<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/core.c, branch v6.18.40</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:16:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T10:55:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46fbafe3d2d569d828e8d24a7dbe1659f63685cf'/>
<id>46fbafe3d2d569d828e8d24a7dbe1659f63685cf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 10627ddc0167aab5c1c390a10ef461e9937aba08 ]

The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local
storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check
treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored
storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail
call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even
though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's
context, that is, A -&gt; B(no storage) -&gt; C(storage) path.

Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a
storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one.
Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot
perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -&gt; B(no storage) working
while rejecting the A -&gt; B(no storage) -&gt; C(storage) bridge.

Fixes: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage")
Reported-by: Lin Ma &lt;malin89@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610105539.705887-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 10627ddc0167aab5c1c390a10ef461e9937aba08 ]

The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local
storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check
treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored
storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail
call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even
though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's
context, that is, A -&gt; B(no storage) -&gt; C(storage) path.

Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a
storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one.
Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot
perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -&gt; B(no storage) working
while rejecting the A -&gt; B(no storage) -&gt; C(storage) bridge.

Fixes: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage")
Reported-by: Lin Ma &lt;malin89@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610105539.705887-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:12:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d944b8add331883d8e026e152356e7d9349a3bcf'/>
<id>d944b8add331883d8e026e152356e7d9349a3bcf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b72e29e0f7ee329d89f86db8700c8ea99b4a370a upstream.

The pack allocator only flushes predictors when reusing a dirty pack for
cBPF, eBPF allocations never trigger a flush. Currently, eBPF picks the
first free pack, which could be a clean pack. As an optimization, leaving
a clean pack for cBPF can avoid flushes.

Prefer dirty packs for eBPF and keep clean packs free for cBPF. This
mirrors the existing cBPF preference for clean packs: each program kind
prefers the pack that avoids an extra flush, and falls back to the other
kind only when no preferred pack has room. eBPF reuse of a dirty pack is
harmless since eBPF being privileged does not flush.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b72e29e0f7ee329d89f86db8700c8ea99b4a370a upstream.

The pack allocator only flushes predictors when reusing a dirty pack for
cBPF, eBPF allocations never trigger a flush. Currently, eBPF picks the
first free pack, which could be a clean pack. As an optimization, leaving
a clean pack for cBPF can avoid flushes.

Prefer dirty packs for eBPF and keep clean packs free for cBPF. This
mirrors the existing cBPF preference for clean packs: each program kind
prefers the pack that avoids an extra flush, and falls back to the other
kind only when no preferred pack has room. eBPF reuse of a dirty pack is
harmless since eBPF being privileged does not flush.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:12:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0229944ba7923a73f54e94e42139518bfff9124c'/>
<id>0229944ba7923a73f54e94e42139518bfff9124c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a9b1f19a6a673ba06820898d0f1ad02883ea1639 upstream.

Currently BPF pack allocator picks the chunks from the first available
pack. While this is okay, it naturally leads to more frequent flushes
when there are multiple packs in the system that weren't used since the
last flush.

As an optimization prefer allocating the new programs from packs that
are unused since last flush. When all packs are dirty, allocation forces
a flush and marks all packs clean.

Below are some future optimizations ideas:

  1. Currently, the "dirty" tracking is only done at the pack-level.
     Flush frequency can further be reduced with chunk-level tracking.
     This requires a new bitmap per-pack to track the dirty state.
  2. IBPB flush is done on all CPUs, even if only a single CPU ran the
     BPF program. On a system with hundreds of CPUs this could be a
     major bottleneck forcing hundreds of IPIs to deliver the flush.
     The solution is to track the CPUs where a BPF program ran, and
     issue IBPB only on those CPUs.
  3. Avoid IBPB when flush is already done at other sources (e.g.
     context switch).

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a9b1f19a6a673ba06820898d0f1ad02883ea1639 upstream.

Currently BPF pack allocator picks the chunks from the first available
pack. While this is okay, it naturally leads to more frequent flushes
when there are multiple packs in the system that weren't used since the
last flush.

As an optimization prefer allocating the new programs from packs that
are unused since last flush. When all packs are dirty, allocation forces
a flush and marks all packs clean.

Below are some future optimizations ideas:

  1. Currently, the "dirty" tracking is only done at the pack-level.
     Flush frequency can further be reduced with chunk-level tracking.
     This requires a new bitmap per-pack to track the dirty state.
  2. IBPB flush is done on all CPUs, even if only a single CPU ran the
     BPF program. On a system with hundreds of CPUs this could be a
     major bottleneck forcing hundreds of IPIs to deliver the flush.
     The solution is to track the CPUs where a BPF program ran, and
     issue IBPB only on those CPUs.
  3. Avoid IBPB when flush is already done at other sources (e.g.
     context switch).

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:12:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f1f36bf9bb1173ef4ddb7fb917bbda75fb1db690'/>
<id>f1f36bf9bb1173ef4ddb7fb917bbda75fb1db690</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a23c1c5396a91680703360d1ee28a44657c503c4 upstream.

bpf_prog_pack_alloc() issues IBPB on all CPUs on every cBPF allocation,
even when reusing chunks from an existing pack where no new memory was
touched since the last IBPB.

Since IBPB on all CPUs is heavy, Dave Hansen suggested to track allocation
since last IBPB, and only issue IBPB at reuse for the chunks that have not
seen an IBPB since they were last freed.

Track per-pack whether an IBPB is needed via arch_flush_needed. Set it when
allocating a chunk, reset on IBPB flush. On reuse, conditionally issue the
flush. Since IBPB invalidates all BTB entries, clear the flag on all packs
after flushing.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a23c1c5396a91680703360d1ee28a44657c503c4 upstream.

bpf_prog_pack_alloc() issues IBPB on all CPUs on every cBPF allocation,
even when reusing chunks from an existing pack where no new memory was
touched since the last IBPB.

Since IBPB on all CPUs is heavy, Dave Hansen suggested to track allocation
since last IBPB, and only issue IBPB at reuse for the chunks that have not
seen an IBPB since they were last freed.

Track per-pack whether an IBPB is needed via arch_flush_needed. Set it when
allocating a chunk, reset on IBPB flush. On reuse, conditionally issue the
flush. Since IBPB invalidates all BTB entries, clear the flag on all packs
after flushing.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:12:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=666fc2e6e4d0a37592e5a3029deddc272e10df1e'/>
<id>666fc2e6e4d0a37592e5a3029deddc272e10df1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0bb99f2cfaae6822d734d69722de30af823efdf3 upstream.

Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT
allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user.
eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on
every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit.

eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors
for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the
flush as they are eBPF-only.

  [pawan: backport had various conflicts in arches bpf_int_jit_compile().
	  loongarch bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't use pack allocator,
	  dropped was_classic hunk. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0bb99f2cfaae6822d734d69722de30af823efdf3 upstream.

Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT
allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user.
eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on
every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit.

eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors
for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the
flush as they are eBPF-only.

  [pawan: backport had various conflicts in arches bpf_int_jit_compile().
	  loongarch bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't use pack allocator,
	  dropped was_classic hunk. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:11:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e'/>
<id>8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995 upstream.

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.

Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.

Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.

Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995 upstream.

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.

Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.

Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.

Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix stale offload-&gt;prog pointer after constant blinding</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:06:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>MingTao Huang</name>
<email>mintaohuang@tencent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-02T12:18:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=059525cf18e69a9313baf947d8898c6ee7ca6b65'/>
<id>059525cf18e69a9313baf947d8898c6ee7ca6b65</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a1aa9ef47c299c5bbc30594d3c2f0589edf908e6 ]

When a dev-bound-only BPF program (BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY) undergoes
JIT compilation with constant blinding enabled (bpf_jit_harden &gt;= 2),
bpf_jit_blind_constants() clones the program. The original prog is then
freed in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), which updates aux-&gt;prog to point
to the surviving clone, but fails to update offload-&gt;prog.

This leaves offload-&gt;prog pointing to the freed original program. When
the network namespace is subsequently destroyed, cleanup_net() triggers
bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister(), which iterates ondev-&gt;progs and calls
__bpf_prog_offload_destroy(offload-&gt;prog). Accessing the freed prog
causes a page fault:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900085f1038
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0xc/0x80
Call Trace:
__bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister+0x257/0x350
bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister+0x4a/0x90
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x2a2/0x660
...
cleanup_net+0x21a/0x320

The test sequence that triggers this reliably is:

1. Set net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 (echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden)
2. Run xdp_metadata selftest, which creates a dev-bound-only XDP
   program on a veth inside a netns (./test_progs -t xdp_metadata)
3. cleanup_net -&gt; page fault in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy

Dev-bound-only programs are unique in that they have an offload structure
but go through the normal JIT path instead of bpf_prog_offload_compile().
This means they are subject to constant blinding's prog clone-and-replace,
while also having offload-&gt;prog that must stay in sync.

Fix this by updating offload-&gt;prog in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(),
alongside the existing aux-&gt;prog update. Both are back-pointers to
the prog that must be kept in sync when the prog is replaced.

Fixes: 2b3486bc2d23 ("bpf: Introduce device-bound XDP programs")
Signed-off-by: MingTao Huang &lt;mintaohuang@tencent.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_BCF692F45859CCE6C22B7B0B64827947D406@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a1aa9ef47c299c5bbc30594d3c2f0589edf908e6 ]

When a dev-bound-only BPF program (BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY) undergoes
JIT compilation with constant blinding enabled (bpf_jit_harden &gt;= 2),
bpf_jit_blind_constants() clones the program. The original prog is then
freed in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), which updates aux-&gt;prog to point
to the surviving clone, but fails to update offload-&gt;prog.

This leaves offload-&gt;prog pointing to the freed original program. When
the network namespace is subsequently destroyed, cleanup_net() triggers
bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister(), which iterates ondev-&gt;progs and calls
__bpf_prog_offload_destroy(offload-&gt;prog). Accessing the freed prog
causes a page fault:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900085f1038
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0xc/0x80
Call Trace:
__bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister+0x257/0x350
bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister+0x4a/0x90
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x2a2/0x660
...
cleanup_net+0x21a/0x320

The test sequence that triggers this reliably is:

1. Set net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 (echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden)
2. Run xdp_metadata selftest, which creates a dev-bound-only XDP
   program on a veth inside a netns (./test_progs -t xdp_metadata)
3. cleanup_net -&gt; page fault in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy

Dev-bound-only programs are unique in that they have an offload structure
but go through the normal JIT path instead of bpf_prog_offload_compile().
This means they are subject to constant blinding's prog clone-and-replace,
while also having offload-&gt;prog that must stay in sync.

Fix this by updating offload-&gt;prog in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(),
alongside the existing aux-&gt;prog update. Both are back-pointers to
the prog that must be kept in sync when the prog is replaced.

Fixes: 2b3486bc2d23 ("bpf: Introduce device-bound XDP programs")
Signed-off-by: MingTao Huang &lt;mintaohuang@tencent.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_BCF692F45859CCE6C22B7B0B64827947D406@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN</title>
<updated>2026-04-02T11:22:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jenny Guanni Qu</name>
<email>qguanni@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-11T01:11:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f14ca604c0ff274fba19f73f1f0485c0047c1396'/>
<id>f14ca604c0ff274fba19f73f1f0485c0047c1396</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c77b30bd1dcb61f66c640ff7d2757816210c7cb0 ]

The BPF interpreter's signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.

The verifier's abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.

Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter's sdiv32/smod32 handlers.

s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().

Fixes: ec0e2da95f72 ("bpf: Support new signed div/mod instructions.")
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jenny Guanni Qu &lt;qguanni@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260311011116.2108005-2-qguanni@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c77b30bd1dcb61f66c640ff7d2757816210c7cb0 ]

The BPF interpreter's signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.

The verifier's abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.

Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter's sdiv32/smod32 handlers.

s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().

Fixes: ec0e2da95f72 ("bpf: Support new signed div/mod instructions.")
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yonghong.song@linux.dev&gt;
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jenny Guanni Qu &lt;qguanni@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260311011116.2108005-2-qguanni@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Fix constant blinding for PROBE_MEM32 stores</title>
<updated>2026-04-02T11:22:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sachin Kumar</name>
<email>xcyfun@protonmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-09T18:25:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ccbf29b28b5554f9d65b2fb53b994673ad58b3bf'/>
<id>ccbf29b28b5554f9d65b2fb53b994673ad58b3bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2321a9596d2260310267622e0ad8fbfa6f95378f ]

BPF_ST | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 immediate stores are not handled by
bpf_jit_blind_insn(), allowing user-controlled 32-bit immediates to
survive unblinded into JIT-compiled native code when bpf_jit_harden &gt;= 1.

The root cause is that convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites BPF_ST|BPF_MEM
to BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 for arena pointer stores during verification,
before bpf_jit_blind_constants() runs during JIT compilation. The
blinding switch only matches BPF_ST|BPF_MEM (mode 0x60), not
BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 (mode 0xa0). The instruction falls through
unblinded.

Add BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 cases to bpf_jit_blind_insn() alongside the
existing BPF_ST|BPF_MEM cases. The blinding transformation is identical:
load the blinded immediate into BPF_REG_AX via mov+xor, then convert
the immediate store to a register store (BPF_STX).

The rewritten STX instruction must preserve the BPF_PROBE_MEM32 mode so
the architecture JIT emits the correct arena addressing (R12-based on
x86-64). Cannot use the BPF_STX_MEM() macro here because it hardcodes
BPF_MEM mode; construct the instruction directly instead.

Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sachin Kumar &lt;xcyfun@protonmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y6IT5VvNRchPBLI5D7JZHBzZrU9rb0ycRJPJzJSXGj7kJlX8RJwZFSM2YZjcDxoQKABkxt1T8Os2gi23PYyFuQe6KkZGWVyfz8K5afdy9ak=@protonmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2321a9596d2260310267622e0ad8fbfa6f95378f ]

BPF_ST | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 immediate stores are not handled by
bpf_jit_blind_insn(), allowing user-controlled 32-bit immediates to
survive unblinded into JIT-compiled native code when bpf_jit_harden &gt;= 1.

The root cause is that convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites BPF_ST|BPF_MEM
to BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 for arena pointer stores during verification,
before bpf_jit_blind_constants() runs during JIT compilation. The
blinding switch only matches BPF_ST|BPF_MEM (mode 0x60), not
BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 (mode 0xa0). The instruction falls through
unblinded.

Add BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 cases to bpf_jit_blind_insn() alongside the
existing BPF_ST|BPF_MEM cases. The blinding transformation is identical:
load the blinded immediate into BPF_REG_AX via mov+xor, then convert
the immediate store to a register store (BPF_STX).

The rewritten STX instruction must preserve the BPF_PROBE_MEM32 mode so
the architecture JIT emits the correct arena addressing (R12-based on
x86-64). Cannot use the BPF_STX_MEM() macro here because it hardcodes
BPF_MEM mode; construct the instruction directly instead.

Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.")
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sachin Kumar &lt;xcyfun@protonmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y6IT5VvNRchPBLI5D7JZHBzZrU9rb0ycRJPJzJSXGj7kJlX8RJwZFSM2YZjcDxoQKABkxt1T8Os2gi23PYyFuQe6KkZGWVyfz8K5afdy9ak=@protonmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kallsyms/bpf: rename __bpf_address_lookup() to bpf_address_lookup()</title>
<updated>2026-02-26T22:59:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Mladek</name>
<email>pmladek@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-11-28T13:59:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=34de49d09775a4c8d5a6e14ed9005c850f4934fe'/>
<id>34de49d09775a4c8d5a6e14ed9005c850f4934fe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cd6735896d0343942cf3dafb48ce32eb79341990 ]

bpf_address_lookup() has been used only in kallsyms_lookup_buildid().  It
was supposed to set @modname and @modbuildid when the symbol was in a
module.

But it always just cleared @modname because BPF symbols were never in a
module.  And it did not clear @modbuildid because the pointer was not
passed.

The wrapper is no longer needed.  Both @modname and @modbuildid are now
always initialized to NULL in kallsyms_lookup_buildid().

Remove the wrapper and rename __bpf_address_lookup() to
bpf_address_lookup() because this variant is used everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix loongarch]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251128135920.217303-6-pmladek@suse.com
Fixes: 9294523e3768 ("module: add printk formats to add module build ID to stacktraces")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@atomlin.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkman &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Daniel Gomez &lt;da.gomez@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberalin &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Pavlu &lt;petr.pavlu@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cd6735896d0343942cf3dafb48ce32eb79341990 ]

bpf_address_lookup() has been used only in kallsyms_lookup_buildid().  It
was supposed to set @modname and @modbuildid when the symbol was in a
module.

But it always just cleared @modname because BPF symbols were never in a
module.  And it did not clear @modbuildid because the pointer was not
passed.

The wrapper is no longer needed.  Both @modname and @modbuildid are now
always initialized to NULL in kallsyms_lookup_buildid().

Remove the wrapper and rename __bpf_address_lookup() to
bpf_address_lookup() because this variant is used everywhere.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix loongarch]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251128135920.217303-6-pmladek@suse.com
Fixes: 9294523e3768 ("module: add printk formats to add module build ID to stacktraces")
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@atomlin.com&gt;
Cc: Daniel Borkman &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Daniel Gomez &lt;da.gomez@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luis Chamberalin &lt;mcgrof@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Marc Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Petr Pavlu &lt;petr.pavlu@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Sami Tolvanen &lt;samitolvanen@google.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
