<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v4.19.307</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alfred Piccioni</name>
<email>alpic@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-19T09:09:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f8f51085b4be6132762ce0d8940071ccdcce2504'/>
<id>f8f51085b4be6132762ce0d8940071ccdcce2504</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.

Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).

However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.

This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".

This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.

Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni &lt;alpic@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.

Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).

However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.

This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".

This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.

Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni &lt;alpic@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hrtimer: Report offline hrtimer enqueue</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Frederic Weisbecker</name>
<email>frederic@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-29T23:56:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1aa4f696306dfe4f0d453eeb1e90f26cd10d8ed5'/>
<id>1aa4f696306dfe4f0d453eeb1e90f26cd10d8ed5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dad6a09f3148257ac1773cd90934d721d68ab595 upstream.

The hrtimers migration on CPU-down hotplug process has been moved
earlier, before the CPU actually goes to die. This leaves a small window
of opportunity to queue an hrtimer in a blind spot, leaving it ignored.

For example a practical case has been reported with RCU waking up a
SCHED_FIFO task right before the CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD stage, queuing that
way a sched/rt timer to the local offline CPU.

Make sure such situations never go unnoticed and warn when that happens.

Fixes: 5c0930ccaad5 ("hrtimers: Push pending hrtimers away from outgoing CPU earlier")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129235646.3171983-4-boqun.feng@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dad6a09f3148257ac1773cd90934d721d68ab595 upstream.

The hrtimers migration on CPU-down hotplug process has been moved
earlier, before the CPU actually goes to die. This leaves a small window
of opportunity to queue an hrtimer in a blind spot, leaving it ignored.

For example a practical case has been reported with RCU waking up a
SCHED_FIFO task right before the CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD stage, queuing that
way a sched/rt timer to the local offline CPU.

Make sure such situations never go unnoticed and warn when that happens.

Fixes: 5c0930ccaad5 ("hrtimers: Push pending hrtimers away from outgoing CPU earlier")
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker &lt;frederic@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129235646.3171983-4-boqun.feng@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_compat: reject unused compat flag</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-01T22:33:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56fb2bf4ab8c91a2e078553497b6c5b2f1dac699'/>
<id>56fb2bf4ab8c91a2e078553497b6c5b2f1dac699</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 292781c3c5485ce33bd22b2ef1b2bed709b4d672 ]

Flag (1 &lt;&lt; 0) is ignored is set, never used, reject it it with EINVAL
instead.

Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 292781c3c5485ce33bd22b2ef1b2bed709b4d672 ]

Flag (1 &lt;&lt; 0) is ignored is set, never used, reject it it with EINVAL
instead.

Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dmaengine: fix is_slave_direction() return false when DMA_DEV_TO_DEV</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Frank Li</name>
<email>Frank.Li@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-23T17:28:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=743259cc178aee41626f5929ed9ea6f63bb0c631'/>
<id>743259cc178aee41626f5929ed9ea6f63bb0c631</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a22fe1d6dec7e98535b97249fdc95c2be79120bb ]

is_slave_direction() should return true when direction is DMA_DEV_TO_DEV.

Fixes: 49920bc66984 ("dmaengine: add new enum dma_transfer_direction")
Signed-off-by: Frank Li &lt;Frank.Li@nxp.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123172842.3764529-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a22fe1d6dec7e98535b97249fdc95c2be79120bb ]

is_slave_direction() should return true when direction is DMA_DEV_TO_DEV.

Fixes: 49920bc66984 ("dmaengine: add new enum dma_transfer_direction")
Signed-off-by: Frank Li &lt;Frank.Li@nxp.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123172842.3764529-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: fix lockdep positive in sk_diag_dump_icons()</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-30T18:42:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=875f31aaa67e306098befa5e798a049075910fa7'/>
<id>875f31aaa67e306098befa5e798a049075910fa7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4d322dce82a1d44f8c83f0f54f95dd1b8dcf46c9 ]

syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1].

Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep
violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested()
in an attempt to silence lockdep.

It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested()
is already used from unix_state_double_lock().

We need to use a separate subclass.

This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things
more explicit.

Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up.

v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested()

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88808b5dfe70 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378
        sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline]
        sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157
        sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline]
        unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220
        netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
        __netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
        netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
        unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319
       sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
        sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
        netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
        netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
        netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160
        call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline]
        new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
        vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590
        ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

-&gt; #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
        skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
        unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
        ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
        __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
        __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
        __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
        __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&amp;u-&gt;lock/1);
                               lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
                               lock(&amp;u-&gt;lock/1);
  lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542:
  #0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
  skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
  ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68

Fixes: 2aac7a2cb0d9 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130184235.1620738-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4d322dce82a1d44f8c83f0f54f95dd1b8dcf46c9 ]

syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1].

Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep
violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested()
in an attempt to silence lockdep.

It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested()
is already used from unix_state_double_lock().

We need to use a separate subclass.

This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things
more explicit.

Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up.

v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested()

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88808b5dfe70 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-&gt; #1 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378
        sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline]
        sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157
        sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline]
        unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220
        netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
        __netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
        netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
        unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319
       sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
        sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
        netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
        netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
        netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160
        call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline]
        new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
        vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590
        ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

-&gt; #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
        skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
        unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
        ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
        __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
        __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
        __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
        __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&amp;u-&gt;lock/1);
                               lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
                               lock(&amp;u-&gt;lock/1);
  lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542:
  #0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&amp;u-&gt;lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
  skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
  ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68

Fixes: 2aac7a2cb0d9 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130184235.1620738-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: add INTEL_HDA_ARL to pci_ids.h</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pierre-Louis Bossart</name>
<email>pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-04T21:27:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6265345461f1580efd7e38ba6b9506dda987d23'/>
<id>a6265345461f1580efd7e38ba6b9506dda987d23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5ec42bf04d72fd6d0a6855810cc779e0ee31dfd7 ]

The PCI ID insertion follows the increasing order in the table, but
this hardware follows MTL (MeteorLake).

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi &lt;peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen &lt;kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204212710.185976-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5ec42bf04d72fd6d0a6855810cc779e0ee31dfd7 ]

The PCI ID insertion follows the increasing order in the table, but
this hardware follows MTL (MeteorLake).

Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart &lt;pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi &lt;peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen &lt;kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204212710.185976-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drm/mipi-dsi: Fix detach call without attach</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tomi Valkeinen</name>
<email>tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T10:50:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9eef5de467f413e14c9b145aa41914334c29f8a7'/>
<id>9eef5de467f413e14c9b145aa41914334c29f8a7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 90d50b8d85834e73536fdccd5aa913b30494fef0 ]

It's been reported that DSI host driver's detach can be called without
the attach ever happening:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230412073954.20601-1-tony@atomide.com/

After reading the code, I think this is what happens:

We have a DSI host defined in the device tree and a DSI peripheral under
that host (i.e. an i2c device using the DSI as data bus doesn't exhibit
this behavior).

The host driver calls mipi_dsi_host_register(), which causes (via a few
functions) mipi_dsi_device_add() to be called for the DSI peripheral. So
now we have a DSI device under the host, but attach hasn't been called.

Normally the probing of the devices continues, and eventually the DSI
peripheral's driver will call mipi_dsi_attach(), attaching the
peripheral.

However, if the host driver's probe encounters an error after calling
mipi_dsi_host_register(), and before the peripheral has called
mipi_dsi_attach(), the host driver will do cleanups and return an error
from its probe function. The cleanups include calling
mipi_dsi_host_unregister().

mipi_dsi_host_unregister() will call two functions for all its DSI
peripheral devices: mipi_dsi_detach() and mipi_dsi_device_unregister().
The latter makes sense, as the device exists, but the former may be
wrong as attach has not necessarily been done.

To fix this, track the attached state of the peripheral, and only detach
from mipi_dsi_host_unregister() if the peripheral was attached.

Note that I have only tested this with a board with an i2c DSI
peripheral, not with a "pure" DSI peripheral.

However, slightly related, the unregister machinery still seems broken.
E.g. if the DSI host driver is unbound, it'll detach and unregister the
DSI peripherals. After that, when the DSI peripheral driver unbound
it'll call detach either directly or using the devm variant, leading to
a crash. And probably the driver will crash if it happens, for some
reason, to try to send a message via the DSI bus.

But that's another topic.

Tested-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller &lt;hns@goldelico.com&gt;
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard &lt;mripard@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sebastian.reichel@collabora.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen &lt;tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230921-dsi-detach-fix-v1-1-d0de2d1621d9@ideasonboard.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 90d50b8d85834e73536fdccd5aa913b30494fef0 ]

It's been reported that DSI host driver's detach can be called without
the attach ever happening:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230412073954.20601-1-tony@atomide.com/

After reading the code, I think this is what happens:

We have a DSI host defined in the device tree and a DSI peripheral under
that host (i.e. an i2c device using the DSI as data bus doesn't exhibit
this behavior).

The host driver calls mipi_dsi_host_register(), which causes (via a few
functions) mipi_dsi_device_add() to be called for the DSI peripheral. So
now we have a DSI device under the host, but attach hasn't been called.

Normally the probing of the devices continues, and eventually the DSI
peripheral's driver will call mipi_dsi_attach(), attaching the
peripheral.

However, if the host driver's probe encounters an error after calling
mipi_dsi_host_register(), and before the peripheral has called
mipi_dsi_attach(), the host driver will do cleanups and return an error
from its probe function. The cleanups include calling
mipi_dsi_host_unregister().

mipi_dsi_host_unregister() will call two functions for all its DSI
peripheral devices: mipi_dsi_detach() and mipi_dsi_device_unregister().
The latter makes sense, as the device exists, but the former may be
wrong as attach has not necessarily been done.

To fix this, track the attached state of the peripheral, and only detach
from mipi_dsi_host_unregister() if the peripheral was attached.

Note that I have only tested this with a board with an i2c DSI
peripheral, not with a "pure" DSI peripheral.

However, slightly related, the unregister machinery still seems broken.
E.g. if the DSI host driver is unbound, it'll detach and unregister the
DSI peripherals. After that, when the DSI peripheral driver unbound
it'll call detach either directly or using the devm variant, leading to
a crash. And probably the driver will crash if it happens, for some
reason, to try to send a message via the DSI bus.

But that's another topic.

Tested-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller &lt;hns@goldelico.com&gt;
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard &lt;mripard@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel &lt;sebastian.reichel@collabora.com&gt;
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen &lt;tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com&gt;
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230921-dsi-detach-fix-v1-1-d0de2d1621d9@ideasonboard.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Add map and need_defer parameters to .map_fd_put_ptr()</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hou Tao</name>
<email>houtao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-04T14:04:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5aa1e7d3f6d0db96c7139677d9e898bbbd6a7dcf'/>
<id>5aa1e7d3f6d0db96c7139677d9e898bbbd6a7dcf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 20c20bd11a0702ce4dc9300c3da58acf551d9725 ]

map is the pointer of outer map, and need_defer needs some explanation.
need_defer tells the implementation to defer the reference release of
the passed element and ensure that the element is still alive before
the bpf program, which may manipulate it, exits.

The following three cases will invoke map_fd_put_ptr() and different
need_defer values will be passed to these callers:

1) release the reference of the old element in the map during map update
   or map deletion. The release must be deferred, otherwise the bpf
   program may incur use-after-free problem, so need_defer needs to be
   true.
2) release the reference of the to-be-added element in the error path of
   map update. The to-be-added element is not visible to any bpf
   program, so it is OK to pass false for need_defer parameter.
3) release the references of all elements in the map during map release.
   Any bpf program which has access to the map must have been exited and
   released, so need_defer=false will be OK.

These two parameters will be used by the following patches to fix the
potential use-after-free problem for map-in-map.

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao &lt;houtao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 20c20bd11a0702ce4dc9300c3da58acf551d9725 ]

map is the pointer of outer map, and need_defer needs some explanation.
need_defer tells the implementation to defer the reference release of
the passed element and ensure that the element is still alive before
the bpf program, which may manipulate it, exits.

The following three cases will invoke map_fd_put_ptr() and different
need_defer values will be passed to these callers:

1) release the reference of the old element in the map during map update
   or map deletion. The release must be deferred, otherwise the bpf
   program may incur use-after-free problem, so need_defer needs to be
   true.
2) release the reference of the to-be-added element in the error path of
   map update. The to-be-added element is not visible to any bpf
   program, so it is OK to pass false for need_defer parameter.
3) release the references of all elements in the map during map release.
   Any bpf program which has access to the map must have been exited and
   released, so need_defer=false will be OK.

These two parameters will be used by the following patches to fix the
potential use-after-free problem for map-in-map.

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao &lt;houtao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-3-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/entry/ia32: Ensure s32 is sign extended to s64</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Palethorpe</name>
<email>rpalethorpe@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-10T13:01:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d20c05fc2f18651d19ef881d403a0ccf8ce8b8e1'/>
<id>d20c05fc2f18651d19ef881d403a0ccf8ce8b8e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 56062d60f117dccfb5281869e0ab61e090baf864 upstream.

Presently ia32 registers stored in ptregs are unconditionally cast to
unsigned int by the ia32 stub. They are then cast to long when passed to
__se_sys*, but will not be sign extended.

This takes the sign of the syscall argument into account in the ia32
stub. It still casts to unsigned int to avoid implementation specific
behavior. However then casts to int or unsigned int as necessary. So that
the following cast to long sign extends the value.

This fixes the io_pgetevents02 LTP test when compiled with -m32. Presently
the systemcall io_pgetevents_time64() unexpectedly accepts -1 for the
maximum number of events.

It doesn't appear other systemcalls with signed arguments are effected
because they all have compat variants defined and wired up.

Fixes: ebeb8c82ffaf ("syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe &lt;rpalethorpe@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110130122.3836513-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20210921130127.24131-1-rpalethorpe@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 56062d60f117dccfb5281869e0ab61e090baf864 upstream.

Presently ia32 registers stored in ptregs are unconditionally cast to
unsigned int by the ia32 stub. They are then cast to long when passed to
__se_sys*, but will not be sign extended.

This takes the sign of the syscall argument into account in the ia32
stub. It still casts to unsigned int to avoid implementation specific
behavior. However then casts to int or unsigned int as necessary. So that
the following cast to long sign extends the value.

This fixes the io_pgetevents02 LTP test when compiled with -m32. Presently
the systemcall io_pgetevents_time64() unexpectedly accepts -1 for the
maximum number of events.

It doesn't appear other systemcalls with signed arguments are effected
because they all have compat variants defined and wired up.

Fixes: ebeb8c82ffaf ("syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe &lt;rpalethorpe@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov &lt;nik.borisov@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110130122.3836513-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20210921130127.24131-1-rpalethorpe@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: defrag: reject unknown flags of btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:12:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-09T22:28:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f084057282bc5f45e5f50a4b226244a30666422d'/>
<id>f084057282bc5f45e5f50a4b226244a30666422d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 173431b274a9a54fc10b273b46e67f46bcf62d2e upstream.

Add extra sanity check for btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args::flags.

This is not really to enhance fuzzing tests, but as a preparation for
future expansion on btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args.

In the future we're going to add new members, allowing more fine tuning
for btrfs defrag.  Without the -ENONOTSUPP error, there would be no way
to detect if the kernel supports those new defrag features.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 173431b274a9a54fc10b273b46e67f46bcf62d2e upstream.

Add extra sanity check for btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args::flags.

This is not really to enhance fuzzing tests, but as a preparation for
future expansion on btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args.

In the future we're going to add new members, allowing more fine tuning
for btrfs defrag.  Without the -ENONOTSUPP error, there would be no way
to detect if the kernel supports those new defrag features.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana &lt;fdmanana@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
