linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/core.c, branch v4.19.239

bpf: Prevent increasing bpf_jit_limit above max

2021-11-26T10:35:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit fadb7ff1a6c2c565af56b4aacdd086b067eed440 ]

Restrict bpf_jit_limit to the maximum supported by the arch's JIT.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211014142554.53120-4-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4

2021-09-22T09:47:58+00:00

commit f5e81d1117501546b7be050c5fbafa6efd2c722c upstream.

In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.

This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.

The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.

Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk 
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk 
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
[OP: adjusted context for 4.19, drop riscv and ppc32 changes]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Do not use ax register in interpreter on div/mod

2021-09-03T07:58:00+00:00

Partially undo old commit 144cd91c4c2b ("bpf: move tmp variable into ax
register in interpreter"). The reason we need this here is because ax
register will be used for holding temporary state for div/mod instruction
which otherwise interpreter would corrupt. This will cause a small +8 byte
stack increase for interpreter, but with the gain that we can use it from
verifier rewrites as scratch register.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend 
[cascardo: This partial revert is needed in order to support using AX for
the following two commits, as there is no JMP32 on 4.19.y]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K

2019-07-10T07:53:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit fdadd04931c2d7cd294dc5b2b342863f94be53a3 ]

Michael and Sandipan report:

  Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
  JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
  and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.

  For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
  the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
  using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
  value:

  root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
  -1673527296

  and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
  stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:

  setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
             16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)

  and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
  always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
  failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
  host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
  with no noticeable errors in the logs.

Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().

Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.

Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.

Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das 
Reported-by: Michael Roth 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Tested-by: Michael Roth 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations

2019-05-31T13:46:03+00:00

commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.

Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.

Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.

Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Kees Cook 
Cc: LKML 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite

2019-01-31T07:14:40+00:00

[ commit 9b73bfdd08e73231d6a90ae6db4b46b3fbf56c30 upstream ]

Right now we are using BPF ax register in JIT for constant blinding as
well as in interpreter as temporary variable. Verifier will not be able
to use it simply because its use will get overridden from the former in
bpf_jit_blind_insn(). However, it can be made to work in that blinding
will be skipped if there is prior use in either source or destination
register on the instruction. Taking constraints of ax into account, the
verifier is then open to use it in rewrites under some constraints. Note,
ax register already has mappings in every eBPF JIT.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter

2019-01-31T07:14:40+00:00

[ commit 144cd91c4c2bced6eb8a7e25e590f6618a11e854 upstream ]

This change moves the on-stack 64 bit tmp variable in ___bpf_prog_run()
into the hidden ax register. The latter is currently only used in JITs
for constant blinding as a temporary scratch register, meaning the BPF
interpreter will never see the use of ax. Therefore it is safe to use
it for the cases where tmp has been used earlier. This is needed to later
on allow restricted hidden use of ax in both interpreter and JITs.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: fix a rcu usage warning in bpf_prog_array_copy_core()

2018-08-16T19:55:32+00:00

Commit 394e40a29788 ("bpf: extend bpf_prog_array to store pointers
to the cgroup storage") refactored the bpf_prog_array_copy_core()
to accommodate new structure bpf_prog_array_item which contains
bpf_prog array itself.

In the old code, we had
   perf_event_query_prog_array():
     mutex_lock(...)
     bpf_prog_array_copy_call():
       prog = rcu_dereference_check(array, 1)->progs
       bpf_prog_array_copy_core(prog, ...)
     mutex_unlock(...)

With the above commit, we had
   perf_event_query_prog_array():
     mutex_lock(...)
     bpf_prog_array_copy_call():
       bpf_prog_array_copy_core(array, ...):
         item = rcu_dereference(array)->items;
         ...
     mutex_unlock(...)

The new code will trigger a lockdep rcu checking warning.
The fix is to change rcu_dereference() to rcu_dereference_check()
to prevent such a warning.

Reported-by: syzbot+6e72317008eef84a216b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 394e40a29788 ("bpf: extend bpf_prog_array to store pointers to the cgroup storage")
Cc: Roman Gushchin 
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: introduce the bpf_get_local_storage() helper function

2018-08-02T22:47:32+00:00

The bpf_get_local_storage() helper function is used
to get a pointer to the bpf local storage from a bpf program.

It takes a pointer to a storage map and flags as arguments.
Right now it accepts only cgroup storage maps, and flags
argument has to be 0. Further it can be extended to support
other types of local storage: e.g. thread local storage etc.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: extend bpf_prog_array to store pointers to the cgroup storage

2018-08-02T22:47:32+00:00

This patch converts bpf_prog_array from an array of prog pointers
to the array of struct bpf_prog_array_item elements.

This allows to save a cgroup storage pointer for each bpf program
efficiently attached to a cgroup.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin 
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov 
Cc: Daniel Borkmann 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann