Pull probes updates from Masami Hiramatsu:
 "Uprobes:

   - x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack

   - Add uretprobe syscall which speeds up the uretprobe 10-30% faster.
     This syscall is automatically used from user-space trampolines
     which are generated by the uretprobe. If this syscall is used by
     normal user program, it will cause SIGILL. Note that this is
     currently only implemented on x86_64.

     (This also has two fixes for adjusting the syscall number to avoid
     conflict with new *attrat syscalls.)

   - uprobes/perf: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending
     uretprobe. This corrects the uretprobe's trampoline address in the
     stacktrace with correct return address

   - selftests/x86: Add a return uprobe with shadow stack test

   - selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall related tests.
      - test case for register integrity check
      - test case with register changing case
      - test case for uretprobe syscall without uprobes (expected to fail)
      - test case for uretprobe with shadow stack

   - selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces

   - MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry. This does not specify the tree but
     to clarify who maintains and reviews the uprobes

  Kprobes:

   - tracing/kprobes: Test case cleanups.

     Replace redundant WARN_ON_ONCE() + pr_warn() with WARN_ONCE() and
     remove unnecessary code from selftest

   - tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads.

     This checks the uniqueness of the probed symbol on modules. The
     same check has already done for kernel symbols

     (This also has a fix for build error with CONFIG_MODULES=n)

  Cleanup:

   - Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros for fprobe and kprobe examples"

* tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry
  selftests/bpf: Change uretprobe syscall number in uprobe_syscall test
  uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number
  tracing/kprobes: Fix build error when find_module() is not available
  tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads
  selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces
  perf,uprobes: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobes
  tracing/kprobe: Remove cleanup code unrelated to selftest
  tracing/kprobe: Integrate test warnings into WARN_ONCE
  selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test
  selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test
  selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes
  selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity
  selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test
  uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe
  uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
  x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
  samples: kprobes: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros
  fprobe: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macro

My earlier fix missed an incorrect function prototype that shows up on
native 32-bit builds:

In file included from fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:14:
include/linux/syscalls.h:248:25: error: conflicting types for 'sys_fanotify_mark'; have 'long int(int,  unsigned int,  u32,  u32,  int,  const char *)' {aka 'long int(int,  unsigned int,  unsigned int,  unsigned int,  int,  const char *)'}
 1924 | SYSCALL32_DEFINE6(fanotify_mark,
      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/syscalls.h:862:17: note: previous declaration of 'sys_fanotify_mark' with type 'long int(int,  unsigned int,  u64,  int, const char *)' {aka 'long int(int,  unsigned int,  long long unsigned int,  int,  const char *)'}

On x86 and powerpc, the prototype is also wrong but hidden in an #ifdef,
so it never caused problems.

Add another alternative declaration that matches the conditional function
definition.

Fixes: 403f17a33073 ("parisc: use generic sys_fanotify_mark implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

A couple of declarations in linux/syscalls.h are missing __user
annotations on their pointers, which can lead to warnings from
sparse because these don't match the implementation that have
the correct address space annotations.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The old ftruncate() syscall, using the 32-bit off_t misses a sign
extension when called in compat mode on 64-bit architectures.  As a
result, passing a negative length accidentally succeeds in truncating
to file size between 2GiB and 4GiB.

Changing the type of the compat syscall to the signed compat_off_t
changes the behavior so it instead returns -EINVAL.

The native entry point, the truncate() syscall and the corresponding
loff_t based variants are all correct already and do not suffer
from this mistake.

Fixes: 3f6d078d4acc ("fix compat truncate/ftruncate")
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes.
We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation
needs the syscall number.

Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native
64-bit process.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-3-jolsa@kernel.org/

Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>

The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:

int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.

mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.

1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
   via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
   be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.

2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
   via mremap().

3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).

4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
   risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
   unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.

5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().

6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
   memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
   behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
   memset(0) for anonymous memory.

Following input during RFC are incooperated into this patch:

Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
  implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.

Finally, the idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger's
work in Chrome V8 CFI.

[jeffxu@chromium.org: add branch prediction hint, per Pedro]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240423192825.1273679-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-3-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Presently ia32 registers stored in ptregs are unconditionally cast to
unsigned int by the ia32 stub. They are then cast to long when passed to
__se_sys*, but will not be sign extended.

This takes the sign of the syscall argument into account in the ia32
stub. It still casts to unsigned int to avoid implementation specific
behavior. However then casts to int or unsigned int as necessary. So that
the following cast to long sign extends the value.

This fixes the io_pgetevents02 LTP test when compiled with -m32. Presently
the systemcall io_pgetevents_time64() unexpectedly accepts -1 for the
maximum number of events.

It doesn't appear other systemcalls with signed arguments are effected
because they all have compat variants defined and wired up.

Fixes: ebeb8c82ffaf ("syscalls/x86: Use 'struct pt_regs' based syscall calling for IA32_EMULATION and x32")
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110130122.3836513-1-nik.borisov@suse.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20210921130127.24131-1-rpalethorpe@suse.com/

Linus pointed out that there's error handling and naming issues in the
that we should rewrite:

* Perform the access checks for the buffer before actually doing any
  work instead of doing it during the iteration.
* Rename the arguments to listmount() and do_listmount() to clarify what
  the arguments are used for.
* Get rid of the pointless ctr variable and overflow checking.
* Get rid of the pointless speculation check.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjh6Cypo8WC-McXgSzCaou3UXccxB+7PVeSuGR8AjCphg@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
   lsm_set_self_attr().

   The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
   third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
   syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
   /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
   simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
   /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
   was allowed to be active at a given time.

   We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
   existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
   even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
   API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
   established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.

   Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
   unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
   is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
   difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
   community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
   continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
   pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
   syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.

   My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
   out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
   support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
   forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
   reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
   for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
   folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
   their concerns.

 - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
   ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.

   This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
   provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
   cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
   Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
   patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.

 - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
   at boot.

   While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
   users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
   then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
   NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.

   Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
   this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
   the best fit.

 - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
   our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.

   I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
   MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
   working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
   they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
   hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
   look after it.

 - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
  lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
  lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
  calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
  selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
  MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
  MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
  mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
  mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
  lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
  lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
  lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
  lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
  lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
  lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
  LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
  SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
  AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
  Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
  ...