<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.2.80</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: validate variable length ll headers</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-10T02:58:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b5518429e70cd783b8ca52335456172c1a0589f6'/>
<id>b5518429e70cd783b8ca52335456172c1a0589f6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2793a23aacbd754dbbb5cb75093deb7e4103bace ]

Netdevice parameter hard_header_len is variously interpreted both as
an upper and lower bound on link layer header length. The field is
used as upper bound when reserving room at allocation, as lower bound
when validating user input in PF_PACKET.

Clarify the definition to be maximum header length. For validation
of untrusted headers, add an optional validate member to header_ops.

Allow bypassing of validation by passing CAP_SYS_RAWIO, for instance
for deliberate testing of corrupt input. In this case, pad trailing
bytes, as some device drivers expect completely initialized headers.

See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: net_device has inline comments instead of kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2793a23aacbd754dbbb5cb75093deb7e4103bace ]

Netdevice parameter hard_header_len is variously interpreted both as
an upper and lower bound on link layer header length. The field is
used as upper bound when reserving room at allocation, as lower bound
when validating user input in PF_PACKET.

Clarify the definition to be maximum header length. For validation
of untrusted headers, add an optional validate member to header_ops.

Allow bypassing of validation by passing CAP_SYS_RAWIO, for instance
for deliberate testing of corrupt input. In this case, pad trailing
bytes, as some device drivers expect completely initialized headers.

See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: net_device has inline comments instead of kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/ipv6: add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hangbin Liu</name>
<email>liuhangbin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-30T06:28:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=619d48665f45c3a9ccadd8cf171cb8ce230900ec'/>
<id>619d48665f45c3a9ccadd8cf171cb8ce230900ec</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 ]

Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.

RFC 4861, 6.3.4.  Processing Received Router Advertisements
   A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
   and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
   unspecified.  In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
   host should continue using whatever value it is already using.

   If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
   its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu &lt;liuhangbin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename, context
 - Number DEVCONF enumerators explicitly to match upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8013d1d7eafb0589ca766db6b74026f76b7f5cb4 ]

Commit 6fd99094de2b ("ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface")
disabled accept hop limit from RA if it is smaller than the current hop
limit for security stuff. But this behavior kind of break the RFC definition.

RFC 4861, 6.3.4.  Processing Received Router Advertisements
   A Router Advertisement field (e.g., Cur Hop Limit, Reachable Time,
   and Retrans Timer) may contain a value denoting that it is
   unspecified.  In such cases, the parameter should be ignored and the
   host should continue using whatever value it is already using.

   If the received Cur Hop Limit value is non-zero, the host SHOULD set
   its CurHopLimit variable to the received value.

So add sysctl option accept_ra_min_hop_limit to let user choose the minimum
hop limit value they can accept from RA. And set default to 1 to meet RFC
standards.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu &lt;liuhangbin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki &lt;hideaki.yoshifuji@miraclelinux.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename, context
 - Number DEVCONF enumerators explicitly to match upstream]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: update skb-&gt;csum when CE mark is propagated</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-15T12:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58b45f408a8821b6d9f0003c3fdfa179145c90e7'/>
<id>58b45f408a8821b6d9f0003c3fdfa179145c90e7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 34ae6a1aa0540f0f781dd265366036355fdc8930 ]

When a tunnel decapsulates the outer header, it has to comply
with RFC 6080 and eventually propagate CE mark into inner header.

It turns out IP6_ECN_set_ce() does not correctly update skb-&gt;csum
for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets, triggering infamous "hw csum failure"
messages and stack traces.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Add skb argument to other callers of IP6_ECN_set_ce()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 34ae6a1aa0540f0f781dd265366036355fdc8930 ]

When a tunnel decapsulates the outer header, it has to comply
with RFC 6080 and eventually propagate CE mark into inner header.

It turns out IP6_ECN_set_ce() does not correctly update skb-&gt;csum
for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets, triggering infamous "hw csum failure"
messages and stack traces.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Add skb argument to other callers of IP6_ECN_set_ce()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/coredump: prevent fsuid=0 dumps into user-controlled directories</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jann@thejh.net</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-22T21:25:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b1bf6857ac304ee1c05cb3d804f70312e947887c'/>
<id>b1bf6857ac304ee1c05cb3d804f70312e947887c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 378c6520e7d29280f400ef2ceaf155c86f05a71a upstream.

This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where
all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

 - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2.
 - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems
   where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.)
 - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is
   true on Linux &gt;=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by
   default using a distro patch.)

Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules,
causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user
namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be
written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but
this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process,
allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with
root privileges.

To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that
are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 378c6520e7d29280f400ef2ceaf155c86f05a71a upstream.

This commit fixes the following security hole affecting systems where
all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

 - The fs.suid_dumpable sysctl is set to 2.
 - The kernel.core_pattern sysctl's value starts with "/". (Systems
   where kernel.core_pattern starts with "|/" are not affected.)
 - Unprivileged user namespace creation is permitted. (This is
   true on Linux &gt;=3.8, but some distributions disallow it by
   default using a distro patch.)

Under these conditions, if a program executes under secure exec rules,
causing it to run with the SUID_DUMP_ROOT flag, then unshares its user
namespace, changes its root directory and crashes, the coredump will be
written using fsuid=0 and a path derived from kernel.core_pattern - but
this path is interpreted relative to the root directory of the process,
allowing the attacker to control where a coredump will be written with
root privileges.

To fix the security issue, always interpret core_pattern for dumps that
are written under SUID_DUMP_ROOT relative to the root directory of init.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jann@thejh.net&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dm snapshot: disallow the COW and origin devices from being identical</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>DingXiang</name>
<email>dingxiang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-02T04:29:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9d4ac2d1b8b858afc6178317d9b2977dc6f2c747'/>
<id>9d4ac2d1b8b858afc6178317d9b2977dc6f2c747</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4df2bf466a9c9c92f40d27c4aa9120f4e8227bfc upstream.

Otherwise loading a "snapshot" table using the same device for the
origin and COW devices, e.g.:

echo "0 20971520 snapshot 253:3 253:3 P 8" | dmsetup create snap

will trigger:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098
[ 1958.979934] IP: [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1958.989655] PGD 0
[ 1958.991903] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
[ 1959.059647] CPU: 9 PID: 3556 Comm: dmsetup Tainted: G          IO    4.5.0-rc5.snitm+ #150
...
[ 1959.083517] task: ffff8800b9660c80 ti: ffff88032a954000 task.ti: ffff88032a954000
[ 1959.091865] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.104295] RSP: 0018:ffff88032a957b30  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1959.110219] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 1959.118180] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff880329334a00
[ 1959.126141] RBP: ffff88032a957b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 1959.134102] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff880330884d80
[ 1959.142061] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffc90001c13088 R15: ffff880330884d80
[ 1959.150021] FS:  00007f8926ba3840(0000) GS:ffff880333440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1959.159047] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1959.165456] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 000000032f48b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1959.173415] Stack:
[ 1959.175656]  ffffc90001c13040 ffff880329334a00 ffff880330884ed0 ffff88032a957bdc
[ 1959.183946]  ffff88032a957bb8 ffffffffa040f225 ffff880329334a30 ffff880300000000
[ 1959.192233]  ffffffffa04133e0 ffff880329334b30 0000000830884d58 00000000569c58cf
[ 1959.200521] Call Trace:
[ 1959.203248]  [&lt;ffffffffa040f225&gt;] dm_exception_store_create+0x1d5/0x240 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.211986]  [&lt;ffffffffa040d310&gt;] snapshot_ctr+0x140/0x630 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.219469]  [&lt;ffffffffa0005c44&gt;] ? dm_split_args+0x64/0x150 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.226656]  [&lt;ffffffffa0005ea7&gt;] dm_table_add_target+0x177/0x440 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.234328]  [&lt;ffffffffa0009203&gt;] table_load+0x143/0x370 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.241129]  [&lt;ffffffffa00090c0&gt;] ? retrieve_status+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.248607]  [&lt;ffffffffa0009e35&gt;] ctl_ioctl+0x255/0x4d0 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.255307]  [&lt;ffffffff813304e2&gt;] ? memzero_explicit+0x12/0x20
[ 1959.261816]  [&lt;ffffffffa000a0c3&gt;] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x13/0x20 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.268615]  [&lt;ffffffff81215eb6&gt;] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x5c0
[ 1959.274637]  [&lt;ffffffff81120d2f&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xaf/0x100
[ 1959.281726]  [&lt;ffffffff81003176&gt;] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70
[ 1959.288814]  [&lt;ffffffff81216449&gt;] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[ 1959.294450]  [&lt;ffffffff8167e4ae&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
...
[ 1959.323277] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.333090]  RSP &lt;ffff88032a957b30&gt;
[ 1959.336978] CR2: 0000000000000098
[ 1959.344121] ---[ end trace b049991ccad1169e ]---

Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1195899
Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang &lt;dingxiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: the device path parsing code is rather different,
 but move it into dm_get_dev_t() anyway]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4df2bf466a9c9c92f40d27c4aa9120f4e8227bfc upstream.

Otherwise loading a "snapshot" table using the same device for the
origin and COW devices, e.g.:

echo "0 20971520 snapshot 253:3 253:3 P 8" | dmsetup create snap

will trigger:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098
[ 1958.979934] IP: [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1958.989655] PGD 0
[ 1958.991903] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
[ 1959.059647] CPU: 9 PID: 3556 Comm: dmsetup Tainted: G          IO    4.5.0-rc5.snitm+ #150
...
[ 1959.083517] task: ffff8800b9660c80 ti: ffff88032a954000 task.ti: ffff88032a954000
[ 1959.091865] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.104295] RSP: 0018:ffff88032a957b30  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1959.110219] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 1959.118180] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff880329334a00
[ 1959.126141] RBP: ffff88032a957b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 1959.134102] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff880330884d80
[ 1959.142061] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffc90001c13088 R15: ffff880330884d80
[ 1959.150021] FS:  00007f8926ba3840(0000) GS:ffff880333440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1959.159047] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1959.165456] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 000000032f48b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1959.173415] Stack:
[ 1959.175656]  ffffc90001c13040 ffff880329334a00 ffff880330884ed0 ffff88032a957bdc
[ 1959.183946]  ffff88032a957bb8 ffffffffa040f225 ffff880329334a30 ffff880300000000
[ 1959.192233]  ffffffffa04133e0 ffff880329334b30 0000000830884d58 00000000569c58cf
[ 1959.200521] Call Trace:
[ 1959.203248]  [&lt;ffffffffa040f225&gt;] dm_exception_store_create+0x1d5/0x240 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.211986]  [&lt;ffffffffa040d310&gt;] snapshot_ctr+0x140/0x630 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.219469]  [&lt;ffffffffa0005c44&gt;] ? dm_split_args+0x64/0x150 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.226656]  [&lt;ffffffffa0005ea7&gt;] dm_table_add_target+0x177/0x440 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.234328]  [&lt;ffffffffa0009203&gt;] table_load+0x143/0x370 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.241129]  [&lt;ffffffffa00090c0&gt;] ? retrieve_status+0x1b0/0x1b0 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.248607]  [&lt;ffffffffa0009e35&gt;] ctl_ioctl+0x255/0x4d0 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.255307]  [&lt;ffffffff813304e2&gt;] ? memzero_explicit+0x12/0x20
[ 1959.261816]  [&lt;ffffffffa000a0c3&gt;] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x13/0x20 [dm_mod]
[ 1959.268615]  [&lt;ffffffff81215eb6&gt;] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x5c0
[ 1959.274637]  [&lt;ffffffff81120d2f&gt;] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xaf/0x100
[ 1959.281726]  [&lt;ffffffff81003176&gt;] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70
[ 1959.288814]  [&lt;ffffffff81216449&gt;] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[ 1959.294450]  [&lt;ffffffff8167e4ae&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
...
[ 1959.323277] RIP  [&lt;ffffffffa040efba&gt;] dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size+0x7a/0x110 [dm_snapshot]
[ 1959.333090]  RSP &lt;ffff88032a957b30&gt;
[ 1959.336978] CR2: 0000000000000098
[ 1959.344121] ---[ end trace b049991ccad1169e ]---

Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1195899
Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang &lt;dingxiang@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer &lt;snitzer@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: the device path parsing code is rather different,
 but move it into dm_get_dev_t() anyway]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI: Disable IO/MEM decoding for devices with non-compliant BARs</title>
<updated>2016-04-30T22:05:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjorn Helgaas</name>
<email>bhelgaas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-25T20:35:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c85e3d6901273bf7b28af947e5d6b6ede3111f7'/>
<id>5c85e3d6901273bf7b28af947e5d6b6ede3111f7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b84106b4e2290c081cdab521fa832596cdfea246 upstream.

The PCI config header (first 64 bytes of each device's config space) is
defined by the PCI spec so generic software can identify the device and
manage its usage of I/O, memory, and IRQ resources.

Some non-spec-compliant devices put registers other than BARs where the
BARs should be.  When the PCI core sizes these "BARs", the reads and writes
it does may have unwanted side effects, and the "BAR" may appear to
describe non-sensical address space.

Add a flag bit to mark non-compliant devices so we don't touch their BARs.
Turn off IO/MEM decoding to prevent the devices from consuming address
space, since we can't read the BARs to find out what that address space
would be.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b84106b4e2290c081cdab521fa832596cdfea246 upstream.

The PCI config header (first 64 bytes of each device's config space) is
defined by the PCI spec so generic software can identify the device and
manage its usage of I/O, memory, and IRQ resources.

Some non-spec-compliant devices put registers other than BARs where the
BARs should be.  When the PCI core sizes these "BARs", the reads and writes
it does may have unwanted side effects, and the "BAR" may appear to
describe non-sensical address space.

Add a flag bit to mark non-compliant devices so we don't touch their BARs.
Turn off IO/MEM decoding to prevent the devices from consuming address
space, since we can't read the BARs to find out what that address space
would be.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas &lt;bhelgaas@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andi Kleen &lt;ak@linux.intel.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/poison.h: fix LIST_POISON{1,2} offset</title>
<updated>2016-04-01T00:54:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Kulikov</name>
<email>segoon@openwall.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-09T22:36:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7a1adecfd8254ea61c79585a9c56dd6e3d0f5b7'/>
<id>d7a1adecfd8254ea61c79585a9c56dd6e3d0f5b7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a5e5e02fc83aaf67053ab53b359af08c6c49aaf upstream.

Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in
non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space.  E.g.  on x86 "poison pointer space"
is located starting from 0x0.  Given unprivileged users cannot mmap
anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers
lower than mmap_min_addr.

The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for
mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g.  Ubuntu
uses only 0x10000).  There is little point to use such a big value given
the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted.  Changing it
to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups.

The values are suggested by Solar Designer:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6

Signed-off-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8a5e5e02fc83aaf67053ab53b359af08c6c49aaf upstream.

Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in
non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space.  E.g.  on x86 "poison pointer space"
is located starting from 0x0.  Given unprivileged users cannot mmap
anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers
lower than mmap_min_addr.

The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for
mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g.  Ubuntu
uses only 0x10000).  There is little point to use such a big value given
the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted.  Changing it
to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups.

The values are suggested by Solar Designer:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6

Signed-off-by: Vasily Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mld, igmp: Fix reserved tailroom calculation</title>
<updated>2016-04-01T00:54:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Poirier</name>
<email>bpoirier@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-29T23:03:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2a175739619bd59e8e963200561fc7d6e3bb916'/>
<id>a2a175739619bd59e8e963200561fc7d6e3bb916</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1837b2e2bcd23137766555a63867e649c0b637f0 upstream.

The current reserved_tailroom calculation fails to take hlen and tlen into
account.

skb:
[__hlen__|__data____________|__tlen___|__extra__]
^                                               ^
head                                            skb_end_offset

In this representation, hlen + data + tlen is the size passed to alloc_skb.
"extra" is the extra space made available in __alloc_skb because of
rounding up by kmalloc. We can reorder the representation like so:

[__hlen__|__data____________|__extra__|__tlen___]
^                                               ^
head                                            skb_end_offset

The maximum space available for ip headers and payload without
fragmentation is min(mtu, data + extra). Therefore,
reserved_tailroom
= data + extra + tlen - min(mtu, data + extra)
= skb_end_offset - hlen - min(mtu, skb_end_offset - hlen - tlen)
= skb_tailroom - min(mtu, skb_tailroom - tlen) ; after skb_reserve(hlen)

Compare the second line to the current expression:
reserved_tailroom = skb_end_offset - min(mtu, skb_end_offset)
and we can see that hlen and tlen are not taken into account.

The min() in the third line can be expanded into:
if mtu &lt; skb_tailroom - tlen:
	reserved_tailroom = skb_tailroom - mtu
else:
	reserved_tailroom = tlen

Depending on hlen, tlen, mtu and the number of multicast address records,
the current code may output skbs that have less tailroom than
dev-&gt;needed_tailroom or it may output more skbs than needed because not all
space available is used.

Fixes: 4c672e4b ("ipv6: mld: fix add_grhead skb_over_panic for devs with large MTUs")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier &lt;bpoirier@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1837b2e2bcd23137766555a63867e649c0b637f0 upstream.

The current reserved_tailroom calculation fails to take hlen and tlen into
account.

skb:
[__hlen__|__data____________|__tlen___|__extra__]
^                                               ^
head                                            skb_end_offset

In this representation, hlen + data + tlen is the size passed to alloc_skb.
"extra" is the extra space made available in __alloc_skb because of
rounding up by kmalloc. We can reorder the representation like so:

[__hlen__|__data____________|__extra__|__tlen___]
^                                               ^
head                                            skb_end_offset

The maximum space available for ip headers and payload without
fragmentation is min(mtu, data + extra). Therefore,
reserved_tailroom
= data + extra + tlen - min(mtu, data + extra)
= skb_end_offset - hlen - min(mtu, skb_end_offset - hlen - tlen)
= skb_tailroom - min(mtu, skb_tailroom - tlen) ; after skb_reserve(hlen)

Compare the second line to the current expression:
reserved_tailroom = skb_end_offset - min(mtu, skb_end_offset)
and we can see that hlen and tlen are not taken into account.

The min() in the third line can be expanded into:
if mtu &lt; skb_tailroom - tlen:
	reserved_tailroom = skb_tailroom - mtu
else:
	reserved_tailroom = tlen

Depending on hlen, tlen, mtu and the number of multicast address records,
the current code may output skbs that have less tailroom than
dev-&gt;needed_tailroom or it may output more skbs than needed because not all
space available is used.

Fixes: 4c672e4b ("ipv6: mld: fix add_grhead skb_over_panic for devs with large MTUs")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier &lt;bpoirier@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libata: Align ata_device's id on a cacheline</title>
<updated>2016-04-01T00:54:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harvey Hunt</name>
<email>harvey.hunt@imgtec.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-24T15:16:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d5a6d0db3c83f5883b542fd3f79a2a80d319b14'/>
<id>2d5a6d0db3c83f5883b542fd3f79a2a80d319b14</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4ee34ea3a12396f35b26d90a094c75db95080baa upstream.

The id buffer in ata_device is a DMA target, but it isn't explicitly
cacheline aligned. Due to this, adjacent fields can be overwritten with
stale data from memory on non coherent architectures. As a result, the
kernel is sometimes unable to communicate with an ATA device.

Fix this by ensuring that the id buffer is cacheline aligned.

This issue is similar to that fixed by Commit 84bda12af31f
("libata: align ap-&gt;sector_buf").

Signed-off-by: Harvey Hunt &lt;harvey.hunt@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4ee34ea3a12396f35b26d90a094c75db95080baa upstream.

The id buffer in ata_device is a DMA target, but it isn't explicitly
cacheline aligned. Due to this, adjacent fields can be overwritten with
stale data from memory on non coherent architectures. As a result, the
kernel is sometimes unable to communicate with an ATA device.

Fix this by ensuring that the id buffer is cacheline aligned.

This issue is similar to that fixed by Commit 84bda12af31f
("libata: align ap-&gt;sector_buf").

Signed-off-by: Harvey Hunt &lt;harvey.hunt@imgtec.com&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tracing: Fix freak link error caused by branch tracer</title>
<updated>2016-04-01T00:54:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-12T21:26:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=41e5439ffcd260aa4574a655885fbfb6ac8a9957'/>
<id>41e5439ffcd260aa4574a655885fbfb6ac8a9957</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b33c8ff4431a343561e2319f17c14286f2aa52e2 upstream.

In my randconfig tests, I came across a bug that involves several
components:

* gcc-4.9 through at least 5.3
* CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL enabling -fprofile-arcs for all files
* CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES overriding every if()
* The optimized implementation of do_div() that tries to
  replace a library call with an division by multiplication
* code in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.c doing

        u32 adc_clock = 450560; /* 45.056 MHz */
        if (state-&gt;config.adc_clock)
                adc_clock = state-&gt;config.adc_clock;
        do_div(value, adc_clock);

In this case, gcc fails to determine whether the divisor
in do_div() is __builtin_constant_p(). In particular, it
concludes that __builtin_constant_p(adc_clock) is false, while
__builtin_constant_p(!!adc_clock) is true.

That in turn throws off the logic in do_div() that also uses
__builtin_constant_p(), and instead of picking either the
constant- optimized division, and the code in ilog2() that uses
__builtin_constant_p() to figure out whether it knows the answer at
compile time. The result is a link error from failing to find
multiple symbols that should never have been called based on
the __builtin_constant_p():

dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `____ilog2_NaN'
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod'
ERROR: "____ilog2_NaN" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "__aeabi_uldivmod" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!

This patch avoids the problem by changing __trace_if() to check
whether the condition is known at compile-time to be nonzero, rather
than checking whether it is actually a constant.

I see this one link error in roughly one out of 1600 randconfig builds
on ARM, and the patch fixes all known instances.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455312410-1058841-1-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de

Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Fixes: ab3c9c686e22 ("branch tracer, intel-iommu: fix build with CONFIG_BRANCH_TRACER=y")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b33c8ff4431a343561e2319f17c14286f2aa52e2 upstream.

In my randconfig tests, I came across a bug that involves several
components:

* gcc-4.9 through at least 5.3
* CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL enabling -fprofile-arcs for all files
* CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES overriding every if()
* The optimized implementation of do_div() that tries to
  replace a library call with an division by multiplication
* code in drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.c doing

        u32 adc_clock = 450560; /* 45.056 MHz */
        if (state-&gt;config.adc_clock)
                adc_clock = state-&gt;config.adc_clock;
        do_div(value, adc_clock);

In this case, gcc fails to determine whether the divisor
in do_div() is __builtin_constant_p(). In particular, it
concludes that __builtin_constant_p(adc_clock) is false, while
__builtin_constant_p(!!adc_clock) is true.

That in turn throws off the logic in do_div() that also uses
__builtin_constant_p(), and instead of picking either the
constant- optimized division, and the code in ilog2() that uses
__builtin_constant_p() to figure out whether it knows the answer at
compile time. The result is a link error from failing to find
multiple symbols that should never have been called based on
the __builtin_constant_p():

dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `____ilog2_NaN'
dvb-frontends/zl10353.c:138: undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod'
ERROR: "____ilog2_NaN" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "__aeabi_uldivmod" [drivers/media/dvb-frontends/zl10353.ko] undefined!

This patch avoids the problem by changing __trace_if() to check
whether the condition is known at compile-time to be nonzero, rather
than checking whether it is actually a constant.

I see this one link error in roughly one out of 1600 randconfig builds
on ARM, and the patch fixes all known instances.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455312410-1058841-1-git-send-email-arnd@arndb.de

Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre &lt;nico@linaro.org&gt;
Fixes: ab3c9c686e22 ("branch tracer, intel-iommu: fix build with CONFIG_BRANCH_TRACER=y")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
