linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v6.18.27 Linux kernel stable tree driver core: Add kernel-doc for DEV_FLAG_COUNT enum value 2026-05-07T04:12:01+00:00 Douglas Anderson dianders@chromium.org 2026-04-14T02:59:11+00:00 b8c5acce56e07eb6654d0ff0427945875d9179f8 commit 5b484311507b5d403c1f7a45f6aa3778549e268b upstream. Even though nobody should use this value (except when declaring the "flags" bitmap), kernel-doc still gets upset that it's not documented. It reports: WARNING: ../include/linux/device.h:519 Enum value 'DEV_FLAG_COUNT' not described in enum 'struct_device_flags' Add the description of DEV_FLAG_COUNT. Fixes: a2225b6e834a ("driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/f318cd43-81fd-48b9-abf7-92af85f12f91@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413195910.1.I23aca74fe2d3636a47df196a80920fecb2643220@changeid Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 5b484311507b5d403c1f7a45f6aa3778549e268b upstream.

Even though nobody should use this value (except when declaring the
"flags" bitmap), kernel-doc still gets upset that it's not documented.
It reports:

  WARNING: ../include/linux/device.h:519
  Enum value 'DEV_FLAG_COUNT' not described in enum 'struct_device_flags'

Add the description of DEV_FLAG_COUNT.

Fixes: a2225b6e834a ("driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/f318cd43-81fd-48b9-abf7-92af85f12f91@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413195910.1.I23aca74fe2d3636a47df196a80920fecb2643220@changeid
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm: prevent droppable mappings from being locked 2026-05-07T04:11:59+00:00 Anthony Yznaga anthony.yznaga@oracle.com 2026-04-28T20:05:33+00:00 6f977b0472f700e4bcb981342ceacf2f1b1a3671 [ Upstream commit d239462787b072c78eb19fc1f155c3d411256282 ] Droppable mappings must not be lockable. There is a check for VMAs with VM_DROPPABLE set in mlock_fixup() along with checks for other types of unlockable VMAs which ensures this when calling mlock()/mlock2(). For mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), the check for unlockable VMAs is different. In apply_mlockall_flags(), if the flags parameter has MCL_FUTURE set, the current task's mm's default VMA flag field mm->def_flags has VM_LOCKED applied to it. VM_LOCKONFAULT is also applied if MCL_ONFAULT is also set. When these flags are set as default in this manner they are cleared in __mmap_complete() for new mappings that do not support mlock. A check for VM_DROPPABLE in __mmap_complete() is missing resulting in droppable mappings created with VM_LOCKED set. To fix this and reduce that chance of similar bugs in the future, introduce and use vma_supports_mlock(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260310155821.17869-1-anthony.yznaga@oracle.com Fixes: 9651fcedf7b9 ("mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings") Signed-off-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org> Tested-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> [ added const to is_vm_hugetlb_page and stubbed vma_supports_mlock in vma_internal.h instead of the split-out stubs.h ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit d239462787b072c78eb19fc1f155c3d411256282 ]

Droppable mappings must not be lockable.  There is a check for VMAs with
VM_DROPPABLE set in mlock_fixup() along with checks for other types of
unlockable VMAs which ensures this when calling mlock()/mlock2().

For mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), the check for unlockable VMAs is different.  In
apply_mlockall_flags(), if the flags parameter has MCL_FUTURE set, the
current task's mm's default VMA flag field mm->def_flags has VM_LOCKED
applied to it.  VM_LOCKONFAULT is also applied if MCL_ONFAULT is also set.
When these flags are set as default in this manner they are cleared in
__mmap_complete() for new mappings that do not support mlock.  A check for
VM_DROPPABLE in __mmap_complete() is missing resulting in droppable
mappings created with VM_LOCKED set.  To fix this and reduce that chance
of similar bugs in the future, introduce and use vma_supports_mlock().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260310155821.17869-1-anthony.yznaga@oracle.com
Fixes: 9651fcedf7b9 ("mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ added const to is_vm_hugetlb_page and stubbed vma_supports_mlock in vma_internal.h instead of the split-out stubs.h ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task 2026-05-07T04:11:47+00:00 Ryan Roberts ryan.roberts@arm.com 2026-03-03T15:08:38+00:00 d780f24a4939862e1df9def415fe7de59280fc7c commit 37beb42560165869838e7d91724f3e629db64129 upstream. kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task. Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset() expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be called in preemptible context. Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen random offset. choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on. Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dd8c37bc-795f-4c7a-9086-69e584d8ab24@arm.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303150840.3789438-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 37beb42560165869838e7d91724f3e629db64129 upstream.

kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a
couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task.

Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset()
expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption
disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch
and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I
don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly
unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which
could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache
lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be
called in preemptible context.

Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the
syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen random offset.
choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and
chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With
per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration
during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being
updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next
syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem
goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the
syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on.

Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dd8c37bc-795f-4c7a-9086-69e584d8ab24@arm.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303150840.3789438-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tpm: avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable 2026-05-07T04:11:46+00:00 Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de 2024-03-22T13:22:48+00:00 c5dfddc57f1b6b4e4df6610e917baceb114b8f6e commit 6f1d4d2ecfcd1b577dc87350ea965fe81f272e83 upstream. Outside of the EFI tpm code, the TPM_MEMREMAP()/TPM_MEMUNMAP functions are defined as trivial macros, leading to the mapping_size variable ending up unused: In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c:16: In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h:28: include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h:167:6: error: variable 'mapping_size' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable] 167 | int mapping_size; Turn the stubs into inline functions to avoid this warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 6f1d4d2ecfcd1b577dc87350ea965fe81f272e83 upstream.

Outside of the EFI tpm code, the TPM_MEMREMAP()/TPM_MEMUNMAP functions are
defined as trivial macros, leading to the mapping_size variable ending
up unused:

In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c:16:
In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h:28:
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h:167:6: error: variable 'mapping_size' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  167 |         int mapping_size;

Turn the stubs into inline functions to avoid this warning.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race 2026-05-07T04:11:39+00:00 SeongJae Park sj@kernel.org 2026-03-27T23:33:14+00:00 2691332ad88b57179c38653e2cd613d5820a52cf commit 55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e upstream. Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit race". damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they race with kdamond terminations. Fix those. This patch (of 2); When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request. The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call() requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request. After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together. Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel, the request memory would be leaked. The issue is found by sashiko [1]. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-1-sj@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-2-sj@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1] Fixes: 42b7491af14c ("mm/damon/core: introduce damon_call()") Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.14.x Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e upstream.

Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit
race".

damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they
race with kdamond terminations.  Fix those.


This patch (of 2);

When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all
remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that
API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is
terminated.  damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first.
After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running
(damon_ctx->kdamond is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call()
starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.

The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damon_call() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.

For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call()
requests cancelling.  Right after that, damon_call() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damon_call() caller threads
infinitely waits.

Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
call_controls_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests
registration.  Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining
damon_call() requests is executed.  damon_call() reads the obsolete field
under the lock and avoids adding a new request.

After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered.  Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed.  Remove it together.

Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for
repeat mode request.  In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting
for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the
kdamond is running.  However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel,
the request memory would be leaked.

The issue is found by sashiko [1].

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-1-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-2-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1]
Fixes: 42b7491af14c ("mm/damon/core: introduce damon_call()")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.14.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm/alloc_tag: clear codetag for pages allocated before page_ext initialization 2026-05-07T04:11:39+00:00 Hao Ge hao.ge@linux.dev 2026-03-31T08:13:12+00:00 d5b495ba9de0423ef39f8bd86729a885870c7efe commit 6b1842775a460245e97d36d3a67d0cfba7c4ff79 upstream. Due to initialization ordering, page_ext is allocated and initialized relatively late during boot. Some pages have already been allocated and freed before page_ext becomes available, leaving their codetag uninitialized. A clear example is in init_section_page_ext(): alloc_page_ext() calls kmemleak_alloc(). If the slab cache has no free objects, it falls back to the buddy allocator to allocate memory. However, at this point page_ext is not yet fully initialized, so these newly allocated pages have no codetag set. These pages may later be reclaimed by KASAN, which causes the warning to trigger when they are freed because their codetag ref is still empty. Use a global array to track pages allocated before page_ext is fully initialized. The array size is fixed at 8192 entries, and will emit a warning if this limit is exceeded. When page_ext initialization completes, set their codetag to empty to avoid warnings when they are freed later. This warning is only observed with CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=Y and mem_profiling_compressed disabled: [ 9.582133] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 9.582137] alloc_tag was not set [ 9.582139] WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:164 at __pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550, CPU#5: systemd/1 [ 9.582190] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 9.582192] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 9.582194] RIP: 0010:__pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550 [ 9.582196] Code: 00 00 4c 29 e5 48 8b 05 1f 88 56 05 48 8d 4c ad 00 48 8d 2c c8 e9 87 fd ff ff 0f 0b 0f 0b e9 f3 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 61 2f ed 03 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 b3 fd ff ff 0f 0b eb e4 e8 5e cd 14 02 4c 89 c7 [ 9.582197] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000001f940 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 9.582200] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000003f2b RCX: 1ffff110200d806c [ 9.582201] RDX: ffff8881006c0360 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff9bc7b460 [ 9.582202] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff3a62324 [ 9.582203] R10: ffffffff9d311923 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0004001b00 [ 9.582204] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: ffff8881006c0360 [ 9.582206] FS: 00007ffbbcf2d940(0000) GS:ffff888450479000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9.582208] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9.582210] CR2: 000055ee3aa260d0 CR3: 0000000148b67005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 9.582211] PKRU: 55555554 [ 9.582212] Call Trace: [ 9.582213] <TASK> [ 9.582214] ? __pfx___pgalloc_tag_sub+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582216] ? check_bytes_and_report+0x68/0x140 [ 9.582219] __free_frozen_pages+0x2e4/0x1150 [ 9.582221] ? __free_slab+0xc2/0x2b0 [ 9.582224] qlist_free_all+0x4c/0xf0 [ 9.582227] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15d/0x180 [ 9.582229] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90 [ 9.582232] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x14a/0x500 [ 9.582234] do_getname+0x96/0x310 [ 9.582237] do_readlinkat+0x91/0x2f0 [ 9.582239] ? __pfx_do_readlinkat+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582240] ? get_random_bytes_user+0x1df/0x2c0 [ 9.582244] __x64_sys_readlinkat+0x96/0x100 [ 9.582246] do_syscall_64+0xce/0x650 [ 9.582250] ? __x64_sys_getrandom+0x13a/0x1e0 [ 9.582252] ? __pfx___x64_sys_getrandom+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582254] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582255] ? ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [ 9.582258] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582260] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582262] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582264] ? __pfx_fput_close_sync+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582266] ? file_close_fd_locked+0x178/0x2a0 [ 9.582268] ? __x64_sys_faccessat2+0x96/0x100 [ 9.582269] ? __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0 [ 9.582271] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582273] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582275] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0 [ 9.582277] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0 [ 9.582279] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 9.582280] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbbda345ee [ 9.582282] Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 29 38 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 0b 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fa 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 9.582284] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ad8de58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010b [ 9.582286] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ee3aa25570 RCX: 00007ffbbda345ee [ 9.582287] RDX: 000055ee3aa25570 RSI: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 9.582288] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000001001 [ 9.582289] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000033 [ 9.582290] R13: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 R14: 00000000ffffff9c R15: 00007ffe2ad8deb0 [ 9.582292] </TASK> [ 9.582293] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331081312.123719-1-hao.ge@linux.dev Fixes: dcfe378c81f72 ("lib: introduce support for page allocation tagging") Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <hao.ge@linux.dev> Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 6b1842775a460245e97d36d3a67d0cfba7c4ff79 upstream.

