<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/net, branch v6.10.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net: busy-poll: use ktime_get_ns() instead of local_clock()</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-27T11:49:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=12a366a5d14b878b55a2475e3e3f6eb825fbbce4'/>
<id>12a366a5d14b878b55a2475e3e3f6eb825fbbce4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0870b0d8b393dde53106678a1e2cec9dfa52f9b7 ]

Typically, busy-polling durations are below 100 usec.

When/if the busy-poller thread migrates to another cpu,
local_clock() can be off by +/-2msec or more for small
values of HZ, depending on the platform.

Use ktimer_get_ns() to ensure deterministic behavior,
which is the whole point of busy-polling.

Fixes: 060212928670 ("net: add low latency socket poll")
Fixes: 9a3c71aa8024 ("net: convert low latency sockets to sched_clock()")
Fixes: 37089834528b ("sched, net: Fixup busy_loop_us_clock()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mina Almasry &lt;almasrymina@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato &lt;jdamato@fastly.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240827114916.223377-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0870b0d8b393dde53106678a1e2cec9dfa52f9b7 ]

Typically, busy-polling durations are below 100 usec.

When/if the busy-poller thread migrates to another cpu,
local_clock() can be off by +/-2msec or more for small
values of HZ, depending on the platform.

Use ktimer_get_ns() to ensure deterministic behavior,
which is the whole point of busy-polling.

Fixes: 060212928670 ("net: add low latency socket poll")
Fixes: 9a3c71aa8024 ("net: convert low latency sockets to sched_clock()")
Fixes: 37089834528b ("sched, net: Fixup busy_loop_us_clock()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Mina Almasry &lt;almasrymina@google.com&gt;
Cc: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato &lt;jdamato@fastly.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240827114916.223377-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bonding: change ipsec_lock from spin lock to mutex</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jianbo Liu</name>
<email>jianbol@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-23T03:10:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56354b0a2c24a7828eeed7de4b4dc9652d9affa3'/>
<id>56354b0a2c24a7828eeed7de4b4dc9652d9affa3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2aeeef906d5a526dc60cf4af92eda69836c39b1f ]

In the cited commit, bond-&gt;ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list,
hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside
this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep,
"scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's
active slave.

[  101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200
[  101.055726] Modules linked in:
[  101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
[  101.058760] Hardware name:
[  101.059434] Call Trace:
[  101.059436]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  101.060873]  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
[  101.061275]  __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60
[  101.061682]  __schedule+0x612/0x7c0
[  101.062078]  ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370
[  101.062486]  schedule+0x25/0xd0
[  101.062845]  schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0
[  101.063265]  ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[  101.063724]  ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10
[  101.064215]  __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190
[  101.064648]  ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[  101.065091]  cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core]
[  101.065569]  mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066051]  mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066552]  mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[  101.067163]  ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.067738]  ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350
[  101.068156]  mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[  101.068747]  mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core]
[  101.069312]  bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding]
[  101.069868]  bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding]
[  101.070454]  __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding]
[  101.070935]  __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding]
[  101.071453]  bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding]
[  101.071965]  bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.072567]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
[  101.073033]  vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400
[  101.073416]  ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180
[  101.073798]  ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[  101.074175]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110
[  101.074576]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called
from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock.
And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state
xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user
context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to
mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved.

Fixes: 9a5605505d9c ("bonding: Add struct bond_ipesc to manage SA")
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu &lt;jianbol@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu &lt;liuhangbin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh &lt;jv@jvosburgh.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240823031056.110999-4-jianbol@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2aeeef906d5a526dc60cf4af92eda69836c39b1f ]

In the cited commit, bond-&gt;ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list,
hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside
this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep,
"scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's
active slave.

[  101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200
[  101.055726] Modules linked in:
[  101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
[  101.058760] Hardware name:
[  101.059434] Call Trace:
[  101.059436]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  101.060873]  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
[  101.061275]  __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60
[  101.061682]  __schedule+0x612/0x7c0
[  101.062078]  ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370
[  101.062486]  schedule+0x25/0xd0
[  101.062845]  schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0
[  101.063265]  ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[  101.063724]  ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10
[  101.064215]  __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190
[  101.064648]  ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[  101.065091]  cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core]
[  101.065569]  mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066051]  mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066552]  mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[  101.067163]  ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.067738]  ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350
[  101.068156]  mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[  101.068747]  mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core]
[  101.069312]  bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding]
[  101.069868]  bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding]
[  101.070454]  __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding]
[  101.070935]  __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding]
[  101.071453]  bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding]
[  101.071965]  bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.072567]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
[  101.073033]  vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400
[  101.073416]  ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180
[  101.073798]  ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[  101.074175]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110
[  101.074576]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called
from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock.
And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state
xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user
context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to
mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved.

Fixes: 9a5605505d9c ("bonding: Add struct bond_ipesc to manage SA")
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu &lt;jianbol@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu &lt;liuhangbin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh &lt;jv@jvosburgh.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240823031056.110999-4-jianbol@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables_ipv6: consider network offset in netdev/egress validation</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-26T13:03:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2138d574c0a2a38b19e0f28056a7457932abb073'/>
<id>2138d574c0a2a38b19e0f28056a7457932abb073</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 70c261d500951cf3ea0fcf32651aab9a65a91471 ]

From netdev/egress, skb-&gt;len can include the ethernet header, therefore,
subtract network offset from skb-&gt;len when validating IPv6 packet length.

Fixes: 42df6e1d221d ("netfilter: Introduce egress hook")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 70c261d500951cf3ea0fcf32651aab9a65a91471 ]

From netdev/egress, skb-&gt;len can include the ethernet header, therefore,
subtract network offset from skb-&gt;len when validating IPv6 packet length.

Fixes: 42df6e1d221d ("netfilter: Introduce egress hook")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: restore IP sanity checks for netdev/egress</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:30:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-26T10:45:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ac746de608677d9ba511503a310efbd67a4bd95f'/>
<id>ac746de608677d9ba511503a310efbd67a4bd95f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5fd0628918977a0afdc2e6bc562d8751b5d3b8c5 ]

Subtract network offset to skb-&gt;len before performing IPv4 header sanity
checks, then adjust transport offset from offset from mac header.

Jorge Ortiz says:

When small UDP packets (&lt; 4 bytes payload) are sent from eth0,
`meta l4proto udp` condition is not met because `NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO` is
not set. This happens because there is a comparison that checks if the
transport header offset exceeds the total length.  This comparison does
not take into account the fact that the skb network offset might be
non-zero in egress mode (e.g., 14 bytes for Ethernet header).

Fixes: 0ae8e4cca787 ("netfilter: nf_tables: set transport offset from mac header for netdev/egress")
Reported-by: Jorge Ortiz &lt;jorge.ortiz.escribano@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5fd0628918977a0afdc2e6bc562d8751b5d3b8c5 ]

Subtract network offset to skb-&gt;len before performing IPv4 header sanity
checks, then adjust transport offset from offset from mac header.

Jorge Ortiz says:

When small UDP packets (&lt; 4 bytes payload) are sent from eth0,
`meta l4proto udp` condition is not met because `NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO` is
not set. This happens because there is a comparison that checks if the
transport header offset exceeds the total length.  This comparison does
not take into account the fact that the skb network offset might be
non-zero in egress mode (e.g., 14 bytes for Ethernet header).

Fixes: 0ae8e4cca787 ("netfilter: nf_tables: set transport offset from mac header for netdev/egress")
Reported-by: Jorge Ortiz &lt;jorge.ortiz.escribano@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kcm: Serialise kcm_sendmsg() for the same socket.</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-15T22:04:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9c8d544ed619f704e2b70e63e08ab75630c2ea23'/>
<id>9c8d544ed619f704e2b70e63e08ab75630c2ea23</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 807067bf014d4a3ae2cc55bd3de16f22a01eb580 ]

syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0]

The scenario is

  1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm-&gt;seq_skb.

  2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm-&gt;seq_skb but is blocked
     by sk_stream_wait_memory()

  3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm-&gt;seq_skb
     and puts the skb to the write queue

  4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the
     write queue

  5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue

When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it.

Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg().

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167

CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G    B              6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
 __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
 __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
 __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
 __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
 kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
 __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
 ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
 task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
 do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
 get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
 do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
 do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
 el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

Allocated by task 6166:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626
 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903
 __alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
 kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768
 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108
 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline]
 do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233
 do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

Freed by task 6167:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
 poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241
 __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363
 kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline]
 kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144
 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline]
 kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685
 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
 __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
 ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
 task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
 do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
 get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
 do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
 do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
 el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f
flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
 ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60
Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 807067bf014d4a3ae2cc55bd3de16f22a01eb580 ]

syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0]

The scenario is

  1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm-&gt;seq_skb.

  2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm-&gt;seq_skb but is blocked
     by sk_stream_wait_memory()

  3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm-&gt;seq_skb
     and puts the skb to the write queue

  4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the
     write queue

  5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue

When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it.

Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg().

[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167

CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G    B              6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
 __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
 __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
 __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
 __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
 kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
 __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
 ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
 task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
 do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
 get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
 do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
 do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
 el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

Allocated by task 6166:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626
 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903
 __alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
 kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768
 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108
 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline]
 do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233
 do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

Freed by task 6167:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
 poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241
 __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363
 kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline]
 kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144
 kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline]
 kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685
 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
 __fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
 ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
 task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
 do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
 do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
 get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
 do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
 do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
 el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f
flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
&gt;ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
 ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60
Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: HCI: Invert LE State quirk to be opt-out rather then opt-in</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-12T14:43:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2179b1c66c08e3481382fee4154857cefcb30a35'/>
<id>2179b1c66c08e3481382fee4154857cefcb30a35</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit aae6b81260fd9a7224f7eb4fc440d625852245bb ]

This inverts the LE State quirk so by default we assume the controllers
would report valid states rather than invalid which is how quirks
normally behave, also this would result in HCI command failing it the LE
States are really broken thus exposing the controllers that are really
broken in this respect.

Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/584
Fixes: 220915857e29 ("Bluetooth: Adding driver and quirk defs for multi-role LE")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit aae6b81260fd9a7224f7eb4fc440d625852245bb ]

This inverts the LE State quirk so by default we assume the controllers
would report valid states rather than invalid which is how quirks
normally behave, also this would result in HCI command failing it the LE
States are really broken thus exposing the controllers that are really
broken in this respect.

Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/584
Fixes: 220915857e29 ("Bluetooth: Adding driver and quirk defs for multi-role LE")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vsock: fix recursive -&gt;recvmsg calls</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>cong.wang@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-12T02:21:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b4ee8cf1acc5018ed1369150d7bb3e0d0f79e135'/>
<id>b4ee8cf1acc5018ed1369150d7bb3e0d0f79e135</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 69139d2919dd4aa9a553c8245e7c63e82613e3fc ]

After a vsock socket has been added to a BPF sockmap, its prot-&gt;recvmsg
has been replaced with vsock_bpf_recvmsg(). Thus the following
recursiion could happen:

vsock_bpf_recvmsg()
 -&gt; __vsock_recvmsg()
  -&gt; vsock_connectible_recvmsg()
   -&gt; prot-&gt;recvmsg()
    -&gt; vsock_bpf_recvmsg() again

We need to fix it by calling the original -&gt;recvmsg() without any BPF
sockmap logic in __vsock_recvmsg().

Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Reported-by: syzbot+bdb4bd87b5e22058e2a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+bdb4bd87b5e22058e2a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Bobby Eshleman &lt;bobby.eshleman@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Garzarella &lt;sgarzare@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240812022153.86512-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 69139d2919dd4aa9a553c8245e7c63e82613e3fc ]

After a vsock socket has been added to a BPF sockmap, its prot-&gt;recvmsg
has been replaced with vsock_bpf_recvmsg(). Thus the following
recursiion could happen:

vsock_bpf_recvmsg()
 -&gt; __vsock_recvmsg()
  -&gt; vsock_connectible_recvmsg()
   -&gt; prot-&gt;recvmsg()
    -&gt; vsock_bpf_recvmsg() again

We need to fix it by calling the original -&gt;recvmsg() without any BPF
sockmap logic in __vsock_recvmsg().

Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Reported-by: syzbot+bdb4bd87b5e22058e2a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+bdb4bd87b5e22058e2a4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Bobby Eshleman &lt;bobby.eshleman@bytedance.com&gt;
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Stefano Garzarella &lt;sgarzare@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;cong.wang@bytedance.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240812022153.86512-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: mana: Fix doorbell out of order violation and avoid unnecessary doorbell rings</title>
<updated>2024-08-29T15:35:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Long Li</name>
<email>longli@microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T15:58:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=462ff7dd86b4d906bda805de05abe2d102a52642'/>
<id>462ff7dd86b4d906bda805de05abe2d102a52642</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 58a63729c957621f1990c3494c702711188ca347 upstream.

After napi_complete_done() is called when NAPI is polling in the current
process context, another NAPI may be scheduled and start running in
softirq on another CPU and may ring the doorbell before the current CPU
does. When combined with unnecessary rings when there is no need to arm
the CQ, it triggers error paths in the hardware.

This patch fixes this by calling napi_complete_done() after doorbell
rings. It limits the number of unnecessary rings when there is
no need to arm. MANA hardware specifies that there must be one doorbell
ring every 8 CQ wraparounds. This driver guarantees one doorbell ring as
soon as the number of consumed CQEs exceeds 4 CQ wraparounds. In practical
workloads, the 4 CQ wraparounds proves to be big enough that it rarely
exceeds this limit before all the napi weight is consumed.

To implement this, add a per-CQ counter cq-&gt;work_done_since_doorbell,
and make sure the CQ is armed as soon as passing 4 wraparounds of the CQ.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e1b5683ff62e ("net: mana: Move NAPI from EQ to CQ")
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang &lt;haiyangz@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Long Li &lt;longli@microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1723219138-29887-1-git-send-email-longli@linuxonhyperv.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 58a63729c957621f1990c3494c702711188ca347 upstream.

After napi_complete_done() is called when NAPI is polling in the current
process context, another NAPI may be scheduled and start running in
softirq on another CPU and may ring the doorbell before the current CPU
does. When combined with unnecessary rings when there is no need to arm
the CQ, it triggers error paths in the hardware.

This patch fixes this by calling napi_complete_done() after doorbell
rings. It limits the number of unnecessary rings when there is
no need to arm. MANA hardware specifies that there must be one doorbell
ring every 8 CQ wraparounds. This driver guarantees one doorbell ring as
soon as the number of consumed CQEs exceeds 4 CQ wraparounds. In practical
workloads, the 4 CQ wraparounds proves to be big enough that it rarely
exceeds this limit before all the napi weight is consumed.

To implement this, add a per-CQ counter cq-&gt;work_done_since_doorbell,
and make sure the CQ is armed as soon as passing 4 wraparounds of the CQ.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e1b5683ff62e ("net: mana: Move NAPI from EQ to CQ")
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang &lt;haiyangz@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Long Li &lt;longli@microsoft.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1723219138-29887-1-git-send-email-longli@linuxonhyperv.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix source address selection with route leak</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:00:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicolas Dichtel</name>
<email>nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-10T08:14:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce1268b5adbe2fec354aede0e00098e97e987aa4'/>
<id>ce1268b5adbe2fec354aede0e00098e97e987aa4</id>
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commit 252442f2ae317d109ef0b4b39ce0608c09563042 upstream.

By default, an address assigned to the output interface is selected when
the source address is not specified. This is problematic when a route,
configured in a vrf, uses an interface from another vrf (aka route leak).
The original vrf does not own the selected source address.

Let's add a check against the output interface and call the appropriate
function to select the source address.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0d240e7811c4 ("net: vrf: Implement get_saddr for IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710081521.3809742-3-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
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<pre>
commit 252442f2ae317d109ef0b4b39ce0608c09563042 upstream.

By default, an address assigned to the output interface is selected when
the source address is not specified. This is problematic when a route,
configured in a vrf, uses an interface from another vrf (aka route leak).
The original vrf does not own the selected source address.

Let's add a check against the output interface and call the appropriate
function to select the source address.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0d240e7811c4 ("net: vrf: Implement get_saddr for IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710081521.3809742-3-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: Fix incorrect TOS in route get reply</title>
<updated>2024-08-03T07:00:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-07-15T14:23:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3ff2e0a82532b9dda4740830ceebdf13160cd727'/>
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[ Upstream commit 338bb57e4c2a1c2c6fc92f9c0bd35be7587adca7 ]

The TOS value that is returned to user space in the route get reply is
the one with which the lookup was performed ('fl4-&gt;flowi4_tos'). This is
fine when the matched route is configured with a TOS as it would not
match if its TOS value did not match the one with which the lookup was
performed.

However, matching on TOS is only performed when the route's TOS is not
zero. It is therefore possible to have the kernel incorrectly return a
non-zero TOS:

 # ip link add name dummy1 up type dummy
 # ip address add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy1
 # ip route get 192.0.2.2 tos 0xfc
 192.0.2.2 tos 0x1c dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.1 uid 0
     cache

Fix by adding a DSCP field to the FIB result structure (inside an
existing 4 bytes hole), populating it in the route lookup and using it
when filling the route get reply.

Output after the patch:

 # ip link add name dummy1 up type dummy
 # ip address add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy1
 # ip route get 192.0.2.2 tos 0xfc
 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.1 uid 0
     cache

Fixes: 1a00fee4ffb2 ("ipv4: Remove rt_key_{src,dst,tos} from struct rtable.")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit 338bb57e4c2a1c2c6fc92f9c0bd35be7587adca7 ]

The TOS value that is returned to user space in the route get reply is
the one with which the lookup was performed ('fl4-&gt;flowi4_tos'). This is
fine when the matched route is configured with a TOS as it would not
match if its TOS value did not match the one with which the lookup was
performed.

However, matching on TOS is only performed when the route's TOS is not
zero. It is therefore possible to have the kernel incorrectly return a
non-zero TOS:

 # ip link add name dummy1 up type dummy
 # ip address add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy1
 # ip route get 192.0.2.2 tos 0xfc
 192.0.2.2 tos 0x1c dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.1 uid 0
     cache

Fix by adding a DSCP field to the FIB result structure (inside an
existing 4 bytes hole), populating it in the route lookup and using it
when filling the route get reply.

Output after the patch:

 # ip link add name dummy1 up type dummy
 # ip address add 192.0.2.1/24 dev dummy1
 # ip route get 192.0.2.2 tos 0xfc
 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.1 uid 0
     cache

Fixes: 1a00fee4ffb2 ("ipv4: Remove rt_key_{src,dst,tos} from struct rtable.")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault &lt;gnault@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
