<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/io_uring, branch v6.0.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: remove iopoll spinlock</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-23T11:33:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c1baa6037b717c8c925cbaf757f01a758ac8c6f'/>
<id>5c1baa6037b717c8c925cbaf757f01a758ac8c6f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2dac1a159216b39ced8d78dba590c5d2f4249586 upstream.

This reverts commit 2ccc92f4effcfa1c51c4fcf1e34d769099d3cad4

io_req_complete_post() should now behave well even in case of IOPOLL, we
can remove completion_lock locking.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7e171c8b530656b14a671c59100ca260e46e7f2a.1669203009.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2dac1a159216b39ced8d78dba590c5d2f4249586 upstream.

This reverts commit 2ccc92f4effcfa1c51c4fcf1e34d769099d3cad4

io_req_complete_post() should now behave well even in case of IOPOLL, we
can remove completion_lock locking.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7e171c8b530656b14a671c59100ca260e46e7f2a.1669203009.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: protect cq_timeouts with timeout_lock</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-02T17:47:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=223ba1d1f06aab7752b104f1d64158025d1ff297'/>
<id>223ba1d1f06aab7752b104f1d64158025d1ff297</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ea011ee10231f5fa6cbb415007048ca0bb948baf upstream.

Read cq_timeouts in io_flush_timeouts() only after taking the
timeout_lock, as it's protected by it. There are many places where we
also grab -&gt;completion_lock, but for instance io_timeout_fn() doesn't
and still modifies cq_timeouts.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9c79544dd6cf5c4018cb1bab99cf481a93ea46ef.1670002973.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ea011ee10231f5fa6cbb415007048ca0bb948baf upstream.

Read cq_timeouts in io_flush_timeouts() only after taking the
timeout_lock, as it's protected by it. There are many places where we
also grab -&gt;completion_lock, but for instance io_timeout_fn() doesn't
and still modifies cq_timeouts.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9c79544dd6cf5c4018cb1bab99cf481a93ea46ef.1670002973.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/net: fix cleanup after recycle</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-19T15:11:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1011a5f52bc365d1592e251ed728b102dec0ef72'/>
<id>1011a5f52bc365d1592e251ed728b102dec0ef72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c3e8955d4bd9811a6e1761eea412a14fb51a2e6 upstream.

Don't access io_async_msghdr io_netmsg_recycle(), it may be reallocated.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9bb66906f23e5 ("io_uring: support multishot in recvmsg")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9e326f4ad4046ddadf15bf34bf3fa58c6372f6b5.1671461985.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c3e8955d4bd9811a6e1761eea412a14fb51a2e6 upstream.

Don't access io_async_msghdr io_netmsg_recycle(), it may be reallocated.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9bb66906f23e5 ("io_uring: support multishot in recvmsg")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9e326f4ad4046ddadf15bf34bf3fa58c6372f6b5.1671461985.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: improve io_double_lock_ctx fail handling</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-07T03:53:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=72750cf68d58fa08e301833fb73cef5e8d97004b'/>
<id>72750cf68d58fa08e301833fb73cef5e8d97004b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4c979eaefa4356d385b7c7d2877dc04d7fe88969 upstream.

msg_ring will fail the request if it can't lock rings, instead punt it
to io-wq as was originally intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4697f05afcc37df5c8f89e2fe6d9c7c19f0241f9.1670384893.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4c979eaefa4356d385b7c7d2877dc04d7fe88969 upstream.

msg_ring will fail the request if it can't lock rings, instead punt it
to io-wq as was originally intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4697f05afcc37df5c8f89e2fe6d9c7c19f0241f9.1670384893.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: add completion locking for iopoll</title>
<updated>2022-12-31T12:26:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-23T11:33:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ffd5d0a7b105bedac1f50e33e6019b18331bdc8'/>
<id>4ffd5d0a7b105bedac1f50e33e6019b18331bdc8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2ccc92f4effcfa1c51c4fcf1e34d769099d3cad4 upstream.

There are pieces of code that may allow iopoll to race filling cqes,
temporarily add spinlocking around posting events.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/84d86b5c117feda075471c5c9e65208e0dccf5d0.1669203009.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2ccc92f4effcfa1c51c4fcf1e34d769099d3cad4 upstream.

There are pieces of code that may allow iopoll to race filling cqes,
temporarily add spinlocking around posting events.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/84d86b5c117feda075471c5c9e65208e0dccf5d0.1669203009.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: Fix a null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb()</title>
<updated>2022-12-14T10:40:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harshit Mogalapalli</name>
<email>harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-12-06T09:38:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d91edca1943453aaaba4f380f6f364346222e5cf'/>
<id>d91edca1943453aaaba4f380f6f364346222e5cf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 998b30c3948e4d0b1097e639918c5cff332acac5 upstream.

Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:

 BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955

 CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
  ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
  ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
  io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  task_work_run+0x164/0x250
  ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
  get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
  ? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
  ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
  ? putname+0xfe/0x140
  ? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
  ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
  ? putname+0xfe/0x140
  ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
  do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0023:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

This happens because the adding of task_work from io_ring_exit_work()
isn't synchronized with canceling all work items from eg exec. The
execution of the two are ordered in that they are both run by the task
itself, but if io_tctx_exit_cb() is queued while we're canceling all
work items off exec AND gets executed when the task exits to userspace
rather than in the main loop in io_uring_cancel_generic(), then we can
find current-&gt;io_uring == NULL and hit the above crash.

It's safe to add this NULL check here, because the execution of the two
paths are done by the task itself.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d56d938b4bef ("io_uring: do ctx initiated file note removal")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206093833.3812138-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com
[axboe: add code comment and also put an explanation in the commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 998b30c3948e4d0b1097e639918c5cff332acac5 upstream.

Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:

 BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955

 CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
  ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
  ? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
  io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
  task_work_run+0x164/0x250
  ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
  get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
  ? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
  ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
  ? putname+0xfe/0x140
  ? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
  ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
  ? putname+0xfe/0x140
  ? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
  do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0023:0x0
 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
 RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  &lt;/TASK&gt;
 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

This happens because the adding of task_work from io_ring_exit_work()
isn't synchronized with canceling all work items from eg exec. The
execution of the two are ordered in that they are both run by the task
itself, but if io_tctx_exit_cb() is queued while we're canceling all
work items off exec AND gets executed when the task exits to userspace
rather than in the main loop in io_uring_cancel_generic(), then we can
find current-&gt;io_uring == NULL and hit the above crash.

It's safe to add this NULL check here, because the execution of the two
paths are done by the task itself.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d56d938b4bef ("io_uring: do ctx initiated file note removal")
Reported-by: syzkaller &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli &lt;harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206093833.3812138-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com
[axboe: add code comment and also put an explanation in the commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL if set and task_work not available</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T16:43:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-25T16:36:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4b729a5def9f0cb267e76535dd7704859d4efe81'/>
<id>4b729a5def9f0cb267e76535dd7704859d4efe81</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7cfe7a09489c1cefee7181e07b5f2bcbaebd9f41 upstream.

With how task_work is added and signaled, we can have TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
set and no task_work pending as it got run in a previous loop. Treat
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL like get_signal(), always clear it if set regardless
of whether or not task_work is pending to run.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 46a525e199e4 ("io_uring: don't gate task_work run on TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7cfe7a09489c1cefee7181e07b5f2bcbaebd9f41 upstream.

With how task_work is added and signaled, we can have TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
set and no task_work pending as it got run in a previous loop. Treat
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL like get_signal(), always clear it if set regardless
of whether or not task_work is pending to run.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 46a525e199e4 ("io_uring: don't gate task_work run on TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: make poll refs more robust</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T16:43:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-20T16:57:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc4e6ee16778149811333a969a7a893d4cc110c5'/>
<id>bc4e6ee16778149811333a969a7a893d4cc110c5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a26a35e9019fd70bf3cf647dcfdae87abc7bacea upstream.

poll_refs carry two functions, the first is ownership over the request.
The second is notifying the io_poll_check_events() that there was an
event but wake up couldn't grab the ownership, so io_poll_check_events()
should retry.

We want to make poll_refs more robust against overflows. Instead of
always incrementing it, which covers two purposes with one atomic, check
if poll_refs is elevated enough and if so set a retry flag without
attempts to grab ownership. The gap between the bias check and following
atomics may seem racy, but we don't need it to be strict. Moreover there
might only be maximum 4 parallel updates: by the first and the second
poll entries, __io_arm_poll_handler() and cancellation. From those four,
only poll wake ups may be executed multiple times, but they're protected
by a spin.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Fixes: aa43477b04025 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c762bc31f8683b3270f3587691348a7119ef9c9d.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a26a35e9019fd70bf3cf647dcfdae87abc7bacea upstream.

poll_refs carry two functions, the first is ownership over the request.
The second is notifying the io_poll_check_events() that there was an
event but wake up couldn't grab the ownership, so io_poll_check_events()
should retry.

We want to make poll_refs more robust against overflows. Instead of
always incrementing it, which covers two purposes with one atomic, check
if poll_refs is elevated enough and if so set a retry flag without
attempts to grab ownership. The gap between the bias check and following
atomics may seem racy, but we don't need it to be strict. Moreover there
might only be maximum 4 parallel updates: by the first and the second
poll entries, __io_arm_poll_handler() and cancellation. From those four,
only poll wake ups may be executed multiple times, but they're protected
by a spin.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Fixes: aa43477b04025 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c762bc31f8683b3270f3587691348a7119ef9c9d.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: cmpxchg for poll arm refs release</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T16:43:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pavel Begunkov</name>
<email>asml.silence@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-20T16:57:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f2ce0ce90727d3656168c1694aef51e558c18474'/>
<id>f2ce0ce90727d3656168c1694aef51e558c18474</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2f3893437a4ebf2e892ca172e9e122841319d675 upstream.

Replace atomically substracting the ownership reference at the end of
arming a poll with a cmpxchg. We try to release ownership by setting 0
assuming that poll_refs didn't change while we were arming. If it did
change, we keep the ownership and use it to queue a tw, which is fully
capable to process all events and (even tolerates spurious wake ups).

It's a bit more elegant as we reduce races b/w setting the cancellation
flag and getting refs with this release, and with that we don't have to
worry about any kinds of underflows. It's not the fastest path for
polling. The performance difference b/w cmpxchg and atomic dec is
usually negligible and it's not the fastest path.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa43477b04025 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c95251624397ea6def568ff040cad2d7926fd51.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2f3893437a4ebf2e892ca172e9e122841319d675 upstream.

Replace atomically substracting the ownership reference at the end of
arming a poll with a cmpxchg. We try to release ownership by setting 0
assuming that poll_refs didn't change while we were arming. If it did
change, we keep the ownership and use it to queue a tw, which is fully
capable to process all events and (even tolerates spurious wake ups).

It's a bit more elegant as we reduce races b/w setting the cancellation
flag and getting refs with this release, and with that we don't have to
worry about any kinds of underflows. It's not the fastest path for
polling. The performance difference b/w cmpxchg and atomic dec is
usually negligible and it's not the fastest path.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa43477b04025 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c95251624397ea6def568ff040cad2d7926fd51.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/poll: fix poll_refs race with cancelation</title>
<updated>2022-12-02T16:43:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lin Ma</name>
<email>linma@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-25T14:15:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b01f4ae68ddb59c090773da01c84cbf2cc832bcf'/>
<id>b01f4ae68ddb59c090773da01c84cbf2cc832bcf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 12ad3d2d6c5b0131a6052de91360849e3e154846 ]

There is an interesting race condition of poll_refs which could result
in a NULL pointer dereference. The crash trace is like:

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 30781 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-g493ffd6605b2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entry io_uring/poll.c:154 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entries+0x171/0x5b4 io_uring/poll.c:190
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffff88810dfefba0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc900030c4000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: ffffffff9764d3dd R09: fffffbfff3836781
R10: fffffbfff3836781 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11003422d60
R13: ffff88801a116b04 R14: ffff88801a116ac0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f9c07497700(0000) GS:ffff88811a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffb5c00ea98 CR3: 0000000105680005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 io_apoll_task_func+0x3f/0xa0 io_uring/poll.c:299
 handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1037 [inline]
 tctx_task_work+0x37e/0x4f0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1090
 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:177
 get_signal+0x2402/0x25a0 kernel/signal.c:2635
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3b/0x660 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:166 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc2/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:201
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x58/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The root cause for this is a tiny overlooking in
io_poll_check_events() when cocurrently run with poll cancel routine
io_poll_cancel_req().

