00:00 Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com 2025-08-01T23:23:30+00:00 1b30d44417278196a90c79244bb43e8428586345 env->scc_info array contains references to bpf_scc_info objects allocated lazily in verifier.c:scc_visit_alloc(). env->scc_cnt was supposed to track env->scc_info array size in order to free referenced objects in verifier.c:free_states(). Fix initialization of env->scc_cnt that was omitted in verifier.c:compute_scc(). To reproduce the bug: - build with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK - boot and load bpf program with loops, e.g.: ./veristat -q pyperf180.bpf.o - initiate memleak scan and check results: echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak Fixes: c9e31900b54c ("bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges") Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKXUWg9uRCPD5ebRXwN4dmBCRUFFM7kN=GxymYz3zU25A@mail.gmail.com/T/ Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250801232330.1800436-1-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
env->scc_info array contains references to bpf_scc_info objects
allocated lazily in verifier.c:scc_visit_alloc().
env->scc_cnt was supposed to track env->scc_info array size
in order to free referenced objects in verifier.c:free_states().
Fix initialization of env->scc_cnt that was omitted in
verifier.c:compute_scc().

To reproduce the bug:
- build with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
- boot and load bpf program with loops, e.g.:
  ./veristat -q pyperf180.bpf.o
- initiate memleak scan and check results:
  echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

Fixes: c9e31900b54c ("bpf: propagate read/precision marks over state graph backedges")
Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKXUWg9uRCPD5ebRXwN4dmBCRUFFM7kN=GxymYz3zU25A@mail.gmail.com/T/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250801232330.1800436-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: Improve ctx access verifier error message 2025-08-01T16:22:44+00:00 Paul Chaignon paul.chaignon@gmail.com 2025-08-01T09:49:15+00:00 f914876eec9e72ae94b5cee81a9dc7935c255b2f We've already had two "error during ctx access conversion" warnings triggered by syzkaller. Let's improve the error message by dumping the cnt variable so that we can more easily differentiate between the different error cases. Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc94316c30dd76fae4a75a664b61a2dbfe68e205.1754039605.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
We've already had two "error during ctx access conversion" warnings
triggered by syzkaller. Let's improve the error message by dumping the
cnt variable so that we can more easily differentiate between the
different error cases.

Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cc94316c30dd76fae4a75a664b61a2dbfe68e205.1754039605.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf: Add log for attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list 2025-07-29T02:39:29+00:00 KaFai Wan kafai.wan@linux.dev 2025-07-24T15:14:52+00:00 863aab3d4dcdfffa5cf0e0795c526dadca65be7a Show the rejected function name when attaching tracing programs to functions in deny list. With this change, we know why tracing programs can't attach to functions like __rcu_read_lock() from log. $ ./fentry libbpf: prog '__rcu_read_lock': BPF program load failed: -EINVAL libbpf: prog '__rcu_read_lock': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG -- Attaching tracing programs to function '__rcu_read_lock' is rejected. Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724151454.499040-3-kafai.wan@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> 
Show the rejected function name when attaching tracing programs to
functions in deny list.

With this change, we know why tracing programs can't attach to functions
like __rcu_read_lock() from log.

$ ./fentry
libbpf: prog '__rcu_read_lock': BPF program load failed: -EINVAL
libbpf: prog '__rcu_read_lock': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG --
Attaching tracing programs to function '__rcu_read_lock' is rejected.

Suggested-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724151454.499040-3-kafai.wan@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>