<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v3.16.44</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>locking/static_keys: Add static_key_{en,dis}able() helpers</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:17:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-24T13:03:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0331b8df8465955329d55a419ddbe4532be53de6'/>
<id>0331b8df8465955329d55a419ddbe4532be53de6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e33886b38cc82a9fc3b2d655dfc7f50467594138 upstream.

Add two helpers to make it easier to treat the refcount as boolean.

Suggested-by: Jason Baron &lt;jasonbaron0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e33886b38cc82a9fc3b2d655dfc7f50467594138 upstream.

Add two helpers to make it easier to treat the refcount as boolean.

Suggested-by: Jason Baron &lt;jasonbaron0@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/mlx4: &amp;&amp; vs &amp; typo</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:17:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>dan.carpenter@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-28T12:02:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b062afbe20f28efbc5897bbf4ccef10e194db298'/>
<id>b062afbe20f28efbc5897bbf4ccef10e194db298</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b2d0fe35471d1a71471f99147ffb5986bd60e744 upstream.

Bitwise &amp; was obviously intended here.

Fixes: 745d8ae4622c ("net/mlx4: Spoofcheck and zero MAC can't coexist")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b2d0fe35471d1a71471f99147ffb5986bd60e744 upstream.

Bitwise &amp; was obviously intended here.

Fixes: 745d8ae4622c ("net/mlx4: Spoofcheck and zero MAC can't coexist")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/mlx4: Spoofcheck and zero MAC can't coexist</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:17:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eugenia Emantayev</name>
<email>eugenia@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-23T10:02:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=914bacc3d55dc9f9f6e16f058362bfebd76e6277'/>
<id>914bacc3d55dc9f9f6e16f058362bfebd76e6277</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 745d8ae4622c6808b22e33a944c7decb30074be4 upstream.

Spoofcheck can't be enabled if VF MAC is zero.
Vice versa, can't zero MAC if spoofcheck is on.

Fixes: 8f7ba3ca12f6 ('net/mlx4: Add set VF mac address support')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev &lt;eugenia@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 745d8ae4622c6808b22e33a944c7decb30074be4 upstream.

Spoofcheck can't be enabled if VF MAC is zero.
Vice versa, can't zero MAC if spoofcheck is on.

Fixes: 8f7ba3ca12f6 ('net/mlx4: Add set VF mac address support')
Signed-off-by: Eugenia Emantayev &lt;eugenia@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan &lt;tariqt@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: fix &lt;linux/pagemap.h&gt; stray kernel-doc notation</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:17:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-22T23:46:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=179d24052ed075150a167dfb5510327d714d041a'/>
<id>179d24052ed075150a167dfb5510327d714d041a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 083fb8edda0487d192e8c117f625563b920cf7a4 upstream.

Delete stray (second) function description in find_lock_page()
kernel-doc notation.

Note: scripts/kernel-doc just ignores the second function description.

Fixes: 2457aec63745e ("mm: non-atomically mark page accessed during page cache allocation where possible")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b037e9a3-516c-ec02-6c8e-fa5479747ba6@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 083fb8edda0487d192e8c117f625563b920cf7a4 upstream.

Delete stray (second) function description in find_lock_page()
kernel-doc notation.

Note: scripts/kernel-doc just ignores the second function description.

Fixes: 2457aec63745e ("mm: non-atomically mark page accessed during page cache allocation where possible")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b037e9a3-516c-ec02-6c8e-fa5479747ba6@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox &lt;mawilcox@microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nlm: Ensure callback code also checks that the files match</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:17:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>trond.myklebust@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-11T15:37:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bdf0863011d5d23857b61d2d41372fee53e91b0e'/>
<id>bdf0863011d5d23857b61d2d41372fee53e91b0e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 251af29c320d86071664f02c76f0d063a19fefdf upstream.

It is not sufficient to just check that the lock pids match when
granting a callback, we also need to ensure that we're granting
the callback on the right file.

Reported-by: Pankaj Singh &lt;psingh.ait@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 251af29c320d86071664f02c76f0d063a19fefdf upstream.

It is not sufficient to just check that the lock pids match when
granting a callback, we also need to ensure that we're granting
the callback on the right file.

Reported-by: Pankaj Singh &lt;psingh.ait@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;trond.myklebust@primarydata.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker &lt;Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>locking/ww_mutex: Fix compilation of __WW_MUTEX_INITIALIZER</title>
<updated>2017-06-05T20:16:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Wilson</name>
<email>chris@chris-wilson.co.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2016-12-01T11:47:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4675edf4758da56a31fb254e7648d132dd37441a'/>
<id>4675edf4758da56a31fb254e7648d132dd37441a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit af2e859edd477fa1ea3d1d106f41a595cff3d162 upstream.

From conflicting macro parameters, passing the wrong name to
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER and a stray '\', #define __WW_MUTEX_INITIALIZER was
very unhappy.

One unnecessary change was to choose to pass &amp;ww_class instead of
implicitly taking the address of the class within the macro.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 1b375dc30710 ("mutex: Move ww_mutex definitions to ww_mutex.h")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161201114711.28697-2-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit af2e859edd477fa1ea3d1d106f41a595cff3d162 upstream.

From conflicting macro parameters, passing the wrong name to
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER and a stray '\', #define __WW_MUTEX_INITIALIZER was
very unhappy.

One unnecessary change was to choose to pass &amp;ww_class instead of
implicitly taking the address of the class within the macro.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson &lt;chris@chris-wilson.co.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst &lt;maarten.lankhorst@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 1b375dc30710 ("mutex: Move ww_mutex definitions to ww_mutex.h")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161201114711.28697-2-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:21:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-29T19:42:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=495d1af4041fcb3cb726ca414d3c09cbb251fefa'/>
<id>495d1af4041fcb3cb726ca414d3c09cbb251fefa</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a upstream.

Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we don't have super_block::s_iflags; use
 file_system_type::fs_flags instead]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a upstream.

Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we don't have super_block::s_iflags; use
 file_system_type::fs_flags instead]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>blk: rq_data_dir() should not return a boolean</title>
<updated>2017-04-04T21:21:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-05-27T22:32:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5b9e032567e1a762bd86d1c7d4d6cf325b024c33'/>
<id>5b9e032567e1a762bd86d1c7d4d6cf325b024c33</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 10fbd36e362a0f367e34a7cd876a81295d8fc5ca upstream.

rq_data_dir() returns either READ or WRITE (0 == READ, 1 == WRITE), not
a boolean value.

Now, admittedly the "!= 0" doesn't really change the value (0 stays as
zero, 1 stays as one), but it's not only redundant, it confuses gcc, and
causes gcc to warn about the construct

    switch (rq_data_dir(req)) {
        case READ:
            ...
        case WRITE:
            ...

that we have in a few drivers.

Now, the gcc warning is silly and stupid (it seems to warn not about the
switch value having a different type from the case statements, but about
_any_ boolean switch value), but in this case the code itself is silly
and stupid too, so let's just change it, and get rid of warnings like
this:

  drivers/block/hd.c: In function ‘hd_request’:
  drivers/block/hd.c:630:11: warning: switch condition has boolean value [-Wswitch-bool]
     switch (rq_data_dir(req)) {

The odd '!= 0' came in when "cmd_flags" got turned into a "u64" in
commit 5953316dbf90 ("block: make rq-&gt;cmd_flags be 64-bit") and is
presumably because the old code (that just did a logical 'and' with 1)
would then end up making the type of rq_data_dir() be u64 too.

But if we want to retain the old regular integer type, let's just cast
the result to 'int' rather than use that rather odd '!= 0'.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 10fbd36e362a0f367e34a7cd876a81295d8fc5ca upstream.

rq_data_dir() returns either READ or WRITE (0 == READ, 1 == WRITE), not
a boolean value.

Now, admittedly the "!= 0" doesn't really change the value (0 stays as
zero, 1 stays as one), but it's not only redundant, it confuses gcc, and
causes gcc to warn about the construct

    switch (rq_data_dir(req)) {
        case READ:
            ...
        case WRITE:
            ...

that we have in a few drivers.

Now, the gcc warning is silly and stupid (it seems to warn not about the
switch value having a different type from the case statements, but about
_any_ boolean switch value), but in this case the code itself is silly
and stupid too, so let's just change it, and get rid of warnings like
this:

  drivers/block/hd.c: In function ‘hd_request’:
  drivers/block/hd.c:630:11: warning: switch condition has boolean value [-Wswitch-bool]
     switch (rq_data_dir(req)) {

The odd '!= 0' came in when "cmd_flags" got turned into a "u64" in
commit 5953316dbf90 ("block: make rq-&gt;cmd_flags be 64-bit") and is
presumably because the old code (that just did a logical 'and' with 1)
would then end up making the type of rq_data_dir() be u64 too.

But if we want to retain the old regular integer type, let's just cast
the result to 'int' rather than use that rather odd '!= 0'.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: Fix kernel panic at security_sock_rcv_skb</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:27:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-27T16:11:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b6927bd60d353de044584ab9400aaccd8694fe1e'/>
<id>b6927bd60d353de044584ab9400aaccd8694fe1e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f1712c73714088a7252d276a57126d56c7d37e64 ]

Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a
synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister()

The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU
protected.

If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after
one RCU grace period.

Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's
ease stable backports with the following fix instead.

[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff81495e25&gt;] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0

Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff81485d8c&gt;] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60
 [&lt;ffffffff81d55771&gt;] sk_filter+0x41/0x210
 [&lt;ffffffff81d12913&gt;] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0
 [&lt;ffffffff81f0a2b3&gt;] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0
 [&lt;ffffffff81f06eab&gt;] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370
 [&lt;ffffffff81f07af9&gt;] can_receive+0xd9/0x120
 [&lt;ffffffff81f07beb&gt;] can_rcv+0xab/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff81d362ac&gt;] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0
 [&lt;ffffffff81d36734&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff81d37f67&gt;] process_backlog+0x127/0x280
 [&lt;ffffffff81d36f7b&gt;] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810c88d4&gt;] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440
 [&lt;ffffffff81f9e86c&gt;] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
 &lt;EOI&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff810c76fb&gt;] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff810c8bed&gt;] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff81d30085&gt;] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110
 [&lt;ffffffff8199cc87&gt;] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520
 [&lt;ffffffff8167ef7c&gt;] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230
 [&lt;ffffffff810e3baf&gt;] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670
 [&lt;ffffffff810e44ed&gt;] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810e4450&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
 [&lt;ffffffff810ebafc&gt;] kthread+0x12c/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff81f9ccef&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70

Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin &lt;yanmin.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f1712c73714088a7252d276a57126d56c7d37e64 ]

Zhang Yanmin reported crashes [1] and provided a patch adding a
synchronize_rcu() call in can_rx_unregister()

The main problem seems that the sockets themselves are not RCU
protected.

If CAN uses RCU for delivery, then sockets should be freed only after
one RCU grace period.

Recent kernels could use sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE), but let's
ease stable backports with the following fix instead.

[1]
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [&lt;ffffffff81495e25&gt;] selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb+0x65/0x2a0

Call Trace:
 &lt;IRQ&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff81485d8c&gt;] security_sock_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x60
 [&lt;ffffffff81d55771&gt;] sk_filter+0x41/0x210
 [&lt;ffffffff81d12913&gt;] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x53/0x3a0
 [&lt;ffffffff81f0a2b3&gt;] raw_rcv+0x2a3/0x3c0
 [&lt;ffffffff81f06eab&gt;] can_rcv_filter+0x12b/0x370
 [&lt;ffffffff81f07af9&gt;] can_receive+0xd9/0x120
 [&lt;ffffffff81f07beb&gt;] can_rcv+0xab/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff81d362ac&gt;] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xd8c/0x11f0
 [&lt;ffffffff81d36734&gt;] __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0xb0
 [&lt;ffffffff81d37f67&gt;] process_backlog+0x127/0x280
 [&lt;ffffffff81d36f7b&gt;] net_rx_action+0x33b/0x4f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810c88d4&gt;] __do_softirq+0x184/0x440
 [&lt;ffffffff81f9e86c&gt;] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
 &lt;EOI&gt;
 [&lt;ffffffff810c76fb&gt;] do_softirq.part.18+0x3b/0x40
 [&lt;ffffffff810c8bed&gt;] do_softirq+0x1d/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff81d30085&gt;] netif_rx_ni+0xe5/0x110
 [&lt;ffffffff8199cc87&gt;] slcan_receive_buf+0x507/0x520
 [&lt;ffffffff8167ef7c&gt;] flush_to_ldisc+0x21c/0x230
 [&lt;ffffffff810e3baf&gt;] process_one_work+0x24f/0x670
 [&lt;ffffffff810e44ed&gt;] worker_thread+0x9d/0x6f0
 [&lt;ffffffff810e4450&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480
 [&lt;ffffffff810ebafc&gt;] kthread+0x12c/0x150
 [&lt;ffffffff81f9ccef&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70

Reported-by: Zhang Yanmin &lt;yanmin.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix tcp_fastopen unaligned access complaints on sparc</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:27:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Shannon Nelson</name>
<email>shannon.nelson@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-01-12T22:24:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9706d633879045c9b771a94b24b7d817aae23b0c'/>
<id>9706d633879045c9b771a94b24b7d817aae23b0c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 003c941057eaa868ca6fedd29a274c863167230d ]

Fix up a data alignment issue on sparc by swapping the order
of the cookie byte array field with the length field in
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie, and making it a proper union
to clean up the typecasting.

This addresses log complaints like these:
    log_unaligned: 113 callbacks suppressed
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764ac] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2ec/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764c8] tcp_try_fastopen+0x308/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764e4] tcp_try_fastopen+0x324/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 003c941057eaa868ca6fedd29a274c863167230d ]

Fix up a data alignment issue on sparc by swapping the order
of the cookie byte array field with the length field in
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie, and making it a proper union
to clean up the typecasting.

This addresses log complaints like these:
    log_unaligned: 113 callbacks suppressed
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764ac] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2ec/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764c8] tcp_try_fastopen+0x308/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[9764e4] tcp_try_fastopen+0x324/0x360
    Kernel unaligned access at TPC[976490] tcp_try_fastopen+0x2d0/0x360

Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson &lt;shannon.nelson@oracle.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