The interleaving to trigger use-after-free:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // poll_refs not change                  |
                                           |
  if (v &amp; IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG)             |
   return -ECANCELED;                      |
  // io_poll_check_events return           |
  // will go into                          |
  // io_req_complete_failed() free req     |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

And the interleaving to trigger the kernel WARNING:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG               |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
                                           |
  WARN_ON_ONCE(!(v &amp; IO_POLL_REF_MASK)))   |
  // v &amp; IO_POLL_REF_MASK = 0 WARN         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

By looking up the source code and communicating with Pavel, the
implementation of this atomic poll refs should continue the loop of
io_poll_check_events() just to avoid somewhere else to grab the
ownership. Therefore, this patch simply adds another AND operation to
make sure the loop will stop if it finds the poll_refs is exactly equal
to IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG. Since io_poll_cancel_req() grabs ownership and
will finally make its way to io_req_complete_failed(), the req will
be reclaimed as expected.

Fixes: aa43477b0402 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
[axboe: tweak description and code style]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 12ad3d2d6c5b0131a6052de91360849e3e154846 ]

There is an interesting race condition of poll_refs which could result
in a NULL pointer dereference. The crash trace is like:

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 30781 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-g493ffd6605b2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entry io_uring/poll.c:154 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entries+0x171/0x5b4 io_uring/poll.c:190
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffff88810dfefba0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc900030c4000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: ffffffff9764d3dd R09: fffffbfff3836781
R10: fffffbfff3836781 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11003422d60
R13: ffff88801a116b04 R14: ffff88801a116ac0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f9c07497700(0000) GS:ffff88811a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffb5c00ea98 CR3: 0000000105680005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 io_apoll_task_func+0x3f/0xa0 io_uring/poll.c:299
 handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1037 [inline]
 tctx_task_work+0x37e/0x4f0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1090
 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:177
 get_signal+0x2402/0x25a0 kernel/signal.c:2635
 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3b/0x660 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:166 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc2/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:201
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x58/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The root cause for this is a tiny overlooking in
io_poll_check_events() when cocurrently run with poll cancel routine
io_poll_cancel_req().

The interleaving to trigger use-after-free:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // poll_refs not change                  |
                                           |
  if (v &amp; IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG)             |
   return -ECANCELED;                      |
  // io_poll_check_events return           |
  // will go into                          |
  // io_req_complete_failed() free req     |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

And the interleaving to trigger the kernel WARNING:

CPU0                                       |  CPU1
                                           |
io_apoll_task_func()                       |  io_poll_cancel_req()
 io_poll_check_events()                    |
  // do while first loop                   |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = poll_refs = 1                     |
  ...                                      |  io_poll_mark_cancelled()
                                           |   atomic_or()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |
  atomic_sub_return(...)                   |
  // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG       |
  // loop continue                         |
                                           |
  v = atomic_read(...)                     |
  // v = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG               |
                                           |  io_poll_execute()
                                           |   io_poll_get_ownership()
                                           |   // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
                                           |   // gets the ownership
                                           |
  WARN_ON_ONCE(!(v &amp; IO_POLL_REF_MASK)))   |
  // v &amp; IO_POLL_REF_MASK = 0 WARN         |
                                           |
                                           |  io_apoll_task_func()
                                           |  // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()

By looking up the source code and communicating with Pavel, the
implementation of this atomic poll refs should continue the loop of
io_poll_check_events() just to avoid somewhere else to grab the
ownership. Therefore, this patch simply adds another AND operation to
make sure the loop will stop if it finds the poll_refs is exactly equal
to IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG. Since io_poll_cancel_req() grabs ownership and
will finally make its way to io_req_complete_failed(), the req will
be reclaimed as expected.

Fixes: aa43477b0402 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov &lt;asml.silence@gmail.com&gt;
[axboe: tweak description and code style]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
