<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v4.19.63</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentials</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:27:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T16:54:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=408af82309a73e6b47c9227756fef9a0d4400708'/>
<id>408af82309a73e6b47c9227756fef9a0d4400708</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpu: host1x: Increase maximum DMA segment size</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:26:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thierry Reding</name>
<email>treding@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-05T08:46:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d14323a2eb556a9d06d0a956618662bc9dad1c1'/>
<id>4d14323a2eb556a9d06d0a956618662bc9dad1c1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1e390478cfb527e34c9ab89ba57212cb05c33c51 ]

Recent versions of the DMA API debug code have started to warn about
violations of the maximum DMA segment size. This is because the segment
size defaults to 64 KiB, which can easily be exceeded in large buffer
allocations such as used in DRM/KMS for framebuffers.

Technically the Tegra SMMU and ARM SMMU don't have a maximum segment
size (they map individual pages irrespective of whether they are
contiguous or not), so the choice of 4 MiB is a bit arbitrary here. The
maximum segment size is a 32-bit unsigned integer, though, so we can't
set it to the correct maximum size, which would be the size of the
aperture.

Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1e390478cfb527e34c9ab89ba57212cb05c33c51 ]

Recent versions of the DMA API debug code have started to warn about
violations of the maximum DMA segment size. This is because the segment
size defaults to 64 KiB, which can easily be exceeded in large buffer
allocations such as used in DRM/KMS for framebuffers.

Technically the Tegra SMMU and ARM SMMU don't have a maximum segment
size (they map individual pages irrespective of whether they are
contiguous or not), so the choice of 4 MiB is a bit arbitrary here. The
maximum segment size is a 32-bit unsigned integer, though, so we can't
set it to the correct maximum size, which would be the size of the
aperture.

Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Zwisler</name>
<email>zwisler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T21:24:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af3812b65c3785f7d052b4a1f5dd7c6f54a77e24'/>
<id>af3812b65c3785f7d052b4a1f5dd7c6f54a77e24</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.

Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space
of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry.  The
consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly
appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of
time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the
pages under writeback to be written out.

The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from
/dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem.  This can
cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of
the entire dd operation.

We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges
associated with a given transaction.  We do this via the jbd2_inode
structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it
follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.

This allows us to limit the writeback &amp; wait in
journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for
a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode
in question is still being appended to.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.

Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space
of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry.  The
consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly
appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of
time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the
pages under writeback to be written out.

The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from
/dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem.  This can
cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of
the entire dd operation.

We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges
associated with a given transaction.  We do this via the jbd2_inode
structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it
follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.

This allows us to limit the writeback &amp; wait in
journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for
a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode
in question is still being appended to.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Zwisler</name>
<email>zwisler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T21:05:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4becd6c11e9a0be4ab8af7b28e9bbc01288da014'/>
<id>4becd6c11e9a0be4ab8af7b28e9bbc01288da014</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and
filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon
which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and
filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon
which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix exclusive events' grouping</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Shishkin</name>
<email>alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-01T11:07:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75100ec5f079c5c3c65b28a6b8d360acfe00b983'/>
<id>75100ec5f079c5c3c65b28a6b8d360acfe00b983</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.

So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of
complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically,
moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity
rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.

This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the
perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and
insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated
by running:

  $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
  $ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' uname

ultimately successfully.

Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation
by:

   perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'

even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.

The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because
it's also wrong.

Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid
of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: bed5b25ad9c8a ("perf: Add a pmu capability for "exclusive" events")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701110755.24646-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.

So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of
complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically,
moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity
rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.

This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the
perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and
insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated
by running:

  $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
  $ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' uname

ultimately successfully.

Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation
by:

   perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'

even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.

The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because
it's also wrong.

Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid
of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: bed5b25ad9c8a ("perf: Add a pmu capability for "exclusive" events")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701110755.24646-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: make sure offload also gets the keys wiped</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>jakub.kicinski@netronome.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T23:11:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fde351aeff4afe74c430395be01dd83c070ab85c'/>
<id>fde351aeff4afe74c430395be01dd83c070ab85c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit acd3e96d53a24d219f720ed4012b62723ae05da1 ]

Commit 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context
before freeing") added memzero_explicit() calls to clear the key material
before freeing struct tls_context, but it missed tls_device.c has its
own way of freeing this structure. Replace the missing free.

Fixes: 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dirk van der Merwe &lt;dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit acd3e96d53a24d219f720ed4012b62723ae05da1 ]

Commit 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context
before freeing") added memzero_explicit() calls to clear the key material
before freeing struct tls_context, but it missed tls_device.c has its
own way of freeing this structure. Replace the missing free.

Fixes: 86029d10af18 ("tls: zero the crypto information from tls_context before freeing")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;jakub.kicinski@netronome.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dirk van der Merwe &lt;dirk.vandermerwe@netronome.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix tcp_set_congestion_control() use from bpf hook</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T02:28:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c60f57dfe995172c2f01e59266e3ffa3419c6cd9'/>
<id>c60f57dfe995172c2f01e59266e3ffa3419c6cd9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8d650cdedaabb33e85e9b7c517c0c71fcecc1de9 ]

Neal reported incorrect use of ns_capable() from bpf hook.

bpf_setsockopt(...TCP_CONGESTION...)
  -&gt; tcp_set_congestion_control()
   -&gt; ns_capable(sock_net(sk)-&gt;user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)
    -&gt; ns_capable_common()
     -&gt; current_cred()
      -&gt; rcu_dereference_protected(current-&gt;cred, 1)

Accessing 'current' in bpf context makes no sense, since packets
are processed from softirq context.

As Neal stated : The capability check in tcp_set_congestion_control()
was written assuming a system call context, and then was reused from
a BPF call site.

The fix is to add a new parameter to tcp_set_congestion_control(),
so that the ns_capable() call is only performed under the right
context.

Fixes: 91b5b21c7c16 ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8d650cdedaabb33e85e9b7c517c0c71fcecc1de9 ]

Neal reported incorrect use of ns_capable() from bpf hook.

bpf_setsockopt(...TCP_CONGESTION...)
  -&gt; tcp_set_congestion_control()
   -&gt; ns_capable(sock_net(sk)-&gt;user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)
    -&gt; ns_capable_common()
     -&gt; current_cred()
      -&gt; rcu_dereference_protected(current-&gt;cred, 1)

Accessing 'current' in bpf context makes no sense, since packets
are processed from softirq context.

As Neal stated : The capability check in tcp_set_congestion_control()
was written assuming a system call context, and then was reused from
a BPF call site.

The fix is to add a new parameter to tcp_set_congestion_control(),
so that the ns_capable() call is only performed under the right
context.

Fixes: 91b5b21c7c16 ("bpf: Add support for changing congestion control")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Lawrence Brakmo &lt;brakmo@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: be more careful in tcp_fragment()</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-19T18:52:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6323c238bb4374d1477348cfbd5854f2bebe9a21'/>
<id>6323c238bb4374d1477348cfbd5854f2bebe9a21</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]

Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect
TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478
broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might
be prevented.

We should allow these flows to make progress.

This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue
to be split even if memory limits are hit.

It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg()
and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full
TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present
in stable backports for kernels &lt; 4.15

Note for &lt; 4.15 backports :
 tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :

static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);

	return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}

Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Prout &lt;aprout@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew Prout &lt;aprout@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;cpaasch@apple.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b617158dc096709d8600c53b6052144d12b89fab ]

Some applications set tiny SO_SNDBUF values and expect
TCP to just work. Recent patches to address CVE-2019-11478
broke them in case of losses, since retransmits might
be prevented.

We should allow these flows to make progress.

This patch allows the first and last skb in retransmit queue
to be split even if memory limits are hit.

It also adds the some room due to the fact that tcp_sendmsg()
and tcp_sendpage() might overshoot sk_wmem_queued by about one full
TSO skb (64KB size). Note this allowance was already present
in stable backports for kernels &lt; 4.15

Note for &lt; 4.15 backports :
 tcp_rtx_queue_tail() will probably look like :

static inline struct sk_buff *tcp_rtx_queue_tail(const struct sock *sk)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb = tcp_send_head(sk);

	return skb ? tcp_write_queue_prev(sk, skb) : tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
}

Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Andrew Prout &lt;aprout@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Andrew Prout &lt;aprout@ll.mit.edu&gt;
Tested-by: Jonathan Lemon &lt;jonathan.lemon@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Michal Kubecek &lt;mkubecek@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christoph Paasch &lt;cpaasch@apple.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Looney &lt;jtl@netflix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-26T18:40:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=832d0ea751a8c511d719c3ede60db05981ebc7d4'/>
<id>832d0ea751a8c511d719c3ede60db05981ebc7d4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 ]

netfilter did not expect that skb_dst_force() can cause skb to lose its
dst entry.

I got a bug report with a skb-&gt;dst NULL dereference in netfilter
output path.  The backtrace contains nf_reinject(), so the dst might have
been cleared when skb got queued to userspace.

Other users were fixed via
if (skb_dst(skb)) {
	skb_dst_force(skb);
	if (!skb_dst(skb))
		goto handle_err;
}

But I think its preferable to make the 'dst might be cleared' part
of the function explicit.

In netfilter case, skb with a null dst is expected when queueing in
prerouting hook, so drop skb for the other hooks.

v2:
 v1 of this patch returned true in case skb had no dst entry.
 Eric said:
   Say if we have two skb_dst_force() calls for some reason
   on the same skb, only the first one will return false.

 This now returns false even when skb had no dst, as per Erics
 suggestion, so callers might need to check skb_dst() first before
 skb_dst_force().

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 ]

netfilter did not expect that skb_dst_force() can cause skb to lose its
dst entry.

I got a bug report with a skb-&gt;dst NULL dereference in netfilter
output path.  The backtrace contains nf_reinject(), so the dst might have
been cleared when skb got queued to userspace.

Other users were fixed via
if (skb_dst(skb)) {
	skb_dst_force(skb);
	if (!skb_dst(skb))
		goto handle_err;
}

But I think its preferable to make the 'dst might be cleared' part
of the function explicit.

In netfilter case, skb with a null dst is expected when queueing in
prerouting hook, so drop skb for the other hooks.

v2:
 v1 of this patch returned true in case skb had no dst entry.
 Eric said:
   Say if we have two skb_dst_force() calls for some reason
   on the same skb, only the first one will return false.

 This now returns false even when skb had no dst, as per Erics
 suggestion, so callers might need to check skb_dst() first before
 skb_dst_force().

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/asm-generic/bug.h: fix "cut here" for WARN_ON for __WARN_TAINT architectures</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:14:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Drew Davenport</name>
<email>ddavenport@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-16T23:30:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=41f64437f030dc56b738afaa3b3ba7cf9e4064d6'/>
<id>41f64437f030dc56b738afaa3b3ba7cf9e4064d6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6b15f678fb7d5ef54e089e6ace72f007fe6e9895 upstream.

For architectures using __WARN_TAINT, the WARN_ON macro did not print
out the "cut here" string.  The other WARN_XXX macros would print "cut
here" inside __warn_printk, which is not called for WARN_ON since it
doesn't have a message to print.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190624154831.163888-1-ddavenport@chromium.org
Fixes: a7bed27af194 ("bug: fix "cut here" location for __WARN_TAINT architectures")
Signed-off-by: Drew Davenport &lt;ddavenport@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6b15f678fb7d5ef54e089e6ace72f007fe6e9895 upstream.

For architectures using __WARN_TAINT, the WARN_ON macro did not print
out the "cut here" string.  The other WARN_XXX macros would print "cut
here" inside __warn_printk, which is not called for WARN_ON since it
doesn't have a message to print.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190624154831.163888-1-ddavenport@chromium.org
Fixes: a7bed27af194 ("bug: fix "cut here" location for __WARN_TAINT architectures")
Signed-off-by: Drew Davenport &lt;ddavenport@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Tested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
