<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/io_uring, branch linux-6.5.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/fdinfo: remove need for sqpoll lock for thread/pid retrieval</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:14:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-14T16:55:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e87fa62ebc593be2127261192cee3002826ecbdd'/>
<id>e87fa62ebc593be2127261192cee3002826ecbdd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a0d45c3f596be53c1bd8822a1984532d14fdcea9 ]

A previous commit added a trylock for getting the SQPOLL thread info via
fdinfo, but this introduced a regression where we often fail to get it if
the thread is busy. For that case, we end up not printing the current CPU
and PID info.

Rather than rely on this lock, just print the pid we already stored in
the io_sq_data struct, and ensure we update the current CPU every time
we've slept or potentially rescheduled. The latter won't potentially be
100% accurate, but that wasn't the case before either as the task can
get migrated at any time unless it has been pinned at creation time.

We retain keeping the io_sq_data dereference inside the ctx-&gt;uring_lock,
as it has always been, as destruction of the thread and data happen below
that. We could make this RCU safe, but there's little point in doing that.

With this, we always print the last valid information we had, rather than
have spurious outputs with missing information.

Fixes: 7644b1a1c9a7 ("io_uring/fdinfo: lock SQ thread while retrieving thread cpu/pid")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a0d45c3f596be53c1bd8822a1984532d14fdcea9 ]

A previous commit added a trylock for getting the SQPOLL thread info via
fdinfo, but this introduced a regression where we often fail to get it if
the thread is busy. For that case, we end up not printing the current CPU
and PID info.

Rather than rely on this lock, just print the pid we already stored in
the io_sq_data struct, and ensure we update the current CPU every time
we've slept or potentially rescheduled. The latter won't potentially be
100% accurate, but that wasn't the case before either as the task can
get migrated at any time unless it has been pinned at creation time.

We retain keeping the io_sq_data dereference inside the ctx-&gt;uring_lock,
as it has always been, as destruction of the thread and data happen below
that. We could make this RCU safe, but there's little point in doing that.

With this, we always print the last valid information we had, rather than
have spurious outputs with missing information.

Fixes: 7644b1a1c9a7 ("io_uring/fdinfo: lock SQ thread while retrieving thread cpu/pid")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/net: ensure socket is marked connected on connect retry</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:57:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-11-03T16:35:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9e1c7fe85391364c8c73e2284f526733966ce34e'/>
<id>9e1c7fe85391364c8c73e2284f526733966ce34e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8f9ab2d98116e79d220f1d089df7464ad4e026d upstream.

io_uring does non-blocking connection attempts, which can yield some
unexpected results if a connect request is re-attempted by an an
application. This is equivalent to the following sync syscall sequence:

sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(sock, &amp;addr, sizeof(addr);

ret == -1 and errno == EINPROGRESS expected here. Now poll for POLLOUT
on sock, and when that returns, we expect the socket to be connected.
But if we follow that procedure with:

connect(sock, &amp;addr, sizeof(addr));

you'd expect ret == -1 and errno == EISCONN here, but you actually get
ret == 0. If we attempt the connection one more time, then we get EISCON
as expected.

io_uring used to do this, but turns out that bluetooth fails with EBADFD
if you attempt to re-connect. Also looks like EISCONN _could_ occur with
this sequence.

Retain the -&gt;in_progress logic, but work-around a potential EISCONN or
EBADFD error and only in those cases look at the sock_error(). This
should work in general and avoid the odd sequence of a repeated connect
request returning success when the socket is already connected.

This is all a side effect of the socket state being in a CONNECTING
state when we get EINPROGRESS, and only a re-connect or other related
operation will turn that into CONNECTED.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fb1bd688172 ("io_uring/net: handle -EINPROGRESS correct for IORING_OP_CONNECT")
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/980
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f8f9ab2d98116e79d220f1d089df7464ad4e026d upstream.

io_uring does non-blocking connection attempts, which can yield some
unexpected results if a connect request is re-attempted by an an
application. This is equivalent to the following sync syscall sequence:

sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK, IPPROTO_TCP);
connect(sock, &amp;addr, sizeof(addr);

ret == -1 and errno == EINPROGRESS expected here. Now poll for POLLOUT
on sock, and when that returns, we expect the socket to be connected.
But if we follow that procedure with:

connect(sock, &amp;addr, sizeof(addr));

you'd expect ret == -1 and errno == EISCONN here, but you actually get
ret == 0. If we attempt the connection one more time, then we get EISCON
as expected.

io_uring used to do this, but turns out that bluetooth fails with EBADFD
if you attempt to re-connect. Also looks like EISCONN _could_ occur with
this sequence.

Retain the -&gt;in_progress logic, but work-around a potential EISCONN or
EBADFD error and only in those cases look at the sock_error(). This
should work in general and avoid the odd sequence of a repeated connect
request returning success when the socket is already connected.

This is all a side effect of the socket state being in a CONNECTING
state when we get EINPROGRESS, and only a re-connect or other related
operation will turn that into CONNECTED.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fb1bd688172 ("io_uring/net: handle -EINPROGRESS correct for IORING_OP_CONNECT")
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/980
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/kbuf: Allow the full buffer id space for provided buffers</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:57:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gabriel Krisman Bertazi</name>
<email>krisman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T00:05:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cafff2cfb7104cf096f2f3d37a29d7b4e25a340b'/>
<id>cafff2cfb7104cf096f2f3d37a29d7b4e25a340b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f74c746e476b9dad51448b9a9421aae72b60e25f ]

nbufs tracks the number of buffers and not the last bgid. In 16-bit, we
have 2^16 valid buffers, but the check mistakenly rejects the last
bid. Let's fix it to make the interface consistent with the
documentation.

Fixes: ddf0322db79c ("io_uring: add IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005000531.30800-3-krisman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f74c746e476b9dad51448b9a9421aae72b60e25f ]

nbufs tracks the number of buffers and not the last bgid. In 16-bit, we
have 2^16 valid buffers, but the check mistakenly rejects the last
bid. Let's fix it to make the interface consistent with the
documentation.

Fixes: ddf0322db79c ("io_uring: add IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005000531.30800-3-krisman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/kbuf: Fix check of BID wrapping in provided buffers</title>
<updated>2023-11-20T10:57:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gabriel Krisman Bertazi</name>
<email>krisman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T00:05:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aabcc4c49967c61c9c6c16dd724dbe182a4b2586'/>
<id>aabcc4c49967c61c9c6c16dd724dbe182a4b2586</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ab69838e7c75b0edb699c1a8f42752b30333c46f ]

Commit 3851d25c75ed0 ("io_uring: check for rollover of buffer ID when
providing buffers") introduced a check to prevent wrapping the BID
counter when sqe-&gt;off is provided, but it's off-by-one too
restrictive, rejecting the last possible BID (65534).

i.e., the following fails with -EINVAL.

     io_uring_prep_provide_buffers(sqe, addr, size, 0xFFFF, 0, 0);

Fixes: 3851d25c75ed ("io_uring: check for rollover of buffer ID when providing buffers")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005000531.30800-2-krisman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ab69838e7c75b0edb699c1a8f42752b30333c46f ]

Commit 3851d25c75ed0 ("io_uring: check for rollover of buffer ID when
providing buffers") introduced a check to prevent wrapping the BID
counter when sqe-&gt;off is provided, but it's off-by-one too
restrictive, rejecting the last possible BID (65534).

i.e., the following fails with -EINVAL.

     io_uring_prep_provide_buffers(sqe, addr, size, 0xFFFF, 0, 0);

Fixes: 3851d25c75ed ("io_uring: check for rollover of buffer ID when providing buffers")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005000531.30800-2-krisman@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: kiocb_done() should *not* trust -&gt;ki_pos if -&gt;{read,write}_iter() failed</title>
<updated>2023-11-08T13:09:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-28T22:47:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fd652af1e1f99a9dd71c9aaffc514da890fd6d7e'/>
<id>fd652af1e1f99a9dd71c9aaffc514da890fd6d7e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1939316bf988f3e49a07d9c4dd6f660bf4daa53d ]

-&gt;ki_pos value is unreliable in such cases.  For an obvious example,
consider O_DSYNC write - we feed the data to page cache and start IO,
then we make sure it's completed.  Update of -&gt;ki_pos is dealt with
by the first part; failure in the second ends up with negative value
returned _and_ -&gt;ki_pos left advanced as if sync had been successful.
In the same situation write(2) does not advance the file position
at all.

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1939316bf988f3e49a07d9c4dd6f660bf4daa53d ]

-&gt;ki_pos value is unreliable in such cases.  For an obvious example,
consider O_DSYNC write - we feed the data to page cache and start IO,
then we make sure it's completed.  Update of -&gt;ki_pos is dealt with
by the first part; failure in the second ends up with negative value
returned _and_ -&gt;ki_pos left advanced as if sync had been successful.
In the same situation write(2) does not advance the file position
at all.

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/fdinfo: lock SQ thread while retrieving thread cpu/pid</title>
<updated>2023-11-02T08:36:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-28T13:30:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56e08ccc969796168f0e6adf6642f8546f54ba6f'/>
<id>56e08ccc969796168f0e6adf6642f8546f54ba6f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7644b1a1c9a7ae8ab99175989bfc8676055edb46 upstream.

We could race with SQ thread exit, and if we do, we'll hit a NULL pointer
dereference when the thread is cleared. Grab the SQPOLL data lock before
attempting to get the task cpu and pid for fdinfo, this ensures we have a
stable view of it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218032
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7644b1a1c9a7ae8ab99175989bfc8676055edb46 upstream.

We could race with SQ thread exit, and if we do, we'll hit a NULL pointer
dereference when the thread is cleared. Grab the SQPOLL data lock before
attempting to get the task cpu and pid for fdinfo, this ensures we have a
stable view of it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218032
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi &lt;krisman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io-wq: fully initialize wqe before calling cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls()</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Moyer</name>
<email>jmoyer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T17:55:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=054dfb821c6e4328bca6a23b2bcb292fbf730cb0'/>
<id>054dfb821c6e4328bca6a23b2bcb292fbf730cb0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0f8baa3c9802fbfe313c901e1598397b61b91ada ]

I received a bug report with the following signature:

[ 1759.937637] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 1759.944564] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 1759.949732] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 1759.954901] PGD 7ab615067 P4D 7ab615067 PUD 7ab617067 PMD 0
[ 1759.960596] Oops: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 1759.964804] CPU: 15 PID: 109 Comm: cpuhp/15 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G X ------- — 5.14.0-362.3.1.el9_3.x86_64 #1
[ 1759.976609] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 06/20/2018
[ 1759.985181] RIP: 0010:io_wq_for_each_worker.isra.0+0x24/0xa0
[ 1759.990877] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d 6f 78 53 48 8b 47 78 48 39 c5 74 4f 49 89 f5 49 89 d4 48 8d 58 e8 &lt;8b&gt; 13 85 d2 74 32 8d 4a 01 89 d0 f0 0f b1 0b 75 5c 09 ca 78 3d 48
[ 1760.009758] RSP: 0000:ffffb6f403603e20 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1760.015013] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffe8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.022188] RDX: ffffb6f403603e50 RSI: ffffffffb11e95b0 RDI: ffff9f73b09e9400
[ 1760.029362] RBP: ffff9f73b09e9478 R08: 000000000000000f R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.036536] R10: ffffffffffffff00 R11: ffffb6f403603d80 R12: ffffb6f403603e50
[ 1760.043712] R13: ffffffffb11e95b0 R14: ffffffffb28531e8 R15: ffff9f7a6fbdf548
[ 1760.050887] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f7a6fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1760.059025] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1760.064801] CR2: ffffffffffffffe8 CR3: 00000007ab610002 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 1760.071976] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.079150] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1760.086325] PKRU: 55555554
[ 1760.089044] Call Trace:
[ 1760.091501] &lt;TASK&gt;
[ 1760.093612] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 1760.097995] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 1760.102377] ? __io_wq_cpu_online+0x54/0xb0
[ 1760.106584] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 1760.110356] ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
[ 1760.114479] ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
[ 1760.119298] ? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
[ 1760.123247] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 1760.127458] ? __pfx_io_wq_worker_affinity+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.132453] ? __pfx_io_wq_worker_affinity+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.137446] ? io_wq_for_each_worker.isra.0+0x24/0xa0
[ 1760.142527] __io_wq_cpu_online+0x54/0xb0
[ 1760.146558] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x109/0x460
[ 1760.151029] ? __pfx_io_wq_cpu_offline+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.155673] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.160320] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x8d/0x140
[ 1760.164266] smpboot_thread_fn+0xd3/0x1a0
[ 1760.168297] kthread+0xdd/0x100
[ 1760.171457] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.175225] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[ 1760.178826] &lt;/TASK&gt;
[ 1760.181022] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill sunrpc vfat fat dm_multipath intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_common ipmi_ssif nfit libnvdimm mgag200 i2c_algo_bit ioatdma drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper acpi_ipmi syscopyarea x86_pkg_temp_thermal sysfillrect ipmi_si intel_powerclamp sysimgblt ipmi_devintf coretemp acpi_power_meter ipmi_msghandler rapl pcspkr dca intel_pch_thermal intel_cstate ses lpc_ich intel_uncore enclosure hpilo mei_me mei acpi_tad fuse drm xfs sd_mod sg bnx2x nvme nvme_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul nvme_common ghash_clmulni_intel smartpqi tg3 t10_pi mdio uas libcrc32c crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage hpwdt wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 1760.248623] CR2: ffffffffffffffe8

A cpu hotplug callback was issued before wq-&gt;all_list was initialized.
This results in a null pointer dereference.  The fix is to fully setup
the io_wq before calling cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls().

Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/x49y1ghnecs.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0f8baa3c9802fbfe313c901e1598397b61b91ada ]

I received a bug report with the following signature:

[ 1759.937637] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffe8
[ 1759.944564] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 1759.949732] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 1759.954901] PGD 7ab615067 P4D 7ab615067 PUD 7ab617067 PMD 0
[ 1759.960596] Oops: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 1759.964804] CPU: 15 PID: 109 Comm: cpuhp/15 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G X ------- — 5.14.0-362.3.1.el9_3.x86_64 #1
[ 1759.976609] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 06/20/2018
[ 1759.985181] RIP: 0010:io_wq_for_each_worker.isra.0+0x24/0xa0
[ 1759.990877] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d 6f 78 53 48 8b 47 78 48 39 c5 74 4f 49 89 f5 49 89 d4 48 8d 58 e8 &lt;8b&gt; 13 85 d2 74 32 8d 4a 01 89 d0 f0 0f b1 0b 75 5c 09 ca 78 3d 48
[ 1760.009758] RSP: 0000:ffffb6f403603e20 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1760.015013] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffe8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.022188] RDX: ffffb6f403603e50 RSI: ffffffffb11e95b0 RDI: ffff9f73b09e9400
[ 1760.029362] RBP: ffff9f73b09e9478 R08: 000000000000000f R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.036536] R10: ffffffffffffff00 R11: ffffb6f403603d80 R12: ffffb6f403603e50
[ 1760.043712] R13: ffffffffb11e95b0 R14: ffffffffb28531e8 R15: ffff9f7a6fbdf548
[ 1760.050887] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f7a6fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1760.059025] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1760.064801] CR2: ffffffffffffffe8 CR3: 00000007ab610002 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 1760.071976] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1760.079150] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1760.086325] PKRU: 55555554
[ 1760.089044] Call Trace:
[ 1760.091501] &lt;TASK&gt;
[ 1760.093612] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 1760.097995] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 1760.102377] ? __io_wq_cpu_online+0x54/0xb0
[ 1760.106584] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 1760.110356] ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170
[ 1760.114479] ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x84/0x110
[ 1760.119298] ? exc_page_fault+0xa8/0x150
[ 1760.123247] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 1760.127458] ? __pfx_io_wq_worker_affinity+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.132453] ? __pfx_io_wq_worker_affinity+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.137446] ? io_wq_for_each_worker.isra.0+0x24/0xa0
[ 1760.142527] __io_wq_cpu_online+0x54/0xb0
[ 1760.146558] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x109/0x460
[ 1760.151029] ? __pfx_io_wq_cpu_offline+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.155673] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.160320] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x8d/0x140
[ 1760.164266] smpboot_thread_fn+0xd3/0x1a0
[ 1760.168297] kthread+0xdd/0x100
[ 1760.171457] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1760.175225] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[ 1760.178826] &lt;/TASK&gt;
[ 1760.181022] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill sunrpc vfat fat dm_multipath intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_common ipmi_ssif nfit libnvdimm mgag200 i2c_algo_bit ioatdma drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper acpi_ipmi syscopyarea x86_pkg_temp_thermal sysfillrect ipmi_si intel_powerclamp sysimgblt ipmi_devintf coretemp acpi_power_meter ipmi_msghandler rapl pcspkr dca intel_pch_thermal intel_cstate ses lpc_ich intel_uncore enclosure hpilo mei_me mei acpi_tad fuse drm xfs sd_mod sg bnx2x nvme nvme_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul nvme_common ghash_clmulni_intel smartpqi tg3 t10_pi mdio uas libcrc32c crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas usb_storage hpwdt wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 1760.248623] CR2: ffffffffffffffe8

A cpu hotplug callback was issued before wq-&gt;all_list was initialized.
This results in a null pointer dereference.  The fix is to fully setup
the io_wq before calling cpuhp_state_add_instance_nocalls().

Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/x49y1ghnecs.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: fix crash with IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP and invalid SQ ring address</title>
<updated>2023-10-25T10:16:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-18T14:09:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7053f66e945de2a1429bb0446710d54ded670926'/>
<id>7053f66e945de2a1429bb0446710d54ded670926</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8b51a3956d44ea6ade962874ade14de9a7d16556 upstream.

If we specify a valid CQ ring address but an invalid SQ ring address,
we'll correctly spot this and free the allocated pages and clear them
to NULL. However, we don't clear the ring page count, and hence will
attempt to free the pages again. We've already cleared the address of
the page array when freeing them, but we don't check for that. This
causes the following crash:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-dirty #56
Hardware name: ucbbar,riscvemu-bare (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
epc : io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 ra : io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 epc : ffffffff808811a2 ra : ffffffff80881406 sp : ffff8f80000c3cd0
 status: 0000000200000121 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000d
 [&lt;ffffffff808811a2&gt;] io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 [&lt;ffffffff80881406&gt;] io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff80882176&gt;] io_ring_exit_work+0x37e/0x424
 [&lt;ffffffff80027234&gt;] process_one_work+0x10c/0x1f4
 [&lt;ffffffff8002756e&gt;] worker_thread+0x252/0x31c
 [&lt;ffffffff8002f5e4&gt;] kthread+0xc4/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff8000332a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x1c

Check for a NULL array in io_pages_free(), but also clear the page counts
when we free them to be on the safer side.

Reported-by: rtm@csail.mit.edu
Fixes: 03d89a2de25b ("io_uring: support for user allocated memory for rings/sqes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8b51a3956d44ea6ade962874ade14de9a7d16556 upstream.

If we specify a valid CQ ring address but an invalid SQ ring address,
we'll correctly spot this and free the allocated pages and clear them
to NULL. However, we don't clear the ring page count, and hence will
attempt to free the pages again. We've already cleared the address of
the page array when freeing them, but we don't check for that. This
causes the following crash:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Oops [#1]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-dirty #56
Hardware name: ucbbar,riscvemu-bare (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
epc : io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 ra : io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 epc : ffffffff808811a2 ra : ffffffff80881406 sp : ffff8f80000c3cd0
 status: 0000000200000121 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000d
 [&lt;ffffffff808811a2&gt;] io_pages_free+0x2a/0x58
 [&lt;ffffffff80881406&gt;] io_rings_free+0x3a/0x50
 [&lt;ffffffff80882176&gt;] io_ring_exit_work+0x37e/0x424
 [&lt;ffffffff80027234&gt;] process_one_work+0x10c/0x1f4
 [&lt;ffffffff8002756e&gt;] worker_thread+0x252/0x31c
 [&lt;ffffffff8002f5e4&gt;] kthread+0xc4/0xe0
 [&lt;ffffffff8000332a&gt;] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x1c

Check for a NULL array in io_pages_free(), but also clear the page counts
when we free them to be on the safer side.

Reported-by: rtm@csail.mit.edu
Fixes: 03d89a2de25b ("io_uring: support for user allocated memory for rings/sqes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer &lt;jmoyer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring: ensure io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() handles disabled rings</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-03T01:51:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=79a487128c50ff7235ad646d4934503ce2e72870'/>
<id>79a487128c50ff7235ad646d4934503ce2e72870</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1658633c04653578429ff5dfc62fdc159203a8f2 upstream.

io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() checks that locking is correctly done when
a CQE is posted. If the ring is setup in a disabled state with
IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED, then ctx-&gt;submitter_task isn't assigned until
the ring is later enabled. We generally don't post CQEs in this state,
as no SQEs can be submitted. However it is possible to generate a CQE
if tagged resources are being updated. If this happens and PROVE_LOCKING
is enabled, then the locking check helper will dereference
ctx-&gt;submitter_task, which hasn't been set yet.

Fixup io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() to handle this case correctly. While
at it, convert it to a static inline as well, so that generated line
offsets will actually reflect which condition failed, rather than just
the line offset for io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() itself.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+efc45d4e7ba6ab4ef1eb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f26cc9593581 ("io_uring: lockdep annotate CQ locking")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1658633c04653578429ff5dfc62fdc159203a8f2 upstream.

io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() checks that locking is correctly done when
a CQE is posted. If the ring is setup in a disabled state with
IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED, then ctx-&gt;submitter_task isn't assigned until
the ring is later enabled. We generally don't post CQEs in this state,
as no SQEs can be submitted. However it is possible to generate a CQE
if tagged resources are being updated. If this happens and PROVE_LOCKING
is enabled, then the locking check helper will dereference
ctx-&gt;submitter_task, which hasn't been set yet.

Fixup io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() to handle this case correctly. While
at it, convert it to a static inline as well, so that generated line
offsets will actually reflect which condition failed, rather than just
the line offset for io_lockdep_assert_cq_locked() itself.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+efc45d4e7ba6ab4ef1eb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f26cc9593581 ("io_uring: lockdep annotate CQ locking")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/kbuf: don't allow registered buffer rings on highmem pages</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:02:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-03T00:14:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fa6a7e0d8b1d313f985d432d2d6d54bf79903d52'/>
<id>fa6a7e0d8b1d313f985d432d2d6d54bf79903d52</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8024f1f36a30a082b0457d5779c8847cea57f57 upstream.

syzbot reports that registering a mapped buffer ring on arm32 can
trigger an OOPS. Registered buffer rings have two modes, one of them
is the application passing in the memory that the buffer ring should
reside in. Once those pages are mapped, we use page_address() to get
a virtual address. This will obviously fail on highmem pages, which
aren't mapped.

Add a check if we have any highmem pages after mapping, and fail the
attempt to register a provided buffer ring if we do. This will return
the same error as kernels that don't support provided buffer rings to
begin with.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/000000000000af635c0606bcb889@google.com/
Fixes: c56e022c0a27 ("io_uring: add support for user mapped provided buffer ring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+2113e61b8848fa7951d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f8024f1f36a30a082b0457d5779c8847cea57f57 upstream.

syzbot reports that registering a mapped buffer ring on arm32 can
trigger an OOPS. Registered buffer rings have two modes, one of them
is the application passing in the memory that the buffer ring should
reside in. Once those pages are mapped, we use page_address() to get
a virtual address. This will obviously fail on highmem pages, which
aren't mapped.

Add a check if we have any highmem pages after mapping, and fail the
attempt to register a provided buffer ring if we do. This will return
the same error as kernels that don't support provided buffer rings to
begin with.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/000000000000af635c0606bcb889@google.com/
Fixes: c56e022c0a27 ("io_uring: add support for user mapped provided buffer ring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+2113e61b8848fa7951d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
