<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/net, branch linux-5.0.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash</title>
<updated>2019-06-04T06:01:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-27T19:40:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8d9b786e1124253738e992a845af24d9d95eac68'/>
<id>8d9b786e1124253738e992a845af24d9d95eac68</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ]

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 ]

According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.

Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.

It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas &lt;benny@pinkas.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Ignore CC events not matching the last HCI command</title>
<updated>2019-05-31T13:44:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>João Paulo Rechi Vita</name>
<email>jprvita@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-02T02:01:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0e061885bfcd65ef5d09f154f3c3c3491cc7544a'/>
<id>0e061885bfcd65ef5d09f154f3c3c3491cc7544a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]

This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.

The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.

This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.

Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64)                                  0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0)               [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84                                 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm)                      [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14             {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14                  {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14                {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1       {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6   #1 [hci0] 27.302496
        Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7  #3 [hci0] 27.419244
        Type: Active (0x01)
        Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2      #5 [hci0] 27.420259
        Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
        Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
      LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
      LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4        {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
      Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)

Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita &lt;jprvita@endlessm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f80c5dad7b6467b884c445ffea45985793b4b2d0 ]

This commit makes the kernel not send the next queued HCI command until
a command complete arrives for the last HCI command sent to the
controller. This change avoids a problem with some buggy controllers
(seen on two SKUs of QCA9377) that send an extra command complete event
for the previous command after the kernel had already sent a new HCI
command to the controller.

The problem was reproduced when starting an active scanning procedure,
where an extra command complete event arrives for the LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR
command. When this happends the kernel ends up not processing the
command complete for the following commmand, LE_SET_SCAN_PARAM, and
ultimately behaving as if a passive scanning procedure was being
performed, when in fact controller is performing an active scanning
procedure. This makes it impossible to discover BLE devices as no device
found events are sent to userspace.

This problem is reproducible on 100% of the attempts on the affected
controllers. The extra command complete event can be seen at timestamp
27.420131 on the btmon logs bellow.

Bluetooth monitor ver 5.50
= Note: Linux version 5.0.0+ (x86_64)                                  0.352340
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.352343
= New Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Primary,USB,hci0)               [hci0] 0.352344
= Open Index: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84                                 [hci0] 0.352345
= Index Info: 80:C5:F2:8F:87:84 (Qualcomm)                      [hci0] 0.352346
@ MGMT Open: bluetoothd (privileged) version 1.14             {0x0001} 0.352347
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.14                  {0x0002} 0.352366
@ MGMT Open: btmgmt (privileged) version 1.14                {0x0003} 27.302164
@ MGMT Command: Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1       {0x0003} [hci0] 27.302310
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6   #1 [hci0] 27.302496
        Address: 15:60:F2:91:B2:24 (Non-Resolvable)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #2 [hci0] 27.419117
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7  #3 [hci0] 27.419244
        Type: Active (0x01)
        Interval: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Window: 11.250 msec (0x0012)
        Own address type: Random (0x01)
        Filter policy: Accept all advertisement (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #4 [hci0] 27.420131
      LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&lt; HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2      #5 [hci0] 27.420259
        Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
        Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #6 [hci0] 27.420969
      LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
&gt; HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4                 #7 [hci0] 27.421983
      LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
@ MGMT Event: Command Complete (0x0001) plen 4        {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422059
      Start Discovery (0x0023) plen 1
        Status: Success (0x00)
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0003} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0002} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)
@ MGMT Event: Discovering (0x0013) plen 2             {0x0001} [hci0] 27.422067
        Address type: 0x06
          LE Public
          LE Random
        Discovery: Enabled (0x01)

Signed-off-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita &lt;jprvita@endlessm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: Honor original L3 slave device in xfrmi policy lookup</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:22:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Willi</name>
<email>martin@strongswan.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-26T12:20:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=79fad8fd2b7664883d3c3ba9aa88937a56d70940'/>
<id>79fad8fd2b7664883d3c3ba9aa88937a56d70940</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 025c65e119bf58b610549ca359c9ecc5dee6a8d2 ]

If an xfrmi is associated to a vrf layer 3 master device,
xfrm_policy_check() fails after traffic decapsulation. The input
interface is replaced by the layer 3 master device, and hence
xfrmi_decode_session() can't match the xfrmi anymore to satisfy
policy checking.

Extend ingress xfrmi lookup to honor the original layer 3 slave
device, allowing xfrm interfaces to operate within a vrf domain.

Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 025c65e119bf58b610549ca359c9ecc5dee6a8d2 ]

If an xfrmi is associated to a vrf layer 3 master device,
xfrm_policy_check() fails after traffic decapsulation. The input
interface is replaced by the layer 3 master device, and hence
xfrmi_decode_session() can't match the xfrmi anymore to satisfy
policy checking.

Extend ingress xfrmi lookup to honor the original layer 3 slave
device, allowing xfrm interfaces to operate within a vrf domain.

Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi &lt;martin@strongswan.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:22:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-22T23:26:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e8ce2680442d924c7b267fded16967c33b0e87c'/>
<id>4e8ce2680442d924c7b267fded16967c33b0e87c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 ]

In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().

And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net-&gt;xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.

This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.

Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 ]

In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().

And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net-&gt;xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.

This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.

Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: prevent possible fib6 leaks</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:21:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-16T02:39:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6c8566ebb5f13b3d36fee56923ac5360360cff65'/>
<id>6c8566ebb5f13b3d36fee56923ac5360360cff65</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61fb0d01680771f72cc9d39783fb2c122aaad51e ]

At ipv6 route dismantle, fib6_drop_pcpu_from() is responsible
for finding all percpu routes and set their -&gt;from pointer
to NULL, so that fib6_ref can reach its expected value (1).

The problem right now is that other cpus can still catch the
route being deleted, since there is no rcu grace period
between the route deletion and call to fib6_drop_pcpu_from()

This can leak the fib6 and associated resources, since no
notifier will take care of removing the last reference(s).

I decided to add another boolean (fib6_destroying) instead
of reusing/renaming exception_bucket_flushed to ease stable backports,
and properly document the memory barriers used to implement this fix.

This patch has been co-developped with Wei Wang.

Fixes: 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 61fb0d01680771f72cc9d39783fb2c122aaad51e ]

At ipv6 route dismantle, fib6_drop_pcpu_from() is responsible
for finding all percpu routes and set their -&gt;from pointer
to NULL, so that fib6_ref can reach its expected value (1).

The problem right now is that other cpus can still catch the
route being deleted, since there is no rcu grace period
between the route deletion and call to fib6_drop_pcpu_from()

This can leak the fib6 and associated resources, since no
notifier will take care of removing the last reference(s).

I decided to add another boolean (fib6_destroying) instead
of reusing/renaming exception_bucket_flushed to ease stable backports,
and properly document the memory barriers used to implement this fix.

This patch has been co-developped with Wei Wang.

Fixes: 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Cc: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Wei Wang &lt;weiwan@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau &lt;kafai@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ctnetlink: don't use conntrack/expect object addresses as id</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:40:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Florian Westphal</name>
<email>fw@strlen.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-01T11:08:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b0a90cae081d7ee14eaa46524fb70f4e23ae8905'/>
<id>b0a90cae081d7ee14eaa46524fb70f4e23ae8905</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c79107631db1f7fd32cf3f7368e4672004a3010 ]

else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events
and dumps.

Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct.

Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no
immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and
reallocated again immediately.

Fixes: 3583240249ef ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID")
Fixes: 7f85f914721f ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c79107631db1f7fd32cf3f7368e4672004a3010 ]

else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events
and dumps.

Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct.

Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no
immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and
reallocated again immediately.

Fixes: 3583240249ef ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID")
Fixes: 7f85f914721f ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections</title>
<updated>2019-05-10T16:36:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marcel Holtmann</name>
<email>marcel@holtmann.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-24T20:19:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c93762f4b38d894158bdf73a783685d39d6a981'/>
<id>2c93762f4b38d894158bdf73a783685d39d6a981</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.

The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.

Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann &lt;marcel@holtmann.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg &lt;johan.hedberg@intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: avoid running the sctp state machine recursively</title>
<updated>2019-05-05T12:43:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xin Long</name>
<email>lucien.xin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-29T06:16:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=484d404fdc2a64261f95692d7e242ec717e4ea7b'/>
<id>484d404fdc2a64261f95692d7e242ec717e4ea7b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]

Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;  [&lt;ffffffffa4375904&gt;] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
   [&lt;ffffffffa436fcaf&gt;] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72
   [&lt;ffffffffa437b93a&gt;] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00
   [&lt;ffffffffa3cd5326&gt;] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffffa437bc4a&gt;] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffffa3e22be8&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200
   [&lt;ffffffffa423512d&gt;] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0
   [&lt;ffffffffc0995320&gt;] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc098510e&gt;] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc098646c&gt;] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0977338&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0976ad1&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc099443d&gt;] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0977384&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0976ad1&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc097b3a4&gt;] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc09840f1&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc099732b&gt;] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]

As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX
softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later,
and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides,
sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.

Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693404c ("sctp: Fix
oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command
SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still
used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will
be called in this command again.

To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF
not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st
sctp_do_sm() directly.

Reported-by: Ying Xu &lt;yinxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]

Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100
  Call Trace:
   &lt;IRQ&gt;  [&lt;ffffffffa4375904&gt;] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
   [&lt;ffffffffa436fcaf&gt;] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72
   [&lt;ffffffffa437b93a&gt;] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00
   [&lt;ffffffffa3cd5326&gt;] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30
   [&lt;ffffffffa437bc4a&gt;] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50
   [&lt;ffffffffa3e22be8&gt;] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200
   [&lt;ffffffffa423512d&gt;] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0
   [&lt;ffffffffc0995320&gt;] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc098510e&gt;] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc098646c&gt;] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0977338&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0976ad1&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc099443d&gt;] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0977384&gt;] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc0976ad1&gt;] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc097b3a4&gt;] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc09840f1&gt;] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp]
   [&lt;ffffffffc099732b&gt;] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]

As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX
softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later,
and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides,
sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.

Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693404c ("sctp: Fix
oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command
SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still
used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will
be called in this command again.

To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF
not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st
sctp_do_sm() directly.

Reported-by: Ying Xu &lt;yinxu@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/sched: don't dereference a-&gt;goto_chain to read the chain index</title>
<updated>2019-05-04T07:21:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Davide Caratti</name>
<email>dcaratti@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-20T14:00:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4da511ff427b43f7db6ee6368223bde1b925e4f4'/>
<id>4da511ff427b43f7db6ee6368223bde1b925e4f4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fe384e2fa36ca084a456fd30558cccc75b4b3fbd ]

callers of tcf_gact_goto_chain_index() can potentially read an old value
of the chain index, or even dereference a NULL 'goto_chain' pointer,
because 'goto_chain' and 'tcfa_action' are read in the traffic path
without caring of concurrent write in the control path. The most recent
value of chain index can be read also from a-&gt;tcfa_action (it's encoded
there together with TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN bits), so we don't really need to
dereference 'goto_chain': just read the chain id from the control action.

Fixes: e457d86ada27 ("net: sched: add couple of goto_chain helpers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti &lt;dcaratti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fe384e2fa36ca084a456fd30558cccc75b4b3fbd ]

callers of tcf_gact_goto_chain_index() can potentially read an old value
of the chain index, or even dereference a NULL 'goto_chain' pointer,
because 'goto_chain' and 'tcfa_action' are read in the traffic path
without caring of concurrent write in the control path. The most recent
value of chain index can be read also from a-&gt;tcfa_action (it's encoded
there together with TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN bits), so we don't really need to
dereference 'goto_chain': just read the chain id from the control action.

Fixes: e457d86ada27 ("net: sched: add couple of goto_chain helpers")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti &lt;dcaratti@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xsk: fix umem memory leak on cleanup</title>
<updated>2019-05-04T07:21:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Björn Töpel</name>
<email>bjorn.topel@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-13T14:15:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5227fe96b107d7cbf91d2d8f5093b0a007bb2e7b'/>
<id>5227fe96b107d7cbf91d2d8f5093b0a007bb2e7b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 044175a06706d516aa42874bb44dbbfc3c4d20eb ]

When the umem is cleaned up, the task that created it might already be
gone. If the task was gone, the xdp_umem_release function did not free
the pages member of struct xdp_umem.

It turned out that the task lookup was not needed at all; The code was
a left-over when we moved from task accounting to user accounting [1].

This patch fixes the memory leak by removing the task lookup logic
completely.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20180131135356.19134-3-bjorn.topel@gmail.com/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c1cb2ca8-6a14-3980-8672-f3de0bb38dfd@suse.cz/
Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 044175a06706d516aa42874bb44dbbfc3c4d20eb ]

When the umem is cleaned up, the task that created it might already be
gone. If the task was gone, the xdp_umem_release function did not free
the pages member of struct xdp_umem.

It turned out that the task lookup was not needed at all; The code was
a left-over when we moved from task accounting to user accounting [1].

This patch fixes the memory leak by removing the task lookup logic
completely.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20180131135356.19134-3-bjorn.topel@gmail.com/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c1cb2ca8-6a14-3980-8672-f3de0bb38dfd@suse.cz/
Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel &lt;bjorn.topel@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
