<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux, branch v3.0.57</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tmpfs: fix shared mempolicy leak</title>
<updated>2012-12-17T18:49:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-05T22:01:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=15487eba1006de0db3c8d9f78ef16700a4d0a217'/>
<id>15487eba1006de0db3c8d9f78ef16700a4d0a217</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 18a2f371f5edf41810f6469cb9be39931ef9deb9 upstream.

This fixes a regression in 3.7-rc, which has since gone into stable.

Commit 00442ad04a5e ("mempolicy: fix a memory corruption by refcount
imbalance in alloc_pages_vma()") changed get_vma_policy() to raise the
refcount on a shmem shared mempolicy; whereas shmem_alloc_page() went
on expecting alloc_page_vma() to drop the refcount it had acquired.
This deserves a rework: but for now fix the leak in shmem_alloc_page().

Hugh: shmem_swapin() did not need a fix, but surely it's clearer to use
the same refcounting there as in shmem_alloc_page(), delete its onstack
mempolicy, and the strange mpol_cond_copy() and __mpol_cond_copy() -
those were invented to let swapin_readahead() make an unknown number of
calls to alloc_pages_vma() with one mempolicy; but since 00442ad04a5e,
alloc_pages_vma() has kept refcount in balance, so now no problem.

Reported-and-tested-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tt.rantala@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 18a2f371f5edf41810f6469cb9be39931ef9deb9 upstream.

This fixes a regression in 3.7-rc, which has since gone into stable.

Commit 00442ad04a5e ("mempolicy: fix a memory corruption by refcount
imbalance in alloc_pages_vma()") changed get_vma_policy() to raise the
refcount on a shmem shared mempolicy; whereas shmem_alloc_page() went
on expecting alloc_page_vma() to drop the refcount it had acquired.
This deserves a rework: but for now fix the leak in shmem_alloc_page().

Hugh: shmem_swapin() did not need a fix, but surely it's clearer to use
the same refcounting there as in shmem_alloc_page(), delete its onstack
mempolicy, and the strange mpol_cond_copy() and __mpol_cond_copy() -
those were invented to let swapin_readahead() make an unknown number of
calls to alloc_pages_vma() with one mempolicy; but since 00442ad04a5e,
alloc_pages_vma() has kept refcount in balance, so now no problem.

Reported-and-tested-by: Tommi Rantala &lt;tt.rantala@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PCI : ability to relocate assigned pci-resources</title>
<updated>2012-11-26T19:34:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ram Pai</name>
<email>linuxram@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-25T20:08:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36720ae8b37c324a1c2e8ad9652f08b180081861'/>
<id>36720ae8b37c324a1c2e8ad9652f08b180081861</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bbc6942273b5b3097bd265d82227bdd84b351b2 upstream.

Currently pci-bridges are allocated enough resources to satisfy their immediate
requirements.  Any additional resource-requests fail if additional free space,
contiguous to the one already allocated, is not available. This behavior is not
reasonable since sufficient contiguous resources, that can satisfy the request,
are available at a different location.

This patch provides the ability to expand and relocate a allocated resource.

	v2: Changelog: Fixed size calculation in pci_reassign_resource()
	v3: Changelog : Split this patch. The resource.c changes are already
			upstream. All the pci driver changes are in here.

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai &lt;linuxram@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes &lt;jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Worsley &lt;amworsley@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2bbc6942273b5b3097bd265d82227bdd84b351b2 upstream.

Currently pci-bridges are allocated enough resources to satisfy their immediate
requirements.  Any additional resource-requests fail if additional free space,
contiguous to the one already allocated, is not available. This behavior is not
reasonable since sufficient contiguous resources, that can satisfy the request,
are available at a different location.

This patch provides the ability to expand and relocate a allocated resource.

	v2: Changelog: Fixed size calculation in pci_reassign_resource()
	v3: Changelog : Split this patch. The resource.c changes are already
			upstream. All the pci driver changes are in here.

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai &lt;linuxram@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Barnes &lt;jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org&gt;
Cc: Andrew Worsley &lt;amworsley@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: add get_uint for u32's</title>
<updated>2012-11-17T21:14:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>J. Bruce Fields</name>
<email>bfields@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-12T20:54:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=110d3a25cc089af6a8b7ddee3f01e65aeb55ae49'/>
<id>110d3a25cc089af6a8b7ddee3f01e65aeb55ae49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a007c4c3e943ecc054a806c259d95420a188754b upstream.

I don't think there's a practical difference for the range of values
these interfaces should see, but it would be safer to be unambiguous.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a007c4c3e943ecc054a806c259d95420a188754b upstream.

I don't think there's a practical difference for the range of values
these interfaces should see, but it would be safer to be unambiguous.

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mempolicy: fix a race in shared_policy_replace()</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T20:28:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-08T23:29:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cedd186e31dacfb400ec74e0cdd59b02c3d55da8'/>
<id>cedd186e31dacfb400ec74e0cdd59b02c3d55da8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream.

shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe.  1) sp_node cannot
be dereferenced if sp-&gt;lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify
sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next
spin_lock.  The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2.

Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and
policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is
reacquired.  I was not keen on this approach because it partially
duplicates sp_alloc().  As the paths were sp-&gt;lock is taken are not that
performance critical this patch converts sp-&gt;lock to sp-&gt;mutex so it can
sleep when calling sp_alloc().

[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b22d127a39ddd10d93deee3d96e643657ad53a49 upstream.

shared_policy_replace() use of sp_alloc() is unsafe.  1) sp_node cannot
be dereferenced if sp-&gt;lock is not held and 2) another thread can modify
sp_node between spin_unlock for allocating a new sp node and next
spin_lock.  The bug was introduced before 2.6.12-rc2.

Kosaki's original patch for this problem was to allocate an sp node and
policy within shared_policy_replace and initialise it when the lock is
reacquired.  I was not keen on this approach because it partially
duplicates sp_alloc().  As the paths were sp-&gt;lock is taken are not that
performance critical this patch converts sp-&gt;lock to sp-&gt;mutex so it can
sleep when calling sp_alloc().

[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: Original patch]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@suse.de&gt;
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T20:28:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathias Krause</name>
<email>minipli@googlemail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-20T10:01:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d39c3b09b4ef1fd7febdcf88f6bb9437cf4c141'/>
<id>3d39c3b09b4ef1fd7febdcf88f6bb9437cf4c141</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ]

The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (&lt;http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/&gt;). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@revosec.ch&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ]

The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (&lt;http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/&gt;). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause &lt;minipli@googlemail.com&gt;
Cc: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Cc: Martin Willi &lt;martin@revosec.ch&gt;
Cc: Ben Hutchings &lt;bhutchings@solarflare.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>serial: set correct baud_base for EXSYS EX-41092 Dual 16950</title>
<updated>2012-10-07T15:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Flavio Leitner</name>
<email>fbl@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-22T00:04:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d482e8f2f8afc2f6fd0a1e450b0516c9ae7fef82'/>
<id>d482e8f2f8afc2f6fd0a1e450b0516c9ae7fef82</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 26e8220adb0aec43b7acafa0f1431760eee28522 upstream.

Apparently the same card model has two IDs, so this patch
complements the commit 39aced68d664291db3324d0fcf0985ab5626aac2
adding the missing one.

Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner &lt;fbl@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 26e8220adb0aec43b7acafa0f1431760eee28522 upstream.

Apparently the same card model has two IDs, so this patch
complements the commit 39aced68d664291db3324d0fcf0985ab5626aac2
adding the missing one.

Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner &lt;fbl@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Move ktime_t overflow checking into timespec_valid_strict</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T16:47:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Stultz</name>
<email>john.stultz@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-12T00:49:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fe979e2c0aa6e5b9157c3b381b43de2ca6965d7e'/>
<id>fe979e2c0aa6e5b9157c3b381b43de2ca6965d7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cee58483cf56e0ba355fdd97ff5e8925329aa936 upstream

Andreas Bombe reported that the added ktime_t overflow checking added to
timespec_valid in commit 4e8b14526ca7 ("time: Improve sanity checking of
timekeeping inputs") was causing problems with X.org because it caused
timeouts larger then KTIME_T to be invalid.

Previously, these large timeouts would be clamped to KTIME_MAX and would
never expire, which is valid.

This patch splits the ktime_t overflow checking into a new
timespec_valid_strict function, and converts the timekeeping codes
internal checking to use this more strict function.

Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Bombe &lt;aeb@debian.org&gt;
Cc: Zhouping Liu &lt;zliu@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cee58483cf56e0ba355fdd97ff5e8925329aa936 upstream

Andreas Bombe reported that the added ktime_t overflow checking added to
timespec_valid in commit 4e8b14526ca7 ("time: Improve sanity checking of
timekeeping inputs") was causing problems with X.org because it caused
timeouts larger then KTIME_T to be invalid.

Previously, these large timeouts would be clamped to KTIME_MAX and would
never expire, which is valid.

This patch splits the ktime_t overflow checking into a new
timespec_valid_strict function, and converts the timekeeping codes
internal checking to use this more strict function.

Reported-and-tested-by: Andreas Bombe &lt;aeb@debian.org&gt;
Cc: Zhouping Liu &lt;zliu@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>time: Improve sanity checking of timekeeping inputs</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T16:47:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Stultz</name>
<email>john.stultz@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-12T00:49:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=44fa9a0111168832510f8add6d589e73eac6793d'/>
<id>44fa9a0111168832510f8add6d589e73eac6793d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4e8b14526ca7fb046a81c94002c1c43b6fdf0e9b upstream

Unexpected behavior could occur if the time is set to a value large
enough to overflow a 64bit ktime_t (which is something larger then the
year 2262).

Also unexpected behavior could occur if large negative offsets are
injected via adjtimex.

So this patch improves the sanity check timekeeping inputs by
improving the timespec_valid() check, and then makes better use of
timespec_valid() to make sure we don't set the time to an invalid
negative value or one that overflows ktime_t.

Note: This does not protect from setting the time close to overflowing
ktime_t and then letting natural accumulation cause the overflow.

Reported-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Zhouping Liu &lt;zliu@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344454580-17031-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4e8b14526ca7fb046a81c94002c1c43b6fdf0e9b upstream

Unexpected behavior could occur if the time is set to a value large
enough to overflow a 64bit ktime_t (which is something larger then the
year 2262).

Also unexpected behavior could occur if large negative offsets are
injected via adjtimex.

So this patch improves the sanity check timekeeping inputs by
improving the timespec_valid() check, and then makes better use of
timespec_valid() to make sure we don't set the time to an invalid
negative value or one that overflows ktime_t.

Note: This does not protect from setting the time close to overflowing
ktime_t and then letting natural accumulation cause the overflow.

Reported-by: CAI Qian &lt;caiqian@redhat.com&gt;
Reported-by: Sasha Levin &lt;levinsasha928@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Cc: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Zhouping Liu &lt;zliu@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1344454580-17031-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Stultz &lt;john.stultz@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sched: Fix race in task_group()</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T16:47:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-22T11:36:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=64ac72f81b1b41819dab596d1524bd5cae4813fd'/>
<id>64ac72f81b1b41819dab596d1524bd5cae4813fd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream.

Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched:
Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he
found the reason to be that the multiple task_group()
invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values.

Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain
wrong comments.

The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is
updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty,
but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup
stuff works.

Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8323f26ce3425460769605a6aece7a174edaa7d1 upstream.

Stefan reported a crash on a kernel before a3e5d1091c1 ("sched:
Don't call task_group() too many times in set_task_rq()"), he
found the reason to be that the multiple task_group()
invocations in set_task_rq() returned different values.

Looking at all that I found a lack of serialization and plain
wrong comments.

The below tries to fix it using an extra pointer which is
updated under the appropriate scheduler locks. Its not pretty,
but I can't really see another way given how all the cgroup
stuff works.

Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Bader &lt;stefan.bader@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1340364965.18025.71.camel@twins
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFS: Fix the initialisation of the readdir 'cookieverf' array</title>
<updated>2012-10-02T16:47:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Trond Myklebust</name>
<email>Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-03T18:56:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=839e17b7fb531eec48714abf5962b0a1310f71d9'/>
<id>839e17b7fb531eec48714abf5962b0a1310f71d9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c3f52af3e03013db5237e339c817beaae5ec9e3a upstream.

When the NFS_COOKIEVERF helper macro was converted into a static
inline function in commit 99fadcd764 (nfs: convert NFS_*(inode)
helpers to static inline), we broke the initialisation of the
readdir cookies, since that depended on doing a memset with an
argument of 'sizeof(NFS_COOKIEVERF(inode))' which therefore
changed from sizeof(be32 cookieverf[2]) to sizeof(be32 *).

At this point, NFS_COOKIEVERF seems to be more of an obfuscation
than a helper, so the best thing would be to just get rid of it.

Also see: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=46881

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Reported-by: David Binderman &lt;dcb314@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c3f52af3e03013db5237e339c817beaae5ec9e3a upstream.

When the NFS_COOKIEVERF helper macro was converted into a static
inline function in commit 99fadcd764 (nfs: convert NFS_*(inode)
helpers to static inline), we broke the initialisation of the
readdir cookies, since that depended on doing a memset with an
argument of 'sizeof(NFS_COOKIEVERF(inode))' which therefore
changed from sizeof(be32 cookieverf[2]) to sizeof(be32 *).

At this point, NFS_COOKIEVERF seems to be more of an obfuscation
than a helper, so the best thing would be to just get rid of it.

Also see: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=46881

Reported-by: Andi Kleen &lt;andi@firstfloor.org&gt;
Reported-by: David Binderman &lt;dcb314@hotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust &lt;Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
