<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v5.4.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Don't rely on GCC __attribute__((optimize)) to disable GCSE</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-28T17:15:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2e61c5202e63fd591023525965a7379ba493385'/>
<id>d2e61c5202e63fd591023525965a7379ba493385</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 080b6f40763565f65ebb9540219c71ce885cf568 ]

Commit 3193c0836 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for
___bpf_prog_run()") introduced a __no_fgcse macro that expands to a
function scope __attribute__((optimize("-fno-gcse"))), to disable a
GCC specific optimization that was causing trouble on x86 builds, and
was not expected to have any positive effect in the first place.

However, as the GCC manual documents, __attribute__((optimize))
is not for production use, and results in all other optimization
options to be forgotten for the function in question. This can
cause all kinds of trouble, but in one particular reported case,
it causes -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables to be disregarded,
resulting in .eh_frame info to be emitted for the function.

This reverts commit 3193c0836, and instead, it disables the -fgcse
optimization for the entire source file, but only when building for
X86 using GCC with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON disabled. Note that the
original commit states that CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n triggers the issue,
whereas CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y performs better without the optimization,
so it is kept disabled in both cases.

Fixes: 3193c0836f20 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdUg0WJHEcq6to0-eODpXPOywLot6UD2=GFHpzoj_hCoBQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201028171506.15682-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 080b6f40763565f65ebb9540219c71ce885cf568 ]

Commit 3193c0836 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for
___bpf_prog_run()") introduced a __no_fgcse macro that expands to a
function scope __attribute__((optimize("-fno-gcse"))), to disable a
GCC specific optimization that was causing trouble on x86 builds, and
was not expected to have any positive effect in the first place.

However, as the GCC manual documents, __attribute__((optimize))
is not for production use, and results in all other optimization
options to be forgotten for the function in question. This can
cause all kinds of trouble, but in one particular reported case,
it causes -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables to be disregarded,
resulting in .eh_frame info to be emitted for the function.

This reverts commit 3193c0836, and instead, it disables the -fgcse
optimization for the entire source file, but only when building for
X86 using GCC with CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON disabled. Note that the
original commit states that CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n triggers the issue,
whereas CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y performs better without the optimization,
so it is kept disabled in both cases.

Fixes: 3193c0836f20 ("bpf: Disable GCC -fgcse optimization for ___bpf_prog_run()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAMuHMdUg0WJHEcq6to0-eODpXPOywLot6UD2=GFHpzoj_hCoBQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201028171506.15682-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 doesn't return SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Boyd</name>
<email>swboyd@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-23T15:47:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2cef3bae14b755bc17a29968679b3e95a74909d'/>
<id>d2cef3bae14b755bc17a29968679b3e95a74909d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1de111b51b829bcf01d2e57971f8fd07a665fa3f upstream.

According to the SMCCC spec[1](7.5.2 Discovery) the
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 function id only returns 0, 1, and
SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED.

 0 is "workaround required and safe to call this function"
 1 is "workaround not required but safe to call this function"
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is "might be vulnerable or might not be, who knows, I give up!"

SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED might as well mean "workaround required, except
calling this function may not work because it isn't implemented in some
cases". Wonderful. We map this SMC call to

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 1 is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

For KVM hypercalls (hvc), we've implemented this function id to return
SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED, 0, and SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED. One of those
isn't supposed to be there. Per the code we call
arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() to figure out what to return for this
feature discovery call.

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

Let's clean this up so that KVM tells the guest this mapping:

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 1 is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

Note: SMCCC_RET_NOT_AFFECTED is 1 but isn't part of the SMCCC spec

Fixes: c118bbb52743 ("arm64: KVM: Propagate full Spectre v2 workaround state to KVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andre Przywara &lt;andre.przywara@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0028/latest [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023154751.1973872-1-swboyd@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1de111b51b829bcf01d2e57971f8fd07a665fa3f upstream.

According to the SMCCC spec[1](7.5.2 Discovery) the
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 function id only returns 0, 1, and
SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED.

 0 is "workaround required and safe to call this function"
 1 is "workaround not required but safe to call this function"
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is "might be vulnerable or might not be, who knows, I give up!"

SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED might as well mean "workaround required, except
calling this function may not work because it isn't implemented in some
cases". Wonderful. We map this SMC call to

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 1 is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

For KVM hypercalls (hvc), we've implemented this function id to return
SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED, 0, and SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED. One of those
isn't supposed to be there. Per the code we call
arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() to figure out what to return for this
feature discovery call.

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

Let's clean this up so that KVM tells the guest this mapping:

 0 is SPECTRE_MITIGATED
 1 is SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED
 SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED is SPECTRE_VULNERABLE

Note: SMCCC_RET_NOT_AFFECTED is 1 but isn't part of the SMCCC spec

Fixes: c118bbb52743 ("arm64: KVM: Propagate full Spectre v2 workaround state to KVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andre Przywara &lt;andre.przywara@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Steven Price &lt;steven.price@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0028/latest [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023154751.1973872-1-swboyd@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd &lt;swboyd@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random32: make prandom_u32() output unpredictable</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>George Spelvin</name>
<email>lkml@sdf.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T06:57:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=213e1238caccfa8a0d1aa04967486cd8f3025c16'/>
<id>213e1238caccfa8a0d1aa04967486cd8f3025c16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but
are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm,
given a small sample of their output.  An LFSR like prandom_u32() is
particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like
random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable.
Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack.  Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based
on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits
of strong random key.  (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted
about this abuse of their algorithm.)  Speed is prioritized over security;
attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix.
Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it
is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution.  This patch replaces
it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein &lt;aksecurity@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: tytso@mit.edu
Cc: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Cc: Marc Plumb &lt;lkml.mplumb@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity")
Signed-off-by: George Spelvin &lt;lkml@sdf.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/
[ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions
  to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal;
  inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4
  members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch
  happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau &lt;w@1wt.eu&gt;
[wt: backported to 5.4 -- no tracepoint there]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: can_create_echo_skb(): fix echo skb generation: always use skb_clone()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksij Rempel</name>
<email>o.rempel@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T08:39:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5bde65abe166692dbe1d9ff0c7957aa954515056'/>
<id>5bde65abe166692dbe1d9ff0c7957aa954515056</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the
key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned
up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a
unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler,
can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all
registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always
cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now
safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which
detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: &amp;
cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan
CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
Backtrace:
[&lt;c010f570&gt;] (dump_backtrace) from [&lt;c010f90c&gt;] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[&lt;c010f8ec&gt;] (show_stack) from [&lt;c0c3e1a4&gt;] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0)
[&lt;c0c3e118&gt;] (dump_stack) from [&lt;c0127fec&gt;] (__warn+0xe0/0x108)
[&lt;c0127f0c&gt;] (__warn) from [&lt;c01283c8&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc)
[&lt;c0128324&gt;] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [&lt;c0539c0c&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174)
[&lt;c0539b04&gt;] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [&lt;c0ad2cac&gt;] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210)
[&lt;c0ad2aa0&gt;] (j1939_can_recv) from [&lt;c0ac9dc8&gt;] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268)
[&lt;c0ac9d14&gt;] (can_rcv_filter) from [&lt;c0aca2cc&gt;] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4)
[&lt;c0aca21c&gt;] (can_receive) from [&lt;c0aca348&gt;] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98)
[&lt;c0aca300&gt;] (can_rcv) from [&lt;c09b1fdc&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88)
[&lt;c09b1f78&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [&lt;c09b2070&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94)
[&lt;c09b2038&gt;] (__netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c09b2130&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8)
[&lt;c09b20cc&gt;] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [&lt;c09b21f8&gt;] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c)
[&lt;c09b21c4&gt;] (netif_receive_skb) from [&lt;c0791278&gt;] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel &lt;o.rempel@pengutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nf_tables: missing validation from the abort path</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pablo Neira Ayuso</name>
<email>pablo@netfilter.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-29T12:50:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ad017cf5dacea8f318151c31f6227264eca4746d'/>
<id>ad017cf5dacea8f318151c31f6227264eca4746d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c0391b6ab810381df632677a1dcbbbbd63d05b6d ]

If userspace does not include the trailing end of batch message, then
nfnetlink aborts the transaction. This allows to check that ruleset
updates trigger no errors.

After this patch, invoking this command from the prerouting chain:

 # nft -c add rule x y fib saddr . oif type local

fails since oif is not supported there.

This patch fixes the lack of rule validation from the abort/check path
to catch configuration errors such as the one above.

Fixes: a654de8fdc18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain dependency validation")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c0391b6ab810381df632677a1dcbbbbd63d05b6d ]

If userspace does not include the trailing end of batch message, then
nfnetlink aborts the transaction. This allows to check that ruleset
updates trigger no errors.

After this patch, invoking this command from the prerouting chain:

 # nft -c add rule x y fib saddr . oif type local

fails since oif is not supported there.

This patch fixes the lack of rule validation from the abort/check path
to catch configuration errors such as the one above.

Fixes: a654de8fdc18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain dependency validation")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: use actual socket sk rather than skb sk when routing harder</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-29T02:56:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56907fa27b9496609cdc90485555a176a7d4c16b'/>
<id>56907fa27b9496609cdc90485555a176a7d4c16b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 46d6c5ae953cc0be38efd0e469284df7c4328cf8 ]

If netfilter changes the packet mark when mangling, the packet is
rerouted using the route_me_harder set of functions. Prior to this
commit, there's one big difference between route_me_harder and the
ordinary initial routing functions, described in the comment above
__ip_queue_xmit():

   /* Note: skb-&gt;sk can be different from sk, in case of tunnels */
   int __ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,

That function goes on to correctly make use of sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if,
rather than skb-&gt;sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if. And indeed the comment is true: a
tunnel will receive a packet in ndo_start_xmit with an initial skb-&gt;sk.
It will make some transformations to that packet, and then it will send
the encapsulated packet out of a *new* socket. That new socket will
basically always have a different sk_bound_dev_if (otherwise there'd be
a routing loop). So for the purposes of routing the encapsulated packet,
the routing information as it pertains to the socket should come from
that socket's sk, rather than the packet's original skb-&gt;sk. For that
reason __ip_queue_xmit() and related functions all do the right thing.

One might argue that all tunnels should just call skb_orphan(skb) before
transmitting the encapsulated packet into the new socket. But tunnels do
*not* do this -- and this is wisely avoided in skb_scrub_packet() too --
because features like TSQ rely on skb-&gt;destructor() being called when
that buffer space is truely available again. Calling skb_orphan(skb) too
early would result in buffers filling up unnecessarily and accounting
info being all wrong. Instead, additional routing must take into account
the new sk, just as __ip_queue_xmit() notes.

So, this commit addresses the problem by fishing the correct sk out of
state-&gt;sk -- it's already set properly in the call to nf_hook() in
__ip_local_out(), which receives the sk as part of its normal
functionality. So we make sure to plumb state-&gt;sk through the various
route_me_harder functions, and then make correct use of it following the
example of __ip_queue_xmit().

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 46d6c5ae953cc0be38efd0e469284df7c4328cf8 ]

If netfilter changes the packet mark when mangling, the packet is
rerouted using the route_me_harder set of functions. Prior to this
commit, there's one big difference between route_me_harder and the
ordinary initial routing functions, described in the comment above
__ip_queue_xmit():

   /* Note: skb-&gt;sk can be different from sk, in case of tunnels */
   int __ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,

That function goes on to correctly make use of sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if,
rather than skb-&gt;sk-&gt;sk_bound_dev_if. And indeed the comment is true: a
tunnel will receive a packet in ndo_start_xmit with an initial skb-&gt;sk.
It will make some transformations to that packet, and then it will send
the encapsulated packet out of a *new* socket. That new socket will
basically always have a different sk_bound_dev_if (otherwise there'd be
a routing loop). So for the purposes of routing the encapsulated packet,
the routing information as it pertains to the socket should come from
that socket's sk, rather than the packet's original skb-&gt;sk. For that
reason __ip_queue_xmit() and related functions all do the right thing.

One might argue that all tunnels should just call skb_orphan(skb) before
transmitting the encapsulated packet into the new socket. But tunnels do
*not* do this -- and this is wisely avoided in skb_scrub_packet() too --
because features like TSQ rely on skb-&gt;destructor() being called when
that buffer space is truely available again. Calling skb_orphan(skb) too
early would result in buffers filling up unnecessarily and accounting
info being all wrong. Instead, additional routing must take into account
the new sk, just as __ip_queue_xmit() notes.

So, this commit addresses the problem by fishing the correct sk out of
state-&gt;sk -- it's already set properly in the call to nf_hook() in
__ip_local_out(), which receives the sk as part of its normal
functionality. So we make sure to plumb state-&gt;sk through the various
route_me_harder functions, and then make correct use of it following the
example of __ip_queue_xmit().

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()</title>
<updated>2020-11-18T18:20:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zeng Tao</name>
<email>prime.zeng@hisilicon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-01T09:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=160777b19b86bf28a1eec7cbfb4b5f7cece76b5e'/>
<id>160777b19b86bf28a1eec7cbfb4b5f7cece76b5e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit cb47755725da7b90fecbb2aa82ac3b24a7adb89b ]

UBSAN reports:

Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/time64.h:127:27
signed integer overflow:
17179869187 * 1000000000 cannot be represented in type 'long long int'
Call Trace:
 timespec64_to_ns include/linux/time64.h:127 [inline]
 set_cpu_itimer+0x65c/0x880 kernel/time/itimer.c:180
 do_setitimer+0x8e/0x740 kernel/time/itimer.c:245
 __x64_sys_setitimer+0x14c/0x2c0 kernel/time/itimer.c:336
 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x540 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295

Commit bd40a175769d ("y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64")
replaced the original conversion which handled time clamping correctly with
timespec64_to_ns() which has no overflow protection.

Fix it in timespec64_to_ns() as this is not necessarily limited to the
usage in itimers.

[ tglx: Added comment and adjusted the fixes tag ]

Fixes: 361a3bf00582 ("time64: Add time64.h header and define struct timespec64")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Tao &lt;prime.zeng@hisilicon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598952616-6416-1-git-send-email-prime.zeng@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PM: runtime: Drop pm_runtime_clean_up_links()</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:37:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-21T19:13:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=37f75c6aa8ddfea0bb9d6823c24b0da398a649d0'/>
<id>37f75c6aa8ddfea0bb9d6823c24b0da398a649d0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d6e36668598154820177bfd78c1621d8e6c580a2 upstream.

After commit d12544fb2aa9 ("PM: runtime: Remove link state checks in
rpm_get/put_supplier()") nothing prevents the consumer device's
runtime PM from acquiring additional references to the supplier
device after pm_runtime_clean_up_links() has run (or even while it
is running), so calling this function from __device_release_driver()
may be pointless (or even harmful).

Moreover, it ignores stateless device links, so the runtime PM
handling of managed and stateless device links is inconsistent
because of it, so better get rid of it entirely.

Fixes: d12544fb2aa9 ("PM: runtime: Remove link state checks in rpm_get/put_supplier()")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: 5.1+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.1+
Tested-by: Xiang Chen &lt;chenxiang66@hisilicon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d6e36668598154820177bfd78c1621d8e6c580a2 upstream.

After commit d12544fb2aa9 ("PM: runtime: Remove link state checks in
rpm_get/put_supplier()") nothing prevents the consumer device's
runtime PM from acquiring additional references to the supplier
device after pm_runtime_clean_up_links() has run (or even while it
is running), so calling this function from __device_release_driver()
may be pointless (or even harmful).

Moreover, it ignores stateless device links, so the runtime PM
handling of managed and stateless device links is inconsistent
because of it, so better get rid of it entirely.

Fixes: d12544fb2aa9 ("PM: runtime: Remove link state checks in rpm_get/put_supplier()")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: 5.1+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.1+
Tested-by: Xiang Chen &lt;chenxiang66@hisilicon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PM: runtime: Drop runtime PM references to supplier on link removal</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:37:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rafael J. Wysocki</name>
<email>rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-21T19:12:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=874dfb5c6aa3001b8528eb5b0ac57cdabc6a41e8'/>
<id>874dfb5c6aa3001b8528eb5b0ac57cdabc6a41e8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e0e398e204634db8fb71bd89cf2f6e3e5bd09b51 upstream.

While removing a device link, drop the supplier device's runtime PM
usage counter as many times as needed to drop all of the runtime PM
references to it from the consumer in addition to dropping the
consumer's link count.

Fixes: baa8809f6097 ("PM / runtime: Optimize the use of device links")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: 5.1+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.1+
Tested-by: Xiang Chen &lt;chenxiang66@hisilicon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e0e398e204634db8fb71bd89cf2f6e3e5bd09b51 upstream.

While removing a device link, drop the supplier device's runtime PM
usage counter as many times as needed to drop all of the runtime PM
references to it from the consumer in addition to dropping the
consumer's link count.

Fixes: baa8809f6097 ("PM / runtime: Optimize the use of device links")
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com&gt;
Cc: 5.1+ &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 5.1+
Tested-by: Xiang Chen &lt;chenxiang66@hisilicon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: always have io_remap_pfn_range() set pgprot_decrypted()</title>
<updated>2020-11-10T11:37:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason Gunthorpe</name>
<email>jgg@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-02T01:08:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2286457bd838e78f6e12a6f4a0d99aa64dc2cc0'/>
<id>d2286457bd838e78f6e12a6f4a0d99aa64dc2cc0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f8f6ae5d077a9bdaf5cbf2ac960a5d1a04b47482 upstream.

The purpose of io_remap_pfn_range() is to map IO memory, such as a
memory mapped IO exposed through a PCI BAR.  IO devices do not
understand encryption, so this memory must always be decrypted.
Automatically call pgprot_decrypted() as part of the generic
implementation.

This fixes a bug where enabling AMD SME causes subsystems, such as RDMA,
using io_remap_pfn_range() to expose BAR pages to user space to fail.
The CPU will encrypt access to those BAR pages instead of passing
unencrypted IO directly to the device.

Places not mapping IO should use remap_pfn_range().

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Dave Young" &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-025d64bdf6c4+e-amd_sme_fix_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f8f6ae5d077a9bdaf5cbf2ac960a5d1a04b47482 upstream.

The purpose of io_remap_pfn_range() is to map IO memory, such as a
memory mapped IO exposed through a PCI BAR.  IO devices do not
understand encryption, so this memory must always be decrypted.
Automatically call pgprot_decrypted() as part of the generic
implementation.

This fixes a bug where enabling AMD SME causes subsystems, such as RDMA,
using io_remap_pfn_range() to expose BAR pages to user space to fail.
The CPU will encrypt access to those BAR pages instead of passing
unencrypted IO directly to the device.

Places not mapping IO should use remap_pfn_range().

Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Tom Lendacky &lt;thomas.lendacky@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;aryabinin@virtuozzo.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brijesh Singh &lt;brijesh.singh@amd.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: "Dave Young" &lt;dyoung@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk &lt;konrad.wilk@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Larry Woodman &lt;lwoodman@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Matt Fleming &lt;matt@codeblueprint.co.uk&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani &lt;toshi.kani@hpe.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-025d64bdf6c4+e-amd_sme_fix_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
