<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v6.6.71</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/hyperv: Fix hv tsc page based sched_clock for hibernation</title>
<updated>2025-01-10T13:31:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Naman Jain</name>
<email>namjain@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-09-17T05:39:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6923798e471570ac1b24086be0a9679f51c3171'/>
<id>a6923798e471570ac1b24086be0a9679f51c3171</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bcc80dec91ee745b3d66f3e48f0ec2efdea97149 upstream.

read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() assumes that the Hyper-V clock counter is
bigger than the variable hv_sched_clock_offset, which is cached during
early boot, but depending on the timing this assumption may be false
when a hibernated VM starts again (the clock counter starts from 0
again) and is resuming back (Note: hv_init_tsc_clocksource() is not
called during hibernation/resume); consequently,
read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() may return a negative integer (which is
interpreted as a huge positive integer since the return type is u64)
and new kernel messages are prefixed with huge timestamps before
read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() grows big enough (which typically takes
several seconds).

Fix the issue by saving the Hyper-V clock counter just before the
suspend, and using it to correct the hv_sched_clock_offset in
resume. This makes hv tsc page based sched_clock continuous and ensures
that post resume, it starts from where it left off during suspend.
Override x86_platform.save_sched_clock_state and
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state routines to correct this as soon
as possible.

Note: if Invariant TSC is available, the issue doesn't happen because
1) we don't register read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() for sched clock:
See commit e5313f1c5404 ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Rework
clocksource and sched clock setup");
2) the common x86 code adjusts TSC similarly: see
__restore_processor_state() -&gt;  tsc_verify_tsc_adjust(true) and
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1349401ff1aa ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Suspend/resume Hyper-V clocksource for hibernation")
Co-developed-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bcc80dec91ee745b3d66f3e48f0ec2efdea97149 upstream.

read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() assumes that the Hyper-V clock counter is
bigger than the variable hv_sched_clock_offset, which is cached during
early boot, but depending on the timing this assumption may be false
when a hibernated VM starts again (the clock counter starts from 0
again) and is resuming back (Note: hv_init_tsc_clocksource() is not
called during hibernation/resume); consequently,
read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() may return a negative integer (which is
interpreted as a huge positive integer since the return type is u64)
and new kernel messages are prefixed with huge timestamps before
read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() grows big enough (which typically takes
several seconds).

Fix the issue by saving the Hyper-V clock counter just before the
suspend, and using it to correct the hv_sched_clock_offset in
resume. This makes hv tsc page based sched_clock continuous and ensures
that post resume, it starts from where it left off during suspend.
Override x86_platform.save_sched_clock_state and
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state routines to correct this as soon
as possible.

Note: if Invariant TSC is available, the issue doesn't happen because
1) we don't register read_hv_sched_clock_tsc() for sched clock:
See commit e5313f1c5404 ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Rework
clocksource and sched clock setup");
2) the common x86 code adjusts TSC similarly: see
__restore_processor_state() -&gt;  tsc_verify_tsc_adjust(true) and
x86_platform.restore_sched_clock_state().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1349401ff1aa ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Suspend/resume Hyper-V clocksource for hibernation")
Co-developed-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Message-ID: &lt;20240917053917.76787-1-namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86/hyperv: Fix hv tsc page based sched_clock for hibernation"</title>
<updated>2025-01-10T13:31:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-10T12:06:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8bc44c5f96172fdaab66a268a53dccc6c7ffa87'/>
<id>c8bc44c5f96172fdaab66a268a53dccc6c7ffa87</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 6681113633dc738ec95fe33104843a1e25acef3b which is
commit bcc80dec91ee745b3d66f3e48f0ec2efdea97149 upstream.

The dependant patch before this one caused build errors in the 6.6.y
tree, so revert this for now so that we can fix them up properly.

Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3DB3A6D3-0D3A-4682-B4FA-407B2D3263B2@cloudflare.com
Reported-by: Lars Wendler &lt;wendler.lars@web.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110103328.0e3906a8@chagall.paradoxon.rec
Reported-by: Chris Clayton &lt;chris2553@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10c7be00-b1f8-4389-801b-fb2d0b22468d@googlemail.com
Cc: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Cc: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit 6681113633dc738ec95fe33104843a1e25acef3b which is
commit bcc80dec91ee745b3d66f3e48f0ec2efdea97149 upstream.

The dependant patch before this one caused build errors in the 6.6.y
tree, so revert this for now so that we can fix them up properly.

Reported-by: Ignat Korchagin &lt;ignat@cloudflare.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3DB3A6D3-0D3A-4682-B4FA-407B2D3263B2@cloudflare.com
Reported-by: Lars Wendler &lt;wendler.lars@web.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110103328.0e3906a8@chagall.paradoxon.rec
Reported-by: Chris Clayton &lt;chris2553@googlemail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10c7be00-b1f8-4389-801b-fb2d0b22468d@googlemail.com
Cc: Dexuan Cui &lt;decui@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Naman Jain &lt;namjain@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Michael Kelley &lt;mhklinux@outlook.com&gt;
Cc: Wei Liu &lt;wei.liu@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking"</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:32:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shung-Hsi Yu</name>
<email>shung-hsi.yu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-01-05T06:27:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=199f0452873741fa4b8d4d88958e929030b2f92b'/>
<id>199f0452873741fa4b8d4d88958e929030b2f92b</id>
<content type='text'>
Revert commit ecc2aeeaa08a355d84d3ca9c3d2512399a194f29 which is commit
41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b upstream.

Levi reported that commit ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register
spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking") cause eBPF program that
previously loads successfully in stable 6.6 now fails to load, when the
same program also loads successfully in v6.13-rc5.

Revert ecc2aeeaa08a until the problem has been probably figured out and
resolved.

Fixes: ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking")
Reported-by: Levi Zim &lt;rsworktech@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/MEYP282MB2312C3C8801476C4F262D6E1C6162@MEYP282MB2312.AUSP282.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Revert commit ecc2aeeaa08a355d84d3ca9c3d2512399a194f29 which is commit
41f6f64e6999a837048b1bd13a2f8742964eca6b upstream.

Levi reported that commit ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register
spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking") cause eBPF program that
previously loads successfully in stable 6.6 now fails to load, when the
same program also loads successfully in v6.13-rc5.

Revert ecc2aeeaa08a until the problem has been probably figured out and
resolved.

Fixes: ecc2aeeaa08a ("bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking")
Reported-by: Levi Zim &lt;rsworktech@outlook.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/MEYP282MB2312C3C8801476C4F262D6E1C6162@MEYP282MB2312.AUSP282.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu &lt;shung-hsi.yu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seq_buf: Make DECLARE_SEQ_BUF() usable</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:32:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nathan Lynch</name>
<email>nathanl@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-16T14:09:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c3b5a7d6a13baa7e5d6deadb929da20809b345e8'/>
<id>c3b5a7d6a13baa7e5d6deadb929da20809b345e8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7a8e9cdf9405819105ae7405cd91e482bf574b01 ]

Using the address operator on the array doesn't work:

./include/linux/seq_buf.h:27:27: error: initialization of ‘char *’
  from incompatible pointer type ‘char (*)[128]’
  [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
   27 |                 .buffer = &amp;__ ## NAME ## _buffer,       \
      |                           ^

Apart from fixing that, we can improve DECLARE_SEQ_BUF() by using a
compound literal to define the buffer array without attaching a name
to it. This makes the macro a single statement, allowing constructs
such as:

  static DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(my_seq_buf, MYSB_SIZE);

to work as intended.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240116-declare-seq-buf-fix-v1-1-915db4692f32@linux.ibm.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Fixes: dcc4e5728eea ("seq_buf: Introduce DECLARE_SEQ_BUF and seq_buf_str()")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7a8e9cdf9405819105ae7405cd91e482bf574b01 ]

Using the address operator on the array doesn't work:

./include/linux/seq_buf.h:27:27: error: initialization of ‘char *’
  from incompatible pointer type ‘char (*)[128]’
  [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
   27 |                 .buffer = &amp;__ ## NAME ## _buffer,       \
      |                           ^

Apart from fixing that, we can improve DECLARE_SEQ_BUF() by using a
compound literal to define the buffer array without attaching a name
to it. This makes the macro a single statement, allowing constructs
such as:

  static DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(my_seq_buf, MYSB_SIZE);

to work as intended.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240116-declare-seq-buf-fix-v1-1-915db4692f32@linux.ibm.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Fixes: dcc4e5728eea ("seq_buf: Introduce DECLARE_SEQ_BUF and seq_buf_str()")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch &lt;nathanl@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:32:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-03T21:07:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bef333418368c58690b501894324c09124e4614f'/>
<id>bef333418368c58690b501894324c09124e4614f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d94f05558271654670d18c26c912da0c1c15549 ]

This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&amp;hdev-&gt;rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&amp;hdev-&gt;rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&amp;hdev-&gt;lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
 hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d94f05558271654670d18c26c912da0c1c15549 ]

This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&amp;hdev-&gt;rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&amp;hdev-&gt;rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&amp;hdev-&gt;lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
 hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:32:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-30T16:10:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a693b87692b4d7c50f4fc08a996678d60534a9da'/>
<id>a693b87692b4d7c50f4fc08a996678d60534a9da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f91a5b8089389eb408501af2762f168c3aaa7b79 ]

Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.

Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.

Add a const qualifier to skb argument.

[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:&lt;NULL&gt;
------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS:  00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
  vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
  packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
  sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
  ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
  do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
  __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
  __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
  __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
  __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 79eecf631c14 ("af_packet: Handle outgoing VLAN packets without hardware offloading")
Reported-by: syzbot+74f70bb1cb968bf09e4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6772c485.050a0220.2f3838.04c5.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Chengen Du &lt;chengen.du@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230161004.2681892-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f91a5b8089389eb408501af2762f168c3aaa7b79 ]

Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.

Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.

Add a const qualifier to skb argument.

[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:&lt;NULL&gt;
------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 &lt;0f&gt; 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS:  00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
  vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
  packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
  sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
  ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
  do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
  __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
  __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
  __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
  __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 79eecf631c14 ("af_packet: Handle outgoing VLAN packets without hardware offloading")
Reported-by: syzbot+74f70bb1cb968bf09e4f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6772c485.050a0220.2f3838.04c5.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Chengen Du &lt;chengen.du@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230161004.2681892-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_set_hash: unaligned atomic read on struct nft_set_ext</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:32:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-20T23:29:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f49349c1963e507aa37c1ec05178faeb0103959'/>
<id>4f49349c1963e507aa37c1ec05178faeb0103959</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 542ed8145e6f9392e3d0a86a0e9027d2ffd183e4 ]

Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned
atomic read:

[   72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c
[   72.131036] Mem abort info:
[   72.131213]   ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[   72.131446]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   72.132209]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   72.133216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   72.134080]   FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
[   72.135593] Data abort info:
[   72.137194]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   72.142351]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   72.145989]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000
[   72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403,
+pte=0068000102bb7707
[   72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
[...]
[   72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G            E      6.13.0-rc3+ #2
[   72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[   72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023
[   72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables]
[   72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0
[   72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038
[   72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78
[   72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78
[   72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000
[   72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978
[   72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0
[   72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000
[   72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004
[   72.176207] Call trace:
[   72.176316]  nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P)
[   72.176653]  process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0
[   72.176831]  worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
[   72.176995]  kthread+0xe8/0xf8
[   72.177130]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f)
[   72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and
documentation it.

pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and
pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64.

Fixes: 7ffc7481153b ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 542ed8145e6f9392e3d0a86a0e9027d2ffd183e4 ]

Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned
atomic read:

[   72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c
[   72.131036] Mem abort info:
[   72.131213]   ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[   72.131446]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   72.132209]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   72.133216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   72.134080]   FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
[   72.135593] Data abort info:
[   72.137194]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   72.142351]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   72.145989]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000
[   72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403,
+pte=0068000102bb7707
[   72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
[...]
[   72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G            E      6.13.0-rc3+ #2
[   72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[   72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023
[   72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables]
[   72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0
[   72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038
[   72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78
[   72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78
[   72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000
[   72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978
[   72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0
[   72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000
[   72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004
[   72.176207] Call trace:
[   72.176316]  nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P)
[   72.176653]  process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0
[   72.176831]  worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
[   72.176995]  kthread+0xe8/0xf8
[   72.177130]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f)
[   72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and
documentation it.

pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and
pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64.

Fixes: 7ffc7481153b ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>RDMA/mlx5: Enforce same type port association for multiport RoCE</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:31:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrisious Haddad</name>
<email>phaddad@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-03T13:45:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=25e6e9da69263824059a91a83c9d70d3fdc0ab23'/>
<id>25e6e9da69263824059a91a83c9d70d3fdc0ab23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e05feab22fd7dabcd6d272c4e2401ec1acdfdb9b ]

Different core device types such as PFs and VFs shouldn't be affiliated
together since they have different capabilities, fix that by enforcing
type check before doing the affiliation.

Fixes: 32f69e4be269 ("{net, IB}/mlx5: Manage port association for multiport RoCE")
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch &lt;mbloch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad &lt;phaddad@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/88699500f690dff1c1852c1ddb71f8a1cc8b956e.1733233480.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek &lt;mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e05feab22fd7dabcd6d272c4e2401ec1acdfdb9b ]

Different core device types such as PFs and VFs shouldn't be affiliated
together since they have different capabilities, fix that by enforcing
type check before doing the affiliation.

Fixes: 32f69e4be269 ("{net, IB}/mlx5: Manage port association for multiport RoCE")
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch &lt;mbloch@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad &lt;phaddad@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/88699500f690dff1c1852c1ddb71f8a1cc8b956e.1733233480.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek &lt;mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Check "%s" dereference via the field and not the TP_printk format</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:31:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>rostedt@goodmis.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-17T02:41:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f452f397f9a6a605989e4151078ab76b41d490cc'/>
<id>f452f397f9a6a605989e4151078ab76b41d490cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit afd2627f727b89496d79a6b934a025fc916d4ded ]

The TP_printk() portion of a trace event is executed at the time a event
is read from the trace. This can happen seconds, minutes, hours, days,
months, years possibly later since the event was recorded. If the print
format contains a dereference to a string via "%s", and that string was
allocated, there's a chance that string could be freed before it is read
by the trace file.

To protect against such bugs, there are two functions that verify the
event. The first one is test_event_printk(), which is called when the
event is created. It reads the TP_printk() format as well as its arguments
to make sure nothing may be dereferencing a pointer that was not copied
into the ring buffer along with the event. If it is, it will trigger a
WARN_ON().

For strings that use "%s", it is not so easy. The string may not reside in
the ring buffer but may still be valid. Strings that are static and part
of the kernel proper which will not be freed for the life of the running
system, are safe to dereference. But to know if it is a pointer to a
static string or to something on the heap can not be determined until the
event is triggered.

This brings us to the second function that tests for the bad dereferencing
of strings, trace_check_vprintf(). It would walk through the printf format
looking for "%s", and when it finds it, it would validate that the pointer
is safe to read. If not, it would produces a WARN_ON() as well and write
into the ring buffer "[UNSAFE-MEMORY]".

The problem with this is how it used va_list to have vsnprintf() handle
all the cases that it didn't need to check. Instead of re-implementing
vsnprintf(), it would make a copy of the format up to the %s part, and
call vsnprintf() with the current va_list ap variable, where the ap would
then be ready to point at the string in question.

For architectures that passed va_list by reference this was possible. For
architectures that passed it by copy it was not. A test_can_verify()
function was used to differentiate between the two, and if it wasn't
possible, it would disable it.

Even for architectures where this was feasible, it was a stretch to rely
on such a method that is undocumented, and could cause issues later on
with new optimizations of the compiler.

Instead, the first function test_event_printk() was updated to look at
"%s" as well. If the "%s" argument is a pointer outside the event in the
ring buffer, it would find the field type of the event that is the problem
and mark the structure with a new flag called "needs_test". The event
itself will be marked by TRACE_EVENT_FL_TEST_STR to let it be known that
this event has a field that needs to be verified before the event can be
printed using the printf format.

When the event fields are created from the field type structure, the
fields would copy the field type's "needs_test" value.

Finally, before being printed, a new function ignore_event() is called
which will check if the event has the TEST_STR flag set (if not, it
returns false). If the flag is set, it then iterates through the events
fields looking for the ones that have the "needs_test" flag set.

Then it uses the offset field from the field structure to find the pointer
in the ring buffer event. It runs the tests to make sure that pointer is
safe to print and if not, it triggers the WARN_ON() and also adds to the
trace output that the event in question has an unsafe memory access.

The ignore_event() makes the trace_check_vprintf() obsolete so it is
removed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wh3uOnqnZPpR0PeLZZtyWbZLboZ7cHLCKRWsocvs9Y7hQ@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241217024720.848621576@goodmis.org
Fixes: 5013f454a352c ("tracing: Add check of trace event print fmts for dereferencing pointers")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit afd2627f727b89496d79a6b934a025fc916d4ded ]

The TP_printk() portion of a trace event is executed at the time a event
is read from the trace. This can happen seconds, minutes, hours, days,
months, years possibly later since the event was recorded. If the print
format contains a dereference to a string via "%s", and that string was
allocated, there's a chance that string could be freed before it is read
by the trace file.

To protect against such bugs, there are two functions that verify the
event. The first one is test_event_printk(), which is called when the
event is created. It reads the TP_printk() format as well as its arguments
to make sure nothing may be dereferencing a pointer that was not copied
into the ring buffer along with the event. If it is, it will trigger a
WARN_ON().

For strings that use "%s", it is not so easy. The string may not reside in
the ring buffer but may still be valid. Strings that are static and part
of the kernel proper which will not be freed for the life of the running
system, are safe to dereference. But to know if it is a pointer to a
static string or to something on the heap can not be determined until the
event is triggered.

This brings us to the second function that tests for the bad dereferencing
of strings, trace_check_vprintf(). It would walk through the printf format
looking for "%s", and when it finds it, it would validate that the pointer
is safe to read. If not, it would produces a WARN_ON() as well and write
into the ring buffer "[UNSAFE-MEMORY]".

The problem with this is how it used va_list to have vsnprintf() handle
all the cases that it didn't need to check. Instead of re-implementing
vsnprintf(), it would make a copy of the format up to the %s part, and
call vsnprintf() with the current va_list ap variable, where the ap would
then be ready to point at the string in question.

For architectures that passed va_list by reference this was possible. For
architectures that passed it by copy it was not. A test_can_verify()
function was used to differentiate between the two, and if it wasn't
possible, it would disable it.

Even for architectures where this was feasible, it was a stretch to rely
on such a method that is undocumented, and could cause issues later on
with new optimizations of the compiler.

Instead, the first function test_event_printk() was updated to look at
"%s" as well. If the "%s" argument is a pointer outside the event in the
ring buffer, it would find the field type of the event that is the problem
and mark the structure with a new flag called "needs_test". The event
itself will be marked by TRACE_EVENT_FL_TEST_STR to let it be known that
this event has a field that needs to be verified before the event can be
printed using the printf format.

When the event fields are created from the field type structure, the
fields would copy the field type's "needs_test" value.

Finally, before being printed, a new function ignore_event() is called
which will check if the event has the TEST_STR flag set (if not, it
returns false). If the flag is set, it then iterates through the events
fields looking for the ones that have the "needs_test" flag set.

Then it uses the offset field from the field structure to find the pointer
in the ring buffer event. It runs the tests to make sure that pointer is
safe to print and if not, it triggers the WARN_ON() and also adds to the
trace output that the event in question has an unsafe memory access.

The ignore_event() makes the trace_check_vprintf() obsolete so it is
removed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wh3uOnqnZPpR0PeLZZtyWbZLboZ7cHLCKRWsocvs9Y7hQ@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers &lt;mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241217024720.848621576@goodmis.org
Fixes: 5013f454a352c ("tracing: Add check of trace event print fmts for dereferencing pointers")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>seq_buf: Introduce DECLARE_SEQ_BUF and seq_buf_str()</title>
<updated>2025-01-09T12:31:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-27T15:56:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6920e362bc080d045dd1eca431c7819f22014a81'/>
<id>6920e362bc080d045dd1eca431c7819f22014a81</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dcc4e5728eeaeda84878ca0018758cff1abfca21 ]

Solve two ergonomic issues with struct seq_buf;

1) Too much boilerplate is required to initialize:

	struct seq_buf s;
	char buf[32];

	seq_buf_init(s, buf, sizeof(buf));

Instead, we can build this directly on the stack. Provide
DECLARE_SEQ_BUF() macro to do this:

	DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 32);

2) %NUL termination is fragile and requires 2 steps to get a valid
   C String (and is a layering violation exposing the "internals" of
   seq_buf):

	seq_buf_terminate(s);
	do_something(s-&gt;buffer);

Instead, we can just return s-&gt;buffer directly after terminating it in
the refactored seq_buf_terminate(), now known as seq_buf_str():

	do_something(seq_buf_str(s));

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231027155634.make.260-kees@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231026194033.it.702-kees@kernel.org/

Cc: Yosry Ahmed &lt;yosryahmed@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Justin Stitt &lt;justinstitt@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kent.overstreet@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Yun Zhou &lt;yun.zhou@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: afd2627f727b ("tracing: Check "%s" dereference via the field and not the TP_printk format")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dcc4e5728eeaeda84878ca0018758cff1abfca21 ]

Solve two ergonomic issues with struct seq_buf;

1) Too much boilerplate is required to initialize:

	struct seq_buf s;
	char buf[32];

	seq_buf_init(s, buf, sizeof(buf));

Instead, we can build this directly on the stack. Provide
DECLARE_SEQ_BUF() macro to do this:

	DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 32);

2) %NUL termination is fragile and requires 2 steps to get a valid
   C String (and is a layering violation exposing the "internals" of
   seq_buf):

	seq_buf_terminate(s);
	do_something(s-&gt;buffer);

Instead, we can just return s-&gt;buffer directly after terminating it in
the refactored seq_buf_terminate(), now known as seq_buf_str():

	do_something(seq_buf_str(s));

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231027155634.make.260-kees@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20231026194033.it.702-kees@kernel.org/

Cc: Yosry Ahmed &lt;yosryahmed@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Justin Stitt &lt;justinstitt@google.com&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kent.overstreet@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky &lt;senozhatsky@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Yun Zhou &lt;yun.zhou@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Jacob Keller &lt;jacob.e.keller@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Zhen Lei &lt;thunder.leizhen@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: afd2627f727b ("tracing: Check "%s" dereference via the field and not the TP_printk format")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
