<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch v3.10.70</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: tcp: get rid of ugly unicast_sock</title>
<updated>2015-02-27T01:48:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-30T05:35:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6bed3166d097a20ffcf2d440825c611500b0ff97'/>
<id>6bed3166d097a20ffcf2d440825c611500b0ff97</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bdbbb8527b6f6a358dbcb70dac247034d665b8e4 ]

In commit be9f4a44e7d41 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock")
I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution
I chose was horrible :

commit 3a7c384ffd57e ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside
of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression.

commit 0980e56e506b ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1")
took care of another regression.

commit b5ec8eeac46 ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression.

commit 811230cd85 ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate")
was another shot in the dark.

Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan()
call, to re-enable flow control.

This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in
hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure
for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bdbbb8527b6f6a358dbcb70dac247034d665b8e4 ]

In commit be9f4a44e7d41 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock")
I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution
I chose was horrible :

commit 3a7c384ffd57e ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside
of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression.

commit 0980e56e506b ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1")
took care of another regression.

commit b5ec8eeac46 ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression.

commit 811230cd85 ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate")
was another shot in the dark.

Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan()
call, to re-enable flow control.

This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in
hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure
for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect</title>
<updated>2015-02-27T01:48:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-23T11:01:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c6dafeba6f8d1435f05e39142b50bc605f7a91c'/>
<id>8c6dafeba6f8d1435f05e39142b50bc605f7a91c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0 ]

Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").

Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU.  Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with &gt;1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.

Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.

This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.

Cc: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit df4d92549f23e1c037e83323aff58a21b3de7fe0 ]

Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").

Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU.  Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with &gt;1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.

Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.

This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.

Cc: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner &lt;mleitner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov &lt;ja@ssi.bg&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: ak411x: Fix stall in work callback</title>
<updated>2015-02-11T06:48:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-13T09:53:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=15a9c9addacfc62780b7908e15e4fc87b508791f'/>
<id>15a9c9addacfc62780b7908e15e4fc87b508791f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4161b4505f1690358ac0a9ee59845a7887336b21 upstream.

When ak4114 work calls its callback and the callback invokes
ak4114_reinit(), it stalls due to flush_delayed_work().  For avoiding
this, control the reentrance by introducing a refcount.  Also
flush_delayed_work() is replaced with cancel_delayed_work_sync().

The exactly same bug is present in ak4113.c and fixed as well.

Reported-by: Pavel Hofman &lt;pavel.hofman@ivitera.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela &lt;perex@perex.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Hofman &lt;pavel.hofman@ivitera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4161b4505f1690358ac0a9ee59845a7887336b21 upstream.

When ak4114 work calls its callback and the callback invokes
ak4114_reinit(), it stalls due to flush_delayed_work().  For avoiding
this, control the reentrance by introducing a refcount.  Also
flush_delayed_work() is replaced with cancel_delayed_work_sync().

The exactly same bug is present in ak4113.c and fixed as well.

Reported-by: Pavel Hofman &lt;pavel.hofman@ivitera.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela &lt;perex@perex.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Hofman &lt;pavel.hofman@ivitera.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>quota: provide interface for readding allocated space into reserved space</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2013-08-17T13:32:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e9eb2afbc494a56e35bf6c1a621f579eb1199b2'/>
<id>4e9eb2afbc494a56e35bf6c1a621f579eb1199b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c8924eb106c1ac755d5d35ce9b3ff42e89e2511 upstream.

ext4 needs to convert allocated (metadata) blocks back into blocks
reserved for delayed allocation. Add functions into quota code for
supporting such operation.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Hunt &lt;johunt@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c8924eb106c1ac755d5d35ce9b3ff42e89e2511 upstream.

ext4 needs to convert allocated (metadata) blocks back into blocks
reserved for delayed allocation. Add functions into quota code for
supporting such operation.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Josh Hunt &lt;johunt@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-21T01:05:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e635e0d5b0adac839b91cc593babcb812cba3f18'/>
<id>e635e0d5b0adac839b91cc593babcb812cba3f18</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b upstream.

This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b upstream.

This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: settimeofday: Validate the values of tv from user</title>
<updated>2015-01-30T01:40:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sasha.levin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-04T00:22:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7336dcc2139a09928c3aa04216576d94bcc857d9'/>
<id>7336dcc2139a09928c3aa04216576d94bcc857d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ada1fc0e1c4775de0e043e1bd3ae9d065491aa5 upstream.

An unvalidated user input is multiplied by a constant, which can result in
an undefined behaviour for large values. While this is validated later,
we should avoid triggering undefined behaviour.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
[jstultz: include trivial milisecond-&gt;microsecond correction noticed
by Andy]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ada1fc0e1c4775de0e043e1bd3ae9d065491aa5 upstream.

An unvalidated user input is multiplied by a constant, which can result in
an undefined behaviour for large values. While this is validated later,
we should avoid triggering undefined behaviour.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
[jstultz: include trivial milisecond-&gt;microsecond correction noticed
by Andy]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: propagate error from stack expansion even for guard page</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-01-06T21:00:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=88b5d12c6413c7b80c3df4527b09c9d5f65c1c0a'/>
<id>88b5d12c6413c7b80c3df4527b09c9d5f65c1c0a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fee7e49d45149fba60156f5b59014f764d3e3728 upstream.

Jay Foad reports that the address sanitizer test (asan) sometimes gets
confused by a stack pointer that ends up being outside the stack vma
that is reported by /proc/maps.

This happens due to an interaction between RLIMIT_STACK and the guard
page: when we do the guard page check, we ignore the potential error
from the stack expansion, which effectively results in a missing guard
page, since the expected stack expansion won't have been done.

And since /proc/maps explicitly ignores the guard page (commit
d7824370e263: "mm: fix up some user-visible effects of the stack guard
page"), the stack pointer ends up being outside the reported stack area.

This is the minimal patch: it just propagates the error.  It also
effectively makes the guard page part of the stack limit, which in turn
measn that the actual real stack is one page less than the stack limit.

Let's see if anybody notices.  We could teach acct_stack_growth() to
allow an extra page for a grow-up/grow-down stack in the rlimit test,
but I don't want to add more complexity if it isn't needed.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jay Foad &lt;jay.foad@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pstore-ram: Allow optional mapping with pgprot_noncached</title>
<updated>2015-01-16T14:59:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Lindgren</name>
<email>tony@atomide.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-16T20:50:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c0d9d658fa9410fa8f4a8b7eb216f236102f02f2'/>
<id>c0d9d658fa9410fa8f4a8b7eb216f236102f02f2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.

On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
&lt;ccross@android.com&gt;, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.

On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robherring2@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton@enomsg.org&gt;
Cc: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.

On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
&lt;ccross@android.com&gt;, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.

On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robherring2@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;anton@enomsg.org&gt;
Cc: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Cc: Olof Johansson &lt;olof@lixom.net&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren &lt;tony@atomide.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck &lt;tony.luck@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-02T18:27:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c587ee50ec44a2cf07cd160c214a683608b4d2c'/>
<id>1c587ee50ec44a2cf07cd160c214a683608b4d2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.

- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished</title>
<updated>2015-01-08T17:58:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-12-06T00:01:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fc9b65e3d7703e6d63875b0b233bbe26a4a513ba'/>
<id>fc9b65e3d7703e6d63875b0b233bbe26a4a513ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established.  Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.

setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.

The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established.  Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
