<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/syscall.c, branch linux-5.4.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Ensure correct locking around vulnerable function find_vpid()</title>
<updated>2022-10-26T11:22:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lee Jones</name>
<email>lee@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-12T13:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=215c146b402161c545475f736953494355384903'/>
<id>215c146b402161c545475f736953494355384903</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83c10cc362d91c0d8d25e60779ee52fdbbf3894d ]

The documentation for find_vpid() clearly states:

  "Must be called with the tasklist_lock or rcu_read_lock() held."

Presently we do neither for find_vpid() instance in bpf_task_fd_query().
Add proper rcu_read_lock/unlock() to fix the issue.

Fixes: 41bdc4b40ed6f ("bpf: introduce bpf subcommand BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY")
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones &lt;lee@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220912133855.1218900-1-lee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 83c10cc362d91c0d8d25e60779ee52fdbbf3894d ]

The documentation for find_vpid() clearly states:

  "Must be called with the tasklist_lock or rcu_read_lock() held."

Presently we do neither for find_vpid() instance in bpf_task_fd_query().
Add proper rcu_read_lock/unlock() to fix the issue.

Fixes: 41bdc4b40ed6f ("bpf: introduce bpf subcommand BPF_TASK_FD_QUERY")
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones &lt;lee@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220912133855.1218900-1-lee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add kconfig knob for disabling unpriv bpf by default</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:52:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-11T20:35:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c230f6ba1011de8eee5e2468f67eaffaee0f82d4'/>
<id>c230f6ba1011de8eee5e2468f67eaffaee0f82d4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.

Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.

This still allows a transition of 2 -&gt; {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -&gt; {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.

We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 &lt;-&gt; 2.

Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 08389d888287c3823f80b0216766b71e17f0aba5 upstream.

Add a kconfig knob which allows for unprivileged bpf to be disabled by default.
If set, the knob sets /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled to value of 2.

This still allows a transition of 2 -&gt; {0,1} through an admin. Similarly,
this also still keeps 1 -&gt; {1} behavior intact, so that once set to permanently
disabled, it cannot be undone aside from a reboot.

We've also added extra2 with max of 2 for the procfs handler, so that an admin
still has a chance to toggle between 0 &lt;-&gt; 2.

Either way, as an additional alternative, applications can make use of CAP_BPF
that we added a while ago.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/74ec548079189e4e4dffaeb42b8987bb3c852eee.1620765074.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden &lt;fllinden@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: sockmap: Require attach_bpf_fd when detaching a program</title>
<updated>2020-08-07T07:34:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenz Bauer</name>
<email>lmb@cloudflare.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-29T09:56:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ca7ace8fd26d9ae4be3cf69f474ddcfb0e8506ce'/>
<id>ca7ace8fd26d9ae4be3cf69f474ddcfb0e8506ce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.

The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.

Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer &lt;lmb@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.

The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.

Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer &lt;lmb@cloudflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok()</title>
<updated>2020-07-16T06:16:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-02T22:45:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=baef8d1027b0c037128c8be56338e6e066317e68'/>
<id>baef8d1027b0c037128c8be56338e6e066317e68</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream.

When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file-&gt;f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.

Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 upstream.

When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at
open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's
case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated
file-&gt;f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that
kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred.

Cc: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix map permissions check</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:31:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Protopopov</name>
<email>a.s.protopopov@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-27T18:56:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=215a256bc8dd7ef6bc52f3fd697027a7275d1c27'/>
<id>215a256bc8dd7ef6bc52f3fd697027a7275d1c27</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1ea0f9120c8ce105ca181b070561df5cbd6bc049 ]

The map_lookup_and_delete_elem() function should check for both FMODE_CAN_WRITE
and FMODE_CAN_READ permissions because it returns a map element to user space.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov &lt;a.s.protopopov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200527185700.14658-5-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1ea0f9120c8ce105ca181b070561df5cbd6bc049 ]

The map_lookup_and_delete_elem() function should check for both FMODE_CAN_WRITE
and FMODE_CAN_READ permissions because it returns a map element to user space.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov &lt;a.s.protopopov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200527185700.14658-5-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix error return code in map_lookup_and_delete_elem()</title>
<updated>2020-05-20T06:20:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wei Yongjun</name>
<email>weiyongjun1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-30T08:18:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d47b3d6b4d2d554d075823d572706cfd958484a'/>
<id>5d47b3d6b4d2d554d075823d572706cfd958484a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7f645462ca01d01abb94d75e6768c8b3ed3a188b ]

Fix to return negative error code -EFAULT from the copy_to_user() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200430081851.166996-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7f645462ca01d01abb94d75e6768c8b3ed3a188b ]

Fix to return negative error code -EFAULT from the copy_to_user() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: bd513cd08f10 ("bpf: add MAP_LOOKUP_AND_DELETE_ELEM syscall")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun &lt;weiyongjun1@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200430081851.166996-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Explicitly memset some bpf info structures declared on the stack</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T13:11:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-20T16:22:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=877f28596da26273227897605966b8e631d2a420'/>
<id>877f28596da26273227897605966b8e631d2a420</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5c6f25887963f15492b604dd25cb149c501bbabf upstream.

Trying to initialize a structure with "= {};" will not always clean out
all padding locations in a structure. So be explicit and call memset to
initialize everything for a number of bpf information structures that
are then copied from userspace, sometimes from smaller memory locations
than the size of the structure.

Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320162258.GA794295@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5c6f25887963f15492b604dd25cb149c501bbabf upstream.

Trying to initialize a structure with "= {};" will not always clean out
all padding locations in a structure. So be explicit and call memset to
initialize everything for a number of bpf information structures that
are then copied from userspace, sometimes from smaller memory locations
than the size of the structure.

Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320162258.GA794295@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Explicitly memset the bpf_attr structure</title>
<updated>2020-04-02T13:11:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-20T09:48:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e92528a8984e613afead703947282f069bd8b240'/>
<id>e92528a8984e613afead703947282f069bd8b240</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8096f229421f7b22433775e928d506f0342e5907 upstream.

For the bpf syscall, we are relying on the compiler to properly zero out
the bpf_attr union that we copy userspace data into. Unfortunately that
doesn't always work properly, padding and other oddities might not be
correctly zeroed, and in some tests odd things have been found when the
stack is pre-initialized to other values.

Fix this by explicitly memsetting the structure to 0 before using it.

Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Alistair Delva &lt;adelva@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/common/+/1235490
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320094813.GA421650@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8096f229421f7b22433775e928d506f0342e5907 upstream.

For the bpf syscall, we are relying on the compiler to properly zero out
the bpf_attr union that we copy userspace data into. Unfortunately that
doesn't always work properly, padding and other oddities might not be
correctly zeroed, and in some tests odd things have been found when the
stack is pre-initialized to other values.

Fix this by explicitly memsetting the structure to 0 before using it.

Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski &lt;maze@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Alistair Delva &lt;adelva@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/common/+/1235490
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200320094813.GA421650@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Change size to u64 for bpf_map_{area_alloc, charge_init}()</title>
<updated>2019-10-31T20:41:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Björn Töpel</name>
<email>bjorn.topel@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-29T15:43:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ff1c08e1f74b6864854c39be48aa799a6a2e4d2b'/>
<id>ff1c08e1f74b6864854c39be48aa799a6a2e4d2b</id>
<content type='text'>
The functions bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_charge_init() prior
this commit passed the size parameter as size_t. In this commit this
is changed to u64.

All users of these functions avoid size_t overflows on 32-bit systems,
by explicitly using u64 when calculating the allocation size and
memory charge cost. However, since the result was narrowed by the
size_t when passing size and cost to the functions, the overflow
handling was in vain.

Instead of changing all call sites to size_t and handle overflow at
the call site, the parameter is changed to u64 and checked in the
functions above.

Fixes: d407bd25a204 ("bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc")
Fixes: c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191029154307.23053-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The functions bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_charge_init() prior
this commit passed the size parameter as size_t. In this commit this
is changed to u64.

All users of these functions avoid size_t overflows on 32-bit systems,
by explicitly using u64 when calculating the allocation size and
memory charge cost. However, since the result was narrowed by the
size_t when passing size and cost to the functions, the overflow
handling was in vain.

Instead of changing all call sites to size_t and handle overflow at
the call site, the parameter is changed to u64 and checked in the
functions above.

Fixes: d407bd25a204 ("bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc")
Fixes: c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191029154307.23053-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix use after free in bpf_get_prog_name</title>
<updated>2019-10-23T04:59:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-22T21:30:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3b4d9eb2ee74dd5ea7fa36cffb0ca7f5bc4924da'/>
<id>3b4d9eb2ee74dd5ea7fa36cffb0ca7f5bc4924da</id>
<content type='text'>
There is one more problematic case I noticed while recently fixing BPF kallsyms
handling in cd7455f1013e ("bpf: Fix use after free in subprog's jited symbol
removal") and that is bpf_get_prog_name().

If BTF has been attached to the prog, then we may be able to fetch the function
signature type id in kallsyms through prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_info[prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_idx].type_id.
However, while the BTF object itself is torn down via RCU callback, the prog's
aux-&gt;func_info is immediately freed via kvfree(prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_info) once the
prog's refcount either hit zero or when subprograms were already exposed via
kallsyms and we hit the error path added in 5482e9a93c83 ("bpf: Fix memleak in
aux-&gt;func_info and aux-&gt;btf").

This violates RCU as well since kallsyms could be walked in parallel where we
could access aux-&gt;func_info. Hence, defer kvfree() to after RCU grace period.
Looking at ba64e7d85252 ("bpf: btf: support proper non-jit func info") there
is no reason/dependency where we couldn't defer the kvfree(aux-&gt;func_info) into
the RCU callback.

Fixes: 5482e9a93c83 ("bpf: Fix memleak in aux-&gt;func_info and aux-&gt;btf")
Fixes: ba64e7d85252 ("bpf: btf: support proper non-jit func info")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/875f2906a7c1a0691f2d567b4d8e4ea2739b1e88.1571779205.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
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There is one more problematic case I noticed while recently fixing BPF kallsyms
handling in cd7455f1013e ("bpf: Fix use after free in subprog's jited symbol
removal") and that is bpf_get_prog_name().

If BTF has been attached to the prog, then we may be able to fetch the function
signature type id in kallsyms through prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_info[prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_idx].type_id.
However, while the BTF object itself is torn down via RCU callback, the prog's
aux-&gt;func_info is immediately freed via kvfree(prog-&gt;aux-&gt;func_info) once the
prog's refcount either hit zero or when subprograms were already exposed via
kallsyms and we hit the error path added in 5482e9a93c83 ("bpf: Fix memleak in
aux-&gt;func_info and aux-&gt;btf").

This violates RCU as well since kallsyms could be walked in parallel where we
could access aux-&gt;func_info. Hence, defer kvfree() to after RCU grace period.
Looking at ba64e7d85252 ("bpf: btf: support proper non-jit func info") there
is no reason/dependency where we couldn't defer the kvfree(aux-&gt;func_info) into
the RCU callback.

Fixes: 5482e9a93c83 ("bpf: Fix memleak in aux-&gt;func_info and aux-&gt;btf")
Fixes: ba64e7d85252 ("bpf: btf: support proper non-jit func info")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/875f2906a7c1a0691f2d567b4d8e4ea2739b1e88.1571779205.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
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