<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v5.4.192</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm, hugetlb: allow for "high" userspace addresses</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:03:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christophe Leroy</name>
<email>christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-21T23:35:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa2a047b584296a282daa00c850aff7ab371bbc0'/>
<id>aa2a047b584296a282daa00c850aff7ab371bbc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5f24d5a579d1eace79d505b148808a850b417d4c upstream.

This is a fix for commit f6795053dac8 ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high"
userspace addresses") for hugetlb.

This patch adds support for "high" userspace addresses that are
optionally supported on the system and have to be requested via a hint
mechanism ("high" addr parameter to mmap).

Architectures such as powerpc and x86 achieve this by making changes to
their architectural versions of hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() function.
However, arm64 uses the generic version of that function.

So take into account arch_get_mmap_base() and arch_get_mmap_end() in
hugetlb_get_unmapped_area().  To allow that, move those two macros out
of mm/mmap.c into include/linux/sched/mm.h

If these macros are not defined in architectural code then they default
to (TASK_SIZE) and (base) so should not introduce any behavioural
changes to architectures that do not define them.

For the time being, only ARM64 is affected by this change.

Catalin (ARM64) said
 "We should have fixed hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() as well when we added
  support for 52-bit VA. The reason for commit f6795053dac8 was to
  prevent normal mmap() from returning addresses above 48-bit by default
  as some user-space had hard assumptions about this.

  It's a slight ABI change if you do this for hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()
  but I doubt anyone would notice. It's more likely that the current
  behaviour would cause issues, so I'd rather have them consistent.

  Basically when arm64 gained support for 52-bit addresses we did not
  want user-space calling mmap() to suddenly get such high addresses,
  otherwise we could have inadvertently broken some programs (similar
  behaviour to x86 here). Hence we added commit f6795053dac8. But we
  missed hugetlbfs which could still get such high mmap() addresses. So
  in theory that's a potential regression that should have bee addressed
  at the same time as commit f6795053dac8 (and before arm64 enabled
  52-bit addresses)"

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ab847b6edb197bffdfe189e70fb4ac76bfe79e0d.1650033747.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Fixes: f6795053dac8 ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high" userspace addresses")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.0.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5f24d5a579d1eace79d505b148808a850b417d4c upstream.

This is a fix for commit f6795053dac8 ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high"
userspace addresses") for hugetlb.

This patch adds support for "high" userspace addresses that are
optionally supported on the system and have to be requested via a hint
mechanism ("high" addr parameter to mmap).

Architectures such as powerpc and x86 achieve this by making changes to
their architectural versions of hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() function.
However, arm64 uses the generic version of that function.

So take into account arch_get_mmap_base() and arch_get_mmap_end() in
hugetlb_get_unmapped_area().  To allow that, move those two macros out
of mm/mmap.c into include/linux/sched/mm.h

If these macros are not defined in architectural code then they default
to (TASK_SIZE) and (base) so should not introduce any behavioural
changes to architectures that do not define them.

For the time being, only ARM64 is affected by this change.

Catalin (ARM64) said
 "We should have fixed hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() as well when we added
  support for 52-bit VA. The reason for commit f6795053dac8 was to
  prevent normal mmap() from returning addresses above 48-bit by default
  as some user-space had hard assumptions about this.

  It's a slight ABI change if you do this for hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()
  but I doubt anyone would notice. It's more likely that the current
  behaviour would cause issues, so I'd rather have them consistent.

  Basically when arm64 gained support for 52-bit addresses we did not
  want user-space calling mmap() to suddenly get such high addresses,
  otherwise we could have inadvertently broken some programs (similar
  behaviour to x86 here). Hence we added commit f6795053dac8. But we
  missed hugetlbfs which could still get such high mmap() addresses. So
  in theory that's a potential regression that should have bee addressed
  at the same time as commit f6795053dac8 (and before arm64 enabled
  52-bit addresses)"

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ab847b6edb197bffdfe189e70fb4ac76bfe79e0d.1650033747.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Fixes: f6795053dac8 ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high" userspace addresses")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy &lt;christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;	[5.0.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix potential xmit stalls caused by TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:03:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-25T00:34:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e80054ea0cde6ffda827bef1f26be1a3df97c29b'/>
<id>e80054ea0cde6ffda827bef1f26be1a3df97c29b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4bfe744ff1644fbc0a991a2677dc874475dd6776 ]

I had this bug sitting for too long in my pile, it is time to fix it.

Thanks to Doug Porter for reminding me of it!

We had various attempts in the past, including commit
0cbe6a8f089e ("tcp: remove SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK"),
but the issue is that TCP stack currently only generates
EPOLLOUT from input path, when tp-&gt;snd_una has advanced
and skb(s) cleaned from rtx queue.

If a flow has a big RTT, and/or receives SACKs, it is possible
that the notsent part (tp-&gt;write_seq - tp-&gt;snd_nxt) reaches 0
and no more data can be sent until tp-&gt;snd_una finally advances.

What is needed is to also check if POLLOUT needs to be generated
whenever tp-&gt;snd_nxt is advanced, from output path.

This bug triggers more often after an idle period, as
we do not receive ACK for at least one RTT. tcp_notsent_lowat
could be a fraction of what CWND and pacing rate would allow to
send during this RTT.

In a followup patch, I will remove the bogus call
to tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_SNDBUF_LIMITED)
from tcp_check_space(). Fact that we have decided to generate
an EPOLLOUT does not mean the application has immediately
refilled the transmit queue. This optimistic call
might have been the reason the bug seemed not too serious.

Tested:

200 ms rtt, 1% packet loss, 32 MB tcp_rmem[2] and tcp_wmem[2]

$ echo 500000 &gt;/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat
$ cat bench_rr.sh
SUM=0
for i in {1..10}
do
 V=`netperf -H remote_host -l30 -t TCP_RR -- -r 10000000,10000 -o LOCAL_BYTES_SENT | egrep -v "MIGRATED|Bytes"`
 echo $V
 SUM=$(($SUM + $V))
done
echo SUM=$SUM

Before patch:
$ bench_rr.sh
130000000
80000000
140000000
140000000
140000000
140000000
130000000
40000000
90000000
110000000
SUM=1140000000

After patch:
$ bench_rr.sh
430000000
590000000
530000000
450000000
450000000
350000000
450000000
490000000
480000000
460000000
SUM=4680000000  # This is 410 % of the value before patch.

Fixes: c9bee3b7fdec ("tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Doug Porter &lt;dsp@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4bfe744ff1644fbc0a991a2677dc874475dd6776 ]

I had this bug sitting for too long in my pile, it is time to fix it.

Thanks to Doug Porter for reminding me of it!

We had various attempts in the past, including commit
0cbe6a8f089e ("tcp: remove SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK"),
but the issue is that TCP stack currently only generates
EPOLLOUT from input path, when tp-&gt;snd_una has advanced
and skb(s) cleaned from rtx queue.

If a flow has a big RTT, and/or receives SACKs, it is possible
that the notsent part (tp-&gt;write_seq - tp-&gt;snd_nxt) reaches 0
and no more data can be sent until tp-&gt;snd_una finally advances.

What is needed is to also check if POLLOUT needs to be generated
whenever tp-&gt;snd_nxt is advanced, from output path.

This bug triggers more often after an idle period, as
we do not receive ACK for at least one RTT. tcp_notsent_lowat
could be a fraction of what CWND and pacing rate would allow to
send during this RTT.

In a followup patch, I will remove the bogus call
to tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_SNDBUF_LIMITED)
from tcp_check_space(). Fact that we have decided to generate
an EPOLLOUT does not mean the application has immediately
refilled the transmit queue. This optimistic call
might have been the reason the bug seemed not too serious.

Tested:

200 ms rtt, 1% packet loss, 32 MB tcp_rmem[2] and tcp_wmem[2]

$ echo 500000 &gt;/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat
$ cat bench_rr.sh
SUM=0
for i in {1..10}
do
 V=`netperf -H remote_host -l30 -t TCP_RR -- -r 10000000,10000 -o LOCAL_BYTES_SENT | egrep -v "MIGRATED|Bytes"`
 echo $V
 SUM=$(($SUM + $V))
done
echo SUM=$SUM

Before patch:
$ bench_rr.sh
130000000
80000000
140000000
140000000
140000000
140000000
130000000
40000000
90000000
110000000
SUM=1140000000

After patch:
$ bench_rr.sh
430000000
590000000
530000000
450000000
450000000
350000000
450000000
490000000
480000000
460000000
SUM=4680000000  # This is 410 % of the value before patch.

