<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v4.9.246</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Juergen Gross</name>
<email>jgross@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-03T14:35:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e068ed2c1b7ab47e623b8c2eef2537eb5b27defb'/>
<id>e068ed2c1b7ab47e623b8c2eef2537eb5b27defb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d upstream.

In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().

This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.

In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d upstream.

In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().

This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.

In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.

This is part of XSA-332.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall &lt;julien@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu &lt;wl@xen.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix bad use of igrab()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Liu</name>
<email>songliubraving@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-18T06:29:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=51f0471b12817e576e42ecea027177798a968db4'/>
<id>51f0471b12817e576e42ecea027177798a968db4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9511bce9fe8e5e6c0f923c09243a713eba560141 upstream

As Miklos reported and suggested:

 "This pattern repeats two times in trace_uprobe.c and in
  kernel/events/core.c as well:

      ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &amp;path);
      if (ret)
          goto fail_address_parse;

      inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
      path_put(&amp;path);

  And it's wrong.  You can only hold a reference to the inode if you
  have an active ref to the superblock as well (which is normally
  through path.mnt) or holding s_umount.

  This way unmounting the containing filesystem while the tracepoint is
  active will give you the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount..." message
  and a crash when the inode is finally put.

  Solution: store path instead of inode."

This patch fixes the issue in kernel/event/core.c.

Reviewed-and-tested-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-team@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418062907.3210386-2-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[sudip: Backported to 4.9: use file_inode()]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9511bce9fe8e5e6c0f923c09243a713eba560141 upstream

As Miklos reported and suggested:

 "This pattern repeats two times in trace_uprobe.c and in
  kernel/events/core.c as well:

      ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &amp;path);
      if (ret)
          goto fail_address_parse;

      inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
      path_put(&amp;path);

  And it's wrong.  You can only hold a reference to the inode if you
  have an active ref to the superblock as well (which is normally
  through path.mnt) or holding s_umount.

  This way unmounting the containing filesystem while the tracepoint is
  active will give you the "VFS: Busy inodes after unmount..." message
  and a crash when the inode is finally put.

  Solution: store path instead of inode."

This patch fixes the issue in kernel/event/core.c.

Reviewed-and-tested-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Song Liu &lt;songliubraving@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kernel-team@fb.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Fixes: 375637bc5249 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418062907.3210386-2-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
[sudip: Backported to 4.9: use file_inode()]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee &lt;sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Spelvin</name>
<email>lkml@sdf.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T06:57:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29da3bb1a848abdcadc2cbec68787c4c81671341'/>
<id>29da3bb1a848abdcadc2cbec68787c4c81671341</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.9 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
[wt: backported to 4.9 -- various context adjustments; timer API change]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T08:39:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=919d9b622c896f8fac21faa125c4bcbceca8ddf2'/>
<id>919d9b622c896f8fac21faa125c4bcbceca8ddf2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T17:26:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zeng Tao</name>
<email>prime.zeng@hisilicon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T09:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6e12733ef63c3f5be2a4f378eddfddfd82b622cf'/>
<id>6e12733ef63c3f5be2a4f378eddfddfd82b622cf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hil/parisc: Disable HIL driver when it gets stuck</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:24:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-19T14:57:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f7ef2b3c9fd109824e9a6c35fa947f873607dbc9'/>
<id>f7ef2b3c9fd109824e9a6c35fa947f873607dbc9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 879bc2d27904354b98ca295b6168718e045c4aa2 upstream.

When starting a HP machine with HIL driver but without an HIL keyboard
or HIL mouse attached, it may happen that data written to the HIL loop
gets stuck (e.g. because the transaction queue is full).  Usually one
will then have to reboot the machine because all you see is and endless
output of:
 Transaction add failed: transaction already queued?

In the higher layers hp_sdc_enqueue_transaction() is called to queued up
a HIL packet. This function returns an error code, and this patch adds
the necessary checks for this return code and disables the HIL driver if
further packets can't be sent.

Tested on a HP 730 and a HP 715/64 machine.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 879bc2d27904354b98ca295b6168718e045c4aa2 upstream.

When starting a HP machine with HIL driver but without an HIL keyboard
or HIL mouse attached, it may happen that data written to the HIL loop
gets stuck (e.g. because the transaction queue is full).  Usually one
will then have to reboot the machine because all you see is and endless
output of:
 Transaction add failed: transaction already queued?

In the higher layers hp_sdc_enqueue_transaction() is called to queued up
a HIL packet. This function returns an error code, and this patch adds
the necessary checks for this return code and disables the HIL driver if
further packets can't be sent.

Tested on a HP 730 and a HP 715/64 machine.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fscrypto: move ioctl processing more fully into common code</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:23:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-27T00:07:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3326d00ca023c346802ab6cda899e53b2ff4b108'/>
<id>3326d00ca023c346802ab6cda899e53b2ff4b108</id>
<content type='text'>
commit db717d8e26c2d1b0dba3e08668a1e6a7f665adde upstream.

Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl.
To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy()
implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard
security and correctness precautions, rename them to
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy().  Make the
latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
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<pre>
commit db717d8e26c2d1b0dba3e08668a1e6a7f665adde upstream.

Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl.
To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy()
implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard
security and correctness precautions, rename them to
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy().  Make the
latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mtd: lpddr: Fix bad logic in print_drs_error</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T09:23:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gustavo A. R. Silva</name>
<email>gustavo@embeddedor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T19:50:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=609c0dea93f183c6b97b0c9ecc44cf554e9d3b96'/>
<id>609c0dea93f183c6b97b0c9ecc44cf554e9d3b96</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c9c02bb22684f6949d2e7ddc0a3ff364fd5a6fc upstream.

Update logic for broken test. Use a more common logging style.

It appears the logic in this function is broken for the
consecutive tests of

        if (prog_status &amp; 0x3)
                ...
        else if (prog_status &amp; 0x2)
                ...
        else (prog_status &amp; 0x1)
                ...

Likely the first test should be

        if ((prog_status &amp; 0x3) == 0x3)

Found by inspection of include files using printk.

Fixes: eb3db27507f7 ("[MTD] LPDDR PFOW definition")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/3fb0e29f5b601db8be2938a01d974b00c8788501.1588016644.git.gustavo@embeddedor.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c9c02bb22684f6949d2e7ddc0a3ff364fd5a6fc upstream.

Update logic for broken test. Use a more common logging style.

It appears the logic in this function is broken for the
consecutive tests of

        if (prog_status &amp; 0x3)
                ...
        else if (prog_status &amp; 0x2)
                ...
        else (prog_status &amp; 0x1)
                ...

Likely the first test should be

        if ((prog_status &amp; 0x3) == 0x3)

Found by inspection of include files using printk.

Fixes: eb3db27507f7 ("[MTD] LPDDR PFOW definition")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva &lt;gustavo@embeddedor.com&gt;
Acked-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/3fb0e29f5b601db8be2938a01d974b00c8788501.1588016644.git.gustavo@embeddedor.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>scsi: target: core: Add CONTROL field for trace events</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:05:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Bolshakov</name>
<email>r.bolshakov@yadro.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-29T12:59:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f3467a49b545333666e824b0beb64b4aa4b42b37'/>
<id>f3467a49b545333666e824b0beb64b4aa4b42b37</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7010645ba7256992818b518163f46bd4cdf8002a ]

trace-cmd report doesn't show events from target subsystem because
scsi_command_size() leaks through event format string:

  [target:target_sequencer_start] function scsi_command_size not defined
  [target:target_cmd_complete] function scsi_command_size not defined

Addition of scsi_command_size() to plugin_scsi.c in trace-cmd doesn't
help because an expression is used inside TP_printk(). trace-cmd event
parser doesn't understand minus sign inside [ ]:

  Error: expected ']' but read '-'

Rather than duplicating kernel code in plugin_scsi.c, provide a dedicated
field for CONTROL byte.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200929125957.83069-1-r.bolshakov@yadro.com
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov &lt;r.bolshakov@yadro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7010645ba7256992818b518163f46bd4cdf8002a ]

trace-cmd report doesn't show events from target subsystem because
scsi_command_size() leaks through event format string:

  [target:target_sequencer_start] function scsi_command_size not defined
  [target:target_cmd_complete] function scsi_command_size not defined

Addition of scsi_command_size() to plugin_scsi.c in trace-cmd doesn't
help because an expression is used inside TP_printk(). trace-cmd event
parser doesn't understand minus sign inside [ ]:

  Error: expected ']' but read '-'

Rather than duplicating kernel code in plugin_scsi.c, provide a dedicated
field for CONTROL byte.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200929125957.83069-1-r.bolshakov@yadro.com
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie &lt;michael.christie@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov &lt;r.bolshakov@yadro.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen &lt;martin.petersen@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>overflow: Include header file with SIZE_MAX declaration</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:05:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Leon Romanovsky</name>
<email>leonro@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-13T10:29:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ef058c0c6b04fbf66d16217d3a79700e667ed612'/>
<id>ef058c0c6b04fbf66d16217d3a79700e667ed612</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a4947e84f23474803b62a2759b5808147e4e15f9 ]

The various array_size functions use SIZE_MAX define, but missed limits.h
causes to failure to compile code that needs overflow.h.

 In file included from drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_std_types_device.c:6:
 ./include/linux/overflow.h: In function 'array_size':
 ./include/linux/overflow.h:258:10: error: 'SIZE_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function)
   258 |   return SIZE_MAX;
       |          ^~~~~~~~

Fixes: 610b15c50e86 ("overflow.h: Add allocation size calculation helpers")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200913102928.134985-1-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a4947e84f23474803b62a2759b5808147e4e15f9 ]

The various array_size functions use SIZE_MAX define, but missed limits.h
causes to failure to compile code that needs overflow.h.

 In file included from drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_std_types_device.c:6:
 ./include/linux/overflow.h: In function 'array_size':
 ./include/linux/overflow.h:258:10: error: 'SIZE_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function)
   258 |   return SIZE_MAX;
       |          ^~~~~~~~

Fixes: 610b15c50e86 ("overflow.h: Add allocation size calculation helpers")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200913102928.134985-1-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky &lt;leonro@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
