<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v4.19.63</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentials</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:27:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-11T16:54:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=408af82309a73e6b47c9227756fef9a0d4400708'/>
<id>408af82309a73e6b47c9227756fef9a0d4400708</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.

It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.

The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.

Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.

But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary.  Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all.  Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.

So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this).  We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.

Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards.  It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.

It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
-&gt;cred entirely.  Only -&gt;real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.

But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.

Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jan Glauber &lt;jglauber@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Kosina &lt;jikos@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair &lt;jnair@marvell.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;greg@kroah.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Miklos Szeredi &lt;miklos@szeredi.hu&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpu: host1x: Increase maximum DMA segment size</title>
<updated>2019-07-31T05:26:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thierry Reding</name>
<email>treding@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-05T08:46:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d14323a2eb556a9d06d0a956618662bc9dad1c1'/>
<id>4d14323a2eb556a9d06d0a956618662bc9dad1c1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1e390478cfb527e34c9ab89ba57212cb05c33c51 ]

Recent versions of the DMA API debug code have started to warn about
violations of the maximum DMA segment size. This is because the segment
size defaults to 64 KiB, which can easily be exceeded in large buffer
allocations such as used in DRM/KMS for framebuffers.

Technically the Tegra SMMU and ARM SMMU don't have a maximum segment
size (they map individual pages irrespective of whether they are
contiguous or not), so the choice of 4 MiB is a bit arbitrary here. The
maximum segment size is a 32-bit unsigned integer, though, so we can't
set it to the correct maximum size, which would be the size of the
aperture.

Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1e390478cfb527e34c9ab89ba57212cb05c33c51 ]

Recent versions of the DMA API debug code have started to warn about
violations of the maximum DMA segment size. This is because the segment
size defaults to 64 KiB, which can easily be exceeded in large buffer
allocations such as used in DRM/KMS for framebuffers.

Technically the Tegra SMMU and ARM SMMU don't have a maximum segment
size (they map individual pages irrespective of whether they are
contiguous or not), so the choice of 4 MiB is a bit arbitrary here. The
maximum segment size is a 32-bit unsigned integer, though, so we can't
set it to the correct maximum size, which would be the size of the
aperture.

Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding &lt;treding@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jbd2: introduce jbd2_inode dirty range scoping</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Zwisler</name>
<email>zwisler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T21:24:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af3812b65c3785f7d052b4a1f5dd7c6f54a77e24'/>
<id>af3812b65c3785f7d052b4a1f5dd7c6f54a77e24</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.

Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space
of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry.  The
consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly
appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of
time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the
pages under writeback to be written out.

The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from
/dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem.  This can
cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of
the entire dd operation.

We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges
associated with a given transaction.  We do this via the jbd2_inode
structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it
follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.

This allows us to limit the writeback &amp; wait in
journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for
a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode
in question is still being appended to.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6ba0e7dc64a5adcda2fbe65adc466891795d639e upstream.

Currently both journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() operate on the entire address space
of each of the inodes associated with a given journal entry.  The
consequence of this is that if we have an inode where we are constantly
appending dirty pages we can end up waiting for an indefinite amount of
time in journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() while we wait for all the
pages under writeback to be written out.

The easiest way to cause this type of workload is do just dd from
/dev/zero to a file until it fills the entire filesystem.  This can
cause journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() to wait for the duration of
the entire dd operation.

We can improve this situation by scoping each of the inode dirty ranges
associated with a given transaction.  We do this via the jbd2_inode
structure so that the scoping is contained within jbd2 and so that it
follows the lifetime and locking rules for that structure.

This allows us to limit the writeback &amp; wait in
journal_submit_inode_data_buffers() and
journal_finish_inode_data_buffers() respectively to the dirty range for
a given struct jdb2_inode, keeping us from waiting forever if the inode
in question is still being appended to.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: add filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors()</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ross Zwisler</name>
<email>zwisler@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-20T21:05:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4becd6c11e9a0be4ab8af7b28e9bbc01288da014'/>
<id>4becd6c11e9a0be4ab8af7b28e9bbc01288da014</id>
<content type='text'>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and
filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon
which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit aa0bfcd939c30617385ffa28682c062d78050eba upstream.

In the spirit of filemap_fdatawait_range() and
filemap_fdatawait_keep_errors(), introduce
filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors() which both takes a range upon
which to wait and does not clear errors from the address space.

Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler &lt;zwisler@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf/core: Fix exclusive events' grouping</title>
<updated>2019-07-28T06:29:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Shishkin</name>
<email>alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-01T11:07:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75100ec5f079c5c3c65b28a6b8d360acfe00b983'/>
<id>75100ec5f079c5c3c65b28a6b8d360acfe00b983</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.

So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of
complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically,
moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity
rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.

This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the
perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and
insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated
by running:

  $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
  $ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' uname

ultimately successfully.

Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation
by:

   perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'

even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.

The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because
it's also wrong.

Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid
of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: bed5b25ad9c8a ("perf: Add a pmu capability for "exclusive" events")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701110755.24646-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8a58ddae23796c733c5dfbd717538d89d036c5bd upstream.

So far, we tried to disallow grouping exclusive events for the fear of
complications they would cause with moving between contexts. Specifically,
moving a software group to a hardware context would violate the exclusivity
rules if both groups contain matching exclusive events.

This attempt was, however, unsuccessful: the check that we have in the
perf_event_open() syscall is both wrong (looks at wrong PMU) and
insufficient (group leader may still be exclusive), as can be illustrated
by running:

  $ perf record -e '{intel_pt//,cycles}' uname
  $ perf record -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' uname

ultimately successfully.

Furthermore, we are completely free to trigger the exclusivity violation
by:

   perf -e '{cycles,intel_pt//}' -e '{intel_pt//,instructions}'

even though the helpful perf record will not allow that, the ABI will.

The warning later in the perf_event_open() path will also not trigger, because
it's also wrong.

Fix all this by validating the original group before moving, getting rid
of broken safeguards and placing a useful one to perf_install_in_context().

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Stephane Eranian &lt;eranian@google.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Vince Weaver &lt;vincent.weaver@maine.edu&gt;
Cc: mathieu.poirier@linaro.org
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Fixes: bed5b25ad9c8a ("perf: Add a pmu capability for "exclusive" events")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190701110755.24646-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clocksource/drivers/exynos_mct: Increase priority over ARM arch timer</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:14:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marek Szyprowski</name>
<email>m.szyprowski@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-30T10:50:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e69fac59c493107bf25343ad7b387530e2334836'/>
<id>e69fac59c493107bf25343ad7b387530e2334836</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6282edb72bed5324352522d732080d4c1b9dfed6 ]

Exynos SoCs based on CA7/CA15 have 2 timer interfaces: custom Exynos MCT
(Multi Core Timer) and standard ARM Architected Timers.

There are use cases, where both timer interfaces are used simultanously.
One of such examples is using Exynos MCT for the main system timer and
ARM Architected Timers for the KVM and virtualized guests (KVM requires
arch timers).

Exynos Multi-Core Timer driver (exynos_mct) must be however started
before ARM Architected Timers (arch_timer), because they both share some
common hardware blocks (global system counter) and turning on MCT is
needed to get ARM Architected Timer working properly.

To ensure selecting Exynos MCT as the main system timer, increase MCT
timer rating. To ensure proper starting order of both timers during
suspend/resume cycle, increase MCT hotplug priority over ARM Archictected
Timers.

Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chanwoo Choi &lt;cw00.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano &lt;daniel.lezcano@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6282edb72bed5324352522d732080d4c1b9dfed6 ]

Exynos SoCs based on CA7/CA15 have 2 timer interfaces: custom Exynos MCT
(Multi Core Timer) and standard ARM Architected Timers.

There are use cases, where both timer interfaces are used simultanously.
One of such examples is using Exynos MCT for the main system timer and
ARM Architected Timers for the KVM and virtualized guests (KVM requires
arch timers).

Exynos Multi-Core Timer driver (exynos_mct) must be however started
before ARM Architected Timers (arch_timer), because they both share some
common hardware blocks (global system counter) and turning on MCT is
needed to get ARM Architected Timer working properly.

To ensure selecting Exynos MCT as the main system timer, increase MCT
timer rating. To ensure proper starting order of both timers during
suspend/resume cycle, increase MCT hotplug priority over ARM Archictected
Timers.

Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski &lt;m.szyprowski@samsung.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Chanwoo Choi &lt;cw00.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano &lt;daniel.lezcano@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rcu: Force inlining of rcu_read_lock()</title>
<updated>2019-07-26T07:14:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Waiman Long</name>
<email>longman@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-21T20:48:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=366ae49ed78ccdd66df37c7dcd3be7710511b2cc'/>
<id>366ae49ed78ccdd66df37c7dcd3be7710511b2cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6da9f775175e516fc7229ceaa9b54f8f56aa7924 ]

When debugging options are turned on, the rcu_read_lock() function
might not be inlined. This results in lockdep's print_lock() function
printing "rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70" instead of rcu_read_lock()'s caller.
For example:

[   10.579995] =============================
[   10.584033] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   10.588074] 4.18.0.memcg_v2+ #1 Not tainted
[   10.593162] -----------------------------
[   10.597203] include/linux/rcupdate.h:281 Illegal context switch in
RCU read-side critical section!
[   10.606220]
[   10.606220] other info that might help us debug this:
[   10.606220]
[   10.614280]
[   10.614280] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[   10.620853] 3 locks held by systemd/1:
[   10.624632]  #0: (____ptrval____) (&amp;type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key#5){.+.+}, at: lookup_slow+0x42/0x70
[   10.633232]  #1: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70
[   10.640954]  #2: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70

These "rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70" strings are not providing any useful
information.  This commit therefore forces inlining of the rcu_read_lock()
function so that rcu_read_lock()'s caller is instead shown.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6da9f775175e516fc7229ceaa9b54f8f56aa7924 ]

When debugging options are turned on, the rcu_read_lock() function
might not be inlined. This results in lockdep's print_lock() function
printing "rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70" instead of rcu_read_lock()'s caller.
For example:

[   10.579995] =============================
[   10.584033] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   10.588074] 4.18.0.memcg_v2+ #1 Not tainted
[   10.593162] -----------------------------
[   10.597203] include/linux/rcupdate.h:281 Illegal context switch in
RCU read-side critical section!
[   10.606220]
[   10.606220] other info that might help us debug this:
[   10.606220]
[   10.614280]
[   10.614280] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[   10.620853] 3 locks held by systemd/1:
[   10.624632]  #0: (____ptrval____) (&amp;type-&gt;i_mutex_dir_key#5){.+.+}, at: lookup_slow+0x42/0x70
[   10.633232]  #1: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70
[   10.640954]  #2: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70

These "rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x70" strings are not providing any useful
information.  This commit therefore forces inlining of the rcu_read_lock()
function so that rcu_read_lock()'s caller is instead shown.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long &lt;longman@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>linux/kernel.h: fix overflow for DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL</title>
<updated>2019-07-21T07:03:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vinod Koul</name>
<email>vkoul@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-28T19:07:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2656ee5a5ad59300bbe183d0833867a582910dcc'/>
<id>2656ee5a5ad59300bbe183d0833867a582910dcc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8f9fab480c7a87b10bb5440b5555f370272a5d59 ]

DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL adds the two arguments and then invokes
DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL.  But on a 32bit system the addition of two 32 bit
values can overflow.  DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL does it correctly and stashes
the addition into a unsigned long long so cast the result to unsigned
long long here to avoid the overflow condition.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL must be an rval]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190625100518.30753-1-vkoul@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Andersson &lt;bjorn.andersson@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8f9fab480c7a87b10bb5440b5555f370272a5d59 ]

DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL adds the two arguments and then invokes
DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL.  But on a 32bit system the addition of two 32 bit
values can overflow.  DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL does it correctly and stashes
the addition into a unsigned long long so cast the result to unsigned
long long here to avoid the overflow condition.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL must be an rval]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190625100518.30753-1-vkoul@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul &lt;vkoul@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Bjorn Andersson &lt;bjorn.andersson@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>drivers: base: cacheinfo: Ensure cpu hotplug work is done before Intel RDT</title>
<updated>2019-07-21T07:03:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morse</name>
<email>james.morse@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-24T17:36:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=079d7f16a9738f8ea8a71671f5481f9b5049da3a'/>
<id>079d7f16a9738f8ea8a71671f5481f9b5049da3a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83b44fe343b5abfcb1b2261289bd0cfcfcfd60a8 upstream.

The cacheinfo structures are alloced/freed by cpu online/offline
callbacks. Originally these were only used by sysfs to expose the
cache topology to user space. Without any in-kernel dependencies
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN was an appropriate choice.

resctrl has started using these structures to identify CPUs that
share a cache. It updates its 'domain' structures from cpu
online/offline callbacks. These depend on the cacheinfo structures
(resctrl_online_cpu()-&gt;domain_add_cpu()-&gt;get_cache_id()-&gt;
 get_cpu_cacheinfo()).
These also run as CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN.

Now that there is an in-kernel dependency, move the cacheinfo
work earlier so we know its done before resctrl's CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN
work runs.

Fixes: 2264d9c74dda1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Build structures for each resource based on cache topology")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190624173656.202407-1-james.morse@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 83b44fe343b5abfcb1b2261289bd0cfcfcfd60a8 upstream.

The cacheinfo structures are alloced/freed by cpu online/offline
callbacks. Originally these were only used by sysfs to expose the
cache topology to user space. Without any in-kernel dependencies
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN was an appropriate choice.

resctrl has started using these structures to identify CPUs that
share a cache. It updates its 'domain' structures from cpu
online/offline callbacks. These depend on the cacheinfo structures
(resctrl_online_cpu()-&gt;domain_add_cpu()-&gt;get_cache_id()-&gt;
 get_cpu_cacheinfo()).
These also run as CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN.

Now that there is an in-kernel dependency, move the cacheinfo
work earlier so we know its done before resctrl's CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN
work runs.

Fixes: 2264d9c74dda1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Build structures for each resource based on cache topology")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Fenghua Yu &lt;fenghua.yu@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Reinette Chatre &lt;reinette.chatre@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190624173656.202407-1-james.morse@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>VMCI: Fix integer overflow in VMCI handle arrays</title>
<updated>2019-07-14T06:11:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vishnu DASA</name>
<email>vdasa@vmware.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-24T15:13:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d202b5adccfb093c4859d67ec74d5f3fb9fcfc54'/>
<id>d202b5adccfb093c4859d67ec74d5f3fb9fcfc54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1c2eb5b2853c9f513690ba6b71072d8eb65da16a upstream.

The VMCI handle array has an integer overflow in
vmci_handle_arr_append_entry when it tries to expand the array. This can be
triggered from a guest, since the doorbell link hypercall doesn't impose a
limit on the number of doorbell handles that a VM can create in the
hypervisor, and these handles are stored in a handle array.

In this change, we introduce a mandatory max capacity for handle
arrays/lists to avoid excessive memory usage.

Signed-off-by: Vishnu Dasa &lt;vdasa@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive &lt;aditr@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen &lt;jhansen@vmware.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1c2eb5b2853c9f513690ba6b71072d8eb65da16a upstream.

The VMCI handle array has an integer overflow in
vmci_handle_arr_append_entry when it tries to expand the array. This can be
triggered from a guest, since the doorbell link hypercall doesn't impose a
limit on the number of doorbell handles that a VM can create in the
hypervisor, and these handles are stored in a handle array.

In this change, we introduce a mandatory max capacity for handle
arrays/lists to avoid excessive memory usage.

Signed-off-by: Vishnu Dasa &lt;vdasa@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive &lt;aditr@vmware.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen &lt;jhansen@vmware.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