Fixes: c9bee3b7fdec ("tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Doug Porter &lt;dsp@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Cc: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh &lt;soheil@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: ensure to use the most recently sent skb when filling the rate sample</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:03:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pengcheng Yang</name>
<email>yangpc@wangsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-20T02:34:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2cba635570d817a012dac45eda032e4bbf60930b'/>
<id>2cba635570d817a012dac45eda032e4bbf60930b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b253a0680ceadc5d7b4acca7aa2d870326cad8ad ]

If an ACK (s)acks multiple skbs, we favor the information
from the most recently sent skb by choosing the skb with
the highest prior_delivered count. But in the interval
between receiving ACKs, we send multiple skbs with the same
prior_delivered, because the tp-&gt;delivered only changes
when we receive an ACK.

We used RACK's solution, copying tcp_rack_sent_after() as
tcp_skb_sent_after() helper to determine "which packet was
sent last?". Later, we will use tcp_skb_sent_after() instead
in RACK.

Fixes: b9f64820fb22 ("tcp: track data delivery rate for a TCP connection")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang &lt;yangpc@wangsu.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650422081-22153-1-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b253a0680ceadc5d7b4acca7aa2d870326cad8ad ]

If an ACK (s)acks multiple skbs, we favor the information
from the most recently sent skb by choosing the skb with
the highest prior_delivered count. But in the interval
between receiving ACKs, we send multiple skbs with the same
prior_delivered, because the tp-&gt;delivered only changes
when we receive an ACK.

We used RACK's solution, copying tcp_rack_sent_after() as
tcp_skb_sent_after() helper to determine "which packet was
sent last?". Later, we will use tcp_skb_sent_after() instead
in RACK.

Fixes: b9f64820fb22 ("tcp: track data delivery rate for a TCP connection")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang &lt;yangpc@wangsu.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650422081-22153-1-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hex2bin: make the function hex_to_bin constant-time</title>
<updated>2022-05-09T07:03:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mikulas Patocka</name>
<email>mpatocka@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-25T12:07:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=15b78a8e38e89688793ff75f8c84347843eddadf'/>
<id>15b78a8e38e89688793ff75f8c84347843eddadf</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e5be15767e7e284351853cbaba80cde8620341fb upstream.

The function hex2bin is used to load cryptographic keys into device
mapper targets dm-crypt and dm-integrity.  It should take constant time
independent on the processed data, so that concurrently running
unprivileged code can't infer any information about the keys via
microarchitectural convert channels.

This patch changes the function hex_to_bin so that it contains no
branches and no memory accesses.

Note that this shouldn't cause performance degradation because the size
of the new function is the same as the size of the old function (on
x86-64) - and the new function causes no branch misprediction penalties.

I compile-tested this function with gcc on aarch64 alpha arm hppa hppa64
i386 ia64 m68k mips32 mips64 powerpc powerpc64 riscv sh4 s390x sparc32
sparc64 x86_64 and with clang on aarch64 arm hexagon i386 mips32 mips64
powerpc powerpc64 s390x sparc32 sparc64 x86_64 to verify that there are
no branches in the generated code.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e5be15767e7e284351853cbaba80cde8620341fb upstream.

The function hex2bin is used to load cryptographic keys into device
mapper targets dm-crypt and dm-integrity.  It should take constant time
independent on the processed data, so that concurrently running
unprivileged code can't infer any information about the keys via
microarchitectural convert channels.

This patch changes the function hex_to_bin so that it contains no
branches and no memory accesses.

Note that this shouldn't cause performance degradation because the size
of the new function is the same as the size of the old function (on
x86-64) - and the new function causes no branch misprediction penalties.

I compile-tested this function with gcc on aarch64 alpha arm hppa hppa64
i386 ia64 m68k mips32 mips64 powerpc powerpc64 riscv sh4 s390x sparc32
sparc64 x86_64 and with clang on aarch64 arm hexagon i386 mips32 mips64
powerpc powerpc64 s390x sparc32 sparc64 x86_64 to verify that there are
no branches in the generated code.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka &lt;mpatocka@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>oom_kill.c: futex: delay the OOM reaper to allow time for proper futex cleanup</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T11:50:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nico Pache</name>
<email>npache@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-21T23:36:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0441d3e95bca9157e0e0acfe626a2b3b05b50a43'/>
<id>0441d3e95bca9157e0e0acfe626a2b3b05b50a43</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e4a38402c36e42df28eb1a5394be87e6571fb48a upstream.

The pthread struct is allocated on PRIVATE|ANONYMOUS memory [1] which
can be targeted by the oom reaper.  This mapping is used to store the
futex robust list head; the kernel does not keep a copy of the robust
list and instead references a userspace address to maintain the
robustness during a process death.

A race can occur between exit_mm and the oom reaper that allows the oom
reaper to free the memory of the futex robust list before the exit path
has handled the futex death:

    CPU1                               CPU2
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    page_fault
    do_exit "signal"
    wake_oom_reaper
                                        oom_reaper
                                        oom_reap_task_mm (invalidates mm)
    exit_mm
    exit_mm_release
    futex_exit_release
    futex_cleanup
    exit_robust_list
    get_user (EFAULT- can't access memory)

If the get_user EFAULT's, the kernel will be unable to recover the
waiters on the robust_list, leaving userspace mutexes hung indefinitely.

Delay the OOM reaper, allowing more time for the exit path to perform
the futex cleanup.

Reproducer: https://gitlab.com/jsavitz/oom_futex_reproducer

Based on a patch by Michal Hocko.

Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.35/source/nptl/allocatestack.c#L370 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414144042.677008-1-npache@redhat.com
Fixes: 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently")
Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nico Pache &lt;npache@redhat.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael Aquini &lt;aquini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Herton R. Krzesinski &lt;herton@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e4a38402c36e42df28eb1a5394be87e6571fb48a upstream.

The pthread struct is allocated on PRIVATE|ANONYMOUS memory [1] which
can be targeted by the oom reaper.  This mapping is used to store the
futex robust list head; the kernel does not keep a copy of the robust
list and instead references a userspace address to maintain the
robustness during a process death.

A race can occur between exit_mm and the oom reaper that allows the oom
reaper to free the memory of the futex robust list before the exit path
has handled the futex death:

    CPU1                               CPU2
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    page_fault
    do_exit "signal"
    wake_oom_reaper
                                        oom_reaper
                                        oom_reap_task_mm (invalidates mm)
    exit_mm
    exit_mm_release
    futex_exit_release
    futex_cleanup
    exit_robust_list
    get_user (EFAULT- can't access memory)

If the get_user EFAULT's, the kernel will be unable to recover the
waiters on the robust_list, leaving userspace mutexes hung indefinitely.

Delay the OOM reaper, allowing more time for the exit path to perform
the futex cleanup.

Reproducer: https://gitlab.com/jsavitz/oom_futex_reproducer

Based on a patch by Michal Hocko.

Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.35/source/nptl/allocatestack.c#L370 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414144042.677008-1-npache@redhat.com
Fixes: 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently")
Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nico Pache &lt;npache@redhat.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Rafael Aquini &lt;aquini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Herton R. Krzesinski &lt;herton@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juri Lelli &lt;juri.lelli@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Vincent Guittot &lt;vincent.guittot@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann &lt;dietmar.eggemann@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Segall &lt;bsegall@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira &lt;bristot@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli &lt;aarcange@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso &lt;dave@stgolabs.net&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Savitz &lt;jsavitz@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T11:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ricardo Dias</name>
<email>rdias@singlestore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T11:11:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b01b700e0c5a3d820c4884f67708112b034bd6da'/>
<id>b01b700e0c5a3d820c4884f67708112b034bd6da</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 01770a166165738a6e05c3d911fb4609cc4eb416 ]

When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
set.

The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
from that SYN cookie.

Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
instant.

When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
userspace program to the same client.

This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
to the same client.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias &lt;rdias@singlestore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lan
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 01770a166165738a6e05c3d911fb4609cc4eb416 ]

When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
set.

The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
from that SYN cookie.

Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
instant.

When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
userspace program to the same client.

This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
socket exists, we drop the packet and discard the second child socket
to the same client.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias &lt;rdias@singlestore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120111133.GA67501@rdias-suse-pc.lan
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>etherdevice: Adjust ether_addr* prototypes to silence -Wstringop-overead</title>
<updated>2022-04-27T11:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-12T17:14:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ac94e87675b2f80adc0201a2537d07c7598b51cc'/>
<id>ac94e87675b2f80adc0201a2537d07c7598b51cc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2618a0dae09ef37728dab89ff60418cbe25ae6bd upstream.

With GCC 12, -Wstringop-overread was warning about an implicit cast from
char[6] to char[8]. However, the extra 2 bytes are always thrown away,
alignment doesn't matter, and the risk of hitting the edge of unallocated
memory has been accepted, so this prototype can just be converted to a
regular char *. Silences:

net/core/dev.c: In function ‘bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp’: net/core/dev.c:4618:21: warning: ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’ reading 8 bytes from a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overread]
 4618 |         orig_host = ether_addr_equal_64bits(eth-&gt;h_dest, &gt; skb-&gt;dev-&gt;dev_addr);
      |                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 2 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
In file included from net/core/dev.c:91: include/linux/etherdevice.h:375:20: note: in a call to function ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’
  375 | static inline bool ether_addr_equal_64bits(const u8 addr1[6+2],
      |                    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220212090811.uuzk6d76agw2vv73@pengutronix.de
Cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Khem Raj &lt;raj.khem@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2618a0dae09ef37728dab89ff60418cbe25ae6bd upstream.

With GCC 12, -Wstringop-overread was warning about an implicit cast from
char[6] to char[8]. However, the extra 2 bytes are always thrown away,
alignment doesn't matter, and the risk of hitting the edge of unallocated
memory has been accepted, so this prototype can just be converted to a
regular char *. Silences:

net/core/dev.c: In function ‘bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp’: net/core/dev.c:4618:21: warning: ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’ reading 8 bytes from a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overread]
 4618 |         orig_host = ether_addr_equal_64bits(eth-&gt;h_dest, &gt; skb-&gt;dev-&gt;dev_addr);
      |                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 2 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
In file included from net/core/dev.c:91: include/linux/etherdevice.h:375:20: note: in a call to function ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’
  375 | static inline bool ether_addr_equal_64bits(const u8 addr1[6+2],
      |                    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Tested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220212090811.uuzk6d76agw2vv73@pengutronix.de
Cc: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "David S. Miller" &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Khem Raj &lt;raj.khem@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ax25: fix reference count leaks of ax25_dev</title>
<updated>2022-04-20T07:19:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Duoming Zhou</name>
<email>duoming@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-18T06:33:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1db0b2c55c934a33b6fa4d4a4865f5a5be641344'/>
<id>1db0b2c55c934a33b6fa4d4a4865f5a5be641344</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 87563a043cef044fed5db7967a75741cc16ad2b1 upstream.

The previous commit d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev
to avoid UAF bugs") introduces refcount into ax25_dev, but there
are reference leak paths in ax25_ctl_ioctl(), ax25_fwd_ioctl(),
ax25_rt_add(), ax25_rt_del() and ax25_rt_opt().

This patch uses ax25_dev_put() and adjusts the position of
ax25_addr_ax25dev() to fix reference cout leaks of ax25_dev.

Fixes: d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203150811.42256-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[OP: backport to 5.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait &lt;ovidiu.panait@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 87563a043cef044fed5db7967a75741cc16ad2b1 upstream.

The previous commit d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev
to avoid UAF bugs") introduces refcount into ax25_dev, but there
are reference leak paths in ax25_ctl_ioctl(), ax25_fwd_ioctl(),
ax25_rt_add(), ax25_rt_del() and ax25_rt_opt().

This patch uses ax25_dev_put() and adjusts the position of
ax25_addr_ax25dev() to fix reference cout leaks of ax25_dev.

Fixes: d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203150811.42256-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[OP: backport to 5.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait &lt;ovidiu.panait@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs</title>
<updated>2022-04-20T07:19:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Duoming Zhou</name>
<email>duoming@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-18T06:33:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=418993bbaafb0cd48f904ba68eeda052d624c821'/>
<id>418993bbaafb0cd48f904ba68eeda052d624c821</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d01ffb9eee4af165d83b08dd73ebdf9fe94a519b upstream.

If we dereference ax25_dev after we call kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down(), it will lead to concurrency UAF bugs.
There are eight syscall functions suffer from UAF bugs, include
ax25_bind(), ax25_release(), ax25_connect(), ax25_ioctl(),
ax25_getname(), ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_getsockopt() and
ax25_info_show().

One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:

  (USE)                       |    (FREE)
                              |  ax25_device_event
                              |    ax25_dev_device_down
ax25_bind                     |    ...
  ...                         |      kfree(ax25_dev)
  ax25_fillin_cb()            |    ...
    ax25_fillin_cb_from_dev() |
  ...                         |

The root cause of UAF bugs is that kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down() is not protected by any locks.
When ax25_dev, which there are still pointers point to,
is released, the concurrency UAF bug will happen.

This patch introduces refcount into ax25_dev in order to
guarantee that there are no pointers point to it when ax25_dev
is released.

Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[OP: backport to 5.4: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait &lt;ovidiu.panait@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d01ffb9eee4af165d83b08dd73ebdf9fe94a519b upstream.

If we dereference ax25_dev after we call kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down(), it will lead to concurrency UAF bugs.
There are eight syscall functions suffer from UAF bugs, include
ax25_bind(), ax25_release(), ax25_connect(), ax25_ioctl(),
ax25_getname(), ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_getsockopt() and
ax25_info_show().

One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:

  (USE)                       |    (FREE)
                              |  ax25_device_event
                              |    ax25_dev_device_down
ax25_bind                     |    ...
  ...                         |      kfree(ax25_dev)
  ax25_fillin_cb()            |    ...
    ax25_fillin_cb_from_dev() |
  ...                         |

The root cause of UAF bugs is that kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down() is not protected by any locks.
When ax25_dev, which there are still pointers point to,
is released, the concurrency UAF bug will happen.

This patch introduces refcount into ax25_dev in order to
guarantee that there are no pointers point to it when ax25_dev
is released.

Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[OP: backport to 5.4: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait &lt;ovidiu.panait@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tlb: hugetlb: Add more sizes to tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry</title>
<updated>2022-04-20T07:19:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Capper</name>
<email>steve.capper@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-30T11:25:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a244167964a3916cc54d42e92d36acaed58bd93'/>
<id>4a244167964a3916cc54d42e92d36acaed58bd93</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 697a1d44af8ba0477ee729e632f4ade37999249a ]

tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry only considers PMD_SIZE and PUD_SIZE when
updating the mmu_gather structure.

Unfortunately on arm64 there are two additional huge page sizes that
need to be covered: CONT_PTE_SIZE and CONT_PMD_SIZE. Where an end-user
attempts to employ contiguous huge pages, a VM_BUG_ON can be experienced
due to the fact that the tlb structure hasn't been correctly updated by
the relevant tlb_flush_p.._range() call from tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry.

This patch adds inequality logic to the generic implementation of
tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry s.t. CONT_PTE_SIZE and CONT_PMD_SIZE are
effectively covered on arm64. Also, as well as ptes, pmds and puds;
p4ds are now considered too.

Reported-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/811c5c8e-b3a2-85d2-049c-717f17c3a03a@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330112543.863-1-steve.capper@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 697a1d44af8ba0477ee729e632f4ade37999249a ]

tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry only considers PMD_SIZE and PUD_SIZE when
updating the mmu_gather structure.

Unfortunately on arm64 there are two additional huge page sizes that
need to be covered: CONT_PTE_SIZE and CONT_PMD_SIZE. Where an end-user
attempts to employ contiguous huge pages, a VM_BUG_ON can be experienced
due to the fact that the tlb structure hasn't been correctly updated by
the relevant tlb_flush_p.._range() call from tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry.

This patch adds inequality logic to the generic implementation of
tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry s.t. CONT_PTE_SIZE and CONT_PMD_SIZE are
effectively covered on arm64. Also, as well as ptes, pmds and puds;
p4ds are now considered too.

Reported-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/811c5c8e-b3a2-85d2-049c-717f17c3a03a@redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper &lt;steve.capper@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual &lt;anshuman.khandual@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220330112543.863-1-steve.capper@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
