<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include, branch linux-2.6.32.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ALSA: rawmidi: Make snd_rawmidi_transmit() race-free</title>
<updated>2016-03-12T13:25:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Takashi Iwai</name>
<email>tiwai@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-31T10:57:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1378f539a547be97619cd278badc7e94fc859581'/>
<id>1378f539a547be97619cd278badc7e94fc859581</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 06ab30034ed9c200a570ab13c017bde248ddb2a6 upstream.

A kernel WARNING in snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() is triggered by
syzkaller fuzzer:
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20739 at sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff82999e2d&gt;] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
 [&lt;ffffffff81352089&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
 [&lt;ffffffff813522b9&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
 [&lt;ffffffff84f80bd5&gt;] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x275/0x400 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
 [&lt;ffffffff84fdb3c1&gt;] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x4b1/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:163
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
 [&lt;ffffffff84f87ed9&gt;] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x549/0x780 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1223
 [&lt;ffffffff84f89fd3&gt;] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1273
 [&lt;ffffffff817b0323&gt;] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
 [&lt;ffffffff817b1db7&gt;] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
 [&lt;ffffffff817b50a1&gt;] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
 [&lt;ffffffff86336c36&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

Also a similar warning is found but in another path:
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff82be2c0d&gt;] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
 [&lt;ffffffff81355139&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
 [&lt;ffffffff81355369&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
 [&lt;ffffffff8527e69a&gt;] rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x24a/0x3b0 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1133
 [&lt;ffffffff8527e851&gt;] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x51/0x80 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1163
 [&lt;ffffffff852d9046&gt;] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x2b6/0x570 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:185
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
 [&lt;ffffffff85285a0b&gt;] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x4bb/0x760 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1252
 [&lt;ffffffff85287b73&gt;] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1302
 [&lt;ffffffff817ba5f3&gt;] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
 [&lt;ffffffff817bc087&gt;] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
 [&lt;ffffffff817bf371&gt;] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
 [&lt;ffffffff86660276&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

In the former case, the reason is that virmidi has an open code
calling snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() with the value calculated outside
the spinlock.   We may use snd_rawmidi_transmit() in a loop just for
consuming the input data, but even there, there is a race between
snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack().

Similarly in the latter case, it calls snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack() separately without protection, so they are
racy as well.

The patch tries to address these issues by the following ways:
- Introduce the unlocked versions of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
  snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() to be called inside the explicit lock.
- Rewrite snd_rawmidi_transmit() to be race-free (the former case).
- Make the split calls (the latter case) protected in the rawmidi spin
  lock.

BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YPq1+cYLkadwjWa5XjzF1_Vki1eHnVn-Lm0hzhSpu5PA@mail.gmail.com
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+acG4iyphdOZx47Nyq_VHGbpJQK-6xNpiqUjaZYqsXOGw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 06ab30034ed9c200a570ab13c017bde248ddb2a6 upstream.

A kernel WARNING in snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() is triggered by
syzkaller fuzzer:
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20739 at sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff82999e2d&gt;] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
 [&lt;ffffffff81352089&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
 [&lt;ffffffff813522b9&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
 [&lt;ffffffff84f80bd5&gt;] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x275/0x400 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1136
 [&lt;ffffffff84fdb3c1&gt;] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x4b1/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:163
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
 [&lt;ffffffff84f87ed9&gt;] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x549/0x780 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1223
 [&lt;ffffffff84f89fd3&gt;] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1273
 [&lt;ffffffff817b0323&gt;] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
 [&lt;ffffffff817b1db7&gt;] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
 [&lt;ffffffff817b50a1&gt;] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
 [&lt;ffffffff86336c36&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

Also a similar warning is found but in another path:
Call Trace:
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
 [&lt;ffffffff82be2c0d&gt;] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 lib/dump_stack.c:50
 [&lt;ffffffff81355139&gt;] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:482
 [&lt;ffffffff81355369&gt;] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:515
 [&lt;ffffffff8527e69a&gt;] rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x24a/0x3b0 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1133
 [&lt;ffffffff8527e851&gt;] snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack+0x51/0x80 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1163
 [&lt;ffffffff852d9046&gt;] snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x2b6/0x570 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:185
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150
 [&lt;ffffffff85285a0b&gt;] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x4bb/0x760 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1252
 [&lt;ffffffff85287b73&gt;] snd_rawmidi_write+0x543/0xb30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1302
 [&lt;ffffffff817ba5f3&gt;] __vfs_write+0x113/0x480 fs/read_write.c:528
 [&lt;ffffffff817bc087&gt;] vfs_write+0x167/0x4a0 fs/read_write.c:577
 [&lt;     inline     &gt;] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:624
 [&lt;ffffffff817bf371&gt;] SyS_write+0x111/0x220 fs/read_write.c:616
 [&lt;ffffffff86660276&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

In the former case, the reason is that virmidi has an open code
calling snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() with the value calculated outside
the spinlock.   We may use snd_rawmidi_transmit() in a loop just for
consuming the input data, but even there, there is a race between
snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack().

Similarly in the latter case, it calls snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
snd_rawmidi_tranmit_ack() separately without protection, so they are
racy as well.

The patch tries to address these issues by the following ways:
- Introduce the unlocked versions of snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek() and
  snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack() to be called inside the explicit lock.
- Rewrite snd_rawmidi_transmit() to be race-free (the former case).
- Make the split calls (the latter case) protected in the rawmidi spin
  lock.

BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YPq1+cYLkadwjWa5XjzF1_Vki1eHnVn-Lm0hzhSpu5PA@mail.gmail.com
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+acG4iyphdOZx47Nyq_VHGbpJQK-6xNpiqUjaZYqsXOGw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>readv/writev: do the same MAX_RW_COUNT truncation that read/write does</title>
<updated>2016-03-12T13:25:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-29T17:36:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=adfdad98d876fc9e43746522d6329d482edca6b3'/>
<id>adfdad98d876fc9e43746522d6329d482edca6b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20 upstream.

We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do
what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT.
This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken
low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't
break.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20 upstream.

We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do
what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT.
This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken
low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't
break.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add SECTION_ALIGN_UP() and SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN() macro</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Kiper</name>
<email>dkiper@net-space.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-25T00:12:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=73734375c75ef304e2b4629bc48af9031be6f672'/>
<id>73734375c75ef304e2b4629bc48af9031be6f672</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a539f3533b78e39a22723d6d3e1e11b6c14454d9 upstream.

Add SECTION_ALIGN_UP() and SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN() macro which aligns given
pfn to upper section and lower section boundary accordingly.

Required for the latest memory hotplug support for the Xen balloon driver.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper &lt;dkiper@net-space.pl&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: only needed for next patch]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a539f3533b78e39a22723d6d3e1e11b6c14454d9 upstream.

Add SECTION_ALIGN_UP() and SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN() macro which aligns given
pfn to upper section and lower section boundary accordingly.

Required for the latest memory hotplug support for the Xen balloon driver.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper &lt;dkiper@net-space.pl&gt;
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
[wt: only needed for next patch]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ses: fix additional element traversal bug</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-11T17:16:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d4b6a10d1fc87c0078f6d9b107d91029bff6cc8a'/>
<id>d4b6a10d1fc87c0078f6d9b107d91029bff6cc8a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5e1033561da1152c57b97ee84371dba2b3d64c25 upstream.

KASAN found that our additional element processing scripts drop off
the end of the VPD page into unallocated space.  The reason is that
not every element has additional information but our traversal
routines think they do, leading to them expecting far more additional
information than is present.  Fix this by adding a gate to the
traversal routine so that it only processes elements that are expected
to have additional information (list is in SES-2 section 6.1.13.1:
Additional Element Status diagnostic page overview)

Reported-by: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 344d6d02690a650607e6372bce8fe40e647a51b5)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5e1033561da1152c57b97ee84371dba2b3d64c25 upstream.

KASAN found that our additional element processing scripts drop off
the end of the VPD page into unallocated space.  The reason is that
not every element has additional information but our traversal
routines think they do, leading to them expecting far more additional
information than is present.  Fix this by adding a gate to the
traversal routine so that it only processes elements that are expected
to have additional information (list is in SES-2 section 6.1.13.1:
Additional Element Status diagnostic page overview)

Reported-by: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov &lt;ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 344d6d02690a650607e6372bce8fe40e647a51b5)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>af_unix: fix a fatal race with bit fields</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>eric.dumazet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-05-01T05:24:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=24ba3c534f7f6e17fb3fbdcee9427f05a0fd074e'/>
<id>24ba3c534f7f6e17fb3fbdcee9427f05a0fd074e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60bc851ae59bfe99be6ee89d6bc50008c85ec75d upstream.

Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.

This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)-&gt;gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.

This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.

A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.

As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().

recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.

[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080

Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein &lt;ambrose@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 2ee9cbe7e7bfe2d36374288b818aa31b2c4981db)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 60bc851ae59bfe99be6ee89d6bc50008c85ec75d upstream.

Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1]
uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them.
If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose
critical concurrent changes.

This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)-&gt;gc_candidate/
gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word.

This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever
on a spinlock that will never be available again.

A safer way would be to use a long to store flags.
This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things.

As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits,
we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit().

recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock,
as it is set only with this spinlock held.

[1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 :
http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080

Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein &lt;ambrose@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Cc: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@samba.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 2ee9cbe7e7bfe2d36374288b818aa31b2c4981db)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: update the netstamp_needed counter when copying sockets</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcelo Ricardo Leitner</name>
<email>marcelo.leitner@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-04T17:14:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e0e67b0bbd024c074cd9ac61c2a8f8ebb9be619'/>
<id>7e0e67b0bbd024c074cd9ac61c2a8f8ebb9be619</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.

When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.

The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP is newly defined]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit d85242d91610acbe4f905624a5758a01ae7bb32c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c90170283a9855d1db4fe81934dddce648 ]

Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy
related to disabling sock timestamp.

When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags
but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag
was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever
such clones were closed.

The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with
that flag on, like tcp does.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP is newly defined]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit d85242d91610acbe4f905624a5758a01ae7bb32c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: fix warnings in 'make htmldocs' by moving macro definition out of field declaration</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T22:30:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=073a63f16e3f34ef520270d998d2afea9b79d35f'/>
<id>073a63f16e3f34ef520270d998d2afea9b79d35f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7bbadd2d1009575dad675afc16650ebb5aa10612 upstream.

Docbook does not like the definition of macros inside a field declaration
and adds a warning. Move the definition out.

Fixes: 79462ad02e86180 ("net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: keep open-coding U8_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 35da6d62b608fd3beb576d72e48e2bc866d714c9)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7bbadd2d1009575dad675afc16650ebb5aa10612 upstream.

Docbook does not like the definition of macros inside a field declaration
and adds a warning. Move the definition out.

Fixes: 79462ad02e86180 ("net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: keep open-coding U8_MAX]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from commit 35da6d62b608fd3beb576d72e48e2bc866d714c9)
[wt: adjusted context]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Frederic Sowa</name>
<email>hannes@stressinduktion.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-12-14T21:03:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be9b6c294668e0686e8ac69f617c6c1963a91472'/>
<id>be9b6c294668e0686e8ac69f617c6c1963a91472</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.

é­æ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: é­æ°¸å &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream.

é­æ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:

	int socket_fd;
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	addr.sin_port = 0;
	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
	addr.sin_family = 10;

	socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
	connect(socket_fd , &amp;addr,16);

AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.

This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.

kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db90e&gt;] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff816db9a4&gt;] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645069&gt;] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810ac51b&gt;] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff810236d8&gt;] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81645e0e&gt;] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel:  [&lt;ffffffff81779515&gt;] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89

I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.

CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang &lt;cwang@twopensource.com&gt;
Reported-by: é­æ°¸å &lt;guoyonggang@360.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa &lt;hannes@stressinduktion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec"</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willy Tarreau</name>
<email>w@1wt.eu</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-23T10:16:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d699b47f3c87c2fb30ed548ffacae85cebf2cafe'/>
<id>d699b47f3c87c2fb30ed548ffacae85cebf2cafe</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6.
As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated
reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This reverts commit c507639ba963bb47e3f515670a7cace76af76ab6.
As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated
reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue</title>
<updated>2016-01-29T21:12:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rainer Weikusat</name>
<email>rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-20T22:07:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=60bc010667ef06e0fb08d5ec599c0977adc2ac72'/>
<id>60bc010667ef06e0fb08d5ec599c0977adc2ac72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c upstream.

Rainer Weikusat &lt;rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com&gt; writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.

Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.

Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat &lt;rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com&gt;
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
 - Access sk_sleep directly, not through sk_sleep() function
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c upstream.

Rainer Weikusat &lt;rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com&gt; writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.

Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.

Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat &lt;rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com&gt;
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron &lt;jbaron@akamai.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32:
 - Access sk_sleep directly, not through sk_sleep() function
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
