linux-stable.git/include, branch v5.10.35

swiotlb: add a IO_TLB_SIZE define

2021-05-07T09:04:32+00:00

commit: b5d7ccb7aac3895c2138fe0980a109116ce15eff

Add a new IO_TLB_SIZE define instead open coding it using
IO_TLB_SHIFT all over.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Acked-by: Jianxiong Gao 
Tested-by: Jianxiong Gao 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Jianxiong Gao 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

driver core: add a min_align_mask field to struct device_dma_parameters

2021-05-07T09:04:32+00:00

commit: 36950f2da1ea4cb683be174f6f581e25b2d33e71

Some devices rely on the address offset in a page to function
correctly (NVMe driver as an example). These devices may use
a different page size than the Linux kernel. The address offset
has to be preserved upon mapping, and in order to do so, we
need to record the page_offset_mask first.

Signed-off-by: Jianxiong Gao 
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0

2021-05-07T09:04:31+00:00

[ Upstream commit db2e718a47984b9d71ed890eb2ea36ecf150de18 ]

cap_setfcap is required to create file capabilities.

Since commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"),
a process running as uid 0 but without cap_setfcap is able to work
around this as follows: unshare a new user namespace which maps parent
uid 0 into the child namespace.

While this task will not have new capabilities against the parent
namespace, there is a loophole due to the way namespaced file
capabilities are represented as xattrs.  File capabilities valid in
userns 1 are distinguished from file capabilities valid in userns 2 by
the kuid which underlies uid 0.  Therefore the restricted root process
can unshare a new self-mapping namespace, add a namespaced file
capability onto a file, then use that file capability in the parent
namespace.

To prevent that, do not allow mapping parent uid 0 if the process which
opened the uid_map file does not have CAP_SETFCAP, which is the
capability for setting file capabilities.

As a further wrinkle: a task can unshare its user namespace, then open
its uid_map file itself, and map (only) its own uid.  In this case we do
not have the credential from before unshare, which was potentially more
restricted.  So, when creating a user namespace, we record whether the
creator had CAP_SETFCAP.  Then we can use that during map_write().

With this patch:

1. Unprivileged user can still unshare -Ur

   ubuntu@caps:~$ unshare -Ur
   root@caps:~# logout

2. Root user can still unshare -Ur

   ubuntu@caps:~$ sudo bash
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# logout

3. Root user without CAP_SETFCAP cannot unshare -Ur:

   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/capsh --drop=cap_setfcap --
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/setcap cap_setfcap=p /sbin/setcap
   unable to set CAP_SETFCAP effective capability: Operation not permitted
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
   unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted

Note: an alternative solution would be to allow uid 0 mappings by
processes without CAP_SETFCAP, but to prevent such a namespace from
writing any file capabilities.  This approach can be seen at [1].

Background history: commit 95ebabde382 ("capabilities: Don't allow
writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities") tried to fix the issue by
preventing v3 fscaps to be written to disk when the root uid would map
to the same uid in nested user namespaces.  This led to regressions for
various workloads.  For example, see [2].  Ultimately this is a valid
use-case we have to support meaning we had to revert this change in
3b0c2d3eaa83 ("Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing
ambiguous v3 file capabilities")").

Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/log/?h=2021-04-15/setfcap-nsfscaps-v4 [1]
Link: https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071 [2]
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn 
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan 
Tested-by: Christian Brauner 
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner 
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano 
Cc: Eric Biederman 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation

2021-05-07T09:04:31+00:00

commit 801c6058d14a82179a7ee17a4b532cac6fad067f upstream.

The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under
speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the
speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF
stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack,
potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be
extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special
compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every
program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon
their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either
domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every
stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program
to avoid such data leaking issue.

However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic
operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to
the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate
offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to
extract any restricted stack content via side-channel.

Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown
but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the
register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic
operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit
of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after
the work in 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for
the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the
immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original
instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case.

Reported-by: Piotr Krysiuk 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Tested-by: Piotr Krysiuk 
Reviewed-by: Piotr Krysiuk 
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend 
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access

2021-04-28T11:40:00+00:00

[ Upstream commit 01f810ace9ed37255f27608a0864abebccf0aab3 ]

Before this patch, variable offset access to the stack was dissalowed
for regular instructions, but was allowed for "indirect" accesses (i.e.
helpers). This patch removes the restriction, allowing reading and
writing to the stack through stack pointers with variable offsets. This
makes stack-allocated buffers more usable in programs, and brings stack
pointers closer to other types of pointers.

The motivation is being able to use stack-allocated buffers for data
manipulation. When the stack size limit is sufficient, allocating
buffers on the stack is simpler than per-cpu arrays, or other
alternatives.

In unpriviledged programs, variable-offset reads and writes are
disallowed (they were already disallowed for the indirect access case)
because the speculative execution checking code doesn't support them.
Additionally, when writing through a variable-offset stack pointer, if
any pointers are in the accessible range, there's possilibities of later
leaking pointers because the write cannot be tracked precisely.

Writes with variable offset mark the whole range as initialized, even
though we don't know which stack slots are actually written. This is in
order to not reject future reads to these slots. Note that this doesn't
affect writes done through helpers; like before, helpers need the whole
stack range to be initialized to begin with.
All the stack slots are in range are considered scalars after the write;
variable-offset register spills are not tracked.

For reads, all the stack slots in the variable range needs to be
initialized (but see above about what writes do), otherwise the read is
rejected. All register spilled in stack slots that might be read are
marked as having been read, however reads through such pointers don't do
register filling; the target register will always be either a scalar or
a constant zero.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei 
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210207011027.676572-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

gpio: omap: Save and restore sysconfig

2021-04-28T11:39:59+00:00

[ Upstream commit ddd8d94ca31e768c76cf8bfe34ba7b10136b3694 ]

As we are using cpu_pm to save and restore context, we must also save and
restore the GPIO sysconfig register. This is needed because we are not
calling PM runtime functions at all with cpu_pm.

We need to save the sysconfig on idle as it's value can get reconfigured by
PM runtime and can be different from the init time value. Device specific
flags like "ti,no-idle-on-init" can affect the init value.

Fixes: b764a5863fd8 ("gpio: omap: Remove custom PM calls and use cpu_pm instead")
Cc: Aaro Koskinen 
Cc: Adam Ford 
Cc: Andreas Kemnade 
Cc: Grygorii Strashko 
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi 
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren 
Acked-by: Grygorii Strashko 
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net: phy: marvell: fix detection of PHY on Topaz switches

2021-04-21T11:01:00+00:00

commit 1fe976d308acb6374c899a4ee8025a0a016e453e upstream.

Since commit fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature
sensor reading"), Linux reports the temperature of Topaz hwmon as
constant -75°C.

This is because switches from the Topaz family (88E6141 / 88E6341) have
the address of the temperature sensor register different from Peridot.

This address is instead compatible with 88E1510 PHYs, as was used for
Topaz before the above mentioned commit.

Create a new mapping table between switch family and PHY ID for families
which don't have a model number. And define PHY IDs for Topaz and Peridot
families.

Create a new PHY ID and a new PHY driver for Topaz's internal PHY.
The only difference from Peridot's PHY driver is the HWMON probing
method.

Prior this change Topaz's internal PHY is detected by kernel as:

  PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6390] (irq=63)

And afterwards as:

  PHY [...] driver [Marvell 88E6341 Family] (irq=63)

Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár 
BugLink: https://github.com/globalscaletechnologies/linux/issues/1
Fixes: fee2d546414d ("net: phy: marvell: mv88e6390 temperature sensor reading")
Reviewed-by: Marek Behún 
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: arp_tables: add pre_exit hook for table unregister

2021-04-21T11:00:56+00:00

commit d163a925ebbc6eb5b562b0f1d72c7e817aa75c40 upstream.

Same problem that also existed in iptables/ip(6)tables, when
arptable_filter is removed there is no longer a wait period before the
table/ruleset is free'd.

Unregister the hook in pre_exit, then remove the table in the exit
function.
This used to work correctly because the old nf_hook_unregister API
did unconditional synchronize_net.

The per-net hook unregister function uses call_rcu instead.

Fixes: b9e69e127397 ("netfilter: xtables: don't hook tables by default")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: bridge: add pre_exit hooks for ebtable unregistration

2021-04-21T11:00:55+00:00

commit 7ee3c61dcd28bf6e290e06ad382f13511dc790e9 upstream.

Just like ip/ip6/arptables, the hooks have to be removed, then
synchronize_rcu() has to be called to make sure no more packets are being
processed before the ruleset data is released.

Place the hook unregistration in the pre_exit hook, then call the new
ebtables pre_exit function from there.

Years ago, when first netns support got added for netfilter+ebtables,
this used an older (now removed) netfilter hook unregister API, that did
a unconditional synchronize_rcu().

Now that all is done with call_rcu, ebtable_{filter,nat,broute} pernet exit
handlers may free the ebtable ruleset while packets are still in flight.

This can only happens on module removal, not during netns exit.

The new function expects the table name, not the table struct.

This is because upcoming patch set (targeting -next) will remove all
net->xt.{nat,filter,broute}_table instances, this makes it necessary
to avoid external references to those member variables.

The existing APIs will be converted, so follow the upcoming scheme of
passing name + hook type instead.

Fixes: aee12a0a3727e ("ebtables: remove nf_hook_register usage")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

dmaengine: idxd: fix delta_rec and crc size field for completion record

2021-04-21T11:00:50+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4ac823e9cd85f66da274c951d21bf9f6b714b729 ]

The delta_rec_size and crc_val in the completion record should
be 32bits and not 16bits.

Fixes: bfe1d56091c1 ("dmaengine: idxd: Init and probe for Intel data accelerators")
Reported-by: Nikhil Rao 
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161645618572.2003490.14466173451736323035.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin