linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.8.6

net: fix *_DIAG_MAX constants

2013-04-05T16:26:18+00:00

[ Upstream commit ae5fc98728c8bbbd6d7cab0b9781671fc4419c1b ]

Follow the common pattern and define *_DIAG_MAX like:

        [...]
        __XXX_DIAG_MAX,
};

Because everyone is used to do:

        struct nlattr *attrs[XXX_DIAG_MAX+1];

        nla_parse([...], XXX_DIAG_MAX, [...]

Reported-by: Thomas Graf 
Cc: "David S. Miller" 
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov 
Cc: Eric Dumazet 
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" 
Cc: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

thermal: shorten too long mcast group name

2013-04-05T16:26:17+00:00

[ Upstream commits 73214f5d9f33b79918b1f7babddd5c8af28dd23d
  and f1e79e208076ffe7bad97158275f1c572c04f5c7, the latter
  adds an assertion to genetlink to prevent this from happening
  again in the future. ]

The original name is too long.

Signed-off-by: Masatake YAMATO 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

signal: Define __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER so we know whether to clear sa_restorer

2013-04-05T16:26:05+00:00

Vaguely based on upstream commit 574c4866e33d 'consolidate kernel-side
struct sigaction declarations'.

flush_signal_handlers() needs to know whether sigaction::sa_restorer
is defined, not whether SA_RESTORER is defined.  Define the
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER macro to indicate this.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings 
Cc: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

USB: serial: add modem-status-change wait queue

2013-04-05T16:26:03+00:00

commit e5b33dc9d16053c2ae4c2c669cf008829530364b upstream.

Add modem-status-change wait queue to struct usb_serial_port that
subdrivers can use to implement TIOCMIWAIT.

Currently subdrivers use a private wait queue which may have been
released when waking up after device disconnected.

Note that we're adding a new wait queue rather than reusing the tty-port
one as we do not want to get woken up at hangup (yet).

Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted

2013-04-05T16:26:02+00:00

commit 87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f upstream.

Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.

proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.

Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.

In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts

2013-04-05T16:26:01+00:00

commit 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45 upstream.

When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.

Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted

2013-04-05T16:26:01+00:00

commit 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d upstream.

Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.

Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.

For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace.  Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.

Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead.  With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/blkback: correctly respond to unknown, non-native requests

2013-04-05T16:25:49+00:00

commit 0e367ae46503cfe7791460c8ba8434a5d60b2bd5 upstream.

If the frontend is using a non-native protocol (e.g., a 64-bit
frontend with a 32-bit backend) and it sent an unrecognized request,
the request was not translated and the response would have the
incorrect ID.  This may cause the frontend driver to behave
incorrectly or crash.

Since the ID field in the request is always in the same place,
regardless of the request type we can get the correct ID and make a
valid response (which will report BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP).

This bug affected 64-bit SLES 11 guests when using a 32-bit backend.
This guest does a BLKIF_OP_RESERVED_1 (BLKIF_OP_PACKET in the SLES
source) and would crash in blkif_int() as the ID in the response would
be invalid.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen-pciback: notify hypervisor about devices intended to be assigned to guests

2013-04-05T16:25:49+00:00

commit 909b3fdb0dd4f3db07b2d75425a00a2adb551383 upstream.

For MSI-X capable devices the hypervisor wants to write protect the
MSI-X table and PBA, yet it can't assume that resources have been
assigned to their final values at device enumeration time. Thus have
pciback do that notification, as having the device controlled by it is
a prerequisite to assigning the device to guests anyway.

This is the kernel part of hypervisor side commit 4245d33 ("x86/MSI:
add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses") on
the master branch of git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich 
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

drm/radeon: add Richland pci ids

2013-03-28T19:17:49+00:00

commit b75bbaa038ffc426e88ea3df6c4ae11834fc3e4f upstream.

Reviewed-by: Jerome Glisse 
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman