<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/kernel/bpf/btf.c, branch v4.20.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: check name validity for various types</title>
<updated>2018-11-29T00:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yonghong Song</name>
<email>yhs@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-27T21:23:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eb04bbb608e683f8fd3ef7f716e2fa32dd90861f'/>
<id>eb04bbb608e683f8fd3ef7f716e2fa32dd90861f</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch added name checking for the following types:
 . BTF_KIND_PTR, BTF_KIND_ARRAY, BTF_KIND_VOLATILE,
   BTF_KIND_CONST, BTF_KIND_RESTRICT:
     the name must be null
 . BTF_KIND_STRUCT, BTF_KIND_UNION: the struct/member name
     is either null or a valid identifier
 . BTF_KIND_ENUM: the enum type name is either null or a valid
     identifier; the enumerator name must be a valid identifier.
 . BTF_KIND_FWD: the name must be a valid identifier
 . BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF: the name must be a valid identifier

For those places a valid name is required, the name must be
a valid C identifier. This can be relaxed later if we found
use cases for a different (non-C) frontend.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch added name checking for the following types:
 . BTF_KIND_PTR, BTF_KIND_ARRAY, BTF_KIND_VOLATILE,
   BTF_KIND_CONST, BTF_KIND_RESTRICT:
     the name must be null
 . BTF_KIND_STRUCT, BTF_KIND_UNION: the struct/member name
     is either null or a valid identifier
 . BTF_KIND_ENUM: the enum type name is either null or a valid
     identifier; the enumerator name must be a valid identifier.
 . BTF_KIND_FWD: the name must be a valid identifier
 . BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF: the name must be a valid identifier

For those places a valid name is required, the name must be
a valid C identifier. This can be relaxed later if we found
use cases for a different (non-C) frontend.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: implement btf_name_valid_identifier()</title>
<updated>2018-11-29T00:03:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yonghong Song</name>
<email>yhs@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-27T21:23:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cdbb096adddb3f42584cecb5ec2e07c26815b71f'/>
<id>cdbb096adddb3f42584cecb5ec2e07c26815b71f</id>
<content type='text'>
Function btf_name_valid_identifier() have been implemented in
bpf-next commit 2667a2626f4d ("bpf: btf: Add BTF_KIND_FUNC and
BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO"). Backport this function so later patch
can use it.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Function btf_name_valid_identifier() have been implemented in
bpf-next commit 2667a2626f4d ("bpf: btf: Add BTF_KIND_FUNC and
BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO"). Backport this function so later patch
can use it.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf, btf: fix a missing check bug in btf_parse</title>
<updated>2018-10-25T22:42:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Lau</name>
<email>kafai@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-24T20:42:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a6998aff82a20a1aece86a186d8e5263f8b2315'/>
<id>4a6998aff82a20a1aece86a186d8e5263f8b2315</id>
<content type='text'>
Wenwen Wang reported:

  In btf_parse(), the header of the user-space btf data 'btf_data'
  is firstly parsed and verified through btf_parse_hdr().
  In btf_parse_hdr(), the header is copied from user-space 'btf_data'
  to kernel-space 'btf-&gt;hdr' and then verified. If no error happens
  during the verification process, the whole data of 'btf_data',
  including the header, is then copied to 'data' in btf_parse(). It
  is obvious that the header is copied twice here. More importantly,
  no check is enforced after the second copy to make sure the headers
  obtained in these two copies are same. Given that 'btf_data' resides
  in the user space, a malicious user can race to modify the header
  between these two copies. By doing so, the user can inject
  inconsistent data, which can cause undefined behavior of the
  kernel and introduce potential security risk.

This issue is similar to the one fixed in commit 8af03d1ae2e1 ("bpf:
btf: Fix a missing check bug"). To fix it, this patch copies the user
'btf_data' *before* parsing / verifying the BTF header.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Wenwen Wang reported:

  In btf_parse(), the header of the user-space btf data 'btf_data'
  is firstly parsed and verified through btf_parse_hdr().
  In btf_parse_hdr(), the header is copied from user-space 'btf_data'
  to kernel-space 'btf-&gt;hdr' and then verified. If no error happens
  during the verification process, the whole data of 'btf_data',
  including the header, is then copied to 'data' in btf_parse(). It
  is obvious that the header is copied twice here. More importantly,
  no check is enforced after the second copy to make sure the headers
  obtained in these two copies are same. Given that 'btf_data' resides
  in the user space, a malicious user can race to modify the header
  between these two copies. By doing so, the user can inject
  inconsistent data, which can cause undefined behavior of the
  kernel and introduce potential security risk.

This issue is similar to the one fixed in commit 8af03d1ae2e1 ("bpf:
btf: Fix a missing check bug"). To fix it, this patch copies the user
'btf_data' *before* parsing / verifying the BTF header.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Fix a missing check bug</title>
<updated>2018-10-10T04:42:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wenwen Wang</name>
<email>wang6495@umn.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-07T20:23:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8af03d1ae2e154a8be3631e8694b87007e1bdbc2'/>
<id>8af03d1ae2e154a8be3631e8694b87007e1bdbc2</id>
<content type='text'>
In btf_parse_hdr(), the length of the btf data header is firstly copied
from the user space to 'hdr_len' and checked to see whether it is larger
than 'btf_data_size'. If yes, an error code EINVAL is returned. Otherwise,
the whole header is copied again from the user space to 'btf-&gt;hdr'.
However, after the second copy, there is no check between
'btf-&gt;hdr-&gt;hdr_len' and 'hdr_len' to confirm that the two copies get the
same value. Given that the btf data is in the user space, a malicious user
can race to change the data between the two copies. By doing so, the user
can provide malicious data to the kernel and cause undefined behavior.

This patch adds a necessary check after the second copy, to make sure
'btf-&gt;hdr-&gt;hdr_len' has the same value as 'hdr_len'. Otherwise, an error
code EINVAL will be returned.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In btf_parse_hdr(), the length of the btf data header is firstly copied
from the user space to 'hdr_len' and checked to see whether it is larger
than 'btf_data_size'. If yes, an error code EINVAL is returned. Otherwise,
the whole header is copied again from the user space to 'btf-&gt;hdr'.
However, after the second copy, there is no check between
'btf-&gt;hdr-&gt;hdr_len' and 'hdr_len' to confirm that the two copies get the
same value. Given that the btf data is in the user space, a malicious user
can race to change the data between the two copies. By doing so, the user
can provide malicious data to the kernel and cause undefined behavior.

This patch adds a necessary check after the second copy, to make sure
'btf-&gt;hdr-&gt;hdr_len' has the same value as 'hdr_len'. Otherwise, an error
code EINVAL will be returned.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang &lt;wang6495@umn.edu&gt;
Acked-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Fix end boundary calculation for type section</title>
<updated>2018-09-12T20:00:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin KaFai Lau</name>
<email>kafai@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-12T17:29:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4b1c5d917d34f705096bb7dd8a2bd19b0881970e'/>
<id>4b1c5d917d34f705096bb7dd8a2bd19b0881970e</id>
<content type='text'>
The end boundary math for type section is incorrect in
btf_check_all_metas().  It just happens that hdr-&gt;type_off
is always 0 for now because there are only two sections
(type and string) and string section must be at the end (ensured
in btf_parse_str_sec).

However, type_off may not be 0 if a new section would be added later.
This patch fixes it.

Fixes: f80442a4cd18 ("bpf: btf: Change how section is supported in btf_header")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The end boundary math for type section is incorrect in
btf_check_all_metas().  It just happens that hdr-&gt;type_off
is always 0 for now because there are only two sections
(type and string) and string section must be at the end (ensured
in btf_parse_str_sec).

However, type_off may not be 0 if a new section would be added later.
This patch fixes it.

Fixes: f80442a4cd18 ("bpf: btf: Change how section is supported in btf_header")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Ensure the member-&gt;offset is in the right order</title>
<updated>2018-07-23T23:20:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin KaFai Lau</name>
<email>kafai@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-21T00:38:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6283fa38dc8744dc7c2bd2a03bb0478fe42f79fa'/>
<id>6283fa38dc8744dc7c2bd2a03bb0478fe42f79fa</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch ensures the member-&gt;offset of a struct
is in the correct order (i.e the later member's offset cannot
go backward).

The current "pahole -J" BTF encoder does not generate something
like this.  However, checking this can ensure future encoder
will not violate this.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch ensures the member-&gt;offset of a struct
is in the correct order (i.e the later member's offset cannot
go backward).

The current "pahole -J" BTF encoder does not generate something
like this.  However, checking this can ensure future encoder
will not violate this.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yonghong Song &lt;yhs@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Clean up BTF_INT_BITS() in uapi btf.h</title>
<updated>2018-07-20T08:25:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin KaFai Lau</name>
<email>kafai@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-20T05:14:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36fc3c8c282c01ad1570bd864de52f128d731b75'/>
<id>36fc3c8c282c01ad1570bd864de52f128d731b75</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch shrinks the BTF_INT_BITS() mask.  The current
btf_int_check_meta() ensures the nr_bits of an integer
cannot exceed 64.  Hence, it is mostly an uapi cleanup.

The actual btf usage (i.e. seq_show()) is also modified
to use u8 instead of u16.  The verification (e.g. btf_int_check_meta())
path stays as is to deal with invalid BTF situation.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch shrinks the BTF_INT_BITS() mask.  The current
btf_int_check_meta() ensures the nr_bits of an integer
cannot exceed 64.  Hence, it is mostly an uapi cleanup.

The actual btf usage (i.e. seq_show()) is also modified
to use u8 instead of u16.  The verification (e.g. btf_int_check_meta())
path stays as is to deal with invalid BTF situation.

Fixes: 69b693f0aefa ("bpf: btf: Introduce BPF Type Format (BTF)")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Fix bitfield extraction for big endian</title>
<updated>2018-07-11T20:36:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Okash Khawaja</name>
<email>osk@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-10T21:33:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b65f370d0671c4980ffe866c41e327b88893245c'/>
<id>b65f370d0671c4980ffe866c41e327b88893245c</id>
<content type='text'>
When extracting bitfield from a number, btf_int_bits_seq_show() builds
a mask and accesses least significant byte of the number in a way
specific to little-endian. This patch fixes that by checking endianness
of the machine and then shifting left and right the unneeded bits.

Thanks to Martin Lau for the help in navigating potential pitfalls when
dealing with endianess and for the final solution.

Fixes: b00b8daec828 ("bpf: btf: Add pretty print capability for data with BTF type info")
Signed-off-by: Okash Khawaja &lt;osk@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When extracting bitfield from a number, btf_int_bits_seq_show() builds
a mask and accesses least significant byte of the number in a way
specific to little-endian. This patch fixes that by checking endianness
of the machine and then shifting left and right the unneeded bits.

Thanks to Martin Lau for the help in navigating potential pitfalls when
dealing with endianess and for the final solution.

Fixes: b00b8daec828 ("bpf: btf: Add pretty print capability for data with BTF type info")
Signed-off-by: Okash Khawaja &lt;osk@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: kvzalloc() -&gt; kvcalloc()</title>
<updated>2018-06-12T23:19:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-12T21:04:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=778e1cdd81bb5fcd1e72bf48a2965cd7aaec82a8'/>
<id>778e1cdd81bb5fcd1e72bf48a2965cd7aaec82a8</id>
<content type='text'>
The kvzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kvcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kvzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kvcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kvzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kvzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kvcalloc(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kvzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The kvzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kvcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kvzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kvcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kvzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kvzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kvcalloc(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kvzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kvzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kvzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kvzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kvzalloc
+ kvcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: btf: Ensure t-&gt;type == 0 for BTF_KIND_FWD</title>
<updated>2018-06-02T18:22:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin KaFai Lau</name>
<email>kafai@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-02T16:06:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8175383f2320dbc1b4e803d857ed499ed3e76199'/>
<id>8175383f2320dbc1b4e803d857ed499ed3e76199</id>
<content type='text'>
The t-&gt;type in BTF_KIND_FWD is not used.  It must be 0.
This patch ensures that and also adds a test case in test_btf.c

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The t-&gt;type in BTF_KIND_FWD is not used.  It must be 0.
This patch ensures that and also adds a test case in test_btf.c

Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
