linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.17.7

net-timestamp: make tcp_recvmsg call ipv6_recv_error for AF_INET6 socks

2014-12-16T17:37:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit f4713a3dfad045d46afcb9c2a7d0bba288920ed4 ]

TCP timestamping introduced MSG_ERRQUEUE handling for TCP sockets.
If the socket is of family AF_INET6, call ipv6_recv_error instead
of ip_recv_error.

This change is more complex than a single branch due to the loadable
ipv6 module. It reuses a pre-existing indirect function call from
ping. The ping code is safe to call, because it is part of the core
ipv6 module and always present when AF_INET6 sockets are active.

Fixes: 4ed2d765 (net-timestamp: TCP timestamping)
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn 

----

It may also be worthwhile to add WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->family == AF_INET6)
to ip_recv_error.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

clk: qcom: Fix duplicate rbcpr clock name

2014-12-06T23:57:34+00:00

commit 9a6cb70f40b0268297024949eb0a2689e3b7769b upstream.

There is a duplication in a clock name for apq8084 platform that causes
the following warning: "RBCPR_CLK_SRC" redefined

Resolve this by adding a MMSS_ prefix to this clock and making its name
coherent with msm8974 platform.

Fixes: 2b46cd23a5a2 ("clk: qcom: Add APQ8084 Multimedia Clock Controller (MMCC) support")
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov 
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd 
Signed-off-by: Michael Turquette 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

bitops: Fix shift overflow in GENMASK macros

2014-12-06T23:57:33+00:00

commit 00b4d9a14125f1e51874def2b9de6092e007412d upstream.

On some 32 bits architectures, including x86, GENMASK(31, 0) returns 0
instead of the expected ~0UL.

This is the same on some 64 bits architectures with GENMASK_ULL(63, 0).

This is due to an overflow in the shift operand, 1 << 32 for GENMASK,
1 << 64 for GENMASK_ULL.

Reported-by: Eric Paire 
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes 
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin 
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) 
Cc: linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Cc: gong.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: John Sullivan 
Cc: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Paul E. McKenney 
Cc: Theodore Ts'o 
Fixes: 10ef6b0dffe4 ("bitops: Introduce a more generic BITMASK macro")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1415267659-10563-1-git-send-email-maxime.coquelin@st.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

clk-divider: Fix READ_ONLY when divider > 1

2014-12-06T23:57:32+00:00

commit e6d5e7d90be92cee626d7ec16ca9b06f1eed710b upstream.

Commit 79c6ab509558 (clk: divider: add CLK_DIVIDER_READ_ONLY flag) in
v3.16 introduced the CLK_DIVIDER_READ_ONLY flag which caused the
recalc_rate() and round_rate() clock callbacks to be omitted.

However using this flag has the unfortunate side effect of causing the
clock recalculation code when a clock rate change is attempted to always
treat it as a pass-through clock, i.e. with a fixed divide of 1, which
may not be the case. Child clock rates are then recalculated using the
wrong parent rate.

Therefore instead of dropping the recalc_rate() and round_rate()
callbacks, alter clk_divider_bestdiv() to always report the current
divider as the best divider so that it is never altered.

For me the read only clock was the system clock, which divided the PLL
rate by 2, from which both the UART and the SPI clocks were divided.
Initial setting of the UART rate set it correctly, but when the SPI
clock was set, the other child clocks were miscalculated. The UART clock
was recalculated using the PLL rate as the parent rate, resulting in a
UART new_rate of double what it should be, and a UART which spewed forth
garbage when the rate changes were propagated.

Signed-off-by: James Hogan 
Cc: Thomas Abraham 
Cc: Tomasz Figa 
Cc: Max Schwarz 
Acked-by: Haojian Zhuang 
Signed-off-by: Michael Turquette 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

iio: Fix IIO_EVENT_CODE_EXTRACT_DIR bit mask

2014-12-06T23:57:23+00:00

commit ccf54555da9a5e91e454b909ca6a5303c7d6b910 upstream.

The direction field is set on 7 bits, thus we need to AND it with 0111 111 mask
in order to retrieve it, that is 0x7F, not 0xCF as it is now.

Fixes: ade7ef7ba (staging:iio: Differential channel handling)
Signed-off-by: Cristina Ciocan 
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ASoC: dpcm: Fix race between FE/BE updates and trigger

2014-12-06T23:57:21+00:00

commit ea9d0d771fcd32cd56070819749477d511ec9117 upstream.

DPCM can update the FE/BE connection states totally asynchronously
from the FE's PCM state.  Most of FE/BE state changes are protected by
mutex, so that they won't race, but there are still some actions that
are uncovered.  For example, suppose to switch a BE while a FE's
stream is running.  This would call soc_dpcm_runtime_update(), which
sets FE's runtime_update flag, then sets up and starts BEs, and clears
FE's runtime_update flag again.

When a device emits XRUN during this operation, the PCM core triggers
snd_pcm_stop(XRUN).  Since the trigger action is an atomic ops, this
isn't blocked by the mutex, thus it kicks off DPCM's trigger action.
It eventually updates and clears FE's runtime_update flag while
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() is running concurrently, and it results in
confusion.

Usually, for avoiding such a race, we take a lock.  There is a PCM
stream lock for that purpose.  However, as already mentioned, the
trigger action is atomic, and we can't take the lock for the whole
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() or other operations that include the lengthy
jobs like hw_params or prepare.

This patch provides an alternative solution.  This adds a way to defer
the conflicting trigger callback to be executed at the end of FE/BE
state changes.  For doing it, two things are introduced:

- Each runtime_update state change of FEs is protected via PCM stream
  lock.
- The FE's trigger callback checks the runtime_update flag.  If it's
  not set, the trigger action is executed there.  If set, mark the
  pending trigger action and returns immediately.
- At the exit of runtime_update state change, it checks whether the
  pending trigger is present.  If yes, it executes the trigger action
  at this point.

Reported-and-tested-by: Qiao Zhou 
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai 
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood 
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

PCI/MSI: Add device flag indicating that 64-bit MSIs don't work

2014-12-06T23:57:18+00:00

commit f144d1496b47e7450f41b767d0d91c724c2198bc upstream.

This can be set by quirks/drivers to be used by the architecture code
that assigns the MSI addresses.

We additionally add verification in the core MSI code that the values
assigned by the architecture do satisfy the limitation in order to fail
gracefully if they don't (ie. the arch hasn't been updated to deal with
that quirk yet).

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

inetdevice: fixed signed integer overflow

2014-12-06T23:57:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 84bc88688e3f6ef843aa8803dbcd90168bb89faf ]

There could be a signed overflow in the following code.

The expression, (32-logmask) is comprised between 0 and 31 included.
It may be equal to 31.
In such a case the left shift will produce a signed integer overflow.
According to the C99 Standard, this is an undefined behavior.
A simple fix is to replace the signed int 1 with the unsigned int 1U.

Signed-off-by: Vincent BENAYOUN 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks

2014-11-21T17:23:16+00:00

commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.

Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 
 [] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks

2014-11-21T17:23:16+00:00

commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman