linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v5.15.78 Linux kernel stable tree efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes 2022-11-10T17:15:39+00:00 Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org 2022-10-20T08:39:08+00:00 83b5ec7ee82d74973ee7e1f565e8bf95ace72a94 commit 161a438d730dade2ba2b1bf8785f0759aba4ca5f upstream. We no longer need at least 64 bytes of random seed to permit the early crng init to complete. The RNG is now based on Blake2s, so reduce the EFI seed size to the Blake2s hash size, which is sufficient for our purposes. While at it, drop the READ_ONCE(), which was supposed to prevent size from being evaluated after seed was unmapped. However, this cannot actually happen, so READ_ONCE() is unnecessary here. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 161a438d730dade2ba2b1bf8785f0759aba4ca5f upstream.

We no longer need at least 64 bytes of random seed to permit the early
crng init to complete. The RNG is now based on Blake2s, so reduce the
EFI seed size to the Blake2s hash size, which is sufficient for our
purposes.

While at it, drop the READ_ONCE(), which was supposed to prevent size
from being evaluated after seed was unmapped. However, this cannot
actually happen, so READ_ONCE() is unnecessary here.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fscrypt: fix keyring memory leak on mount failure 2022-11-10T17:15:37+00:00 Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com 2022-11-04T23:12:45+00:00 cff805b1518f38d57866065343db2285f2dcd5ab commit ccd30a476f8e864732de220bd50e6f372f5ebcab upstream. Commit d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key") moved the keyring destruction from __put_super() to generic_shutdown_super() so that the filesystem's block device(s) are still available. Unfortunately, this causes a memory leak in the case where a mount is attempted with the test_dummy_encryption mount option, but the mount fails after the option has already been processed. To fix this, attempt the keyring destruction in both places. Reported-by: syzbot+104c2a89561289cec13e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011213838.209879-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ccd30a476f8e864732de220bd50e6f372f5ebcab upstream.

Commit d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for
fscrypt_master_key") moved the keyring destruction from __put_super() to
generic_shutdown_super() so that the filesystem's block device(s) are
still available.  Unfortunately, this causes a memory leak in the case
where a mount is attempted with the test_dummy_encryption mount option,
but the mount fails after the option has already been processed.

To fix this, attempt the keyring destruction in both places.

Reported-by: syzbot+104c2a89561289cec13e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221011213838.209879-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key 2022-11-10T17:15:37+00:00 Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com 2022-11-04T23:12:44+00:00 e6f4fd85ef1ee6ab356bfbd64df28c1cb73aee7e commit d7e7b9af104c7b389a0c21eb26532511bce4b510 upstream. The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit d7e7b9af104c7b389a0c21eb26532511bce4b510 upstream.

The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key
structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a
"struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness.  The original idea was
to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem.
However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved:

- When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be
  called on any per-mode keys embedded in it.  (This started being the
  case when inline encryption support was added.)  Yet, the keyrings
  subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the
  time the filesystem was unmounted.  Therefore, currently there is no
  easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is
  destroyed.  Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra
  reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s).  But it was overlooked
  that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the
  corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that
  support inline crypto, it doesn't.  This can cause a use-after-free.

- When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key
  is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key
  struct from the keyring.  Currently this is done via key_invalidate().
  Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore.  This can deadlock when
  called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is
  allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore.

- More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily
  delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via
  random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as
  it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped.

- Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the
  key_permission LSM hook being called.  fscrypt doesn't want this, as
  all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the
  files themselves, like any other files.  The workaround which SELinux
  users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search
  access to all domains.  This works, but it is an odd extra step that
  shouldn't really have to be done.

The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I
should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep
track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs.  Instead, just
store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference
counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly.  Retain support for
RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table.  Replace fscrypt_sb_free()
with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs
a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available.

A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves
nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore.
("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be
listed.)  However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was
intended just for debugging purposes.  I don't know of anyone using it.

This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works;
that still uses the keyrings subsystem.  That is still needed for key
quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed
above.  If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch.

I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt
keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch
fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support.

Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm/hugetlb: fix races when looking up a CONT-PTE/PMD size hugetlb page 2022-11-10T17:15:24+00:00 Baolin Wang baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com 2022-09-01T10:41:31+00:00 3a44ae4afaa5318baed3c6e2959f24454e0ae4ff [ Upstream commit fac35ba763ed07ba93154c95ffc0c4a55023707f ] On some architectures (like ARM64), it can support CONT-PTE/PMD size hugetlb, which means it can support not only PMD/PUD size hugetlb (2M and 1G), but also CONT-PTE/PMD size(64K and 32M) if a 4K page size specified. So when looking up a CONT-PTE size hugetlb page by follow_page(), it will use pte_offset_map_lock() to get the pte entry lock for the CONT-PTE size hugetlb in follow_page_pte(). However this pte entry lock is incorrect for the CONT-PTE size hugetlb, since we should use huge_pte_lock() to get the correct lock, which is mm->page_table_lock. That means the pte entry of the CONT-PTE size hugetlb under current pte lock is unstable in follow_page_pte(), we can continue to migrate or poison the pte entry of the CONT-PTE size hugetlb, which can cause some potential race issues, even though they are under the 'pte lock'. For example, suppose thread A is trying to look up a CONT-PTE size hugetlb page by move_pages() syscall under the lock, however antoher thread B can migrate the CONT-PTE hugetlb page at the same time, which will cause thread A to get an incorrect page, if thread A also wants to do page migration, then data inconsistency error occurs. Moreover we have the same issue for CONT-PMD size hugetlb in follow_huge_pmd(). To fix above issues, rename the follow_huge_pmd() as follow_huge_pmd_pte() to handle PMD and PTE level size hugetlb, which uses huge_pte_lock() to get the correct pte entry lock to make the pte entry stable. Mike said: Support for CONT_PMD/_PTE was added with bb9dd3df8ee9 ("arm64: hugetlb: refactor find_num_contig()"). Patch series "Support for contiguous pte hugepages", v4. However, I do not believe these code paths were executed until migration support was added with 5480280d3f2d ("arm64/mm: enable HugeTLB migration for contiguous bit HugeTLB pages") I would go with 5480280d3f2d for the Fixes: targe. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/635f43bdd85ac2615a58405da82b4d33c6e5eb05.1662017562.git.baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 5480280d3f2d ("arm64/mm: enable HugeTLB migration for contiguous bit HugeTLB pages") Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Suggested-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit fac35ba763ed07ba93154c95ffc0c4a55023707f ]

On some architectures (like ARM64), it can support CONT-PTE/PMD size
hugetlb, which means it can support not only PMD/PUD size hugetlb (2M and
1G), but also CONT-PTE/PMD size(64K and 32M) if a 4K page size specified.

So when looking up a CONT-PTE size hugetlb page by follow_page(), it will
use pte_offset_map_lock() to get the pte entry lock for the CONT-PTE size
hugetlb in follow_page_pte().  However this pte entry lock is incorrect
for the CONT-PTE size hugetlb, since we should use huge_pte_lock() to get
the correct lock, which is mm->page_table_lock.

That means the pte entry of the CONT-PTE size hugetlb under current pte
lock is unstable in follow_page_pte(), we can continue to migrate or
poison the pte entry of the CONT-PTE size hugetlb, which can cause some
potential race issues, even though they are under the 'pte lock'.

For example, suppose thread A is trying to look up a CONT-PTE size hugetlb
page by move_pages() syscall under the lock, however antoher thread B can
migrate the CONT-PTE hugetlb page at the same time, which will cause
thread A to get an incorrect page, if thread A also wants to do page
migration, then data inconsistency error occurs.

Moreover we have the same issue for CONT-PMD size hugetlb in
follow_huge_pmd().

To fix above issues, rename the follow_huge_pmd() as follow_huge_pmd_pte()
to handle PMD and PTE level size hugetlb, which uses huge_pte_lock() to
get the correct pte entry lock to make the pte entry stable.

Mike said:

Support for CONT_PMD/_PTE was added with bb9dd3df8ee9 ("arm64: hugetlb:
refactor find_num_contig()").  Patch series "Support for contiguous pte
hugepages", v4.  However, I do not believe these code paths were
executed until migration support was added with 5480280d3f2d ("arm64/mm:
enable HugeTLB migration for contiguous bit HugeTLB pages") I would go
with 5480280d3f2d for the Fixes: targe.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/635f43bdd85ac2615a58405da82b4d33c6e5eb05.1662017562.git.baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 5480280d3f2d ("arm64/mm: enable HugeTLB migration for contiguous bit HugeTLB pages")
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
net/mlx5: Fix possible use-after-free in async command interface 2022-11-03T14:59:19+00:00 Tariq Toukan tariqt@nvidia.com 2022-10-26T13:51:45+00:00 ab3de780c176bb91995c6166a576b370d9726e17 [ Upstream commit bacd22df95147ed673bec4692ab2d4d585935241 ] mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx should return only after all its callback handlers were completed. Before this patch, the below race between mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx and mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler was possible and lead to a use-after-free: 1. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx is called while num_inflight is 2 (i.e. elevated by 1, a single inflight callback). 2. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx decreases num_inflight to 1. 3. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler is called, decreases num_inflight to 0 and is about to call wake_up(). 4. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx calls wait_event, which returns immediately as the condition (num_inflight == 0) holds. 5. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx returns. 6. The caller of mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx frees the mlx5_async_ctx object. 7. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler goes on and calls wake_up() on the freed object. Fix it by syncing using a completion object. Mark it completed when num_inflight reaches 0. Trace: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888139cd12f4 by task swapper/5/0 CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d print_report.cold+0x2d5/0x684 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1a0 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270 do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 ? __delete_object+0xb8/0x100 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x60 ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140 __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140 ? __wake_up_common+0x650/0x650 ? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core] ? kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 ? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core] ? kfree+0x1ba/0x520 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220 mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler+0x136/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_comp_handler+0x65a/0x12b0 [mlx5_core] ? dump_command+0xcc0/0xcc0 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core] cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0 mlx5_eq_async_int+0x3ce/0xa20 [mlx5_core] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0 ? irq_release+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core] irq_int_handler+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1f2/0x620 handle_irq_event+0xb2/0x1d0 handle_edge_irq+0x21e/0xb00 __common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0 common_interrupt+0x78/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60 Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 eb 47 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d e0 9f 48 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 80 08 7f 85 e8 d1 d3 3e fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfdf0 EFLAGS: 00000242 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ecbd48 RCX: 1ffffffff0afe110 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835cc9bc RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88881dec4ac3 R10: ffffed1103bd8958 R11: 0000017d0ca571c9 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: ffffffff84f024e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 ? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x450 default_idle_call+0xec/0x450 do_idle+0x394/0x450 ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40 ? do_idle+0x17/0x450 cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 start_secondary+0x221/0x2b0 ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0x2070/0x2070 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb </TASK> Allocated by task 49502: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 kvmalloc_node+0x48/0xe0 mlx5e_bulk_async_init+0x35/0x110 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x84/0x3e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x40f/0x650 driver_detach+0xc1/0x180 bus_remove_driver+0x125/0x2f0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50 mlx5e_cleanup+0x26/0x30 [mlx5_core] cleanup+0xc/0x4e [mlx5_core] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Freed by task 49502: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 ____kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x1b0 kfree+0x1ba/0x520 mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x2e7/0x3e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x40f/0x650 driver_detach+0xc1/0x180 bus_remove_driver+0x125/0x2f0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50 mlx5e_cleanup+0x26/0x30 [mlx5_core] cleanup+0xc/0x4e [mlx5_core] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Fixes: e355477ed9e4 ("net/mlx5: Make mlx5_cmd_exec_cb() a safe API") Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221026135153.154807-8-saeed@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit bacd22df95147ed673bec4692ab2d4d585935241 ]

mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx should return only after all its callback
handlers were completed. Before this patch, the below race between
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx and mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler was possible and
lead to a use-after-free:

1. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx is called while num_inflight is 2 (i.e.
   elevated by 1, a single inflight callback).
2. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx decreases num_inflight to 1.
3. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler is called, decreases num_inflight to 0 and
   is about to call wake_up().
4. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx calls wait_event, which returns
   immediately as the condition (num_inflight == 0) holds.
5. mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx returns.
6. The caller of mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx frees the mlx5_async_ctx
   object.
7. mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler goes on and calls wake_up() on the freed
   object.

Fix it by syncing using a completion object. Mark it completed when
num_inflight reaches 0.

Trace:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888139cd12f4 by task swapper/5/0

CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3_for_upstream_debug_2022_08_30_13_10 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 print_report.cold+0x2d5/0x684
 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1a0
 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
 do_raw_spin_lock+0x23d/0x270
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 ? __delete_object+0xb8/0x100
 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x60
 ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xb9/0x140
 ? __wake_up_common+0x650/0x650
 ? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
 ? kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 ? destroy_tis_callback+0x53/0x70 [mlx5_core]
 ? kfree+0x1ba/0x520
 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x220
 mlx5_cmd_exec_cb_handler+0x136/0x1a0 [mlx5_core]
 ? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
 ? mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx+0x220/0x220 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5_cmd_comp_handler+0x65a/0x12b0 [mlx5_core]
 ? dump_command+0xcc0/0xcc0 [mlx5_core]
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
 ? cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
 cmd_comp_notifier+0x7e/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
 mlx5_eq_async_int+0x3ce/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xd7/0x1d0
 ? irq_release+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core]
 irq_int_handler+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1f2/0x620
 handle_irq_event+0xb2/0x1d0
 handle_edge_irq+0x21e/0xb00
 __common_interrupt+0x79/0x1a0
 common_interrupt+0x78/0xa0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x42/0x60
Code: c1 83 e0 07 48 c1 e9 03 83 c0 03 0f b6 14 11 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 14 8b 05 eb 47 22 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d e0 9f 48 00 fb f4 <c3> 48 c7 c7 80 08 7f 85 e8 d1 d3 3e fe eb de 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfdf0 EFLAGS: 00000242
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff84ecbd48 RCX: 1ffffffff0afe110
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff835cc9bc
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88881dec4ac3
R10: ffffed1103bd8958 R11: 0000017d0ca571c9 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: ffffffff84f024e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
 ? default_idle_call+0xcc/0x450
 default_idle_call+0xec/0x450
 do_idle+0x394/0x450
 ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x40/0x40
 ? do_idle+0x17/0x450
 cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
 start_secondary+0x221/0x2b0
 ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0x2070/0x2070
 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xcd/0xdb
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 49502:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
 kvmalloc_node+0x48/0xe0
 mlx5e_bulk_async_init+0x35/0x110 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x84/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core]
 auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 device_release_driver_internal+0x40f/0x650
 driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
 bus_remove_driver+0x125/0x2f0
 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
 mlx5e_cleanup+0x26/0x30 [mlx5_core]
 cleanup+0xc/0x4e [mlx5_core]
 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Freed by task 49502:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x11d/0x1b0
 kfree+0x1ba/0x520
 mlx5e_tls_priv_tx_list_cleanup+0x2e7/0x3e0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_ktls_cleanup_tx+0x38f/0x760 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_cleanup_nic_tx+0xa7/0x100 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core]
 mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core]
 auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
 device_release_driver_internal+0x40f/0x650
 driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
 bus_remove_driver+0x125/0x2f0
 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
 mlx5e_cleanup+0x26/0x30 [mlx5_core]
 cleanup+0xc/0x4e [mlx5_core]
 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Fixes: e355477ed9e4 ("net/mlx5: Make mlx5_cmd_exec_cb() a safe API")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221026135153.154807-8-saeed@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
perf: Fix missing SIGTRAPs 2022-11-03T14:59:15+00:00 Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org 2022-10-06T13:00:39+00:00 ca7b0a10287e2733bdafb01ef0d4038536625fe3 [ Upstream commit ca6c21327c6af02b7eec31ce4b9a740a18c6c13f ] Marco reported: Due to the implementation of how SIGTRAP are delivered if perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, we've noticed 3 issues: 1. Missing SIGTRAP due to a race with event_sched_out() (more details below). 2. Hardware PMU events being disabled due to returning 1 from perf_event_overflow(). The only way to re-enable the event is for user space to first "properly" disable the event and then re-enable it. 3. The inability to automatically disable an event after a specified number of overflows via PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH. The worst of the 3 issues is problem (1), which occurs when a pending_disable is "consumed" by a racing event_sched_out(), observed as follows: CPU0 | CPU1 --------------------------------+--------------------------- __perf_event_overflow() | perf_event_disable_inatomic() | pending_disable = CPU0 | ... | _perf_event_enable() | event_function_call() | task_function_call() | /* sends IPI to CPU0 */ <IPI> | ... __perf_event_enable() +--------------------------- ctx_resched() task_ctx_sched_out() ctx_sched_out() group_sched_out() event_sched_out() pending_disable = -1 </IPI> <IRQ-work> perf_pending_event() perf_pending_event_disable() /* Fails to send SIGTRAP because no pending_disable! */ </IRQ-work> In the above case, not only is that particular SIGTRAP missed, but also all future SIGTRAPs because 'event_limit' is not reset back to 1. To fix, rework pending delivery of SIGTRAP via IRQ-work by introduction of a separate 'pending_sigtrap', no longer using 'event_limit' and 'pending_disable' for its delivery. Additionally; and different to Marco's proposed patch: - recognise that pending_disable effectively duplicates oncpu for the case where it is set. As such, change the irq_work handler to use ->oncpu to target the event and use pending_* as boolean toggles. - observe that SIGTRAP targets the ctx->task, so the context switch optimization that carries contexts between tasks is invalid. If the irq_work were delayed enough to hit after a context switch the SIGTRAP would be delivered to the wrong task. - observe that if the event gets scheduled out (rotation/migration/context-switch/...) the irq-work would be insufficient to deliver the SIGTRAP when the event gets scheduled back in (the irq-work might still be pending on the old CPU). Therefore have event_sched_out() convert the pending sigtrap into a task_work which will deliver the signal at return_to_user. Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Debugged-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Debugged-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit ca6c21327c6af02b7eec31ce4b9a740a18c6c13f ]

Marco reported:

Due to the implementation of how SIGTRAP are delivered if
perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, we've noticed 3 issues:

  1. Missing SIGTRAP due to a race with event_sched_out() (more
     details below).

  2. Hardware PMU events being disabled due to returning 1 from
     perf_event_overflow(). The only way to re-enable the event is
     for user space to first "properly" disable the event and then
     re-enable it.

  3. The inability to automatically disable an event after a
     specified number of overflows via PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH.

The worst of the 3 issues is problem (1), which occurs when a
pending_disable is "consumed" by a racing event_sched_out(), observed
as follows:

		CPU0			|	CPU1
	--------------------------------+---------------------------
	__perf_event_overflow()		|
	 perf_event_disable_inatomic()	|
	  pending_disable = CPU0	| ...
					| _perf_event_enable()
					|  event_function_call()
					|   task_function_call()
					|    /* sends IPI to CPU0 */
	<IPI>				| ...
	 __perf_event_enable()		+---------------------------
	  ctx_resched()
	   task_ctx_sched_out()
	    ctx_sched_out()
	     group_sched_out()
	      event_sched_out()
	       pending_disable = -1
	</IPI>
	<IRQ-work>
	 perf_pending_event()
	  perf_pending_event_disable()
	   /* Fails to send SIGTRAP because no pending_disable! */
	</IRQ-work>

In the above case, not only is that particular SIGTRAP missed, but also
all future SIGTRAPs because 'event_limit' is not reset back to 1.

To fix, rework pending delivery of SIGTRAP via IRQ-work by introduction
of a separate 'pending_sigtrap', no longer using 'event_limit' and
'pending_disable' for its delivery.

Additionally; and different to Marco's proposed patch:

 - recognise that pending_disable effectively duplicates oncpu for
   the case where it is set. As such, change the irq_work handler to
   use ->oncpu to target the event and use pending_* as boolean toggles.

 - observe that SIGTRAP targets the ctx->task, so the context switch
   optimization that carries contexts between tasks is invalid. If
   the irq_work were delayed enough to hit after a context switch the
   SIGTRAP would be delivered to the wrong task.

 - observe that if the event gets scheduled out
   (rotation/migration/context-switch/...) the irq-work would be
   insufficient to deliver the SIGTRAP when the event gets scheduled
   back in (the irq-work might still be pending on the old CPU).

   Therefore have event_sched_out() convert the pending sigtrap into a
   task_work which will deliver the signal at return_to_user.

Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Debugged-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup. 2022-11-03T14:59:10+00:00 Benjamin Coddington bcodding@redhat.com 2022-05-14T11:05:13+00:00 eb1fe9600b86c24a789046bfc5c6851dda119280 commit c3ed222745d9ad7b69299b349a64ba533c64a34f upstream. Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and drop the memcpy of fattr. We end up growing two more allocations, but this fixes up a crash as: PID: 790 TASK: ffff88811b43c000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ls" #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs] #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553 #9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9558a007dbc3 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit c3ed222745d9ad7b69299b349a64ba533c64a34f upstream.

Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and
drop the memcpy of fattr.  We end up growing two more allocations, but this
fixes up a crash as:

PID: 790    TASK: ffff88811b43c000  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "ls"
 #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde
 #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b
 #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78
 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45
 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de
 #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs]
 #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f
 #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4
 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553
 #9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b

Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9558a007dbc3 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mmc: core: Add SD card quirk for broken discard 2022-10-29T08:12:58+00:00 Avri Altman avri.altman@wdc.com 2022-09-28T09:57:44+00:00 b9d8cbe90a0f27f2ec4f6f32e7faf86282eb4d7d commit 07d2872bf4c864eb83d034263c155746a2fb7a3b upstream. Some SD-cards from Sandisk that are SDA-6.0 compliant reports they supports discard, while they actually don't. This might cause mk2fs to fail while trying to format the card and revert it to a read-only mode. To fix this problem, let's add a card quirk (MMC_QUIRK_BROKEN_SD_DISCARD) to indicate that we shall fall-back to use the legacy erase command instead. Signed-off-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman@wdc.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928095744.16455-1-avri.altman@wdc.com [Ulf: Updated the commit message] Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 07d2872bf4c864eb83d034263c155746a2fb7a3b upstream.

Some SD-cards from Sandisk that are SDA-6.0 compliant reports they supports
discard, while they actually don't. This might cause mk2fs to fail while
trying to format the card and revert it to a read-only mode.

To fix this problem, let's add a card quirk (MMC_QUIRK_BROKEN_SD_DISCARD)
to indicate that we shall fall-back to use the legacy erase command
instead.

Signed-off-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman@wdc.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220928095744.16455-1-avri.altman@wdc.com
[Ulf: Updated the commit message]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: phylink: add mac_managed_pm in phylink_config structure 2022-10-29T08:12:56+00:00 Shenwei Wang shenwei.wang@nxp.com 2022-10-14T14:47:28+00:00 b9122e0e0ea85997e481db5062f867c797cd229b [ Upstream commit 96de900ae78e7dbedc937fd91bafe2934579c65a ] The recent commit 'commit 744d23c71af3 ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect mdio_bus_phy_resume() state")' requires the MAC driver explicitly tell the phy driver who is managing the PM, otherwise you will see warning during resume stage. Add a boolean property in the phylink_config structure so that the MAC driver can use it to tell the PHY driver if it wants to manage the PM. Fixes: 744d23c71af3 ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect mdio_bus_phy_resume() state") Signed-off-by: Shenwei Wang <shenwei.wang@nxp.com> Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 96de900ae78e7dbedc937fd91bafe2934579c65a ]

The recent commit

'commit 744d23c71af3 ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect
mdio_bus_phy_resume() state")'

requires the MAC driver explicitly tell the phy driver who is
managing the PM, otherwise you will see warning during resume
stage.

Add a boolean property in the phylink_config structure so that
the MAC driver can use it to tell the PHY driver if it wants to
manage the PM.

Fixes: 744d23c71af3 ("net: phy: Warn about incorrect mdio_bus_phy_resume() state")
Signed-off-by: Shenwei Wang <shenwei.wang@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kvm: Add support for arch compat vm ioctls 2022-10-29T08:12:54+00:00 Alexander Graf graf@amazon.com 2022-10-17T18:45:39+00:00 5bf2fda26a720305ce4cfb96a15dd404475e01a2 commit ed51862f2f57cbce6fed2d4278cfe70a490899fd upstream. We will introduce the first architecture specific compat vm ioctl in the next patch. Add all necessary boilerplate to allow architectures to override compat vm ioctls when necessary. Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Message-Id: <20221017184541.2658-2-graf@amazon.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit ed51862f2f57cbce6fed2d4278cfe70a490899fd upstream.

We will introduce the first architecture specific compat vm ioctl in the
next patch. Add all necessary boilerplate to allow architectures to
override compat vm ioctls when necessary.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20221017184541.2658-2-graf@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>