linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.12.35

iio: Fix IIO_EVENT_CODE_EXTRACT_DIR bit mask

2014-12-06T14:18:14+00:00

commit ccf54555da9a5e91e454b909ca6a5303c7d6b910 upstream.

The direction field is set on 7 bits, thus we need to AND it with 0111 111 mask
in order to retrieve it, that is 0x7F, not 0xCF as it is now.

Fixes: ade7ef7ba (staging:iio: Differential channel handling)
Signed-off-by: Cristina Ciocan 
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

ASoC: dpcm: Fix race between FE/BE updates and trigger

2014-12-06T14:14:53+00:00

commit ea9d0d771fcd32cd56070819749477d511ec9117 upstream.

DPCM can update the FE/BE connection states totally asynchronously
from the FE's PCM state.  Most of FE/BE state changes are protected by
mutex, so that they won't race, but there are still some actions that
are uncovered.  For example, suppose to switch a BE while a FE's
stream is running.  This would call soc_dpcm_runtime_update(), which
sets FE's runtime_update flag, then sets up and starts BEs, and clears
FE's runtime_update flag again.

When a device emits XRUN during this operation, the PCM core triggers
snd_pcm_stop(XRUN).  Since the trigger action is an atomic ops, this
isn't blocked by the mutex, thus it kicks off DPCM's trigger action.
It eventually updates and clears FE's runtime_update flag while
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() is running concurrently, and it results in
confusion.

Usually, for avoiding such a race, we take a lock.  There is a PCM
stream lock for that purpose.  However, as already mentioned, the
trigger action is atomic, and we can't take the lock for the whole
soc_dpcm_runtime_update() or other operations that include the lengthy
jobs like hw_params or prepare.

This patch provides an alternative solution.  This adds a way to defer
the conflicting trigger callback to be executed at the end of FE/BE
state changes.  For doing it, two things are introduced:

- Each runtime_update state change of FEs is protected via PCM stream
  lock.
- The FE's trigger callback checks the runtime_update flag.  If it's
  not set, the trigger action is executed there.  If set, mark the
  pending trigger action and returns immediately.
- At the exit of runtime_update state change, it checks whether the
  pending trigger is present.  If yes, it executes the trigger action
  at this point.

Reported-and-tested-by: Qiao Zhou 
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai 
Acked-by: Liam Girdwood 
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

PCI/MSI: Add device flag indicating that 64-bit MSIs don't work

2014-12-06T14:14:51+00:00

commit f144d1496b47e7450f41b767d0d91c724c2198bc upstream.

This can be set by quirks/drivers to be used by the architecture code
that assigns the MSI addresses.

We additionally add verification in the core MSI code that the values
assigned by the architecture do satisfy the limitation in order to fail
gracefully if they don't (ie. the arch hasn't been updated to deal with
that quirk yet).

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt 
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

Input: Add INPUT_PROP_TOPBUTTONPAD device property

2014-12-06T14:02:51+00:00

commit f37c013409bb78ebb958821aa10d069e707cabac upstream.

On some newer laptops with a trackpoint the physical buttons for the
trackpoint have been removed to allow for a larger touchpad. On these
laptops the buttonpad has clearly marked areas on the top which are to be
used as trackpad buttons.

Users of the event device-node need to know about this, so that they can
properly interpret BTN_LEFT events as being a left / right / middle click
depending on where on the button pad the clicking finger is.

This commits adds a INPUT_PROP_TOPBUTTONPAD device property which drivers
for such buttonpads will use to signal to the user that this buttonpad not
only has the normal bottom button area, but also a top button area.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

Input: serio - add firmware_id sysfs attribute

2014-12-06T13:48:31+00:00

commit 0456c66f4e905e1ca839318219c770988b47975c upstream.

serio devices exposed via platform firmware interfaces such as ACPI may
provide additional identifying information of use to userspace.

We don't associate the serio devices with the firmware device (we don't
set it as parent), so there's no way for userspace to make use of this
information.

We cannot change the parent for serio devices instantiated though a
firmware interface as that would break suspend / resume ordering.

Therefore this patch adds a new firmware_id sysfs attribute so that
userspace can get a string from there with any additional identifying
information the firmware interface may provide.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede 
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer 
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

ext4: atomically set inode->i_flags in ext4_set_inode_flags()

2014-12-03T10:58:43+00:00

commit 5f16f3225b06242a9ee876f07c1c9b6ed36a22b6 upstream.

Use cmpxchg() to atomically set i_flags instead of clearing out the
S_IMMUTABLE, S_APPEND, etc. flags and then setting them from the
EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL, EXT4_APPEND_FL flags, since this opens up a race
where an immutable file has the immutable flag cleared for a brief
window of time.

js: there is no change for ext4. This patch defines merely
    inode_set_flags for jffs in the next patch. I wonder why do we
    have both inode_set_flags and set_mask_bits? Looks like an
    improperly resolved merge conflict.

Reported-by: John Sullivan 
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" 
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

fix O_SYNC|O_APPEND syncing the wrong range on write()

2014-12-03T10:58:41+00:00

commit d311d79de305f1ada47cadd672e6ed1b28a949eb upstream.

It actually goes back to 2004 ([PATCH] Concurrent O_SYNC write support)
when sync_page_range() had been introduced; generic_file_write{,v}() correctly
synced
	pos_after_write - written .. pos_after_write - 1
but generic_file_aio_write() synced
	pos_before_write .. pos_before_write + written - 1
instead.  Which is not the same thing with O_APPEND, obviously.
A couple of years later correct variant had been killed off when
everything switched to use of generic_file_aio_write().

All users of generic_file_aio_write() are affected, and the same bug
has been copied into other instances of ->aio_write().

The fix is trivial; the only subtle point is that generic_write_sync()
ought to be inlined to avoid calculations useless for the majority of
calls.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

inetdevice: fixed signed integer overflow

2014-11-27T10:14:05+00:00

[ Upstream commit 84bc88688e3f6ef843aa8803dbcd90168bb89faf ]

There could be a signed overflow in the following code.

The expression, (32-logmask) is comprised between 0 and 31 included.
It may be equal to 31.
In such a case the left shift will produce a signed integer overflow.
According to the C99 Standard, this is an undefined behavior.
A simple fix is to replace the signed int 1 with the unsigned int 1U.

Signed-off-by: Vincent BENAYOUN 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks

2014-11-19T17:38:27+00:00

commit 9de7922bc709eee2f609cd01d98aaedc4cf5ea74 upstream.

Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 
 [] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby

net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks

2014-11-19T17:38:27+00:00

commit b69040d8e39f20d5215a03502a8e8b4c6ab78395 upstream.

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd54b1
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Cc: Josh Boyer 
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby