linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v7.0.4

driver core: Add kernel-doc for DEV_FLAG_COUNT enum value

2026-05-07T04:14:16+00:00

commit 5b484311507b5d403c1f7a45f6aa3778549e268b upstream.

Even though nobody should use this value (except when declaring the
"flags" bitmap), kernel-doc still gets upset that it's not documented.
It reports:

  WARNING: ../include/linux/device.h:519
  Enum value 'DEV_FLAG_COUNT' not described in enum 'struct_device_flags'

Add the description of DEV_FLAG_COUNT.

Fixes: a2225b6e834a ("driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/f318cd43-81fd-48b9-abf7-92af85f12f91@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson 
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap 
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413195910.1.I23aca74fe2d3636a47df196a80920fecb2643220@changeid
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm: various small mmap_prepare cleanups

2026-05-07T04:14:15+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3e4bb2706817710d9461394da8b75be79981586b ]

Patch series "mm: expand mmap_prepare functionality and usage", v4.

This series expands the mmap_prepare functionality, which is intended to
replace the deprecated f_op->mmap hook which has been the source of bugs
and security issues for some time.

This series starts with some cleanup of existing mmap_prepare logic, then
adds documentation for the mmap_prepare call to make it easier for
filesystem and driver writers to understand how it works.

It then importantly adds a vm_ops->mapped hook, a key feature that was
missing from mmap_prepare previously - this is invoked when a driver which
specifies mmap_prepare has successfully been mapped but not merged with
another VMA.

mmap_prepare is invoked prior to a merge being attempted, so you cannot
manipulate state such as reference counts as if it were a new mapping.

The vm_ops->mapped hook allows a driver to perform tasks required at this
stage, and provides symmetry against subsequent vm_ops->open,close calls.

The series uses this to correct the afs implementation which wrongly
manipulated reference count at mmap_prepare time.

It then adds an mmap_prepare equivalent of vm_iomap_memory() -
mmap_action_simple_ioremap(), then uses this to update a number of drivers.

It then splits out the mmap_prepare compatibility layer (which allows for
invocation of mmap_prepare hooks in an mmap() hook) in such a way as to
allow for more incremental implementation of mmap_prepare hooks.

It then uses this to extend mmap_prepare usage in drivers.

Finally it adds an mmap_prepare equivalent of vm_map_pages(), which lays
the foundation for future work which will extend mmap_prepare to DMA
coherent mappings.

This patch (of 21):

Rather than passing arbitrary fields, pass a vm_area_desc pointer to mmap
prepare functions to mmap prepare, and an action and vma pointer to mmap
complete in order to put all the action-specific logic in the function
actually doing the work.

Additionally, allow mmap prepare functions to return an error so we can
error out as soon as possible if there is something logically incorrect in
the input.

Update remap_pfn_range_prepare() to properly check the input range for the
CoW case.

Also remove io_remap_pfn_range_complete(), as we can simply set up the
fields correctly in io_remap_pfn_range_prepare() and use
remap_pfn_range_complete() for this.

While we're here, make remap_pfn_range_prepare_vma() a little neater, and
pass mmap_action directly to call_action_complete().

Then, update compat_vma_mmap() to perform its logic directly, as
__compat_vma_map() is not used by anything so we don't need to export it.

Also update compat_vma_mmap() to use vfs_mmap_prepare() rather than
calling the mmap_prepare op directly.

Finally, update the VMA userland tests to reflect the changes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1774045440.git.ljs@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99f408e4694f44ab12bdc55fe0bd9685d3bd1117.1774045440.git.ljs@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) 
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) 
Cc: Alexander Shishkin 
Cc: Alexandre Torgue 
Cc: Al Viro 
Cc: Arnd Bergmann 
Cc: Bodo Stroesser 
Cc: Christian Brauner 
Cc: Clemens Ladisch 
Cc: David Hildenbrand 
Cc: David Howells 
Cc: Dexuan Cui 
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman 
Cc: Haiyang Zhang 
Cc: Jan Kara 
Cc: Jann Horn 
Cc: Jonathan Corbet 
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan 
Cc: Liam Howlett 
Cc: Long Li 
Cc: Marc Dionne 
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" 
Cc: Maxime Coquelin 
Cc: Michal Hocko 
Cc: Mike Rapoport 
Cc: Miquel Raynal 
Cc: Pedro Falcato 
Cc: Richard Weinberger 
Cc: Ryan Roberts 
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra 
Cc: Wei Liu 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Stable-dep-of: f96e1d5f15b7 ("mm: avoid deadlock when holding rmap on mmap_prepare error")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

firmware: exynos-acpm: Drop fake 'const' on handle pointer

2026-05-07T04:14:02+00:00

commit a2be37eedb52ea26938fa4cc9de1ff84963c57ad upstream.

All the functions operating on the 'handle' pointer are claiming it is a
pointer to const thus they should not modify the handle.  In fact that's
a false statement, because first thing these functions do is drop the
cast to const with container_of:

  struct acpm_info *acpm = handle_to_acpm_info(handle);

And with such cast the handle is easily writable with simple:

  acpm->handle.ops.pmic_ops.read_reg = NULL;

The code is not correct logically, either, because functions like
acpm_get_by_node() and acpm_handle_put() are meant to modify the handle
reference counting, thus they must modify the handle.  Modification here
happens anyway, even if the reference counting is stored in the
container which the handle is part of.

The code does not have actual visible bug, but incorrect 'const'
annotations could lead to incorrect compiler decisions.

Fixes: a88927b534ba ("firmware: add Exynos ACPM protocol driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224104203.42950-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task

2026-05-07T04:14:01+00:00

commit 37beb42560165869838e7d91724f3e629db64129 upstream.

kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a
couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task.

Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset()
expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption
disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch
and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I
don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly
unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which
could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache
lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be
called in preemptible context.

Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the
syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen random offset.
choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and
chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With
per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration
during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being
updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next
syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem
goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the
syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on.

Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dd8c37bc-795f-4c7a-9086-69e584d8ab24@arm.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Mark Rutland 
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303150840.3789438-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks

2026-05-07T04:14:01+00:00

commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 upstream.

Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the
necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the
mmap() and mprotect() operations.  In order to resolve this gap, a LSM
security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following
new LSM hooks are being created:

 security_backing_file_alloc()
 security_backing_file_free()
 security_mmap_backing_file()

The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob
in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access
control point for the underlying backing file.  It is also expected that
LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback
to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not
require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.

There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to
alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the
security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob
as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to
better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into
the common LSM audit code.

Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
and supplying a fixup.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein 
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn 
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fbdev: defio: Disconnect deferred I/O from the lifetime of struct fb_info

2026-05-07T04:14:00+00:00

commit 9ded47ad003f09a94b6a710b5c47f4aa5ceb7429 upstream.

Hold state of deferred I/O in struct fb_deferred_io_state. Allocate an
instance as part of initializing deferred I/O and remove it only after
the final mapping has been closed. If the fb_info and the contained
deferred I/O meanwhile goes away, clear struct fb_deferred_io_state.info
to invalidate the mapping. Any access will then result in a SIGBUS
signal.

Fixes a long-standing problem, where a device hot-unplug happens while
user space still has an active mapping of the graphics memory. The hot-
unplug frees the instance of struct fb_info. Accessing the memory will
operate on undefined state.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann 
Fixes: 60b59beafba8 ("fbdev: mm: Deferred IO support")
Cc: Helge Deller 
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.22+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tpm: avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable

2026-05-07T04:13:59+00:00

commit 6f1d4d2ecfcd1b577dc87350ea965fe81f272e83 upstream.

Outside of the EFI tpm code, the TPM_MEMREMAP()/TPM_MEMUNMAP functions are
defined as trivial macros, leading to the mapping_size variable ending
up unused:

In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c:16:
In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h:28:
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h:167:6: error: variable 'mapping_size' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  167 |         int mapping_size;

Turn the stubs into inline functions to avoid this warning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann 
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum 
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race

2026-05-07T04:13:50+00:00

commit 33c3f6c2b48cd84b441dba1ee3e62290e53930f4 upstream.

When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated.
damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.

The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.

For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.

Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request
registration.  Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the
remaining damos_walk() request is executed.  damos_walk() reads the
obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.

After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered.  Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed.  Remove it together.

The issue is found by sashiko [1].


Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-3-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1]
Fixes: bf0eaba0ff9c ("mm/damon/core: implement damos_walk()")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park 
Cc:  # 6.14.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race

2026-05-07T04:13:50+00:00

commit 55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e upstream.

Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit
race".

damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they
race with kdamond terminations.  Fix those.


This patch (of 2);

When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all
remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that
API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is
terminated.  damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first.
After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running
(damon_ctx->kdamond is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call()
starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.

The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damon_call() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.

For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call()
requests cancelling.  Right after that, damon_call() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damon_call() caller threads
infinitely waits.

Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
call_controls_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests
registration.  Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining
damon_call() requests is executed.  damon_call() reads the obsolete field
under the lock and avoids adding a new request.

After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered.  Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed.  Remove it together.

Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for
repeat mode request.  In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting
for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the
kdamond is running.  However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel,
the request memory would be leaked.

The issue is found by sashiko [1].

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-1-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-2-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1]
Fixes: 42b7491af14c ("mm/damon/core: introduce damon_call()")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park 
Cc:  # 6.14.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/alloc_tag: clear codetag for pages allocated before page_ext initialization

2026-05-07T04:13:50+00:00

commit 6b1842775a460245e97d36d3a67d0cfba7c4ff79 upstream.

Due to initialization ordering, page_ext is allocated and initialized
relatively late during boot.  Some pages have already been allocated and
freed before page_ext becomes available, leaving their codetag
uninitialized.

A clear example is in init_section_page_ext(): alloc_page_ext() calls
kmemleak_alloc().  If the slab cache has no free objects, it falls back to
the buddy allocator to allocate memory.  However, at this point page_ext
is not yet fully initialized, so these newly allocated pages have no
codetag set.  These pages may later be reclaimed by KASAN, which causes
the warning to trigger when they are freed because their codetag ref is
still empty.

Use a global array to track pages allocated before page_ext is fully
initialized.  The array size is fixed at 8192 entries, and will emit a
warning if this limit is exceeded.  When page_ext initialization
completes, set their codetag to empty to avoid warnings when they are
freed later.

This warning is only observed with CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=Y and
mem_profiling_compressed disabled:

[    9.582133] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    9.582137] alloc_tag was not set
[    9.582139] WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:164 at __pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550, CPU#5: systemd/1
[    9.582190] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[    9.582192] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[    9.582194] RIP: 0010:__pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550
[    9.582196] Code: 00 00 4c 29 e5 48 8b 05 1f 88 56 05 48 8d 4c ad 00 48 8d 2c c8 e9 87 fd ff ff 0f 0b 0f 0b e9 f3 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 61 2f ed 03 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 b3 fd ff ff 0f 0b eb e4 e8 5e cd 14 02 4c 89 c7
[    9.582197] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000001f940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    9.582200] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000003f2b RCX: 1ffff110200d806c
[    9.582201] RDX: ffff8881006c0360 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff9bc7b460
[    9.582202] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff3a62324
[    9.582203] R10: ffffffff9d311923 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0004001b00
[    9.582204] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: ffff8881006c0360
[    9.582206] FS:  00007ffbbcf2d940(0000) GS:ffff888450479000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    9.582208] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    9.582210] CR2: 000055ee3aa260d0 CR3: 0000000148b67005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    9.582211] PKRU: 55555554
[    9.582212] Call Trace:
[    9.582213]  
[    9.582214]  ? __pfx___pgalloc_tag_sub+0x10/0x10
[    9.582216]  ? check_bytes_and_report+0x68/0x140
[    9.582219]  __free_frozen_pages+0x2e4/0x1150
[    9.582221]  ? __free_slab+0xc2/0x2b0
[    9.582224]  qlist_free_all+0x4c/0xf0
[    9.582227]  kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15d/0x180
[    9.582229]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
[    9.582232]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x14a/0x500
[    9.582234]  do_getname+0x96/0x310
[    9.582237]  do_readlinkat+0x91/0x2f0
[    9.582239]  ? __pfx_do_readlinkat+0x10/0x10
[    9.582240]  ? get_random_bytes_user+0x1df/0x2c0
[    9.582244]  __x64_sys_readlinkat+0x96/0x100
[    9.582246]  do_syscall_64+0xce/0x650
[    9.582250]  ? __x64_sys_getrandom+0x13a/0x1e0
[    9.582252]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_getrandom+0x10/0x10
[    9.582254]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582255]  ? ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0
[    9.582258]  ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[    9.582260]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582262]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582264]  ? __pfx_fput_close_sync+0x10/0x10
[    9.582266]  ? file_close_fd_locked+0x178/0x2a0
[    9.582268]  ? __x64_sys_faccessat2+0x96/0x100
[    9.582269]  ? __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0
[    9.582271]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582273]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582275]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[    9.582277]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[    9.582279]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[    9.582280] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbbda345ee
[    9.582282] Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 29 38 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 0b 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fa 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[    9.582284] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ad8de58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010b
[    9.582286] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ee3aa25570 RCX: 00007ffbbda345ee
[    9.582287] RDX: 000055ee3aa25570 RSI: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[    9.582288] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000001001
[    9.582289] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000033
[    9.582290] R13: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 R14: 00000000ffffff9c R15: 00007ffe2ad8deb0
[    9.582292]  
[    9.582293] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331081312.123719-1-hao.ge@linux.dev
Fixes: dcfe378c81f72 ("lib: introduce support for page allocation tagging")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge 
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan 
Cc: Kent Overstreet 
Cc: 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman