<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v6.18.39</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pedro Falcato</name>
<email>pfalcato@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-25T15:38:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c942ad7df75925ee166e7f0fb36892d8dde376b'/>
<id>5c942ad7df75925ee166e7f0fb36892d8dde376b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e187bc02f8fa4226d62814592cf064ee4557c470 upstream.

Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:

1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied

In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to
it.

Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.

The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260625153853.913949-1-pfalcato@suse.de
Fixes: 9caccd41541a ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP")
Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato &lt;pfalcato@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e187bc02f8fa4226d62814592cf064ee4557c470 upstream.

Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:

1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied

In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to
it.

Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.

The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260625153853.913949-1-pfalcato@suse.de
Fixes: 9caccd41541a ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP")
Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato &lt;pfalcato@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ketan</name>
<email>ketan.kishore@oss.qualcomm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-22T21:18:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8dcaa0f87a88d720d13106f3a306c6b61d189d86'/>
<id>8dcaa0f87a88d720d13106f3a306c6b61d189d86</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ffd017237cfe99e6e5602ab14179b0e6878a0840 upstream.

The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a
valid section while advancing the iterator.  When dynamically adding
memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference
during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when
iterator count equals __pgcount.

The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop
increment.  for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext =
page_ext_iter_next(&amp;__iter)" at the end.  This causes page_ext_iter_next()
to increment iter-&gt;index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn
+ __pgcount).  During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn +
__pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized,
causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference.

[   14.555124][  T846] Call trace:
[   14.555125][  T846]  lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P)
[   14.555127][  T846]  page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c
[   14.555129][  T846]  __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260
[   14.571201][  T846]  __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0
[   14.571204][  T846]  __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0
[   14.571206][  T846]  generic_online_page+0x14/0x24
[   14.597782][  T846]  online_pages+0x178/0x30c
[   14.597784][  T846]  memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c
[   14.597787][  T846]  memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64
[   14.597789][  T846]  device_online+0x88/0xb0
[   14.597791][  T846]  online_memory_block+0x30/0x40
[   14.597793][  T846]  walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8
[   14.597794][  T846]  add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298
[   14.656161][  T846]  add_memory+0x60/0x98

Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so
callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260623-page_ext-v3-1-a89799a5367c@oss.qualcomm.com
Fixes: 9039b9096ea2 ("mm: page_ext: add an iteration API for page extensions")
Signed-off-by: Ketan Kishore &lt;ketan.kishore@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Brendan Jackman &lt;jackmanb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luiz Capitulino &lt;luizcap@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ffd017237cfe99e6e5602ab14179b0e6878a0840 upstream.

The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a
valid section while advancing the iterator.  When dynamically adding
memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference
during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when
iterator count equals __pgcount.

The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop
increment.  for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext =
page_ext_iter_next(&amp;__iter)" at the end.  This causes page_ext_iter_next()
to increment iter-&gt;index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn
+ __pgcount).  During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn +
__pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized,
causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference.

[   14.555124][  T846] Call trace:
[   14.555125][  T846]  lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P)
[   14.555127][  T846]  page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c
[   14.555129][  T846]  __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260
[   14.571201][  T846]  __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0
[   14.571204][  T846]  __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0
[   14.571206][  T846]  generic_online_page+0x14/0x24
[   14.597782][  T846]  online_pages+0x178/0x30c
[   14.597784][  T846]  memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c
[   14.597787][  T846]  memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64
[   14.597789][  T846]  device_online+0x88/0xb0
[   14.597791][  T846]  online_memory_block+0x30/0x40
[   14.597793][  T846]  walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8
[   14.597794][  T846]  add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298
[   14.656161][  T846]  add_memory+0x60/0x98

Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so
callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260623-page_ext-v3-1-a89799a5367c@oss.qualcomm.com
Fixes: 9039b9096ea2 ("mm: page_ext: add an iteration API for page extensions")
Signed-off-by: Ketan Kishore &lt;ketan.kishore@oss.qualcomm.com&gt;
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) &lt;david@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Brendan Jackman &lt;jackmanb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Liam R. Howlett &lt;liam@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;ljs@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Luiz Capitulino &lt;luizcap@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan &lt;surenb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rqspinlock: Fix order in raw_res_spin_(un)lock_irq to allow schedule</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gabriele Monaco</name>
<email>gmonaco@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T09:04:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b883733302508be1c678ce90b63d6b403f849995'/>
<id>b883733302508be1c678ce90b63d6b403f849995</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b48bd16eb9fc57a463a337ca148516cdf3212d61 upstream.

raw_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore() calls raw_res_spin_unlock() and then
restores interrupts, this means preemption is enabled when interrupts
are still disabled (as part of raw_res_spin_unlock()) so this cannot
trigger an actual preemption.
This is inconsistent with other spinlock implementations
(raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() and bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore()
itself).

Adjust the macro to ensure interrupts are enabled before enabling
preemption, allowing to schedule at that point. Make the same
modification in the error path of raw_res_spin_lock_irqsave().

Fixes: 101acd2e78b1 ("rqspinlock: Add macros for rqspinlock usage")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt; # asm-generic
Acked-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gabriele Monaco &lt;gmonaco@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610090431.32427-1-gmonaco@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b48bd16eb9fc57a463a337ca148516cdf3212d61 upstream.

raw_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore() calls raw_res_spin_unlock() and then
restores interrupts, this means preemption is enabled when interrupts
are still disabled (as part of raw_res_spin_unlock()) so this cannot
trigger an actual preemption.
This is inconsistent with other spinlock implementations
(raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() and bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore()
itself).

Adjust the macro to ensure interrupts are enabled before enabling
preemption, allowing to schedule at that point. Make the same
modification in the error path of raw_res_spin_lock_irqsave().

Fixes: 101acd2e78b1 ("rqspinlock: Add macros for rqspinlock usage")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt; # asm-generic
Acked-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gabriele Monaco &lt;gmonaco@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610090431.32427-1-gmonaco@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Huihui Huang</name>
<email>hhhuang@smu.edu.sg</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-01T10:28:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2dad64a97e1df47f5d9ccb17fa319aa348617226'/>
<id>2dad64a97e1df47f5d9ccb17fa319aa348617226</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 upstream.

String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter
predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and
filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match
callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.

regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called
glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some
string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char
array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a
trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of
the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in
glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()
from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.

Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()
so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop
is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.

Fixes: 60f1d5e3bac4 ("ftrace: Support full glob matching")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/da1aaf125fc3b63320b0c540fd6afa7c3d5b4f1a.1782836943.git.hhhuang@smu.edu.sg
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Huihui Huang &lt;hhhuang@smu.edu.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 upstream.

String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter
predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and
filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match
callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it.

regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called
glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some
string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char
array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a
trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of
the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in
glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds()
from the xfs_lookup tracepoint.

Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob()
so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop
is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour.

Fixes: 60f1d5e3bac4 ("ftrace: Support full glob matching")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/da1aaf125fc3b63320b0c540fd6afa7c3d5b4f1a.1782836943.git.hhhuang@smu.edu.sg
Reported-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang &lt;zcliangcn@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Huihui Huang &lt;hhhuang@smu.edu.sg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: drbg - Fix drbg_max_addtl() on 64-bit kernels</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-20T06:33:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=53d38b93cadc08bcbe6e200bb19d37cb9bec1f1e'/>
<id>53d38b93cadc08bcbe6e200bb19d37cb9bec1f1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f49f00c981bbb9ef602966f19bfdbef46b681d2 upstream.

On 64-bit kernels, drbg_max_addtl() returns 2**35 bytes.  That's too
large, for two reasons:

1. SP800-90A says the maximum limit is 2**35 *bits*, not 2**35 bytes.
   So the implemented limit has confused bits and bytes.

2. When drbg_kcapi_hash() calls crypto_shash_update() on the additional
   information string, the length is implicitly cast to 'unsigned int'.
   That truncates the additional information string to U32_MAX bytes.

Fix the maximum additional information string length to always be
U32_MAX - 1, causing an error to be returned for any longer lengths.

Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f49f00c981bbb9ef602966f19bfdbef46b681d2 upstream.

On 64-bit kernels, drbg_max_addtl() returns 2**35 bytes.  That's too
large, for two reasons:

1. SP800-90A says the maximum limit is 2**35 *bits*, not 2**35 bytes.
   So the implemented limit has confused bits and bytes.

2. When drbg_kcapi_hash() calls crypto_shash_update() on the additional
   information string, the length is implicitly cast to 'unsigned int'.
   That truncates the additional information string to U32_MAX bytes.

Fix the maximum additional information string length to always be
U32_MAX - 1, causing an error to be returned for any longer lengths.

Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:12:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=666fc2e6e4d0a37592e5a3029deddc272e10df1e'/>
<id>666fc2e6e4d0a37592e5a3029deddc272e10df1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0bb99f2cfaae6822d734d69722de30af823efdf3 upstream.

Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT
allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user.
eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on
every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit.

eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors
for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the
flush as they are eBPF-only.

  [pawan: backport had various conflicts in arches bpf_int_jit_compile().
	  loongarch bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't use pack allocator,
	  dropped was_classic hunk. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0bb99f2cfaae6822d734d69722de30af823efdf3 upstream.

Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT
allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user.
eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on
every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit.

eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors
for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the
flush as they are eBPF-only.

  [pawan: backport had various conflicts in arches bpf_int_jit_compile().
	  loongarch bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't use pack allocator,
	  dropped was_classic hunk. ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawan Gupta</name>
<email>pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T01:11:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e'/>
<id>8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995 upstream.

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.

Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.

Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.

Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995 upstream.

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.

Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.

Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.

Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta &lt;pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>HID: sensor-hub: Add sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() for multi-byte reads</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Srinivas Pandruvada</name>
<email>srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T08:29:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c63bc6308da716098833fe3185481cb9905dde79'/>
<id>c63bc6308da716098833fe3185481cb9905dde79</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f784fcea450617055d2d12eec5b2f6e0e38bf878 upstream.

sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value() is limited to returning a single
32-bit value, which is insufficient for sensors that report data larger
than 32 bits, such as a quaternion with four s16 elements.

Add sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() that accepts a caller-provided
buffer and accumulates incoming data until the buffer is full. The two
paths are distinguished in sensor_hub_raw_event() by pending.max_raw_size
being non-zero, preserving backward compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Zhang Lixu &lt;lixu.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Lixu &lt;lixu.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f784fcea450617055d2d12eec5b2f6e0e38bf878 upstream.

sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value() is limited to returning a single
32-bit value, which is insufficient for sensors that report data larger
than 32 bits, such as a quaternion with four s16 elements.

Add sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() that accepts a caller-provided
buffer and accumulates incoming data until the buffer is full. The two
paths are distinguished in sensor_hub_raw_event() by pending.max_raw_size
being non-zero, preserving backward compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada &lt;srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Zhang Lixu &lt;lixu.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Lixu &lt;lixu.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina &lt;jkosina@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;Stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron &lt;jic23@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Siwei Zhang</name>
<email>oss@fourdim.xyz</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-15T15:33:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61701912c58a05f6a043f097cc177a964abef348'/>
<id>61701912c58a05f6a043f097cc177a964abef348</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 12917f591cea1af36087dba5b9ec888652f0b42a upstream.

hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev-&gt;sent_cmd) when a connection
was pending, but hdev-&gt;sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still
HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general
protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.

Instead of inspecting hdev-&gt;sent_cmd, track the in-flight create
connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and
route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which
dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command
is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel
function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker
takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued
command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete
and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and
hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued
command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this
connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated
command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag
mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.

hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear
HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command
status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the
controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on
the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the
create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free.

Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: XIAO WU &lt;xiaowu.417@qq.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang &lt;oss@fourdim.xyz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 12917f591cea1af36087dba5b9ec888652f0b42a upstream.

hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev-&gt;sent_cmd) when a connection
was pending, but hdev-&gt;sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still
HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general
protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path.

Instead of inspecting hdev-&gt;sent_cmd, track the in-flight create
connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and
route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which
dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command
is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel
function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker
takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued
command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete
and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and
hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued
command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this
connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated
command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag
mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection.

hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear
HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command
status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the
controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on
the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the
create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free.

Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: XIAO WU &lt;xiaowu.417@qq.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang &lt;oss@fourdim.xyz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:53:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marco Elver</name>
<email>elver@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-05T14:23:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032'/>
<id>d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b upstream.

l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan-&gt;conn. If
the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending,
chan-&gt;conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer
worker attempts to lock conn-&gt;lock:

| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83
|
| CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full)
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
| Call Trace:
|  &lt;TASK&gt;
|  instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
|  atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
|  __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
|  mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
|  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422
|  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
|  process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
|  worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
|  kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
|  ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
|  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|  &lt;/TASK&gt;
|
| Allocated by task 320:
|  l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075
|  l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452
|  hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline]
|  hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760
|  hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline]
|  hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847
|  hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
|  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
|  process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
|  worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
|  kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
|  ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
|  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|
| Freed by task 322:
|  hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline]
|  hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736
|  hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405
|  hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline]
|  hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679
|  vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690
|  __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510
|  task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233
|  get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810
|  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
|  __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline]
|  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98
|  do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
|  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
|
| The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400
|  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
| The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
|  freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)

Fix it by having chan-&gt;conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via
l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and
releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn
remains alive as long as the channel exists.

A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the channel
has been deleted from its connection. l2cap_chan_del() atomically sets
this flag using test_and_set_bit() instead of setting chan-&gt;conn to
NULL. All asynchronous workers (l2cap_chan_timeout, l2cap_ack_timeout,
l2cap_monitor_timeout, l2cap_retrans_timeout) and l2cap_chan_send()
check FLAG_DEL to determine whether the channel has been torn down,
rather than testing chan-&gt;conn for NULL.

Fixes: 8c8e620467a7 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Siwei Zhang &lt;oss@fourdim.xyz&gt;
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
Reported-by: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260521021249.3258069-1-oss%40fourdim.xyz
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b upstream.

l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan-&gt;conn. If
the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending,
chan-&gt;conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer
worker attempts to lock conn-&gt;lock:

| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83
|
| CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full)
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
| Call Trace:
|  &lt;TASK&gt;
|  instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
|  atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
|  __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
|  mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
|  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422
|  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
|  process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
|  worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
|  kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
|  ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
|  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|  &lt;/TASK&gt;
|
| Allocated by task 320:
|  l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075
|  l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452
|  hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline]
|  hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760
|  hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline]
|  hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847
|  hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
|  process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
|  process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
|  worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
|  kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
|  ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
|  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|
| Freed by task 322:
|  hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline]
|  hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736
|  hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405
|  hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline]
|  hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679
|  vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690
|  __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510
|  task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233
|  get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810
|  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
|  __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline]
|  exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98
|  do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
|  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
|
| The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400
|  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
| The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
|  freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)

Fix it by having chan-&gt;conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via
l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and
releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn
remains alive as long as the channel exists.

A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the channel
has been deleted from its connection. l2cap_chan_del() atomically sets
this flag using test_and_set_bit() instead of setting chan-&gt;conn to
NULL. All asynchronous workers (l2cap_chan_timeout, l2cap_ack_timeout,
l2cap_monitor_timeout, l2cap_retrans_timeout) and l2cap_chan_send()
check FLAG_DEL to determine whether the channel has been torn down,
rather than testing chan-&gt;conn for NULL.

Fixes: 8c8e620467a7 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Siwei Zhang &lt;oss@fourdim.xyz&gt;
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
Reported-by: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260521021249.3258069-1-oss%40fourdim.xyz
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver &lt;elver@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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