<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v5.7.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kretprobe: Prevent triggering kretprobe from within kprobe_flush_task</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:49:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiri Olsa</name>
<email>jolsa@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-12T08:03:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=579d96b83c9eb4418cb29dfa810556fea98e89c3'/>
<id>579d96b83c9eb4418cb29dfa810556fea98e89c3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 upstream.

Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave.
My test was also able to trigger lockdep output:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff9a492798 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff9a491a18 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
   lock(&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

 1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767:
  #0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
  __lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7
  ? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590
  ? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030
  lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940
  ? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380
  ? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
  kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50
  ? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
  ? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70

The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy,
so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there.

The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave

where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs
kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return.

The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already
locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to
lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---&gt; probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed

        ---&gt; kretprobe_table_locks locked

        kretprobe_trampoline
          trampoline_handler
            kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &amp;head, &amp;flags);  &lt;--- deadlock

Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake
probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within
this code.

Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion
protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent
above lockup.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2

Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking")
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Anders Roxell &lt;anders.roxell@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" &lt;zsun@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9b38cc704e844e41d9cf74e647bff1d249512cb3 upstream.

Ziqian reported lockup when adding retprobe on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave.
My test was also able to trigger lockdep output:

 ============================================
 WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
 5.6.0-rc6+ #6 Not tainted
 --------------------------------------------
 sched-messaging/2767 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff9a492798 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff9a491a18 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 other info that might help us debug this:
  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0
        ----
   lock(&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));
   lock(&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

 1 lock held by sched-messaging/2767:
  #0: ffffffff9a491a18 (&amp;(kretprobe_table_locks[i].lock)){-.-.}, at: kretprobe_trampoline+0x0/0x50

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 3 PID: 2767 Comm: sched-messaging Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #6
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
  __lock_acquire.cold.57+0x173/0x2b7
  ? native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x42b/0x9e0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x590/0x590
  ? __lock_acquire+0xf63/0x4030
  lock_acquire+0x15a/0x3d0
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x36/0x70
  ? kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  kretprobe_hash_lock+0x52/0xa0
  trampoline_handler+0xf8/0x940
  ? kprobe_fault_handler+0x380/0x380
  ? find_held_lock+0x3a/0x1c0
  kretprobe_trampoline+0x25/0x50
  ? lock_acquired+0x392/0xbc0
  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x70
  ? __get_valid_kprobe+0x1f0/0x1f0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x40
  ? finish_task_switch+0x4b9/0x6d0
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
  ? __switch_to_asm+0x40/0x70

The code within the kretprobe handler checks for probe reentrancy,
so we won't trigger any _raw_spin_lock_irqsave probe in there.

The problem is in outside kprobe_flush_task, where we call:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave

where _raw_spin_lock_irqsave triggers the kretprobe and installs
kretprobe_trampoline handler on _raw_spin_lock_irqsave return.

The kretprobe_trampoline handler is then executed with already
locked kretprobe_table_locks, and first thing it does is to
lock kretprobe_table_locks ;-) the whole lockup path like:

  kprobe_flush_task
    kretprobe_table_lock
      raw_spin_lock_irqsave
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave ---&gt; probe triggered, kretprobe_trampoline installed

        ---&gt; kretprobe_table_locks locked

        kretprobe_trampoline
          trampoline_handler
            kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &amp;head, &amp;flags);  &lt;--- deadlock

Adding kprobe_busy_begin/end helpers that mark code with fake
probe installed to prevent triggering of another kprobe within
this code.

Using these helpers in kprobe_flush_task, so the probe recursion
protection check is hit and the probe is never set to prevent
above lockup.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158927059835.27680.7011202830041561604.stgit@devnote2

Fixes: ef53d9c5e4da ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking")
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Gustavo A . R . Silva" &lt;gustavoars@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Anders Roxell &lt;anders.roxell@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" &lt;naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy &lt;anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@elte.hu&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: "Ziqian SUN (Zamir)" &lt;zsun@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu &lt;mhiramat@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4, jbd2: ensure panic by fix a race between jbd2 abort and ext4 error handlers</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:49:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>zhangyi (F)</name>
<email>yi.zhang@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-09T07:35:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3db6f8f81cfc11b05f29ec0d6339191522139d1b'/>
<id>3db6f8f81cfc11b05f29ec0d6339191522139d1b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7b97d868b7ab2448859668de9222b8af43f76e78 upstream.

In the ext4 filesystem with errors=panic, if one process is recording
errno in the superblock when invoking jbd2_journal_abort() due to some
error cases, it could be raced by another __ext4_abort() which is
setting the SB_RDONLY flag but missing panic because errno has not been
recorded.

jbd2_journal_commit_transaction()
 jbd2_journal_abort()
  journal-&gt;j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
  jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
                                    | ext4_journal_check_start()
                                    |  __ext4_abort()
                                    |   sb-&gt;s_flags |= SB_RDONLY;
                                    |   if (!JBD2_REC_ERR)
                                    |        return;
  journal-&gt;j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR;

Finally, it will no longer trigger panic because the filesystem has
already been set read-only. Fix this by introduce j_abort_mutex to make
sure journal abort is completed before panic, and remove JBD2_REC_ERR
flag.

Fixes: 4327ba52afd03 ("ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblock")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) &lt;yi.zhang@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200609073540.3810702-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7b97d868b7ab2448859668de9222b8af43f76e78 upstream.

In the ext4 filesystem with errors=panic, if one process is recording
errno in the superblock when invoking jbd2_journal_abort() due to some
error cases, it could be raced by another __ext4_abort() which is
setting the SB_RDONLY flag but missing panic because errno has not been
recorded.

jbd2_journal_commit_transaction()
 jbd2_journal_abort()
  journal-&gt;j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT;
  jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno()
                                    | ext4_journal_check_start()
                                    |  __ext4_abort()
                                    |   sb-&gt;s_flags |= SB_RDONLY;
                                    |   if (!JBD2_REC_ERR)
                                    |        return;
  journal-&gt;j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR;

Finally, it will no longer trigger panic because the filesystem has
already been set read-only. Fix this by introduce j_abort_mutex to make
sure journal abort is completed before panic, and remove JBD2_REC_ERR
flag.

Fixes: 4327ba52afd03 ("ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblock")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) &lt;yi.zhang@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200609073540.3810702-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libata: Use per port sync for detach</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:49:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kai-Heng Feng</name>
<email>kai.heng.feng@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T07:48:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75415eb3eca29d3c24fd5cdd31287d9388d0236c'/>
<id>75415eb3eca29d3c24fd5cdd31287d9388d0236c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b5292111de9bb70cba3489075970889765302136 ]

Commit 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before
detach") may cause system freeze during suspend.

Using async_synchronize_full() in PM callbacks is wrong, since async
callbacks that are already scheduled may wait for not-yet-scheduled
callbacks, causes a circular dependency.

Instead of using big hammer like async_synchronize_full(), use async
cookie to make sure port probe are synced, without affecting other
scheduled PM callbacks.

Fixes: 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before detach")
Suggested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng &lt;kai.heng.feng@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1867983
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b5292111de9bb70cba3489075970889765302136 ]

Commit 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before
detach") may cause system freeze during suspend.

Using async_synchronize_full() in PM callbacks is wrong, since async
callbacks that are already scheduled may wait for not-yet-scheduled
callbacks, causes a circular dependency.

Instead of using big hammer like async_synchronize_full(), use async
cookie to make sure port probe are synced, without affecting other
scheduled PM callbacks.

Fixes: 130f4caf145c ("libata: Ensure ata_port probe has completed before detach")
Suggested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng &lt;kai.heng.feng@canonical.com&gt;
Tested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1867983
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfs: set invalid blocks after NFSv4 writes</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:49:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zheng Bin</name>
<email>zhengbin13@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-21T09:17:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=411eb103c39253607e5f09a5184e66aaa7562369'/>
<id>411eb103c39253607e5f09a5184e66aaa7562369</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3a39e778690500066b31fe982d18e2e394d3bce2 ]

Use the following command to test nfsv4(size of file1M is 1MB):
mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,actimeo=60 127.0.0.1/dir1 /mnt
cp file1M /mnt
du -h /mnt/file1M  --&gt;0 within 60s, then 1M

When write is done(cp file1M /mnt), will call this:
nfs_writeback_done
  nfs4_write_done
    nfs4_write_done_cb
      nfs_writeback_update_inode
        nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked(change, ctime, mtime
nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked
   nfs_set_cache_invalid
   nfs_refresh_inode_locked
     nfs_update_inode

nfsd write response contains change, ctime, mtime, the flag will be
clear after nfs_update_inode. Howerver, write response does not contain
space_used, previous open response contains space_used whose value is 0,
so inode-&gt;i_blocks is still 0.

nfs_getattr  --&gt;called by "du -h"
  do_update |= force_sync || nfs_attribute_cache_expired --&gt;false in 60s
  cache_validity = READ_ONCE(NFS_I(inode)-&gt;cache_validity)
  do_update |= cache_validity &amp; (NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR    --&gt;false
  if (do_update) {
        __nfs_revalidate_inode
  }

Within 60s, does not send getattr request to nfsd, thus "du -h /mnt/file1M"
is 0.

Add a NFS_INO_INVALID_BLOCKS flag, set it when nfsv4 write is done.

Fixes: 16e143751727 ("NFS: More fine grained attribute tracking")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin &lt;zhengbin13@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3a39e778690500066b31fe982d18e2e394d3bce2 ]

Use the following command to test nfsv4(size of file1M is 1MB):
mount -t nfs -o vers=4.0,actimeo=60 127.0.0.1/dir1 /mnt
cp file1M /mnt
du -h /mnt/file1M  --&gt;0 within 60s, then 1M

When write is done(cp file1M /mnt), will call this:
nfs_writeback_done
  nfs4_write_done
    nfs4_write_done_cb
      nfs_writeback_update_inode
        nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked(change, ctime, mtime
nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc_locked
   nfs_set_cache_invalid
   nfs_refresh_inode_locked
     nfs_update_inode

nfsd write response contains change, ctime, mtime, the flag will be
clear after nfs_update_inode. Howerver, write response does not contain
space_used, previous open response contains space_used whose value is 0,
so inode-&gt;i_blocks is still 0.

nfs_getattr  --&gt;called by "du -h"
  do_update |= force_sync || nfs_attribute_cache_expired --&gt;false in 60s
  cache_validity = READ_ONCE(NFS_I(inode)-&gt;cache_validity)
  do_update |= cache_validity &amp; (NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR    --&gt;false
  if (do_update) {
        __nfs_revalidate_inode
  }

Within 60s, does not send getattr request to nfsd, thus "du -h /mnt/file1M"
is 0.

Add a NFS_INO_INVALID_BLOCKS flag, set it when nfsv4 write is done.

Fixes: 16e143751727 ("NFS: More fine grained attribute tracking")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin &lt;zhengbin13@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/bitops.h: avoid clang shift-count-overflow warnings</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:49:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-04T23:50:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2501305a08cfa8bfc1bf234a2d377eb9b0f48834'/>
<id>2501305a08cfa8bfc1bf234a2d377eb9b0f48834</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bd93f003b7462ae39a43c531abca37fe7073b866 ]

Clang normally does not warn about certain issues in inline functions when
it only happens in an eliminated code path. However if something else
goes wrong, it does tend to complain about the definition of hweight_long()
on 32-bit targets:

  include/linux/bitops.h:75:41: error: shift count &gt;= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow]
          return sizeof(w) == 4 ? hweight32(w) : hweight64(w);
                                                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:29:49: note: expanded from macro 'hweight64'
   define hweight64(w) (__builtin_constant_p(w) ? __const_hweight64(w) : __arch_hweight64(w))
                                                  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:76: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight64'
   define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) &gt;&gt; 32))
                                                                             ^  ~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:20:49: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight32'
   define __const_hweight32(w) (__const_hweight16(w) + __const_hweight16((w) &gt;&gt; 16))
                                                  ^
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:19:72: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight16'
   define __const_hweight16(w) (__const_hweight8(w)  + __const_hweight8((w)  &gt;&gt; 8 ))
                                                                         ^
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:12:9: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight8'
            (!!((w) &amp; (1ULL &lt;&lt; 2))) +     \

Adding an explicit cast to __u64 avoids that warning and makes it easier
to read other output.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135513.65265-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bd93f003b7462ae39a43c531abca37fe7073b866 ]

Clang normally does not warn about certain issues in inline functions when
it only happens in an eliminated code path. However if something else
goes wrong, it does tend to complain about the definition of hweight_long()
on 32-bit targets:

  include/linux/bitops.h:75:41: error: shift count &gt;= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow]
          return sizeof(w) == 4 ? hweight32(w) : hweight64(w);
                                                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:29:49: note: expanded from macro 'hweight64'
   define hweight64(w) (__builtin_constant_p(w) ? __const_hweight64(w) : __arch_hweight64(w))
                                                  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:21:76: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight64'
   define __const_hweight64(w) (__const_hweight32(w) + __const_hweight32((w) &gt;&gt; 32))
                                                                             ^  ~~
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:20:49: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight32'
   define __const_hweight32(w) (__const_hweight16(w) + __const_hweight16((w) &gt;&gt; 16))
                                                  ^
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:19:72: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight16'
   define __const_hweight16(w) (__const_hweight8(w)  + __const_hweight8((w)  &gt;&gt; 8 ))
                                                                         ^
  include/asm-generic/bitops/const_hweight.h:12:9: note: expanded from macro '__const_hweight8'
            (!!((w) &amp; (1ULL &lt;&lt; 2))) +     \

Adding an explicit cast to __u64 avoids that warning and makes it easier
to read other output.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Shevchenko &lt;andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes &lt;linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135513.65265-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:48:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Williams</name>
<email>dan.j.williams@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-21T21:06:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=82cb5f72ad22e7cf7ddd3e52f93c2eac6182c2db'/>
<id>82cb5f72ad22e7cf7ddd3e52f93c2eac6182c2db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3234ac664a870e6ea69ae3a57d824cd7edbeacc5 ]

Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.

Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.

Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.

Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.

The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3234ac664a870e6ea69ae3a57d824cd7edbeacc5 ]

Close the hole of holding a mapping over kernel driver takeover event of
a given address range.

Commit 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
introduced CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM with the goal of protecting the
kernel against scenarios where a /dev/mem user tramples memory that a
kernel driver owns. However, this protection only prevents *new* read(),
write() and mmap() requests. Established mappings prior to the driver
calling request_mem_region() are left alone.

Especially with persistent memory, and the core kernel metadata that is
stored there, there are plentiful scenarios for a /dev/mem user to
violate the expectations of the driver and cause amplified damage.

Teach request_mem_region() to find and shoot down active /dev/mem
mappings that it believes it has successfully claimed for the exclusive
use of the driver. Effectively a driver call to request_mem_region()
becomes a hole-punch on the /dev/mem device.

The typical usage of unmap_mapping_range() is part of
truncate_pagecache() to punch a hole in a file, but in this case the
implementation is only doing the "first half" of a hole punch. Namely it
is just evacuating current established mappings of the "hole", and it
relies on the fact that /dev/mem establishes mappings in terms of
absolute physical address offsets. Once existing mmap users are
invalidated they can attempt to re-establish the mapping, or attempt to
continue issuing read(2) / write(2) to the invalidated extent, but they
will then be subject to the CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM checking that can
block those subsequent accesses.

Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Russell King &lt;linux@arm.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Fixes: 90a545e98126 ("restrict /dev/mem to idle io memory ranges")
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159009507306.847224.8502634072429766747.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mfd: stmfx: Disable IRQ in suspend to avoid spurious interrupt</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:48:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amelie Delaunay</name>
<email>amelie.delaunay@st.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-22T09:08:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8fd0afd8bc11f841cc49dd383864cbb058b73fcb'/>
<id>8fd0afd8bc11f841cc49dd383864cbb058b73fcb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 97eda5dcc2cde5dcc778bef7a9344db3b6bf8ef5 ]

When STMFX supply is stopped, spurious interrupt can occur. To avoid that,
disable the interrupt in suspend before disabling the regulator and
re-enable it at the end of resume.

Fixes: 06252ade9156 ("mfd: Add ST Multi-Function eXpander (STMFX) core driver")
Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay &lt;amelie.delaunay@st.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones &lt;lee.jones@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 97eda5dcc2cde5dcc778bef7a9344db3b6bf8ef5 ]

When STMFX supply is stopped, spurious interrupt can occur. To avoid that,
disable the interrupt in suspend before disabling the regulator and
re-enable it at the end of resume.

Fixes: 06252ade9156 ("mfd: Add ST Multi-Function eXpander (STMFX) core driver")
Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay &lt;amelie.delaunay@st.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones &lt;lee.jones@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb: gadget: Fix issue with config_ep_by_speed function</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:48:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pawel Laszczak</name>
<email>pawell@cadence.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-18T10:08:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=332276077e0eb6b7c1159da88bdadbe7538fdf3c'/>
<id>332276077e0eb6b7c1159da88bdadbe7538fdf3c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5d363120aa548ba52d58907a295eee25f8207ed2 ]

This patch adds new config_ep_by_speed_and_alt function which
extends the config_ep_by_speed about alt parameter.
This additional parameter allows to find proper usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor.

Problem has appeared during testing f_tcm (BOT/UAS) driver function.

f_tcm function for SS use array of headers for both  BOT/UAS alternate
setting:

static struct usb_descriptor_header *uasp_ss_function_desc[] = {
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_intf_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bi_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_bi_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bo_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_bo_ep_comp_desc,

        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_intf_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bi_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bi_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bo_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bo_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bo_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_status_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_status_in_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_status_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_cmd_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_cmd_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_cmd_pipe_desc,
        NULL,
};

The first 5 descriptors are associated with BOT alternate setting,
and others are associated with UAS.

During handling UAS alternate setting f_tcm driver invokes
config_ep_by_speed and this function sets incorrect companion endpoint
descriptor in usb_ep object.

Instead setting ep-&gt;comp_desc to uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc function in this
case set ep-&gt;comp_desc to uasp_ss_bi_desc.

This is due to the fact that it searches endpoint based on endpoint
address:

        for_each_ep_desc(speed_desc, d_spd) {
                chosen_desc = (struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *)*d_spd;
                if (chosen_desc-&gt;bEndpoitAddress == _ep-&gt;address)
                        goto ep_found;
        }

And in result it uses the descriptor from BOT alternate setting
instead UAS.

Finally, it causes that controller driver during enabling endpoints
detect that just enabled endpoint for bot.

Signed-off-by: Jayshri Pawar &lt;jpawar@cadence.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak &lt;pawell@cadence.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5d363120aa548ba52d58907a295eee25f8207ed2 ]

This patch adds new config_ep_by_speed_and_alt function which
extends the config_ep_by_speed about alt parameter.
This additional parameter allows to find proper usb_ss_ep_comp_descriptor.

Problem has appeared during testing f_tcm (BOT/UAS) driver function.

f_tcm function for SS use array of headers for both  BOT/UAS alternate
setting:

static struct usb_descriptor_header *uasp_ss_function_desc[] = {
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_intf_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bi_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_bi_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bo_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;bot_bo_ep_comp_desc,

        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_intf_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bi_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bi_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_bo_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bo_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_bo_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_status_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_status_in_ep_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_status_pipe_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_ss_cmd_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_cmd_comp_desc,
        (struct usb_descriptor_header *) &amp;uasp_cmd_pipe_desc,
        NULL,
};

The first 5 descriptors are associated with BOT alternate setting,
and others are associated with UAS.

During handling UAS alternate setting f_tcm driver invokes
config_ep_by_speed and this function sets incorrect companion endpoint
descriptor in usb_ep object.

Instead setting ep-&gt;comp_desc to uasp_bi_ep_comp_desc function in this
case set ep-&gt;comp_desc to uasp_ss_bi_desc.

This is due to the fact that it searches endpoint based on endpoint
address:

        for_each_ep_desc(speed_desc, d_spd) {
                chosen_desc = (struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *)*d_spd;
                if (chosen_desc-&gt;bEndpoitAddress == _ep-&gt;address)
                        goto ep_found;
        }

And in result it uses the descriptor from BOT alternate setting
instead UAS.

Finally, it causes that controller driver during enabling endpoints
detect that just enabled endpoint for bot.

Signed-off-by: Jayshri Pawar &lt;jpawar@cadence.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak &lt;pawell@cadence.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>coresight: Fix support for sparsely populated ports</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:48:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-18T18:02:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=781d2308bafc3b5107d2f0c02aeb1f0a94026cfe'/>
<id>781d2308bafc3b5107d2f0c02aeb1f0a94026cfe</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d375b356e687f2eefb51ddc3f1f2414cfa498f86 ]

On some systems the firmware may not describe all the ports
connected to a component (e.g, for security reasons). This
could be especially problematic for "funnels" where we could
end up in modifying memory beyond the allocated space for
refcounts.

e.g, for a funnel with input ports listed 0, 3, 5, nr_inport = 3.
However the we could access refcnts[5] while checking for
references, like :

 [  526.110401] ==================================================================
 [  526.117988] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
 [  526.124706] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff8135f9549c by task bash/1114
 [  526.131324]
 [  526.132886] CPU: 3 PID: 1114 Comm: bash Tainted: G S                5.4.25 #232
 [  526.140397] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SC7180 IDP (DT)
 [  526.147113] Call trace:
 [  526.149653]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
 [  526.153431]  show_stack+0x20/0x2c
 [  526.156852]  dump_stack+0xdc/0x144
 [  526.160370]  print_address_description+0x3c/0x494
 [  526.165211]  __kasan_report+0x144/0x168
 [  526.169170]  kasan_report+0x10/0x18
 [  526.172769]  check_memory_region+0x1a4/0x1b4
 [  526.177164]  __kasan_check_read+0x18/0x24
 [  526.181292]  funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
 [  526.185072]  coresight_enable_path+0x104/0x198
 [  526.189649]  coresight_enable+0x118/0x26c

  ...

 [  526.237782] Allocated by task 280:
 [  526.241298]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xf0/0x1ac
 [  526.245249]  kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14
 [  526.248849]  __kmalloc+0x28c/0x3b4
 [  526.252361]  coresight_register+0x88/0x250
 [  526.256587]  funnel_probe+0x15c/0x228
 [  526.260365]  dynamic_funnel_probe+0x20/0x2c
 [  526.264679]  amba_probe+0xbc/0x158
 [  526.268193]  really_probe+0x144/0x408
 [  526.271970]  driver_probe_device+0x70/0x140

 ...

 [  526.316810]
 [  526.318364] Freed by task 0:
 [  526.321344] (stack is not available)
 [  526.325024]
 [  526.326580] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff8135f95480
 [  526.326580]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
 [  526.339439] The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
 [  526.339439]  128-byte region [ffffff8135f95480, ffffff8135f95500)
 [  526.351399] The buggy address belongs to the page:
 [  526.356342] page:ffffffff04b7e500 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff814b00c380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
 [  526.366711] flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head)
 [  526.371475] raw: 4000000000010200 ffffffff05034008 ffffffff0501eb08 ffffff814b00c380
 [  526.379435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 [  526.387393] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
 [  526.393128]
 [  526.394681] Memory state around the buggy address:
 [  526.399619]  ffffff8135f95380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.407046]  ffffff8135f95400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.414473] &gt;ffffff8135f95480: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.421900]                             ^
 [  526.426029]  ffffff8135f95500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.433456]  ffffff8135f95580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.440883] ==================================================================

To keep the code simple, we now track the maximum number of
possible input/output connections to/from this component
@ nr_inport and nr_outport in platform_data, respectively.
Thus the output connections could be sparse and code is
adjusted to skip the unspecified connections.

Cc: Mathieu Poirier &lt;mathieu.poirier@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Leach &lt;mike.leach@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan &lt;saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan &lt;saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier &lt;mathieu.poirier@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200518180242.7916-13-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d375b356e687f2eefb51ddc3f1f2414cfa498f86 ]

On some systems the firmware may not describe all the ports
connected to a component (e.g, for security reasons). This
could be especially problematic for "funnels" where we could
end up in modifying memory beyond the allocated space for
refcounts.

e.g, for a funnel with input ports listed 0, 3, 5, nr_inport = 3.
However the we could access refcnts[5] while checking for
references, like :

 [  526.110401] ==================================================================
 [  526.117988] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
 [  526.124706] Read of size 4 at addr ffffff8135f9549c by task bash/1114
 [  526.131324]
 [  526.132886] CPU: 3 PID: 1114 Comm: bash Tainted: G S                5.4.25 #232
 [  526.140397] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SC7180 IDP (DT)
 [  526.147113] Call trace:
 [  526.149653]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
 [  526.153431]  show_stack+0x20/0x2c
 [  526.156852]  dump_stack+0xdc/0x144
 [  526.160370]  print_address_description+0x3c/0x494
 [  526.165211]  __kasan_report+0x144/0x168
 [  526.169170]  kasan_report+0x10/0x18
 [  526.172769]  check_memory_region+0x1a4/0x1b4
 [  526.177164]  __kasan_check_read+0x18/0x24
 [  526.181292]  funnel_enable+0x54/0x1b0
 [  526.185072]  coresight_enable_path+0x104/0x198
 [  526.189649]  coresight_enable+0x118/0x26c

  ...

 [  526.237782] Allocated by task 280:
 [  526.241298]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xf0/0x1ac
 [  526.245249]  kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14
 [  526.248849]  __kmalloc+0x28c/0x3b4
 [  526.252361]  coresight_register+0x88/0x250
 [  526.256587]  funnel_probe+0x15c/0x228
 [  526.260365]  dynamic_funnel_probe+0x20/0x2c
 [  526.264679]  amba_probe+0xbc/0x158
 [  526.268193]  really_probe+0x144/0x408
 [  526.271970]  driver_probe_device+0x70/0x140

 ...

 [  526.316810]
 [  526.318364] Freed by task 0:
 [  526.321344] (stack is not available)
 [  526.325024]
 [  526.326580] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff8135f95480
 [  526.326580]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
 [  526.339439] The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
 [  526.339439]  128-byte region [ffffff8135f95480, ffffff8135f95500)
 [  526.351399] The buggy address belongs to the page:
 [  526.356342] page:ffffffff04b7e500 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffffff814b00c380 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
 [  526.366711] flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head)
 [  526.371475] raw: 4000000000010200 ffffffff05034008 ffffffff0501eb08 ffffff814b00c380
 [  526.379435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 [  526.387393] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
 [  526.393128]
 [  526.394681] Memory state around the buggy address:
 [  526.399619]  ffffff8135f95380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.407046]  ffffff8135f95400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.414473] &gt;ffffff8135f95480: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.421900]                             ^
 [  526.426029]  ffffff8135f95500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.433456]  ffffff8135f95580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 [  526.440883] ==================================================================

To keep the code simple, we now track the maximum number of
possible input/output connections to/from this component
@ nr_inport and nr_outport in platform_data, respectively.
Thus the output connections could be sparse and code is
adjusted to skip the unspecified connections.

Cc: Mathieu Poirier &lt;mathieu.poirier@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Leach &lt;mike.leach@linaro.org&gt;
Reported-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan &lt;saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan &lt;saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier &lt;mathieu.poirier@linaro.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200518180242.7916-13-mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>usb: gadget: core: sync interrupt before unbind the udc</title>
<updated>2020-06-24T15:48:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Chen</name>
<email>peter.chen@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-10T05:30:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6e3e96b898af44eb136cadc19f9480917189e707'/>
<id>6e3e96b898af44eb136cadc19f9480917189e707</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c73bc52195def14165c3a7d91bdbb33b51725f5 ]

The threaded interrupt handler may still be called after the
usb_gadget_disconnect is called, it causes the structures used
at interrupt handler was freed before it uses, eg the
usb_request. This issue usually occurs we remove the udc function
during the transfer. Below is the example when doing stress
test for android switch function, the EP0's request is freed
by .unbind (configfs_composite_unbind -&gt; composite_dev_cleanup),
but the threaded handler accesses this request during handling
setup packet request.

In fact, there is no protection between unbind the udc
and udc interrupt handling, so we have to avoid the interrupt
handler is occurred or scheduled during the .unbind flow.

init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
android_work: did not send uevent (0 0 000000007bec2039)
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 6ms
init: Service 'adbd' (pid 18077) received signal 9
init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 0ms
init: processing action (init.svc.adbd=stopped) from (/init.usb.configfs.rc:14)
init: Received control message 'start' for 'adbd' from pid: 399 (/vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.usb@1.

init: starting service 'adbd'...
read descriptors
read strings
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000002a
android_work: sent uevent USB_STATE=CONNECTED
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x96000004
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
  CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000e97f1000
using random self ethernet address
[000000000000002a] pgd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 232 Comm: irq/68-5b110000 Not tainted 5.4.24-06075-g94a6b52b5815 #92
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT)
pstate: 00400085 (nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)
using random host ethernet address
pc : composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
lr : android_setup+0xc0/0x148
sp : ffff80001349bba0
x29: ffff80001349bba0 x28: ffff00083a50da00
x27: ffff8000124e6000 x26: ffff800010177950
x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff000834e18010
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
x21: ffff00083a50da00 x20: ffff00082e75ec40
x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: ffff80001180fb58 x10: 0000000000000040
x9 : ffff8000120fc980 x8 : 0000000000000000
x7 : ffff00083f98df50 x6 : 0000000000000100
x5 : 00000307e8978431 x4 : ffff800011386788
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff800012342000
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800010c6d3a0
Call trace:
 composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
 android_setup+0xc0/0x148
 cdns3_ep0_delegate_req+0x64/0x90
 cdns3_check_ep0_interrupt_proceed+0x384/0x738
 cdns3_device_thread_irq_handler+0x124/0x6e0
 cdns3_thread_irq+0x94/0xa0
 irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0
 irq_thread+0x150/0x248
 kthread+0xfc/0x128
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Code: 910e8000 f9400693 12001ed7 79400f79 (3940aa61)
---[ end trace c685db37f8773fba ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0002,20002008
Memory Limit: none
Rebooting in 5 seconds..

Reviewed-by: Jun Li &lt;jun.li@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen &lt;peter.chen@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c73bc52195def14165c3a7d91bdbb33b51725f5 ]

The threaded interrupt handler may still be called after the
usb_gadget_disconnect is called, it causes the structures used
at interrupt handler was freed before it uses, eg the
usb_request. This issue usually occurs we remove the udc function
during the transfer. Below is the example when doing stress
test for android switch function, the EP0's request is freed
by .unbind (configfs_composite_unbind -&gt; composite_dev_cleanup),
but the threaded handler accesses this request during handling
setup packet request.

In fact, there is no protection between unbind the udc
and udc interrupt handling, so we have to avoid the interrupt
handler is occurred or scheduled during the .unbind flow.

init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
android_work: did not send uevent (0 0 000000007bec2039)
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 6ms
init: Service 'adbd' (pid 18077) received signal 9
init: Sending signal 9 to service 'adbd' (pid 18077) process group...
libprocessgroup: Successfully killed process cgroup uid 0 pid 18077 in 0ms
init: processing action (init.svc.adbd=stopped) from (/init.usb.configfs.rc:14)
init: Received control message 'start' for 'adbd' from pid: 399 (/vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.usb@1.

init: starting service 'adbd'...
read descriptors
read strings
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000002a
android_work: sent uevent USB_STATE=CONNECTED
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x96000004
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
  CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000e97f1000
using random self ethernet address
[000000000000002a] pgd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 232 Comm: irq/68-5b110000 Not tainted 5.4.24-06075-g94a6b52b5815 #92
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT)
pstate: 00400085 (nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)
using random host ethernet address
pc : composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
lr : android_setup+0xc0/0x148
sp : ffff80001349bba0
x29: ffff80001349bba0 x28: ffff00083a50da00
x27: ffff8000124e6000 x26: ffff800010177950
x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff000834e18010
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
x21: ffff00083a50da00 x20: ffff00082e75ec40
x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: ffff80001180fb58 x10: 0000000000000040
x9 : ffff8000120fc980 x8 : 0000000000000000
x7 : ffff00083f98df50 x6 : 0000000000000100
x5 : 00000307e8978431 x4 : ffff800011386788
x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff800012342000
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800010c6d3a0
Call trace:
 composite_setup+0x5c/0x1730
 android_setup+0xc0/0x148
 cdns3_ep0_delegate_req+0x64/0x90
 cdns3_check_ep0_interrupt_proceed+0x384/0x738
 cdns3_device_thread_irq_handler+0x124/0x6e0
 cdns3_thread_irq+0x94/0xa0
 irq_thread_fn+0x30/0xa0
 irq_thread+0x150/0x248
 kthread+0xfc/0x128
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Code: 910e8000 f9400693 12001ed7 79400f79 (3940aa61)
---[ end trace c685db37f8773fba ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0002,20002008
Memory Limit: none
Rebooting in 5 seconds..

Reviewed-by: Jun Li &lt;jun.li@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen &lt;peter.chen@nxp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi &lt;balbi@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
