<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/ipc/shm.c, branch linux-3.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: Fix pid freeing.</title>
<updated>2019-05-02T20:42:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-28T18:38:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9b5d63b6dd23f6c2f739b047cba43ef971cda8bb'/>
<id>9b5d63b6dd23f6c2f739b047cba43ef971cda8bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2236d4d39035b9839944603ec4b65ce71180a9ea upstream.

The 0day kernel test build report reported an oops:
&gt;
&gt;  IP: put_pid+0x22/0x5c
&gt;  PGD 19efa067 P4D 19efa067 PUD 0
&gt;  Oops: 0000 [#1]
&gt;  CPU: 0 PID: 727 Comm: trinity Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2-00010-g98f929b #1
&gt;  RIP: 0010:put_pid+0x22/0x5c
&gt;  RSP: 0018:ffff986719f73e48 EFLAGS: 00010202
&gt;  RAX: 00000006d765f710 RBX: ffff98671a4fa4d0 RCX: ffff986719f73d40
&gt;  RDX: 000000006f6e6125 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffa01e6d21
&gt;  RBP: ffffffffa0955fe0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000000
&gt;  R10: 0000000000000078 R11: ffff986719f73e76 R12: 0000000000001000
&gt;  R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000054000fb0 R15: 0000000000000000
&gt;  FS:  00000000028c2880(0000) GS:ffffffffa06ad000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
&gt;  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
&gt;  CR2: 0000000677846439 CR3: 0000000019fc1005 CR4: 00000000000606b0
&gt;  Call Trace:
&gt;   ? ipc_update_pid+0x36/0x3e
&gt;   ? newseg+0x34c/0x3a6
&gt;   ? ipcget+0x5d/0x528
&gt;   ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x52/0xb7
&gt;   ? SyS_shmget+0x5a/0x84
&gt;   ? do_syscall_64+0x194/0x1b3
&gt;   ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
&gt;  Code: ff 05 e7 20 9b 03 58 c9 c3 48 ff 05 85 21 9b 03 48 85 ff 74 4f 8b 47 04 8b 17 48 ff 05 7c 21 9b 03 48 83 c0 03 48 c1 e0 04 ff ca &lt;48&gt; 8b 44 07 08 74 1f 48 ff 05 6c 21 9b 03 ff 0f 0f 94 c2 48 ff
&gt;  RIP: put_pid+0x22/0x5c RSP: ffff986719f73e48
&gt;  CR2: 0000000677846439
&gt;  ---[ end trace ab8c5cb4389d37c5 ]---
&gt;  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In newseg when changing shm_cprid and shm_lprid from pid_t to struct
pid* I misread the kvmalloc as kvzalloc and thought shp was
initialized to 0.  As that is not the case it is not safe to for the
error handling to address shm_cprid and shm_lprid before they are
initialized.

Therefore move the cleanup of shm_cprid and shm_lprid from the no_file
error cleanup path to the no_id error cleanup path.  Ensuring that an
early error exit won't cause the oops above.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy &lt;nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2236d4d39035b9839944603ec4b65ce71180a9ea upstream.

The 0day kernel test build report reported an oops:
&gt;
&gt;  IP: put_pid+0x22/0x5c
&gt;  PGD 19efa067 P4D 19efa067 PUD 0
&gt;  Oops: 0000 [#1]
&gt;  CPU: 0 PID: 727 Comm: trinity Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2-00010-g98f929b #1
&gt;  RIP: 0010:put_pid+0x22/0x5c
&gt;  RSP: 0018:ffff986719f73e48 EFLAGS: 00010202
&gt;  RAX: 00000006d765f710 RBX: ffff98671a4fa4d0 RCX: ffff986719f73d40
&gt;  RDX: 000000006f6e6125 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffa01e6d21
&gt;  RBP: ffffffffa0955fe0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000000
&gt;  R10: 0000000000000078 R11: ffff986719f73e76 R12: 0000000000001000
&gt;  R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000054000fb0 R15: 0000000000000000
&gt;  FS:  00000000028c2880(0000) GS:ffffffffa06ad000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
&gt;  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
&gt;  CR2: 0000000677846439 CR3: 0000000019fc1005 CR4: 00000000000606b0
&gt;  Call Trace:
&gt;   ? ipc_update_pid+0x36/0x3e
&gt;   ? newseg+0x34c/0x3a6
&gt;   ? ipcget+0x5d/0x528
&gt;   ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x52/0xb7
&gt;   ? SyS_shmget+0x5a/0x84
&gt;   ? do_syscall_64+0x194/0x1b3
&gt;   ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
&gt;  Code: ff 05 e7 20 9b 03 58 c9 c3 48 ff 05 85 21 9b 03 48 85 ff 74 4f 8b 47 04 8b 17 48 ff 05 7c 21 9b 03 48 83 c0 03 48 c1 e0 04 ff ca &lt;48&gt; 8b 44 07 08 74 1f 48 ff 05 6c 21 9b 03 ff 0f 0f 94 c2 48 ff
&gt;  RIP: put_pid+0x22/0x5c RSP: ffff986719f73e48
&gt;  CR2: 0000000677846439
&gt;  ---[ end trace ab8c5cb4389d37c5 ]---
&gt;  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

In newseg when changing shm_cprid and shm_lprid from pid_t to struct
pid* I misread the kvmalloc as kvzalloc and thought shp was
initialized to 0.  As that is not the case it is not safe to for the
error handling to address shm_cprid and shm_lprid before they are
initialized.

Therefore move the cleanup of shm_cprid and shm_lprid from the no_file
error cleanup path to the no_id error cleanup path.  Ensuring that an
early error exit won't cause the oops above.

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;fengguang.wu@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy &lt;nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: fix shmat() nil address after round-down when remapping</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:46:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T21:47:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=302eeac47d97a95fb3dd3dba17076bbe4593157d'/>
<id>302eeac47d97a95fb3dd3dba17076bbe4593157d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8f89c007b6dec16a1793cb88de88fcc02117bbbc upstream.

shmat()'s SHM_REMAP option forbids passing a nil address for; this is in
fact the very first thing we check for.  Andrea reported that for
SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP cases we can end up bypassing the initial addr check,
but we need to check again if the address was rounded down to nil.  As
of this patch, such cases will return -EINVAL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503204934.kk63josdu6u53fbd@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8f89c007b6dec16a1793cb88de88fcc02117bbbc upstream.

shmat()'s SHM_REMAP option forbids passing a nil address for; this is in
fact the very first thing we check for.  Andrea reported that for
SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP cases we can end up bypassing the initial addr check,
but we need to check again if the address was rounded down to nil.  As
of this patch, such cases will return -EINVAL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503204934.kk63josdu6u53fbd@linux-n805
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection"</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:46:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-25T21:47:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b2df875d0341bd42ddeb1a4bb47764700365c1d'/>
<id>6b2df875d0341bd42ddeb1a4bb47764700365c1d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a73ab244f0dad8fffb3291b905f73e2d3eaa7c00 upstream.

Patch series "ipc/shm: shmat() fixes around nil-page".

These patches fix two issues reported[1] a while back by Joe and Andrea
around how shmat(2) behaves with nil-page.

The first reverts a commit that it was incorrectly thought that mapping
nil-page (address=0) was a no no with MAP_FIXED.  This is not the case,
with the exception of SHM_REMAP; which is address in the second patch.

I chose two patches because it is easier to backport and it explicitly
reverts bogus behaviour.  Both patches ought to be in -stable and ltp
testcases need updated (the added testcase around the cve can be
modified to just test for SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP).

[1] lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430172152.nfa564pvgpk3ut7p@linux-n805

This patch (of 2):

Commit 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
worked on the idea that we should not be mapping as root addr=0 and
MAP_FIXED.  However, it was reported that this scenario is in fact
valid, thus making the patch both bogus and breaks userspace as well.

For example X11's libint10.so relies on shmat(1, SHM_RND) for lowmem
initialization[1].

[1] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/tree/hw/xfree86/os-support/linux/int10/linux.c#n347
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503203243.15045-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Fixes: 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a73ab244f0dad8fffb3291b905f73e2d3eaa7c00 upstream.

Patch series "ipc/shm: shmat() fixes around nil-page".

These patches fix two issues reported[1] a while back by Joe and Andrea
around how shmat(2) behaves with nil-page.

The first reverts a commit that it was incorrectly thought that mapping
nil-page (address=0) was a no no with MAP_FIXED.  This is not the case,
with the exception of SHM_REMAP; which is address in the second patch.

I chose two patches because it is easier to backport and it explicitly
reverts bogus behaviour.  Both patches ought to be in -stable and ltp
testcases need updated (the added testcase around the cve can be
modified to just test for SHM_RND|SHM_REMAP).

[1] lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430172152.nfa564pvgpk3ut7p@linux-n805

This patch (of 2):

Commit 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
worked on the idea that we should not be mapping as root addr=0 and
MAP_FIXED.  However, it was reported that this scenario is in fact
valid, thus making the patch both bogus and breaks userspace as well.

For example X11's libint10.so relies on shmat(1, SHM_RND) for lowmem
initialization[1].

[1] https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/tree/hw/xfree86/os-support/linux/int10/linux.c#n347
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180503203243.15045-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Fixes: 95e91b831f87 ("ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection")
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence &lt;joe.lawrence@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: fix use-after-free of shm file via remap_file_pages()</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-13T22:35:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2b62f4850d9f1572f7e199993f0fee64fe760d43'/>
<id>2b62f4850d9f1572f7e199993f0fee64fe760d43</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3f05317d9889ab75c7190dcd39491d2a97921984 upstream.

syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)-&gt;file-&gt;f_op in
shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages().

Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which
I think caused it.  When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V
shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is
created using the -&gt;vm_file.  Between these steps, the shm ID can be
removed and reused for a new shm segment.  But, shm_mmap() only checks
whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's
-&gt;mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused.  Thus it can use the
wrong underlying file, one that was already freed.

Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in
-&gt;vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making
__shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches
the one associated with the "outer" file.

Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the
problem, since otherwise sfd-&gt;file could point to a freed file, which
then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm
segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks).

Commit 1ac0b6dec656 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in
shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because
it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused.

The following program usually reproduces this bug:

	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/shm.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		int is_parent = (fork() != 0);
		srand(getpid());
		for (;;) {
			int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700);
			if (is_parent) {
				void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0));
			} else {
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
			}
		}
	}

It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file'
being used while it's being freed.  (I couldn't actually get a KASAN
use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report.  But I think it's
possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...)

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724
	[...]
	Call Trace:
	 file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline]
	 shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712
	 do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483
	 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline]
	 SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline]
	 SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769
	 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ebiggers@google.com: add comment]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410192850.235835-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409043039.28915-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 3f05317d9889ab75c7190dcd39491d2a97921984 upstream.

syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)-&gt;file-&gt;f_op in
shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages().

Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which
I think caused it.  When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V
shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is
created using the -&gt;vm_file.  Between these steps, the shm ID can be
removed and reused for a new shm segment.  But, shm_mmap() only checks
whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's
-&gt;mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused.  Thus it can use the
wrong underlying file, one that was already freed.

Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in
-&gt;vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making
__shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches
the one associated with the "outer" file.

Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the
problem, since otherwise sfd-&gt;file could point to a freed file, which
then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm
segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks).

Commit 1ac0b6dec656 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in
shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because
it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused.

The following program usually reproduces this bug:

	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/shm.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/syscall.h&gt;
	#include &lt;unistd.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		int is_parent = (fork() != 0);
		srand(getpid());
		for (;;) {
			int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700);
			if (is_parent) {
				void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0));
			} else {
				usleep(rand() % 50);
				shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
			}
		}
	}

It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file'
being used while it's being freed.  (I couldn't actually get a KASAN
use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report.  But I think it's
possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...)

	BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058
	PGD 0 P4D 0
	Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
	CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
	RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline]
	RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724
	[...]
	Call Trace:
	 file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline]
	 shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465
	 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline]
	 mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712
	 do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483
	 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline]
	 SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline]
	 SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769
	 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ebiggers@google.com: add comment]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410192850.235835-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409043039.28915-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: Fix shmctl(..., IPC_STAT, ...) between pid namespaces.</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-23T05:29:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ecc23ca1da7596dcf39d2ef98fe33e4e05532a8a'/>
<id>ecc23ca1da7596dcf39d2ef98fe33e4e05532a8a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 98f929b1bd4d0b7c7a77d0d9776d1b924db2e454 upstream.

Today shm_cpid and shm_lpid are remembered in the pid namespace of the
creator and the processes that last touched a sysvipc shared memory
segment.   If you have processes in multiple pid namespaces that
is just wrong, and I don't know how this has been over-looked for
so long.

As only creation and shared memory attach and shared memory detach
update the pids I do not expect there to be a repeat of the issues
when struct pid was attached to each af_unix skb, which in some
notable cases cut the performance in half.  The problem was threads of
the same process updating same struct pid from different cpus causing
the cache line to be highly contended and bounce between cpus.

As creation, attach, and detach are expected to be rare operations for
sysvipc shared memory segments I do not expect that kind of cache line
ping pong to cause probems.  In addition because the pid is at a fixed
location in the structure instead of being dynamic on a skb, the
reference count of the pid does not need to be updated on each
operation if the pid is the same.  This ability to simply skip the pid
reference count changes if the pid is unchanging further reduces the
likelihood of the a cache line holding a pid reference count
ping-ponging between cpus.

Fixes: b488893a390e ("pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user")
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy &lt;nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 98f929b1bd4d0b7c7a77d0d9776d1b924db2e454 upstream.

Today shm_cpid and shm_lpid are remembered in the pid namespace of the
creator and the processes that last touched a sysvipc shared memory
segment.   If you have processes in multiple pid namespaces that
is just wrong, and I don't know how this has been over-looked for
so long.

As only creation and shared memory attach and shared memory detach
update the pids I do not expect there to be a repeat of the issues
when struct pid was attached to each af_unix skb, which in some
notable cases cut the performance in half.  The problem was threads of
the same process updating same struct pid from different cpus causing
the cache line to be highly contended and bounce between cpus.

As creation, attach, and detach are expected to be rare operations for
sysvipc shared memory segments I do not expect that kind of cache line
ping pong to cause probems.  In addition because the pid is at a fixed
location in the structure instead of being dynamic on a skb, the
reference count of the pid does not need to be updated on each
operation if the pid is the same.  This ability to simply skip the pid
reference count changes if the pid is unchanging further reduces the
likelihood of the a cache line holding a pid reference count
ping-ponging between cpus.

Fixes: b488893a390e ("pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user")
Reviewed-by: Nagarathnam Muthusamy &lt;nagarathnam.muthusamy@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in shm_mmap()</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:45:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-17T21:11:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29f2668de2c42cd45c01d7e0c647b5ff853c737d'/>
<id>29f2668de2c42cd45c01d7e0c647b5ff853c737d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ac0b6dec656f3f78d1c3dd216fad84cb4d0a01e upstream.

remap_file_pages(2) emulation can reach file which represents removed
IPC ID as long as a memory segment is mapped.  It breaks expectations of
IPC subsystem.

Test case (rewritten to be more human readable, originally autogenerated
by syzkaller[1]):

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/ipc.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/shm.h&gt;

	#define PAGE_SIZE 4096

	int main()
	{
		int id;
		void *p;

		id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0);
		p = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
		shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
		remap_file_pages(p, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0, 7, 0);

	        return 0;
	}

The patch changes shm_mmap() and code around shm_lock() to propagate
locking error back to caller of shm_mmap().

[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1ac0b6dec656f3f78d1c3dd216fad84cb4d0a01e upstream.

remap_file_pages(2) emulation can reach file which represents removed
IPC ID as long as a memory segment is mapped.  It breaks expectations of
IPC subsystem.

Test case (rewritten to be more human readable, originally autogenerated
by syzkaller[1]):

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/ipc.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/mman.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/shm.h&gt;

	#define PAGE_SIZE 4096

	int main()
	{
		int id;
		void *p;

		id = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0);
		p = shmat(id, NULL, 0);
		shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL);
		remap_file_pages(p, 3 * PAGE_SIZE, 0, 7, 0);

	        return 0;
	}

The patch changes shm_mmap() and code around shm_lock() to propagate
locking error back to caller of shm_mmap().

[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: convert invalid scenarios to use WARN_ON</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:45:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:39:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3c6440edddde1e24fa39f2d493744dc8316ed5bb'/>
<id>3c6440edddde1e24fa39f2d493744dc8316ed5bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0edd8528362c07216498340e928159510595e7b upstream.

Considering Linus' past rants about the (ab)use of BUG in the kernel, I
took a look at how we deal with such calls in ipc.  Given that any errors
or corruption in ipc code are most likely contained within the set of
processes participating in the broken mechanisms, there aren't really many
strong fatal system failure scenarios that would require a BUG call.
Also, if something is seriously wrong, ipc might not be the place for such
a BUG either.

1. For example, recently, a customer hit one of these BUG_ONs in shm
   after failing shm_lock().  A busted ID imho does not merit a BUG_ON,
   and WARN would have been better.

2. MSG_COPY functionality of posix msgrcv(2) for checkpoint/restore.
   I don't see how we can hit this anyway -- at least it should be IS_ERR.
    The 'copy' arg from do_msgrcv is always set by calling prepare_copy()
   first and foremost.  We could also probably drop this check altogether.
    Either way, it does not merit a BUG_ON.

3. No -&gt;fault() callback for the fs getting the corresponding page --
   seems selfish to make the system unusable.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d0edd8528362c07216498340e928159510595e7b upstream.

Considering Linus' past rants about the (ab)use of BUG in the kernel, I
took a look at how we deal with such calls in ipc.  Given that any errors
or corruption in ipc code are most likely contained within the set of
processes participating in the broken mechanisms, there aren't really many
strong fatal system failure scenarios that would require a BUG call.
Also, if something is seriously wrong, ipc might not be the place for such
a BUG either.

1. For example, recently, a customer hit one of these BUG_ONs in shm
   after failing shm_lock().  A busted ID imho does not merit a BUG_ON,
   and WARN would have been better.

2. MSG_COPY functionality of posix msgrcv(2) for checkpoint/restore.
   I don't see how we can hit this anyway -- at least it should be IS_ERR.
    The 'copy' arg from do_msgrcv is always set by calling prepare_copy()
   first and foremost.  We could also probably drop this check altogether.
    Either way, it does not merit a BUG_ON.

3. No -&gt;fault() callback for the fs getting the corresponding page --
   seems selfish to make the system unusable.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc,shm: move BUG_ON check into shm_lock</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T07:45:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-30T21:58:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=929194e125e29734bd25baa875dd22de1930e7c8'/>
<id>929194e125e29734bd25baa875dd22de1930e7c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c5c8975b2eb4eb7604e8ce4f762987f56d2a96a2 upstream.

Upon every shm_lock call, we BUG_ON if an error was returned, indicating
racing either in idr or in shm_destroy.  Move this logic into the locking.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify code]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c5c8975b2eb4eb7604e8ce4f762987f56d2a96a2 upstream.

Upon every shm_lock call, we BUG_ON if an error was returned, indicating
racing either in idr or in shm_destroy.  Move this logic into the locking.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify code]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:27:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davidlohr Bueso</name>
<email>dave@stgolabs.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-27T22:28:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=13508cb3bf17a73b91957e7070112b710bdfadc2'/>
<id>13508cb3bf17a73b91957e7070112b710bdfadc2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 95e91b831f87ac8e1f8ed50c14d709089b4e01b8 upstream.

The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931

The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and
the address rounded down to 0.  For the regular mmap case, the
protection mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the
address -- arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and
return that address.  So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things
get funky for shmat().

The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will
not have a problem attaching a nil-page.  There are two possible fixes
to this.  The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root
to crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking
up the testcase and adding mmap(...  |MAP_FIXED).  While this approach
is the safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the
rounded address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags.  This makes the
behavior of shmat() identical to the mmap() case.  The downside of this
is obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains
semantics after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.

Passes shm related ltp tests.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Gareth Evans &lt;gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 95e91b831f87ac8e1f8ed50c14d709089b4e01b8 upstream.

The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931

The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and
the address rounded down to 0.  For the regular mmap case, the
protection mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the
address -- arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and
return that address.  So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things
get funky for shmat().

The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will
not have a problem attaching a nil-page.  There are two possible fixes
to this.  The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root
to crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking
up the testcase and adding mmap(...  |MAP_FIXED).  While this approach
is the safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the
rounded address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags.  This makes the
behavior of shmat() identical to the mmap() case.  The downside of this
is obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains
semantics after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.

Passes shm related ltp tests.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dbueso@suse.de&gt;
Reported-by: Gareth Evans &lt;gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Manfred Spraul &lt;manfred@colorfullife.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kerrisk &lt;mtk.manpages@googlemail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipc: remove use of seq_printf return value</title>
<updated>2017-02-23T03:54:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-15T23:17:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b11c133308bb386e8b6eb6dfc07f232bf0306a1'/>
<id>5b11c133308bb386e8b6eb6dfc07f232bf0306a1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7f032d6ef6154868a2a5d5f6b2c3f8587292196c upstream.

The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.

See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7f032d6ef6154868a2a5d5f6b2c3f8587292196c upstream.

The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.

See: commit 1f33c41c03da ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
