linux-stable.git/ipc, branch v3.12.2

ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races

2013-11-29T19:27:54+00:00

commit a399b29dfbaaaf91162b2dc5a5875dd51bbfa2a1 upstream.

When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).

Here's the race before this patch:

  TASK 1                     TASK 2
  ------                     ------
  shm_rmid()
    ipc_lock_object()
                             shmctl()
                             shp = shm_obtain_object_check()

    shm_destroy()
      shum_unlock()
      fput(shp->shm_file)
                             ipc_lock_object()
                             shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
                             

The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock.  fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2.  I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu

This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
   ipc_object_lock().

Example workloads, which each trigger oops...

Workload 1:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
    _raw_spin_lock
    shmem_lock
    SyS_shmctl

Workload 2:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmat $id 4096 &
    shm_rmid $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
    touch_atime
    shmem_mmap
    shm_mmap
    mmap_region
    do_mmap_pgoff
    do_shmat
    SyS_shmat

Workload 3:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmlock $id
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmunlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode.  The
  first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
  a get_file() and queued this fput():
    locks_remove_flock
    __fput
    ____fput
    task_work_run
    do_notify_resume
    int_signal

Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Manfred Spraul 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipc,shm: correct error return value in shmctl (SHM_UNLOCK)

2013-11-29T19:27:53+00:00

commit 3a72660b07d86d60457ca32080b1ce8c2b628ee2 upstream.

Commit 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
restructured the ipc shm to shorten critical region, but introduced a
path where the return value could be -EPERM, even if the operation
actually was performed.

Before the commit, the err return value was reset by the return value
from security_shm_shmctl() after the if (!ns_capable(...)) statement.

Now, we still exit the if statement with err set to -EPERM, and in the
case of SHM_UNLOCK, it is not reset at all, and used as the return value
from shmctl.

To fix this, we only set err when errors occur, leaving the fallthrough
case alone.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Nilsson 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Michel Lespinasse 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipc, msg: forbid negative values for "msg{max,mnb,mni}"

2013-11-03T18:53:11+00:00

Negative message lengths make no sense -- so don't do negative queue
lenghts or identifier counts. Prevent them from getting negative.

Also change the underlying data types to be unsigned to avoid hairy
surprises with sign extensions in cases where those variables get
evaluated in unsigned expressions with bigger data types, e.g size_t.

In case a user still wants to have "unlimited" sizes she could just use
INT_MAX instead.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc/sem.c: synchronize semop and semctl with IPC_RMID

2013-10-17T04:35:52+00:00

After acquiring the semlock spinlock, operations must test that the
array is still valid.

 - semctl() and exit_sem() would walk stale linked lists (ugly, but
   should be ok: all lists are empty)

 - semtimedop() would sleep forever - and if woken up due to a signal -
   access memory after free.

The patch also:
 - standardizes the tests for .deleted, so that all tests in one
   function leave the function with the same approach.
 - unconditionally tests for .deleted immediately after every call to
   sem_lock - even it it means that for semctl(GETALL), .deleted will be
   tested twice.

Both changes make the review simpler: After every sem_lock, there must
be a test of .deleted, followed by a goto to the cleanup code (if the
function uses "goto cleanup").

The only exception is semctl_down(): If sem_ids().rwsem is locked, then
the presence in ids->ipcs_idr is equivalent to !.deleted, thus no
additional test is required.

Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc: update locking scheme comments

2013-10-17T04:35:52+00:00

The initial documentation was a bit incomplete, update accordingly.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make it more readable in 80 columns]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Acked-by: Manfred Spraul 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc,msg: prevent race with rmid in msgsnd,msgrcv

2013-09-30T21:31:03+00:00

This fixes a race in both msgrcv() and msgsnd() between finding the msg
and actually dealing with the queue, as another thread can delete shmid
underneath us if we are preempted before acquiring the
kern_ipc_perm.lock.

Manfred illustrates this nicely:

Assume a preemptible kernel that is preempted just after

    msq = msq_obtain_object_check(ns, msqid)

in do_msgrcv().  The only lock that is held is rcu_read_lock().

Now the other thread processes IPC_RMID.  When the first task is
resumed, then it will happily wait for messages on a deleted queue.

Fix this by checking for if the queue has been deleted after taking the
lock.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Reported-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc:  	[3.11]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc/sem.c: update sem_otime for all operations

2013-09-30T21:31:03+00:00

In commit 0a2b9d4c7967 ("ipc/sem.c: move wake_up_process out of the
spinlock section"), the update of semaphore's sem_otime(last semop time)
was moved to one central position (do_smart_update).

But since do_smart_update() is only called for operations that modify
the array, this means that wait-for-zero semops do not update sem_otime
anymore.

The fix is simple:
Non-alter operations must update sem_otime.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Reported-by: Jia He 
Tested-by: Jia He 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc/sem.c: synchronize the proc interface

2013-09-30T21:31:01+00:00

The proc interface is not aware of sem_lock(), it instead calls
ipc_lock_object() directly.  This means that simple semop() operations
can run in parallel with the proc interface.  Right now, this is
uncritical, because the implementation doesn't do anything that requires
a proper synchronization.

But it is dangerous and therefore should be fixed.

Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc/sem.c: optimize sem_lock()

2013-09-30T21:31:01+00:00

Operations that need access to the whole array must guarantee that there
are no simple operations ongoing.  Right now this is achieved by
spin_unlock_wait(sem->lock) on all semaphores.

If complex_count is nonzero, then this spin_unlock_wait() is not
necessary, because it was already performed in the past by the thread
that increased complex_count and even though sem_perm.lock was dropped
inbetween, no simple operation could have started, because simple
operations cannot start when complex_count is non-zero.

Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

ipc/sem.c: fix race in sem_lock()

2013-09-30T21:31:01+00:00

The exclusion of complex operations in sem_lock() is insufficient: after
acquiring the per-semaphore lock, a simple op must first check that
sem_perm.lock is not locked and only after that test check
complex_count.  The current code does it the other way around - and that
creates a race.  Details are below.

The patch is a complete rewrite of sem_lock(), based in part on the code
from Mike Galbraith.  It removes all gotos and all loops and thus the
risk of livelocks.

I have tested the patch (together with the next one) on my i3 laptop and
it didn't cause any problems.

The bug is probably also present in 3.10 and 3.11, but for these kernels
it might be simpler just to move the test of sma->complex_count after
the spin_is_locked() test.

Details of the bug:

Assume:
 - sma->complex_count = 0.
 - Thread 1: semtimedop(complex op that must sleep)
 - Thread 2: semtimedop(simple op).

Pseudo-Trace:

Thread 1: sem_lock(): acquire sem_perm.lock
Thread 1: sem_lock(): check for ongoing simple ops
			Nothing ongoing, thread 2 is still before sem_lock().
Thread 1: try_atomic_semop()
	<<< preempted.

Thread 2: sem_lock():
        static inline int sem_lock(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
                                      int nsops)
        {
                int locknum;
         again:
                if (nsops == 1 && !sma->complex_count) {
                        struct sem *sem = sma->sem_base + sops->sem_num;

                        /* Lock just the semaphore we are interested in. */
                        spin_lock(&sem->lock);

                        /*
                         * If sma->complex_count was set while we were spinning,
                         * we may need to look at things we did not lock here.
                         */
                        if (unlikely(sma->complex_count)) {
                                spin_unlock(&sem->lock);
                                goto lock_array;
                        }
        <<<<<<<<<
	<<< complex_count is still 0.
	<<<
        <<< Here it is preempted
        <<<<<<<<<

Thread 1: try_atomic_semop() returns, notices that it must sleep.
Thread 1: increases sma->complex_count.
Thread 1: drops sem_perm.lock
Thread 2:
                /*
                 * Another process is holding the global lock on the
                 * sem_array; we cannot enter our critical section,
                 * but have to wait for the global lock to be released.
                 */
                if (unlikely(spin_is_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock))) {
                        spin_unlock(&sem->lock);
                        spin_unlock_wait(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
                        goto again;
                }
	<<< sem_perm.lock already dropped, thus no "goto again;"

                locknum = sops->sem_num;

Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Rik van Riel 
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso 
Cc: 	[3.10+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds