<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v5.3.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: Fix possible overflow in jbd2_log_space_left()</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:49:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-05T16:44:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=60f4472f5432728d27f853a631612ca62249006d'/>
<id>60f4472f5432728d27f853a631612ca62249006d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit add3efdd78b8a0478ce423bb9d4df6bd95e8b335 upstream.

When number of free space in the journal is very low, the arithmetic in
jbd2_log_space_left() could underflow resulting in very high number of
free blocks and thus triggering assertion failure in transaction commit
code complaining there's not enough space in the journal:

J_ASSERT(journal-&gt;j_free &gt; 1);

Properly check for the low number of free blocks.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit add3efdd78b8a0478ce423bb9d4df6bd95e8b335 upstream.

When number of free space in the journal is very low, the arithmetic in
jbd2_log_space_left() could underflow resulting in very high number of
free blocks and thus triggering assertion failure in transaction commit
code complaining there's not enough space in the journal:

J_ASSERT(journal-&gt;j_free &gt; 1);

Properly check for the low number of free blocks.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kernfs: fix ino wrap-around detection</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:49:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-04T23:54:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c3386e04a0ed2a129e1d6339665f7cba7791497a'/>
<id>c3386e04a0ed2a129e1d6339665f7cba7791497a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e23f568aa63f64cd6b355094224cc9356c0f696b upstream.

When the 32bit ino wraps around, kernfs increments the generation
number to distinguish reused ino instances.  The wrap-around detection
tests whether the allocated ino is lower than what the cursor but the
cursor is pointing to the next ino to allocate so the condition never
triggers.

Fix it by remembering the last ino and comparing against that.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 4a3ef68acacf ("kernfs: implement i_generation")
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e23f568aa63f64cd6b355094224cc9356c0f696b upstream.

When the 32bit ino wraps around, kernfs increments the generation
number to distinguish reused ino instances.  The wrap-around detection
tests whether the allocated ino is lower than what the cursor but the
cursor is pointing to the next ino to allocate so the condition never
triggers.

Fix it by remembering the last ino and comparing against that.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 4a3ef68acacf ("kernfs: implement i_generation")
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: hda: Modify stream stripe mask only when needed</title>
<updated>2019-12-13T07:48:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-02T07:49:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fd76e1a85817cfca0e33ae8c39cc3f2436b7542a'/>
<id>fd76e1a85817cfca0e33ae8c39cc3f2436b7542a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e38e486d66e2a3b902768fd71c32dbf10f77e1cb upstream.

The recent commit in HD-audio stream management for changing the
stripe control seems causing a regression on some platforms.  The
stripe control is currently used only by HDMI codec, and applying the
stripe mask unconditionally may lead to scratchy and static noises as
seen on some MacBooks.

For addressing the regression, this patch changes the stream
management code to apply the stripe mask conditionally only when the
codec driver requested.

Fixes: 9b6f7e7a296e ("ALSA: hda: program stripe bits for controller")
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204477
Tested-by: Michael Pobega &lt;mpobega@neverware.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202074947.1617-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e38e486d66e2a3b902768fd71c32dbf10f77e1cb upstream.

The recent commit in HD-audio stream management for changing the
stripe control seems causing a regression on some platforms.  The
stripe control is currently used only by HDMI codec, and applying the
stripe mask unconditionally may lead to scratchy and static noises as
seen on some MacBooks.

For addressing the regression, this patch changes the stream
management code to apply the stripe mask conditionally only when the
codec driver requested.

Fixes: 9b6f7e7a296e ("ALSA: hda: program stripe bits for controller")
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204477
Tested-by: Michael Pobega &lt;mpobega@neverware.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202074947.1617-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: use sg_next() to walk sg entries</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-27T20:16:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33627d93d75702c70c898441602dbfba03e0f4cc'/>
<id>33627d93d75702c70c898441602dbfba03e0f4cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c5daa6cccdc2f94aca2c9b3fa5f94e4469997293 ]

Partially sent record cleanup path increments an SG entry
directly instead of using sg_next(). This should not be a
problem today, as encrypted messages should be always
allocated as arrays. But given this is a cleanup path it's
easy to miss was this ever to change. Use sg_next(), and
simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c5daa6cccdc2f94aca2c9b3fa5f94e4469997293 ]

Partially sent record cleanup path increments an SG entry
directly instead of using sg_next(). This should not be a
problem today, as encrypted messages should be always
allocated as arrays. But given this is a cleanup path it's
easy to miss was this ever to change. Use sg_next(), and
simplify the code.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: remove the dead inplace_crypto code</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-27T20:16:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7d9da049e68e253e9c0419a7effab878108aa59b'/>
<id>7d9da049e68e253e9c0419a7effab878108aa59b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9e5ffed37df68d0ccfb2fdc528609e23a1e70ebe ]

Looks like when BPF support was added by commit d3b18ad31f93
("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") and
commit d829e9c4112b ("tls: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
it broke/removed the support for in-place crypto as added by
commit 4e6d47206c32 ("tls: Add support for inplace records
encryption").

The inplace_crypto member of struct tls_rec is dead, inited
to zero, and sometimes set to zero again. It used to be
set to 1 when record was allocated, but the skmsg code doesn't
seem to have been written with the idea of in-place crypto
in mind.

Since non trivial effort is required to bring the feature back
and we don't really have the HW to measure the benefit just
remove the left over support for now to avoid confusing readers.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9e5ffed37df68d0ccfb2fdc528609e23a1e70ebe ]

Looks like when BPF support was added by commit d3b18ad31f93
("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") and
commit d829e9c4112b ("tls: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
it broke/removed the support for in-place crypto as added by
commit 4e6d47206c32 ("tls: Add support for inplace records
encryption").

The inplace_crypto member of struct tls_rec is dead, inited
to zero, and sometimes set to zero again. It used to be
set to 1 when record was allocated, but the skmsg code doesn't
seem to have been written with the idea of in-place crypto
in mind.

Since non trivial effort is required to bring the feature back
and we don't really have the HW to measure the benefit just
remove the left over support for now to avoid confusing readers.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: skmsg: fix TLS 1.3 crash with full sk_msg</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-27T20:16:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8015c79d262661c42ceb698ae421b4b5f46969b9'/>
<id>8015c79d262661c42ceb698ae421b4b5f46969b9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 031097d9e079e40dce401031d1012e83d80eaf01 ]

TLS 1.3 started using the entry at the end of the SG array
for chaining-in the single byte content type entry. This mostly
works:

[ E E E E E E . . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

                 E &lt; content type
               /
[ E E E E E E C . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

(Where E denotes a populated SG entry; C denotes a chaining entry.)

If the array is full, however, the end will point to the start:

[ E E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

And we end up overwriting the start:

    E &lt; content type
   /
[ C E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

The sg array is supposed to be a circular buffer with start and
end markers pointing anywhere. In case where start &gt; end
(i.e. the circular buffer has "wrapped") there is an extra entry
reserved at the end to chain the two halves together.

[ E E E E E E . . l ]

(Where l is the reserved entry for "looping" back to front.

As suggested by John, let's reserve another entry for chaining
SG entries after the main circular buffer. Note that this entry
has to be pointed to by the end entry so its position is not fixed.

Examples of full messages:

[ E E E E E E E E . l ]
  ^               ^
   start           end

   &lt;---------------.
[ E E . E E E E E E l ]
      ^ ^
   end   start

Now the end will always point to an unused entry, so TLS 1.3
can always use it.

Fixes: 130b392c6cd6 ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 031097d9e079e40dce401031d1012e83d80eaf01 ]

TLS 1.3 started using the entry at the end of the SG array
for chaining-in the single byte content type entry. This mostly
works:

[ E E E E E E . . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

                 E &lt; content type
               /
[ E E E E E E C . ]
  ^           ^
   start       end

(Where E denotes a populated SG entry; C denotes a chaining entry.)

If the array is full, however, the end will point to the start:

[ E E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

And we end up overwriting the start:

    E &lt; content type
   /
[ C E E E E E E E ]
  ^
   start
   end

The sg array is supposed to be a circular buffer with start and
end markers pointing anywhere. In case where start &gt; end
(i.e. the circular buffer has "wrapped") there is an extra entry
reserved at the end to chain the two halves together.

[ E E E E E E . . l ]

(Where l is the reserved entry for "looping" back to front.

As suggested by John, let's reserve another entry for chaining
SG entries after the main circular buffer. Note that this entry
has to be pointed to by the end entry so its position is not fixed.

Examples of full messages:

[ E E E E E E E E . l ]
  ^               ^
   start           end

   &lt;---------------.
[ E E . E E E E E E l ]
      ^ ^
   end   start

Now the end will always point to an unused entry, so TLS 1.3
can always use it.

Fixes: 130b392c6cd6 ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;simon.horman@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: cache netns in sctp_ep_common</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-23T03:56:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=91273f1480723493e188ec1a0188e9cf0d6fc3bf'/>
<id>91273f1480723493e188ec1a0188e9cf0d6fc3bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 312434617cb16be5166316cf9d08ba760b1042a1 ]

This patch is to fix a data-race reported by syzbot:

  BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sctp_assoc_migrate / sctp_hash_obj

  write to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 18908 on cpu 1:
    sctp_assoc_migrate+0x1a6/0x290 net/sctp/associola.c:1091
    sctp_sock_migrate+0x8aa/0x9b0 net/sctp/socket.c:9465
    sctp_accept+0x3c8/0x470 net/sctp/socket.c:4916
    inet_accept+0x7f/0x360 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:734
    __sys_accept4+0x224/0x430 net/socket.c:1754
    __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1795 [inline]
    __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1792 [inline]
    __x64_sys_accept+0x4e/0x60 net/socket.c:1792
    do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  read to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 12003 on cpu 0:
    sctp_hash_obj+0x4f/0x2d0 net/sctp/input.c:894
    rht_key_get_hash include/linux/rhashtable.h:133 [inline]
    rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]
    rht_head_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:174 [inline]
    head_hashfn lib/rhashtable.c:41 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_one lib/rhashtable.c:245 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_chain lib/rhashtable.c:276 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_table lib/rhashtable.c:316 [inline]
    rht_deferred_worker+0x468/0xab0 lib/rhashtable.c:420
    process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
    worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
    kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

It was caused by rhashtable access asoc-&gt;base.sk when sctp_assoc_migrate
is changing its value. However, what rhashtable wants is netns from asoc
base.sk, and for an asoc, its netns won't change once set. So we can
simply fix it by caching netns since created.

Fixes: d6c0256a60e6 ("sctp: add the rhashtable apis for sctp global transport hashtable")
Reported-by: syzbot+e3b35fe7918ff0ee474e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 312434617cb16be5166316cf9d08ba760b1042a1 ]

This patch is to fix a data-race reported by syzbot:

  BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sctp_assoc_migrate / sctp_hash_obj

  write to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 18908 on cpu 1:
    sctp_assoc_migrate+0x1a6/0x290 net/sctp/associola.c:1091
    sctp_sock_migrate+0x8aa/0x9b0 net/sctp/socket.c:9465
    sctp_accept+0x3c8/0x470 net/sctp/socket.c:4916
    inet_accept+0x7f/0x360 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:734
    __sys_accept4+0x224/0x430 net/socket.c:1754
    __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1795 [inline]
    __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1792 [inline]
    __x64_sys_accept+0x4e/0x60 net/socket.c:1792
    do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  read to 0xffff8880b67c0020 of 8 bytes by task 12003 on cpu 0:
    sctp_hash_obj+0x4f/0x2d0 net/sctp/input.c:894
    rht_key_get_hash include/linux/rhashtable.h:133 [inline]
    rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline]
    rht_head_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:174 [inline]
    head_hashfn lib/rhashtable.c:41 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_one lib/rhashtable.c:245 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_chain lib/rhashtable.c:276 [inline]
    rhashtable_rehash_table lib/rhashtable.c:316 [inline]
    rht_deferred_worker+0x468/0xab0 lib/rhashtable.c:420
    process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
    worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
    kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
    ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

It was caused by rhashtable access asoc-&gt;base.sk when sctp_assoc_migrate
is changing its value. However, what rhashtable wants is netns from asoc
base.sk, and for an asoc, its netns won't change once set. So we can
simply fix it by caching netns since created.

Fixes: d6c0256a60e6 ("sctp: add the rhashtable apis for sctp global transport hashtable")
Reported-by: syzbot+e3b35fe7918ff0ee474e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/fq_impl: Switch to kvmalloc() for memory allocation</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:34:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Toke Høiland-Jørgensen</name>
<email>toke@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-05T15:57:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3b8fcaa9c17ef4b35631154b74d9ba81eb262557'/>
<id>3b8fcaa9c17ef4b35631154b74d9ba81eb262557</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 71e67c3bd127cfe7863f54e4b087eba1cc8f9a7a ]

The FQ implementation used by mac80211 allocates memory using kmalloc(),
which can fail; and Johannes reported that this actually happens in
practice.

To avoid this, switch the allocation to kvmalloc() instead; this also
brings fq_impl in line with all the FQ qdiscs.

Fixes: 557fc4a09803 ("fq: add fair queuing framework")
Reported-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105155750.547379-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 71e67c3bd127cfe7863f54e4b087eba1cc8f9a7a ]

The FQ implementation used by mac80211 allocates memory using kmalloc(),
which can fail; and Johannes reported that this actually happens in
practice.

To avoid this, switch the allocation to kvmalloc() instead; this also
brings fq_impl in line with all the FQ qdiscs.

Fixes: 557fc4a09803 ("fq: add fair queuing framework")
Reported-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105155750.547379-1-toke@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>idr: Fix integer overflow in idr_for_each_entry</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:33:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)</name>
<email>willy@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-03T11:36:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bab23db2db133f3085da283cd729c17f9837949e'/>
<id>bab23db2db133f3085da283cd729c17f9837949e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f6341c5af4e6e15041be39976d16deca789555fa ]

If there is an entry at INT_MAX then idr_for_each_entry() will increment
id after handling it.  This is undefined behaviour, and is caught by
UBSAN.  Adding 1U to id forces the operation to be carried out as an
unsigned addition which (when assigned to id) will result in INT_MIN.
Since there is never an entry stored at INT_MIN, idr_get_next() will
return NULL, ending the loop as expected.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f6341c5af4e6e15041be39976d16deca789555fa ]

If there is an entry at INT_MAX then idr_for_each_entry() will increment
id after handling it.  This is undefined behaviour, and is caught by
UBSAN.  Adding 1U to id forces the operation to be carried out as an
unsigned addition which (when assigned to id) will result in INT_MIN.
Since there is never an entry stored at INT_MIN, idr_get_next() will
return NULL, ending the loop as expected.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Change size to u64 for bpf_map_{area_alloc, charge_init}()</title>
<updated>2019-12-04T21:33:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Björn Töpel</name>
<email>bjorn.topel@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-29T15:43:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ea39e0260e564b48e4904882ef876e2c071b336e'/>
<id>ea39e0260e564b48e4904882ef876e2c071b336e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ff1c08e1f74b6864854c39be48aa799a6a2e4d2b ]

The functions bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_charge_init() prior
this commit passed the size parameter as size_t. In this commit this
is changed to u64.

All users of these functions avoid size_t overflows on 32-bit systems,
by explicitly using u64 when calculating the allocation size and
memory charge cost. However, since the result was narrowed by the
size_t when passing size and cost to the functions, the overflow
handling was in vain.

Instead of changing all call sites to size_t and handle overflow at
the call site, the parameter is changed to u64 and checked in the
functions above.

Fixes: d407bd25a204 ("bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc")
Fixes: c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191029154307.23053-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ff1c08e1f74b6864854c39be48aa799a6a2e4d2b ]

The functions bpf_map_area_alloc() and bpf_map_charge_init() prior
this commit passed the size parameter as size_t. In this commit this
is changed to u64.

All users of these functions avoid size_t overflows on 32-bit systems,
by explicitly using u64 when calculating the allocation size and
memory charge cost. However, since the result was narrowed by the
size_t when passing size and cost to the functions, the overflow
handling was in vain.

Instead of changing all call sites to size_t and handle overflow at
the call site, the parameter is changed to u64 and checked in the
functions above.

Fixes: d407bd25a204 ("bpf: don't trigger OOM killer under pressure with map alloc")
Fixes: c85d69135a91 ("bpf: move memory size checks to bpf_map_charge_init()")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191029154307.23053-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
