<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux/sched, branch v5.10.80</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T13:04:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhang Qiao</name>
<email>zhangqiao22@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-15T06:40:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c85c6fadbef0a3eab41540ea628fa8fe8928c820'/>
<id>c85c6fadbef0a3eab41540ea628fa8fe8928c820</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba1f38f0ea1cedad0cad722f00c14a ]

There is a small race between copy_process() and sched_fork()
where child-&gt;sched_task_group point to an already freed pointer.

	parent doing fork()      | someone moving the parent
				 | to another cgroup
  -------------------------------+-------------------------------
  copy_process()
      + dup_task_struct()&lt;1&gt;
				  parent move to another cgroup,
				  and free the old cgroup. &lt;2&gt;
      + sched_fork()
	+ __set_task_cpu()&lt;3&gt;
	+ task_fork_fair()
	  + sched_slice()&lt;4&gt;

In the worst case, this bug can lead to "use-after-free" and
cause panic as shown above:

  (1) parent copy its sched_task_group to child at &lt;1&gt;;

  (2) someone move the parent to another cgroup and free the old
      cgroup at &lt;2&gt;;

  (3) the sched_task_group and cfs_rq that belong to the old cgroup
      will be accessed at &lt;3&gt; and &lt;4&gt;, which cause a panic:

  [] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
  [] PGD 8000001fa0a86067 P4D 8000001fa0a86067 PUD 2029955067 PMD 0
  [] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  [] CPU: 7 PID: 648398 Comm: ebizzy Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE    --------- -  - 4.18.0.x86_64+ #1
  [] RIP: 0010:sched_slice+0x84/0xc0

  [] Call Trace:
  []  task_fork_fair+0x81/0x120
  []  sched_fork+0x132/0x240
  []  copy_process.part.5+0x675/0x20e0
  []  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x63f/0x690
  []  _do_fork+0xcd/0x3b0
  []  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
  []  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
  [] RIP: 0033:0x7f04418cd7e1

Between cgroup_can_fork() and cgroup_post_fork(), the cgroup
membership and thus sched_task_group can't change. So update child's
sched_task_group at sched_post_fork() and move task_fork() and
__set_task_cpu() (where accees the sched_task_group) from sched_fork()
to sched_post_fork().

Fixes: 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao &lt;zhangqiao22@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210915064030.2231-1-zhangqiao22@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba1f38f0ea1cedad0cad722f00c14a ]

There is a small race between copy_process() and sched_fork()
where child-&gt;sched_task_group point to an already freed pointer.

	parent doing fork()      | someone moving the parent
				 | to another cgroup
  -------------------------------+-------------------------------
  copy_process()
      + dup_task_struct()&lt;1&gt;
				  parent move to another cgroup,
				  and free the old cgroup. &lt;2&gt;
      + sched_fork()
	+ __set_task_cpu()&lt;3&gt;
	+ task_fork_fair()
	  + sched_slice()&lt;4&gt;

In the worst case, this bug can lead to "use-after-free" and
cause panic as shown above:

  (1) parent copy its sched_task_group to child at &lt;1&gt;;

  (2) someone move the parent to another cgroup and free the old
      cgroup at &lt;2&gt;;

  (3) the sched_task_group and cfs_rq that belong to the old cgroup
      will be accessed at &lt;3&gt; and &lt;4&gt;, which cause a panic:

  [] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
  [] PGD 8000001fa0a86067 P4D 8000001fa0a86067 PUD 2029955067 PMD 0
  [] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  [] CPU: 7 PID: 648398 Comm: ebizzy Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE    --------- -  - 4.18.0.x86_64+ #1
  [] RIP: 0010:sched_slice+0x84/0xc0

  [] Call Trace:
  []  task_fork_fair+0x81/0x120
  []  sched_fork+0x132/0x240
  []  copy_process.part.5+0x675/0x20e0
  []  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x63f/0x690
  []  _do_fork+0xcd/0x3b0
  []  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
  []  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca
  [] RIP: 0033:0x7f04418cd7e1

Between cgroup_can_fork() and cgroup_post_fork(), the cgroup
membership and thus sched_task_group can't change. So update child's
sched_task_group at sched_post_fork() and move task_fork() and
__set_task_cpu() (where accees the sched_task_group) from sched_fork()
to sched_post_fork().

Fixes: 8323f26ce342 ("sched: Fix race in task_group")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao &lt;zhangqiao22@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210915064030.2231-1-zhangqiao22@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>task_stack: Fix end_of_stack() for architectures with upwards-growing stack</title>
<updated>2021-11-18T13:04:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Helge Deller</name>
<email>deller@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-04T22:05:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=50a2d1229b512d79233ce57ec5226f29467af8e1'/>
<id>50a2d1229b512d79233ce57ec5226f29467af8e1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9cc2fa4f4a92ccc6760d764e7341be46ee8aaaa1 ]

The function end_of_stack() returns a pointer to the last entry of a
stack. For architectures like parisc where the stack grows upwards
return the pointer to the highest address in the stack.

Without this change I faced a crash on parisc, because the stackleak
functionality wrote STACKLEAK_POISON to the lowest address and thus
overwrote the first 4 bytes of the task_struct which included the
TIF_FLAGS.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9cc2fa4f4a92ccc6760d764e7341be46ee8aaaa1 ]

The function end_of_stack() returns a pointer to the last entry of a
stack. For architectures like parisc where the stack grows upwards
return the pointer to the highest address in the stack.

Without this change I faced a crash on parisc, because the stackleak
functionality wrote STACKLEAK_POISON to the lowest address and thus
overwrote the first 4 bytes of the task_struct which included the
TIF_FLAGS.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-20T14:05:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chang S. Bae</name>
<email>chang.seok.bae@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-18T20:03:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74569cb9ed7bc60e395927f55d3dc3be143a0164'/>
<id>74569cb9ed7bc60e395927f55d3dc3be143a0164</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c ]

The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the
user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal
stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the
stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context.

Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed
it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with
the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered.

Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new
helper.

While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient
alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect
binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data
corruption.

Fixes: c2bc11f10a39 ("x86, AVX-512: Enable AVX-512 States Context Switch")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Len Brown &lt;len.brown@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518200320.17239-6-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=153531
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2beb4a53fc3f1081cedc1c1a198c7f56cc4fc60c ]

The kernel pushes context on to the userspace stack to prepare for the
user's signal handler. When the user has supplied an alternate signal
stack, via sigaltstack(2), it is easy for the kernel to verify that the
stack size is sufficient for the current hardware context.

Check if writing the hardware context to the alternate stack will exceed
it's size. If yes, then instead of corrupting user-data and proceeding with
the original signal handler, an immediate SIGSEGV signal is delivered.

Refactor the stack pointer check code from on_sig_stack() and use the new
helper.

While the kernel allows new source code to discover and use a sufficient
alternate signal stack size, this check is still necessary to protect
binaries with insufficient alternate signal stack size from data
corruption.

Fixes: c2bc11f10a39 ("x86, AVX-512: Enable AVX-512 States Context Switch")
Reported-by: Florian Weimer &lt;fweimer@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae &lt;chang.seok.bae@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Len Brown &lt;len.brown@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518200320.17239-6-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=153531
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/linux/sched/mm.h: use rcu_dereference in in_vfork()</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T16:06:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)</name>
<email>willy@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-13T05:08:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3cbe8f9193e602e67f0371dc9265b60dce939545'/>
<id>3cbe8f9193e602e67f0371dc9265b60dce939545</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 149fc787353f65b7e72e05e7b75d34863266c3e2 ]

Fix a sparse warning by using rcu_dereference().  Technically this is a
bug and a sufficiently aggressive compiler could reload the `real_parent'
pointer outside the protection of the rcu lock (and access freed memory),
but I think it's pretty unlikely to happen.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210221194207.1351703-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: b18dc5f291c0 ("mm, oom: skip vforked tasks from being selected")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin &lt;linmiaohe@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 149fc787353f65b7e72e05e7b75d34863266c3e2 ]

Fix a sparse warning by using rcu_dereference().  Technically this is a
bug and a sufficiently aggressive compiler could reload the `real_parent'
pointer outside the protection of the rcu lock (and access freed memory),
but I think it's pretty unlikely to happen.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210221194207.1351703-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: b18dc5f291c0 ("mm, oom: skip vforked tasks from being selected")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin &lt;linmiaohe@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore</title>
<updated>2021-01-09T12:46:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-03T20:12:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ab7709b551de24e7bebf44946120e6740b1e28db'/>
<id>ab7709b551de24e7bebf44946120e6740b1e28db</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]

Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex.  The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:

   perf_event_open  (exec_update_mutex -&gt; ovl_i_mutex)
   chown            (ovl_i_mutex       -&gt; sb_writes)
   sendfile         (sb_writes         -&gt; p-&gt;lock)
     by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
   proc_pid_syscall (p-&gt;lock           -&gt; exec_update_mutex)

While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same.  They are all readers.  The only writer is
exec.

There is no reason for readers to block on each other.  So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Bernd Edlinger &lt;bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christopher Yeoh &lt;cyeoh@au1.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ]

Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex.  The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:

   perf_event_open  (exec_update_mutex -&gt; ovl_i_mutex)
   chown            (ovl_i_mutex       -&gt; sb_writes)
   sendfile         (sb_writes         -&gt; p-&gt;lock)
     by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
   proc_pid_syscall (p-&gt;lock           -&gt; exec_update_mutex)

While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same.  They are all readers.  The only writer is
exec.

There is no reason for readers to block on each other.  So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.

Cc: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov &lt;segoon@openwall.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Bernd Edlinger &lt;bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Christopher Yeoh &lt;cyeoh@au1.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Sargun Dhillon &lt;sargun@sargun.me&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo) to __section("foo")</title>
<updated>2020-10-25T21:51:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-22T02:36:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=33def8498fdde180023444b08e12b72a9efed41d'/>
<id>33def8498fdde180023444b08e12b72a9efed41d</id>
<content type='text'>
Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.

Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.

Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.

Conversion done using the script at:

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@gooogle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.

Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.

Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.

Conversion done using the script at:

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@gooogle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: kmem: prepare remote memcg charging infra for interrupt contexts</title>
<updated>2020-10-18T16:27:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Gushchin</name>
<email>guro@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-17T23:13:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=37d5985c003daab138a72dd4af9853b396d91c26'/>
<id>37d5985c003daab138a72dd4af9853b396d91c26</id>
<content type='text'>
Remote memcg charging API uses current-&gt;active_memcg to store the
currently active memory cgroup, which overwrites the memory cgroup of the
current process.  It works well for normal contexts, but doesn't work for
interrupt contexts: indeed, if an interrupt occurs during the execution of
a section with an active memcg set, all allocations inside the interrupt
will be charged to the active memcg set (given that we'll enable
accounting for allocations from an interrupt context).  But because the
interrupt might have no relation to the active memcg set outside, it's
obviously wrong from the accounting prospective.

To resolve this problem, let's add a global percpu int_active_memcg
variable, which will be used to store an active memory cgroup which will
be used from interrupt contexts.  set_active_memcg() will transparently
use current-&gt;active_memcg or int_active_memcg depending on the context.

To make the read part simple and transparent for the caller, let's
introduce two new functions:
  - struct mem_cgroup *active_memcg(void),
  - struct mem_cgroup *get_active_memcg(void).

They are returning the active memcg if it's set, hiding all implementation
details: where to get it depending on the current context.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remote memcg charging API uses current-&gt;active_memcg to store the
currently active memory cgroup, which overwrites the memory cgroup of the
current process.  It works well for normal contexts, but doesn't work for
interrupt contexts: indeed, if an interrupt occurs during the execution of
a section with an active memcg set, all allocations inside the interrupt
will be charged to the active memcg set (given that we'll enable
accounting for allocations from an interrupt context).  But because the
interrupt might have no relation to the active memcg set outside, it's
obviously wrong from the accounting prospective.

To resolve this problem, let's add a global percpu int_active_memcg
variable, which will be used to store an active memory cgroup which will
be used from interrupt contexts.  set_active_memcg() will transparently
use current-&gt;active_memcg or int_active_memcg depending on the context.

To make the read part simple and transparent for the caller, let's
introduce two new functions:
  - struct mem_cgroup *active_memcg(void),
  - struct mem_cgroup *get_active_memcg(void).

They are returning the active memcg if it's set, hiding all implementation
details: where to get it depending on the current context.

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@kernel.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827225843.1270629-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, memcg: rework remote charging API to support nesting</title>
<updated>2020-10-18T16:27:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roman Gushchin</name>
<email>guro@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-17T23:13:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b87d8cefe43c7f22e8aa13919c1dfa2b4b4b4e01'/>
<id>b87d8cefe43c7f22e8aa13919c1dfa2b4b4b4e01</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently the remote memcg charging API consists of two functions:
memalloc_use_memcg() and memalloc_unuse_memcg(), which set and clear the
memcg value, which overwrites the memcg of the current task.

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg);
  &lt;...&gt;
  memalloc_unuse_memcg();

It works perfectly for allocations performed from a normal context,
however an attempt to call it from an interrupt context or just nest two
remote charging blocks will lead to an incorrect accounting.  On exit from
the inner block the active memcg will be cleared instead of being
restored.

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg);

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg_2);
    &lt;...&gt;
    memalloc_unuse_memcg();

    Error: allocation here are charged to the memcg of the current
    process instead of target_memcg.

  memalloc_unuse_memcg();

This patch extends the remote charging API by switching to a single
function: struct mem_cgroup *set_active_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg),
which sets the new value and returns the old one.  So a remote charging
block will look like:

  old_memcg = set_active_memcg(target_memcg);
  &lt;...&gt;
  set_active_memcg(old_memcg);

This patch is heavily based on the patch by Johannes Weiner, which can be
found here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/28/806 .

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Schatzberg &lt;dschatzberg@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821212056.3769116-1-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently the remote memcg charging API consists of two functions:
memalloc_use_memcg() and memalloc_unuse_memcg(), which set and clear the
memcg value, which overwrites the memcg of the current task.

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg);
  &lt;...&gt;
  memalloc_unuse_memcg();

It works perfectly for allocations performed from a normal context,
however an attempt to call it from an interrupt context or just nest two
remote charging blocks will lead to an incorrect accounting.  On exit from
the inner block the active memcg will be cleared instead of being
restored.

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg);

  memalloc_use_memcg(target_memcg_2);
    &lt;...&gt;
    memalloc_unuse_memcg();

    Error: allocation here are charged to the memcg of the current
    process instead of target_memcg.

  memalloc_unuse_memcg();

This patch extends the remote charging API by switching to a single
function: struct mem_cgroup *set_active_memcg(struct mem_cgroup *memcg),
which sets the new value and returns the old one.  So a remote charging
block will look like:

  old_memcg = set_active_memcg(target_memcg);
  &lt;...&gt;
  set_active_memcg(old_memcg);

This patch is heavily based on the patch by Johannes Weiner, which can be
found here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/28/806 .

Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin &lt;guro@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt &lt;shakeelb@google.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Dan Schatzberg &lt;dschatzberg@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821212056.3769116-1-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm: remove the now-unnecessary mmget_still_valid() hack</title>
<updated>2020-10-16T18:11:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-16T03:13:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d45e75a9955ade5c2f49bd96fc4173b2cec9a72'/>
<id>4d45e75a9955ade5c2f49bd96fc4173b2cec9a72</id>
<content type='text'>
The preceding patches have ensured that core dumping properly takes the
mmap_lock.  Thanks to that, we can now remove mmget_still_valid() and all
its users.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-8-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The preceding patches have ensured that core dumping properly takes the
mmap_lock.  Thanks to that, we can now remove mmget_still_valid() and all
its users.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Oleg Nesterov &lt;oleg@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-8-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'kernel-clone-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T21:32:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T21:32:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=612e7a4c1645f09449355cf08b6fd3de80b4f8cc'/>
<id>612e7a4c1645f09449355cf08b6fd3de80b4f8cc</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kernel_clone() updates from Christian Brauner:
 "During the v5.9 merge window we reworked the process creation
  codepaths across multiple architectures. After this work we were only
  left with the _do_fork() helper based on the struct kernel_clone_args
  calling convention. As was pointed out _do_fork() isn't valid
  kernelese especially for a helper that isn't just static.

  This series removes the _do_fork() helper and introduces the new
  kernel_clone() helper. The process creation cleanup didn't change the
  name to something more reasonable mainly because _do_fork() was used
  in quite a few places. So sending this as a separate series seemed the
  better strategy.

  I originally intended to send this early in the v5.9 development cycle
  after the merge window had closed but given that this was touching
  quite a few places I decided to defer this until the v5.10 merge
  window"

* tag 'kernel-clone-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  sched: remove _do_fork()
  tracing: switch to kernel_clone()
  kgdbts: switch to kernel_clone()
  kprobes: switch to kernel_clone()
  x86: switch to kernel_clone()
  sparc: switch to kernel_clone()
  nios2: switch to kernel_clone()
  m68k: switch to kernel_clone()
  ia64: switch to kernel_clone()
  h8300: switch to kernel_clone()
  fork: introduce kernel_clone()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kernel_clone() updates from Christian Brauner:
 "During the v5.9 merge window we reworked the process creation
  codepaths across multiple architectures. After this work we were only
  left with the _do_fork() helper based on the struct kernel_clone_args
  calling convention. As was pointed out _do_fork() isn't valid
  kernelese especially for a helper that isn't just static.

  This series removes the _do_fork() helper and introduces the new
  kernel_clone() helper. The process creation cleanup didn't change the
  name to something more reasonable mainly because _do_fork() was used
  in quite a few places. So sending this as a separate series seemed the
  better strategy.

  I originally intended to send this early in the v5.9 development cycle
  after the merge window had closed but given that this was touching
  quite a few places I decided to defer this until the v5.10 merge
  window"

* tag 'kernel-clone-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  sched: remove _do_fork()
  tracing: switch to kernel_clone()
  kgdbts: switch to kernel_clone()
  kprobes: switch to kernel_clone()
  x86: switch to kernel_clone()
  sparc: switch to kernel_clone()
  nios2: switch to kernel_clone()
  m68k: switch to kernel_clone()
  ia64: switch to kernel_clone()
  h8300: switch to kernel_clone()
  fork: introduce kernel_clone()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
