<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v4.4.91</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mmc: sdio: fix alignment issue in struct sdio_func</title>
<updated>2017-10-08T08:14:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiner Kallweit</name>
<email>hkallweit1@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-03-29T18:54:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b760fdad9f0626e7be2c1082c94dca21f72470b'/>
<id>1b760fdad9f0626e7be2c1082c94dca21f72470b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5ef1ecf060f28ecef313b5723f1fd39bf5a35f56 ]

Certain 64-bit systems (e.g. Amlogic Meson GX) require buffers to be
used for DMA to be 8-byte-aligned. struct sdio_func has an embedded
small DMA buffer not meeting this requirement.
When testing switching to descriptor chain mode in meson-gx driver
SDIO is broken therefore. Fix this by allocating the small DMA buffer
separately as kmalloc ensures that the returned memory area is
properly aligned for every basic data type.

Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helmut Klein &lt;hgkr.klein@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5ef1ecf060f28ecef313b5723f1fd39bf5a35f56 ]

Certain 64-bit systems (e.g. Amlogic Meson GX) require buffers to be
used for DMA to be 8-byte-aligned. struct sdio_func has an embedded
small DMA buffer not meeting this requirement.
When testing switching to descriptor chain mode in meson-gx driver
SDIO is broken therefore. Fix this by allocating the small DMA buffer
separately as kmalloc ensures that the returned memory area is
properly aligned for every basic data type.

Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit &lt;hkallweit1@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Helmut Klein &lt;hgkr.klein@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson &lt;ulf.hansson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>audit: log 32-bit socketcalls</title>
<updated>2017-10-08T08:14:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-17T16:07:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc'/>
<id>093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 62bc306e2083436675e33b5bdeb6a77907d35971 ]

32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems.
Log them.  This is basically a duplicate of the call from
net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch
between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 62bc306e2083436675e33b5bdeb6a77907d35971 ]

32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems.
Log them.  This is basically a duplicate of the call from
net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch
between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit.

See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm_fourcc: Fix DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR #define</title>
<updated>2017-10-08T08:14:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristian H. Kristensen</name>
<email>hoegsberg@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-13T19:27:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=771dacea92cd1b6107615aede467bdf62ef8907c'/>
<id>771dacea92cd1b6107615aede467bdf62ef8907c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit af913418261d6d3e7a29f06cf35f04610ead667c ]

We need to define DRM_FORMAT_MOD_VENDOR_NONE for the fourcc_mod_code()
macro to work correctly.

Signed-off-by: Kristian H. Kristensen &lt;hoegsberg@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1481657272-25975-1-git-send-email-hoegsberg@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit af913418261d6d3e7a29f06cf35f04610ead667c ]

We need to define DRM_FORMAT_MOD_VENDOR_NONE for the fourcc_mod_code()
macro to work correctly.

Signed-off-by: Kristian H. Kristensen &lt;hoegsberg@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter &lt;daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch&gt;
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1481657272-25975-1-git-send-email-hoegsberg@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap prototype</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-04T13:51:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=228969b4764fe2b0f58ef096f63666196f7b4881'/>
<id>228969b4764fe2b0f58ef096f63666196f7b4881</id>
<content type='text'>
xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap was backported from v4.10, but older
kernels before commit 00085f1efa38 ("dma-mapping: use unsigned long
for dma_attrs") use a different signature:

arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: error: initialization from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
  .mmap = xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap,
          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: note: (near initialization for 'xen_swiotlb_dma_ops.mmap')

This adapts the patch to the old calling conventions.

Fixes: "swiotlb-xen: implement xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap callback"
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap was backported from v4.10, but older
kernels before commit 00085f1efa38 ("dma-mapping: use unsigned long
for dma_attrs") use a different signature:

arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: error: initialization from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
  .mmap = xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap,
          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arm/xen/mm.c:202:10: note: (near initialization for 'xen_swiotlb_dma_ops.mmap')

This adapts the patch to the old calling conventions.

Fixes: "swiotlb-xen: implement xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap callback"
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;sstabellini@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>swiotlb-xen: implement xen_swiotlb_dma_mmap callback</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefano Stabellini</name>
<email>stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-07T17:58:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=079c03f4a915da1279604f88d6c07bf70427ddbc'/>
<id>079c03f4a915da1279604f88d6c07bf70427ddbc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7e91c7df29b5e196de3dc6f086c8937973bd0b88 upstream.

This function creates userspace mapping for the DMA-coherent memory.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Dmytryshyn &lt;oleksandr.dmytryshyn@globallogic.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Anisov &lt;andrii_anisov@epam.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7e91c7df29b5e196de3dc6f086c8937973bd0b88 upstream.

This function creates userspace mapping for the DMA-coherent memory.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini &lt;stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Dmytryshyn &lt;oleksandr.dmytryshyn@globallogic.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Anisov &lt;andrii_anisov@epam.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dmaengine: mmp-pdma: add number of requestors</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robert Jarzmik</name>
<email>robert.jarzmik@free.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-15T20:57:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a85f176c857e4fe0d2c0b5d2c7090c422982e585'/>
<id>a85f176c857e4fe0d2c0b5d2c7090c422982e585</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c283e41ef32442f41e7180f9bb1c5aedf9255bfe upstream.

The DMA chip has a fixed number of requestor lines used for flow
control. This number is platform dependent. The pxa_dma dma driver will
use this value to activate or not the flow control.

There won't be any impact on mmp_pdma driver.

Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik &lt;robert.jarzmik@free.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c283e41ef32442f41e7180f9bb1c5aedf9255bfe upstream.

The DMA chip has a fixed number of requestor lines used for flow
control. This number is platform dependent. The pxa_dma dma driver will
use this value to activate or not the flow control.

There won't be any impact on mmp_pdma driver.

Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik &lt;robert.jarzmik@free.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:41:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-18T18:37:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=539255aea88e47932a98ba7656775cbca4f3d27c'/>
<id>539255aea88e47932a98ba7656775cbca4f3d27c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &amp;
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &amp;
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tty: improve tty_insert_flip_char() fast path</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T09:00:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-20T21:10:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e1e6620f042cd7a6b1846335c46ca7b9897bc823'/>
<id>e1e6620f042cd7a6b1846335c46ca7b9897bc823</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 979990c6284814617d8f2179d197f72ff62b5d85 upstream.

kernelci.org reports a crazy stack usage for the VT code when CONFIG_KASAN
is enabled:

drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c: In function 'kbd_keycode':
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1452:1: error: the frame size of 2240 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]

The problem is that tty_insert_flip_char() gets inlined many times into
kbd_keycode(), and also into other functions, and each copy requires 128
bytes for stack redzone to check for a possible out-of-bounds access on
the 'ch' and 'flags' arguments that are passed into
tty_insert_flip_string_flags as a variable-length string.

This introduces a new __tty_insert_flip_char() function for the slow
path, which receives the two arguments by value. This completely avoids
the problem and the stack usage goes back down to around 100 bytes.

Without KASAN, this is also slightly better, as we don't have to
spill the arguments to the stack but can simply pass 'ch' and 'flag'
in registers, saving a few bytes in .text for each call site.

This should be backported to linux-4.0 or later, which first introduced
the stack sanitizer in the kernel.

Fixes: c420f167db8c ("kasan: enable stack instrumentation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 979990c6284814617d8f2179d197f72ff62b5d85 upstream.

kernelci.org reports a crazy stack usage for the VT code when CONFIG_KASAN
is enabled:

drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c: In function 'kbd_keycode':
drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1452:1: error: the frame size of 2240 bytes is larger than 2048 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]

The problem is that tty_insert_flip_char() gets inlined many times into
kbd_keycode(), and also into other functions, and each copy requires 128
bytes for stack redzone to check for a possible out-of-bounds access on
the 'ch' and 'flags' arguments that are passed into
tty_insert_flip_string_flags as a variable-length string.

This introduces a new __tty_insert_flip_char() function for the slow
path, which receives the two arguments by value. This completely avoids
the problem and the stack usage goes back down to around 100 bytes.

Without KASAN, this is also slightly better, as we don't have to
spill the arguments to the stack but can simply pass 'ch' and 'flag'
in registers, saving a few bytes in .text for each call site.

This should be backported to linux-4.0 or later, which first introduced
the stack sanitizer in the kernel.

Fixes: c420f167db8c ("kasan: enable stack instrumentation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T09:00:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesper Dangaard Brouer</name>
<email>brouer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-01T09:26:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f529e0d78447e03a3acf125883a3f7826817c01'/>
<id>5f529e0d78447e03a3acf125883a3f7826817c01</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ]

This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb.

After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API
for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this
fix-up patch.  As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot
memory leak it any-longer.

Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;brouer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ]

This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb.

After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API
for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this
fix-up patch.  As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot
memory leak it any-longer.

Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;brouer@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting"</title>
<updated>2017-09-27T09:00:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesper Dangaard Brouer</name>
<email>brouer@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-01T09:26:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=40bc5355e134af1d0ac05fe0dcb0aa55f9144bb4'/>
<id>40bc5355e134af1d0ac05fe0dcb0aa55f9144bb4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fb452a1aa3fd4034d7999e309c5466ff2d7005aa ]

This reverts commit 6d7b857d541ecd1d9bd997c97242d4ef94b19de2.

There is a bug in fragmentation codes use of the percpu_counter API,
that can cause issues on systems with many CPUs.

The frag_mem_limit() just reads the global counter (fbc-&gt;count),
without considering other CPUs can have upto batch size (130K) that
haven't been subtracted yet.  Due to the 3MBytes lower thresh limit,
this become dangerous at &gt;=24 CPUs (3*1024*1024/130000=24).

The correct API usage would be to use __percpu_counter_compare() which
does the right thing, and takes into account the number of (online)
CPUs and batch size, to account for this and call __percpu_counter_sum()
when needed.

We choose to revert the use of the lib/percpu_counter API for frag
memory accounting for several reasons:

1) On systems with CPUs &gt; 24, the heavier fully locked
   __percpu_counter_sum() is always invoked, which will be more
   expensive than the atomic_t that is reverted to.

Given systems with more than 24 CPUs are becoming common this doesn't
seem like a good option.  To mitigate this, the batch size could be
decreased and thresh be increased.

2) The add_frag_mem_limit+sub_frag_mem_limit pairs happen on the RX
   CPU, before SKBs are pushed into sockets on remote CPUs.  Given
   NICs can only hash on L2 part of the IP-header, the NIC-RXq's will
   likely be limited.  Thus, a fair chance that atomic add+dec happen
   on the same CPU.

Revert note that commit 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
removed init_frag_mem_limit() and instead use inet_frags_init_net().
After this revert, inet_frags_uninit_net() becomes empty.

Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;brouer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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[ Upstream commit fb452a1aa3fd4034d7999e309c5466ff2d7005aa ]

This reverts commit 6d7b857d541ecd1d9bd997c97242d4ef94b19de2.

There is a bug in fragmentation codes use of the percpu_counter API,
that can cause issues on systems with many CPUs.

The frag_mem_limit() just reads the global counter (fbc-&gt;count),
without considering other CPUs can have upto batch size (130K) that
haven't been subtracted yet.  Due to the 3MBytes lower thresh limit,
this become dangerous at &gt;=24 CPUs (3*1024*1024/130000=24).

The correct API usage would be to use __percpu_counter_compare() which
does the right thing, and takes into account the number of (online)
CPUs and batch size, to account for this and call __percpu_counter_sum()
when needed.

We choose to revert the use of the lib/percpu_counter API for frag
memory accounting for several reasons:

1) On systems with CPUs &gt; 24, the heavier fully locked
   __percpu_counter_sum() is always invoked, which will be more
   expensive than the atomic_t that is reverted to.

Given systems with more than 24 CPUs are becoming common this doesn't
seem like a good option.  To mitigate this, the batch size could be
decreased and thresh be increased.

2) The add_frag_mem_limit+sub_frag_mem_limit pairs happen on the RX
   CPU, before SKBs are pushed into sockets on remote CPUs.  Given
   NICs can only hash on L2 part of the IP-header, the NIC-RXq's will
   likely be limited.  Thus, a fair chance that atomic add+dec happen
   on the same CPU.

Revert note that commit 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
removed init_frag_mem_limit() and instead use inet_frags_init_net().
After this revert, inet_frags_uninit_net() becomes empty.

Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting")
Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer &lt;brouer@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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