Due to initialization ordering, page_ext is allocated and initialized
relatively late during boot.  Some pages have already been allocated and
freed before page_ext becomes available, leaving their codetag
uninitialized.

A clear example is in init_section_page_ext(): alloc_page_ext() calls
kmemleak_alloc().  If the slab cache has no free objects, it falls back to
the buddy allocator to allocate memory.  However, at this point page_ext
is not yet fully initialized, so these newly allocated pages have no
codetag set.  These pages may later be reclaimed by KASAN, which causes
the warning to trigger when they are freed because their codetag ref is
still empty.

Use a global array to track pages allocated before page_ext is fully
initialized.  The array size is fixed at 8192 entries, and will emit a
warning if this limit is exceeded.  When page_ext initialization
completes, set their codetag to empty to avoid warnings when they are
freed later.

This warning is only observed with CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=Y and
mem_profiling_compressed disabled:

[    9.582133] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    9.582137] alloc_tag was not set
[    9.582139] WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:164 at __pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550, CPU#5: systemd/1
[    9.582190] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[    9.582192] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[    9.582194] RIP: 0010:__pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550
[    9.582196] Code: 00 00 4c 29 e5 48 8b 05 1f 88 56 05 48 8d 4c ad 00 48 8d 2c c8 e9 87 fd ff ff 0f 0b 0f 0b e9 f3 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 61 2f ed 03 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 b3 fd ff ff 0f 0b eb e4 e8 5e cd 14 02 4c 89 c7
[    9.582197] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000001f940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    9.582200] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000003f2b RCX: 1ffff110200d806c
[    9.582201] RDX: ffff8881006c0360 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff9bc7b460
[    9.582202] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff3a62324
[    9.582203] R10: ffffffff9d311923 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0004001b00
[    9.582204] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: ffff8881006c0360
[    9.582206] FS:  00007ffbbcf2d940(0000) GS:ffff888450479000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    9.582208] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    9.582210] CR2: 000055ee3aa260d0 CR3: 0000000148b67005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[    9.582211] PKRU: 55555554
[    9.582212] Call Trace:
[    9.582213]  <TASK>
[    9.582214]  ? __pfx___pgalloc_tag_sub+0x10/0x10
[    9.582216]  ? check_bytes_and_report+0x68/0x140
[    9.582219]  __free_frozen_pages+0x2e4/0x1150
[    9.582221]  ? __free_slab+0xc2/0x2b0
[    9.582224]  qlist_free_all+0x4c/0xf0
[    9.582227]  kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15d/0x180
[    9.582229]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
[    9.582232]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x14a/0x500
[    9.582234]  do_getname+0x96/0x310
[    9.582237]  do_readlinkat+0x91/0x2f0
[    9.582239]  ? __pfx_do_readlinkat+0x10/0x10
[    9.582240]  ? get_random_bytes_user+0x1df/0x2c0
[    9.582244]  __x64_sys_readlinkat+0x96/0x100
[    9.582246]  do_syscall_64+0xce/0x650
[    9.582250]  ? __x64_sys_getrandom+0x13a/0x1e0
[    9.582252]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_getrandom+0x10/0x10
[    9.582254]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582255]  ? ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0
[    9.582258]  ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[    9.582260]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582262]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582264]  ? __pfx_fput_close_sync+0x10/0x10
[    9.582266]  ? file_close_fd_locked+0x178/0x2a0
[    9.582268]  ? __x64_sys_faccessat2+0x96/0x100
[    9.582269]  ? __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0
[    9.582271]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582273]  ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[    9.582275]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[    9.582277]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[    9.582279]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[    9.582280] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbbda345ee
[    9.582282] Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 29 38 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 0b 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fa 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[    9.582284] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ad8de58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010b
[    9.582286] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ee3aa25570 RCX: 00007ffbbda345ee
[    9.582287] RDX: 000055ee3aa25570 RSI: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[    9.582288] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000001001
[    9.582289] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000033
[    9.582290] R13: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 R14: 00000000ffffff9c R15: 00007ffe2ad8deb0
[    9.582292]  </TASK>
[    9.582293] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331081312.123719-1-hao.ge@linux.dev
Fixes: dcfe378c81f72 ("lib: introduce support for page allocation tagging")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <hao.ge@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe 2026-05-07T04:11:32+00:00 Douglas Anderson dianders@chromium.org 2026-03-17T16:01:20+00:00 fa9a4c5e69aaae47df95328fa96b3f2931e3180a commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 upstream. In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member by doing either: fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG; fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG; This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the other. While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock", this is not universally true. Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are thread-safe. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2c724c868c4 ("driver core: Add fw_devlink_parse_fwtree()") Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260317090112.v2.1.I0a4d03104ecd5103df3d76f66c8d21b1d15a2e38@changeid [ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 upstream.

In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member
by doing either:
  fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG;
  fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG;

This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both
mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the
other.

While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock",
this is not universally true.

Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the
FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New
accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are
thread-safe.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2c724c868c4 ("driver core: Add fw_devlink_parse_fwtree()")
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260317090112.v2.1.I0a4d03104ecd5103df3d76f66c8d21b1d15a2e38@changeid
[ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank
  line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses
  around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ]
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready 2026-05-07T04:11:32+00:00 Douglas Anderson dianders@chromium.org 2026-04-06T23:22:54+00:00 3e8fefd2997c85e98de81f35380616c0a51430a4 commit a2225b6e834a838ae3c93709760edc0a169eb2f2 upstream. The moment we link a "struct device" into the list of devices for the bus, it's possible probe can happen. This is because another thread can load the driver at any time and that can cause the device to probe. This has been seen in practice with a stack crawl that looks like this [1]: really_probe() __driver_probe_device() driver_probe_device() __driver_attach() bus_for_each_dev() driver_attach() bus_add_driver() driver_register() __platform_driver_register() init_module() [some module] do_one_initcall() do_init_module() load_module() __arm64_sys_finit_module() invoke_syscall() As a result of the above, it was seen that device_links_driver_bound() could be called for the device before "dev->fwnode->dev" was assigned. This prevented __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers() from being called which meant that other devices waiting on our driver's sub-nodes were stuck deferring forever. It's believed that this problem is showing up suddenly for two reasons: 1. Android has recently (last ~1 year) implemented an optimization to the order it loads modules [2]. When devices opt-in to this faster loading, modules are loaded one-after-the-other very quickly. This is unlike how other distributions do it. The reproduction of this problem has only been seen on devices that opt-in to Android's "parallel module loading". 2. Android devices typically opt-in to fw_devlink, and the most noticeable issue is the NULL "dev->fwnode->dev" in device_links_driver_bound(). fw_devlink is somewhat new code and also not in use by all Linux devices. Even though the specific symptom where "dev->fwnode->dev" wasn't assigned could be fixed by moving that assignment higher in device_add(), other parts of device_add() (like the call to device_pm_add()) are also important to run before probe. Only moving the "dev->fwnode->dev" assignment would likely fix the current symptoms but lead to difficult-to-debug problems in the future. Fix the problem by preventing probe until device_add() has run far enough that the device is ready to probe. If somehow we end up trying to probe before we're allowed, __driver_probe_device() will return -EPROBE_DEFER which will make certain the device is noticed. In the race condition that was seen with Android's faster module loading, we will temporarily add the device to the deferred list and then take it off immediately when device_add() probes the device. Instead of adding another flag to the bitfields already in "struct device", instead add a new "flags" field and use that. This allows us to freely change the bit from different thread without worrying about corrupting nearby bits (and means threads changing other bit won't corrupt us). [1] Captured on a machine running a downstream 6.6 kernel [2] https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/core/libmodprobe/libmodprobe.cpp?q=LoadModulesParallel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2023c610dc54 ("Driver core: add new device to bus's list before probing") Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406162231.v5.1.Id750b0fbcc94f23ed04b7aecabcead688d0d8c17@changeid Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit a2225b6e834a838ae3c93709760edc0a169eb2f2 upstream.

The moment we link a "struct device" into the list of devices for the
bus, it's possible probe can happen. This is because another thread
can load the driver at any time and that can cause the device to
probe. This has been seen in practice with a stack crawl that looks
like this [1]:

  really_probe()
  __driver_probe_device()
  driver_probe_device()
  __driver_attach()
  bus_for_each_dev()
  driver_attach()
  bus_add_driver()
  driver_register()
  __platform_driver_register()
  init_module() [some module]
  do_one_initcall()
  do_init_module()
  load_module()
  __arm64_sys_finit_module()
  invoke_syscall()

As a result of the above, it was seen that device_links_driver_bound()
could be called for the device before "dev->fwnode->dev" was
assigned. This prevented __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers() from
being called which meant that other devices waiting on our driver's
sub-nodes were stuck deferring forever.

It's believed that this problem is showing up suddenly for two
reasons:
1. Android has recently (last ~1 year) implemented an optimization to
   the order it loads modules [2]. When devices opt-in to this faster
   loading, modules are loaded one-after-the-other very quickly. This
   is unlike how other distributions do it. The reproduction of this
   problem has only been seen on devices that opt-in to Android's
   "parallel module loading".
2. Android devices typically opt-in to fw_devlink, and the most
   noticeable issue is the NULL "dev->fwnode->dev" in
   device_links_driver_bound(). fw_devlink is somewhat new code and
   also not in use by all Linux devices.

Even though the specific symptom where "dev->fwnode->dev" wasn't
assigned could be fixed by moving that assignment higher in
device_add(), other parts of device_add() (like the call to
device_pm_add()) are also important to run before probe. Only moving
the "dev->fwnode->dev" assignment would likely fix the current
symptoms but lead to difficult-to-debug problems in the future.

Fix the problem by preventing probe until device_add() has run far
enough that the device is ready to probe. If somehow we end up trying
to probe before we're allowed, __driver_probe_device() will return
-EPROBE_DEFER which will make certain the device is noticed.

In the race condition that was seen with Android's faster module
loading, we will temporarily add the device to the deferred list and
then take it off immediately when device_add() probes the device.

Instead of adding another flag to the bitfields already in "struct
device", instead add a new "flags" field and use that. This allows us
to freely change the bit from different thread without worrying about
corrupting nearby bits (and means threads changing other bit won't
corrupt us).

[1] Captured on a machine running a downstream 6.6 kernel
[2] https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/core/libmodprobe/libmodprobe.cpp?q=LoadModulesParallel

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2023c610dc54 ("Driver core: add new device to bus's list before probing")
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406162231.v5.1.Id750b0fbcc94f23ed04b7aecabcead688d0d8c17@changeid
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
usb: xhci: Make usb_host_endpoint.hcpriv survive endpoint_disable() 2026-05-07T04:11:31+00:00 Michal Pecio michal.pecio@gmail.com 2026-04-02T13:13:42+00:00 49340680d41fd540c1e67b98cf4d5310c7d6a35d commit 25e531b422dc2ac90cdae3b6e74b5cdeb081440d upstream. xHCI hardware maintains its endpoint state between add_endpoint() and drop_endpoint() calls followed by successful check_bandwidth(). So does the driver. Core may call endpoint_disable() during xHCI endpoint life, so don't clear host_ep->hcpriv then, because this breaks endpoint_reset(). If a driver calls usb_set_interface(), submits URBs which make host sequence state non-zero and calls usb_clear_halt(), the device clears its sequence state but xhci_endpoint_reset() bails out. The next URB malfunctions: USB2 loses one packet, USB3 gets Transaction Error or may not complete at all on some (buggy?) HCs from ASMedia and AMD. This is triggered by uvcvideo on bulk video devices. The code was copied from ehci_endpoint_disable() but it isn't needed here - hcpriv should only be NULL on emulated root hub endpoints. It might prevent resetting and inadvertently enabling a disabled and dropped endpoint, but core shouldn't try to reset dropped endpoints. Document xhci requirements regarding hcpriv. They are currently met. Fixes: 18b74067ac78 ("xhci: Fix use-after-free regression in xhci clear hub TT implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402131342.2628648-26-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 25e531b422dc2ac90cdae3b6e74b5cdeb081440d upstream.

xHCI hardware maintains its endpoint state between add_endpoint()
and drop_endpoint() calls followed by successful check_bandwidth().
So does the driver.

Core may call endpoint_disable() during xHCI endpoint life, so don't
clear host_ep->hcpriv then, because this breaks endpoint_reset().

If a driver calls usb_set_interface(), submits URBs which make host
sequence state non-zero and calls usb_clear_halt(), the device clears
its sequence state but xhci_endpoint_reset() bails out. The next URB
malfunctions: USB2 loses one packet, USB3 gets Transaction Error or
may not complete at all on some (buggy?) HCs from ASMedia and AMD.
This is triggered by uvcvideo on bulk video devices.

The code was copied from ehci_endpoint_disable() but it isn't needed
here - hcpriv should only be NULL on emulated root hub endpoints.
It might prevent resetting and inadvertently enabling a disabled and
dropped endpoint, but core shouldn't try to reset dropped endpoints.

Document xhci requirements regarding hcpriv. They are currently met.

Fixes: 18b74067ac78 ("xhci: Fix use-after-free regression in xhci clear hub TT implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402131342.2628648-26-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm/userfaultfd: fix hugetlb fault mutex hash calculation 2026-04-22T11:22:33+00:00 Jianhui Zhou jianhuizzzzz@gmail.com 2026-03-10T11:05:26+00:00 574501ede47ac439afd67ba9812bc66722d500ba commit 0217c7fb4de4a40cee667eb21901f3204effe5ac upstream. In mfill_atomic_hugetlb(), linear_page_index() is used to calculate the page index for hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(). However, linear_page_index() returns the index in PAGE_SIZE units, while hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash() expects the index in huge page units. This mismatch means that different addresses within the same huge page can produce different hash values, leading to the use of different mutexes for the same huge page. This can cause races between faulting threads, which can corrupt the reservation map and trigger the BUG_ON in resv_map_release(). Fix this by introducing hugetlb_linear_page_index(), which returns the page index in huge page granularity, and using it in place of linear_page_index(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260310110526.335749-1-jianhuizzzzz@gmail.com Fixes: a08c7193e4f1 ("mm/filemap: remove hugetlb special casing in filemap.c") Signed-off-by: Jianhui Zhou <jianhuizzzzz@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+f525fd79634858f478e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f525fd79634858f478e7 Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: JonasZhou <JonasZhou@zhaoxin.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 0217c7fb4de4a40cee667eb21901f3204effe5ac upstream.

In mfill_atomic_hugetlb(), linear_page_index() is used to calculate the
page index for hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash().  However, linear_page_index()
returns the index in PAGE_SIZE units, while hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash()
expects the index in huge page units.  This mismatch means that different
addresses within the same huge page can produce different hash values,
leading to the use of different mutexes for the same huge page.  This can
cause races between faulting threads, which can corrupt the reservation
map and trigger the BUG_ON in resv_map_release().

Fix this by introducing hugetlb_linear_page_index(), which returns the
page index in huge page granularity, and using it in place of
linear_page_index().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260310110526.335749-1-jianhuizzzzz@gmail.com
Fixes: a08c7193e4f1 ("mm/filemap: remove hugetlb special casing in filemap.c")
Signed-off-by: Jianhui Zhou <jianhuizzzzz@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f525fd79634858f478e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f525fd79634858f478e7
Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: JonasZhou <JonasZhou@zhaoxin.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>