linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.4.15

ipvs: fix oops on NAT reply in br_nf context

2012-10-21T16:28:00+00:00

commit 9e33ce453f8ac8452649802bee1f410319408f4b upstream.

IPVS should not reset skb->nf_bridge in FORWARD hook
by calling nf_reset for NAT replies. It triggers oops in
br_nf_forward_finish.

[  579.781508] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[  579.781669] IP: [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112
[  579.781792] PGD 218f9067 PUD 0
[  579.781865] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  579.781945] CPU 0
[  579.781983] Modules linked in:
[  579.782047]
[  579.782080]
[  579.782114] Pid: 4644, comm: qemu Tainted: G        W    3.5.0-rc5-00006-g95e69f9 #282 Hewlett-Packard  /30E8
[  579.782300] RIP: 0010:[]  [] br_nf_forward_finish+0x58/0x112
[  579.782455] RSP: 0018:ffff88007b003a98  EFLAGS: 00010287
[  579.782541] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8800762ead00 RCX: 000000000001670a
[  579.782653] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff8800762ead00
[  579.782845] RBP: ffff88007b003ac8 R08: 0000000000016630 R09: ffff88007b003a90
[  579.782957] R10: ffff88007b0038e8 R11: ffff88002da37540 R12: ffff88002da01a02
[  579.783066] R13: ffff88002da01a80 R14: ffff88002d83c000 R15: ffff88002d82a000
[  579.783177] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007b000000(0063) knlGS:00000000f62d1b70
[  579.783306] CS:  0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 000000008005003b
[  579.783395] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 00000000218fe000 CR4: 00000000000027f0
[  579.783505] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  579.783684] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  579.783795] Process qemu (pid: 4644, threadinfo ffff880021b20000, task ffff880021aba760)
[  579.783919] Stack:
[  579.783959]  ffff88007693cedc ffff8800762ead00 ffff88002da01a02 ffff8800762ead00
[  579.784110]  ffff88002da01a02 ffff88002da01a80 ffff88007b003b18 ffffffff817b26c7
[  579.784260]  ffff880080000000 ffffffff81ef59f0 ffff8800762ead00 ffffffff81ef58b0
[  579.784477] Call Trace:
[  579.784523]  
[  579.784562]
[  579.784603]  [] br_nf_forward_ip+0x275/0x2c8
[  579.784707]  [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d
[  579.784797]  [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae
[  579.784906]  [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102
[  579.784995]  [] ? br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0xae/0xae
[  579.785175]  [] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x19/0x1b
[  579.785179]  [] __br_forward+0x97/0xa2
[  579.785179]  [] br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a6/0x257
[  579.785179]  [] br_nf_pre_routing_finish+0x26d/0x2cb
[  579.785179]  [] br_nf_pre_routing+0x55d/0x5c1
[  579.785179]  [] nf_iterate+0x47/0x7d
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44
[  579.785179]  [] nf_hook_slow+0x6d/0x102
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_local_finish+0x44/0x44
[  579.785179]  [] ? sky2_poll+0xb35/0xb54
[  579.785179]  [] br_handle_frame+0x213/0x229
[  579.785179]  [] ? br_handle_frame_finish+0x257/0x257
[  579.785179]  [] __netif_receive_skb+0x2b4/0x3f1
[  579.785179]  [] process_backlog+0x99/0x1e2
[  579.785179]  [] net_rx_action+0xdf/0x242
[  579.785179]  [] __do_softirq+0xc1/0x1e0
[  579.785179]  [] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x3a/0x6c
[  579.785179]  [] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30

The steps to reproduce as follow,

1. On Host1, setup brige br0(192.168.1.106)
2. Boot a kvm guest(192.168.1.105) on Host1 and start httpd
3. Start IPVS service on Host1
   ipvsadm -A -t 192.168.1.106:80 -s rr
   ipvsadm -a -t 192.168.1.106:80 -r 192.168.1.105:80 -m
4. Run apache benchmark on Host2(192.168.1.101)
   ab -n 1000 http://192.168.1.106/

ip_vs_reply4
  ip_vs_out
    handle_response
      ip_vs_notrack
        nf_reset()
        {
          skb->nf_bridge = NULL;
        }

Actually, IPVS wants in this case just to replace nfct
with untracked version. So replace the nf_reset(skb) call
in ip_vs_notrack() with a nf_conntrack_put(skb->nfct) call.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ming 
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov 
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Acked-by: David Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: ipset: fix timeout value overflow bug

2012-10-21T16:28:00+00:00

commit 127f559127f5175e4bec3dab725a34845d956591 upstream.

Large timeout parameters could result wrong timeout values due to
an overflow at msec to jiffies conversion (reported by Andreas Herz)

[ This patch was mangled by Pablo Neira Ayuso since David Laight and
  Eric Dumazet noticed that we were using hardcoded 1000 instead of
  MSEC_PER_SEC to calculate the timeout ]

Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Acked-by: David Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable events

2012-10-21T16:28:00+00:00

commit 5b423f6a40a0327f9d40bc8b97ce9be266f74368 upstream.

Existing code assumes that del_timer returns true for alive conntrack
entries. However, this is not true if reliable events are enabled.
In that case, del_timer may return true for entries that were
just inserted in the dying list. Note that packets / ctnetlink may
hold references to conntrack entries that were just inserted to such
list.

This patch fixes the issue by adding an independent timer for
event delivery. This increases the size of the ecache extension.
Still we can revisit this later and use variable size extensions
to allocate this area on demand.

Tested-by: Oliver Smith 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Acked-by: David Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mempolicy: fix a race in shared_policy_replace()

2012-10-12T20:38:56+00:00

commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream.

shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe.  1) sp_node cannot
be dereferenced if sp->lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify
sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next
spin_lock.  The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2.

Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and
policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is
reacquired.  I was not keen on this approach because it partially
duplicates sp_alloc().  As the paths were sp->lock is taken are not that
performance critical this patch converts sp->lock to sp->mutex so it can
sleep when calling sp_alloc().

[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman 
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro 
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid

2012-10-12T20:38:41+00:00

[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ]

The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause 
Cc: Steffen Klassert 
Cc: Martin Willi 
Cc: Ben Hutchings 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

2012-10-12T20:38:40+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ]

ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.

If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.

We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.

To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

serial: set correct baud_base for EXSYS EX-41092 Dual 16950

2012-10-07T15:32:25+00:00

commit 26e8220adb0aec43b7acafa0f1431760eee28522 upstream.

Apparently the same card model has two IDs, so this patch
complements the commit 39aced68d664291db3324d0fcf0985ab5626aac2
adding the missing one.

Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kthread_worker: reimplement flush_kthread_work() to allow freeing the work item being executed

2012-10-02T17:30:40+00:00

commit 46f3d976213452350f9d10b0c2780c2681f7075b upstream.

kthread_worker provides minimalistic workqueue-like interface for
users which need a dedicated worker thread (e.g. for realtime
priority).  It has basic queue, flush_work, flush_worker operations
which mostly match the workqueue counterparts; however, due to the way
flush_work() is implemented, it has a noticeable difference of not
allowing work items to be freed while being executed.

While the current users of kthread_worker are okay with the current
behavior, the restriction does impede some valid use cases.  Also,
removing this difference isn't difficult and actually makes the code
easier to understand.

This patch reimplements flush_kthread_work() such that it uses a
flush_work item instead of queue/done sequence numbers.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo 
Cc: Colin Cross 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Move ktime_t overflow checking into timespec_valid_strict

2012-10-02T17:30:36+00:00

commit cee58483cf56e0ba355fdd97ff5e8925329aa936 upstream

Andreas Bombe reported that the added ktime_t overflow checking added to
timespec_valid in commit 4e8b14526ca7 ("time: Improve sanity checking of
timekeeping inputs") was causing problems with X.org because it caused
timeouts larger then KTIME_T to be invalid.

Previously, these large timeouts would be clamped to KTIME_MAX and would
never expire, which is valid.

This patch splits the ktime_t overflow checking into a new
timespec_valid_strict function, and converts the timekeeping codes
internal checking to use this more strict function.

Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Bombe 
Cc: Zhouping Liu 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Cc: Prarit Bhargava 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

time: Improve sanity checking of timekeeping inputs

2012-10-02T17:30:36+00:00

commit 4e8b14526ca7fb046a81c94002c1c43b6fdf0e9b upstream.

Unexpected behavior could occur if the time is set to a value large
enough to overflow a 64bit ktime_t (which is something larger then the
year 2262).

Also unexpected behavior could occur if large negative offsets are
injected via adjtimex.

So this patch improves the sanity check timekeeping inputs by
improving the timespec_valid() check, and then makes better use of
timespec_valid() to make sure we don't set the time to an invalid
negative value or one that overflows ktime_t.

Note: This does not protect from setting the time close to overflowing
ktime_t and then letting natural accumulation cause the overflow.

Reported-by: CAI Qian 
Reported-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Prarit Bhargava 
Cc: Zhouping Liu 
Cc: Ingo Molnar 
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344454580-17031-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner 
Signed-off-by: John Stultz 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman