<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux/kvm_host.h, branch v5.10.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>kvm: fix previous commit for 32-bit builds</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T10:01:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-09T05:49:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9064c9d544b906a63e359db5f908594bc07580e6'/>
<id>9064c9d544b906a63e359db5f908594bc07580e6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4422829e8053068e0225e4d0ef42dc41ea7c9ef5 upstream.

array_index_nospec does not work for uint64_t on 32-bit builds.
However, the size of a memory slot must be less than 20 bits wide
on those system, since the memory slot must fit in the user
address space.  So just store it in an unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4422829e8053068e0225e4d0ef42dc41ea7c9ef5 upstream.

array_index_nospec does not work for uint64_t on 32-bit builds.
However, the size of a memory slot must be less than 20 bits wide
on those system, since the memory slot must fit in the user
address space.  So just store it in an unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: avoid speculation-based attacks from out-of-range memslot accesses</title>
<updated>2021-06-16T10:01:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-08T19:31:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7af299b97734c7e7f465b42a2139ce4d77246975'/>
<id>7af299b97734c7e7f465b42a2139ce4d77246975</id>
<content type='text'>
commit da27a83fd6cc7780fea190e1f5c19e87019da65c upstream.

KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot.  The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:

      hva = slot-&gt;userspace_addr + (gfn - slot-&gt;base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE

It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory.  However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.

__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot.  While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva.  If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.

Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable.  One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86.  Right
now these are not vulnerable because the hva read goes through get_user(),
which contains an LFENCE speculation barrier.  However, there are
patches in progress for x86 uaccess.h to mask kernel addresses instead of
using LFENCE; once these land, a guest could use speculation to read
from the VMM's ring 3 address space.  Other architectures such as ARM
already use the address masking method, and would be susceptible to
this same kind of data-dependent access gadgets.  Therefore, this patch
proactively protects from these attacks by masking out-of-bounds gfns
in __gfn_to_hva_memslot, which blocks speculation of invalid hvas.

Sean Christopherson noted that this patch does not cover
kvm_read_guest_offset_cached.  This however is limited to a few bytes
past the end of the cache, and therefore it is unlikely to be useful in
the context of building a chain of data dependent accesses.

Reported-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit da27a83fd6cc7780fea190e1f5c19e87019da65c upstream.

KVM's mechanism for accessing guest memory translates a guest physical
address (gpa) to a host virtual address using the right-shifted gpa
(also known as gfn) and a struct kvm_memory_slot.  The translation is
performed in __gfn_to_hva_memslot using the following formula:

      hva = slot-&gt;userspace_addr + (gfn - slot-&gt;base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE

It is expected that gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory.  However, a guest can access invalid physical addresses
in such a way that the gfn is invalid.

__gfn_to_hva_memslot is called from kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot, which first
retrieves a memslot through __gfn_to_memslot.  While __gfn_to_memslot
does check that the gfn falls within the boundaries of the guest's
physical memory or not, a CPU can speculate the result of the check and
continue execution speculatively using an illegal gfn. The speculation
can result in calculating an out-of-bounds hva.  If the resulting host
virtual address is used to load another guest physical address, this
is effectively a Spectre gadget consisting of two consecutive reads,
the second of which is data dependent on the first.

Right now it's not clear if there are any cases in which this is
exploitable.  One interesting case was reported by the original author
of this patch, and involves visiting guest page tables on x86.  Right
now these are not vulnerable because the hva read goes through get_user(),
which contains an LFENCE speculation barrier.  However, there are
patches in progress for x86 uaccess.h to mask kernel addresses instead of
using LFENCE; once these land, a guest could use speculation to read
from the VMM's ring 3 address space.  Other architectures such as ARM
already use the address masking method, and would be susceptible to
this same kind of data-dependent access gadgets.  Therefore, this patch
proactively protects from these attacks by masking out-of-bounds gfns
in __gfn_to_hva_memslot, which blocks speculation of invalid hvas.

Sean Christopherson noted that this patch does not cover
kvm_read_guest_offset_cached.  This however is limited to a few bytes
past the end of the cache, and therefore it is unlikely to be useful in
the context of building a chain of data dependent accesses.

Reported-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Artemiy Margaritov &lt;artemiy.margaritov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Stop looking for coalesced MMIO zones if the bus is destroyed</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T07:50:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>seanjc@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-12T22:20:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2a20592baff59c5351c5200ec667e1a2aa22af85'/>
<id>2a20592baff59c5351c5200ec667e1a2aa22af85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5d3c4c79384af06e3c8e25b7770b6247496b4417 upstream.

Abort the walk of coalesced MMIO zones if kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev()
fails to allocate memory for the new instance of the bus.  If it can't
instantiate a new bus, unregister_dev() destroys all devices _except_ the
target device.   But, it doesn't tell the caller that it obliterated the
bus and invoked the destructor for all devices that were on the bus.  In
the coalesced MMIO case, this can result in a deleted list entry
dereference due to attempting to continue iterating on coalesced_zones
after future entries (in the walk) have been deleted.

Opportunistically add curly braces to the for-loop, which encompasses
many lines but sneaks by without braces due to the guts being a single
if statement.

Fixes: f65886606c2d ("KVM: fix memory leak in kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hao Sun &lt;sunhao.th@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20210412222050.876100-3-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5d3c4c79384af06e3c8e25b7770b6247496b4417 upstream.

Abort the walk of coalesced MMIO zones if kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev()
fails to allocate memory for the new instance of the bus.  If it can't
instantiate a new bus, unregister_dev() destroys all devices _except_ the
target device.   But, it doesn't tell the caller that it obliterated the
bus and invoked the destructor for all devices that were on the bus.  In
the coalesced MMIO case, this can result in a deleted list entry
dereference due to attempting to continue iterating on coalesced_zones
after future entries (in the walk) have been deleted.

Opportunistically add curly braces to the for-loop, which encompasses
many lines but sneaks by without braces due to the guts being a single
if statement.

Fixes: f65886606c2d ("KVM: fix memory leak in kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hao Sun &lt;sunhao.th@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;seanjc@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20210412222050.876100-3-seanjc@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU</title>
<updated>2020-10-23T07:42:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Gardon</name>
<email>bgardon@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T18:26:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a6a0b05da9f37ff56faa6b8351ed6e0b55032460'/>
<id>a6a0b05da9f37ff56faa6b8351ed6e0b55032460</id>
<content type='text'>
Dirty logging is a key feature of the KVM MMU and must be supported by
the TDP MMU. Add support for both the write protection and PML dirty
logging modes.

Tested by running kvm-unit-tests and KVM selftests on an Intel Haswell
machine. This series introduced no new failures.

This series can be viewed in Gerrit at:
	https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/virt/kvm/kvm/+/2538

Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon &lt;bgardon@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20201014182700.2888246-16-bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Dirty logging is a key feature of the KVM MMU and must be supported by
the TDP MMU. Add support for both the write protection and PML dirty
logging modes.

Tested by running kvm-unit-tests and KVM selftests on an Intel Haswell
machine. This series introduced no new failures.

This series can be viewed in Gerrit at:
	https://linux-review.googlesource.com/c/virt/kvm/kvm/+/2538

Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon &lt;bgardon@google.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20201014182700.2888246-16-bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Cache as_id in kvm_memory_slot</title>
<updated>2020-10-21T22:17:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Xu</name>
<email>peterx@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-14T18:26:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9e9eb226b91225fc199bbafc06f3cd70bfce0100'/>
<id>9e9eb226b91225fc199bbafc06f3cd70bfce0100</id>
<content type='text'>
Cache the address space ID just like the slot ID.  It will be used in
order to fill in the dirty ring entries.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20201014182700.2888246-7-bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Cache the address space ID just like the slot ID.  It will be used in
order to fill in the dirty ring entries.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu &lt;peterx@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20201014182700.2888246-7-bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: pvtime: Fix stolen time accounting across migration</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T13:04:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Jones</name>
<email>drjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T17:06:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=53f985584e3c2ebe5f2455530fbf87a001528db8'/>
<id>53f985584e3c2ebe5f2455530fbf87a001528db8</id>
<content type='text'>
When updating the stolen time we should always read the current
stolen time from the user provided memory, not from a kernel
cache. If we use a cache then we'll end up resetting stolen time
to zero on the first update after migration.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804170604.42662-5-drjones@redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When updating the stolen time we should always read the current
stolen time from the user provided memory, not from a kernel
cache. If we use a cache then we'll end up resetting stolen time
to zero on the first update after migration.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804170604.42662-5-drjones@redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm64: Drop type input from kvm_put_guest</title>
<updated>2020-08-21T13:04:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Jones</name>
<email>drjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-04T17:06:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4d2d4ce001f283ed8127173543b4cfb65641e357'/>
<id>4d2d4ce001f283ed8127173543b4cfb65641e357</id>
<content type='text'>
We can use typeof() to avoid the need for the type input.

Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804170604.42662-4-drjones@redhat.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We can use typeof() to avoid the need for the type input.

Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804170604.42662-4-drjones@redhat.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm</title>
<updated>2020-08-06T19:59:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-06T19:59:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=921d2597abfc05e303f08baa6ead8f9ab8a723e1'/>
<id>921d2597abfc05e303f08baa6ead8f9ab8a723e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "s390:
   - implement diag318

  x86:
   - Report last CPU for debugging
   - Emulate smaller MAXPHYADDR in the guest than in the host
   - .noinstr and tracing fixes from Thomas
   - nested SVM page table switching optimization and fixes

  Generic:
   - Unify shadow MMU cache data structures across architectures"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (127 commits)
  KVM: SVM: Fix sev_pin_memory() error handling
  KVM: LAPIC: Set the TDCR settable bits
  KVM: x86: Specify max TDP level via kvm_configure_mmu()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Rename max_page_level to max_huge_page_level
  KVM: x86: Dynamically calculate TDP level from max level and MAXPHYADDR
  KVM: VXM: Remove temporary WARN on expected vs. actual EPTP level mismatch
  KVM: x86: Pull the PGD's level from the MMU instead of recalculating it
  KVM: VMX: Make vmx_load_mmu_pgd() static
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add separate helper for shadow NPT root page role calc
  KVM: VMX: Drop a duplicate declaration of construct_eptp()
  KVM: nSVM: Correctly set the shadow NPT root level in its MMU role
  KVM: Using macros instead of magic values
  MIPS: KVM: Fix build error caused by 'kvm_run' cleanup
  KVM: nSVM: remove nonsensical EXITINFO1 adjustment on nested NPF
  KVM: x86: Add a capability for GUEST_MAXPHYADDR &lt; HOST_MAXPHYADDR support
  KVM: VMX: optimize #PF injection when MAXPHYADDR does not match
  KVM: VMX: Add guest physical address check in EPT violation and misconfig
  KVM: VMX: introduce vmx_need_pf_intercept
  KVM: x86: update exception bitmap on CPUID changes
  KVM: x86: rename update_bp_intercept to update_exception_bitmap
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "s390:
   - implement diag318

  x86:
   - Report last CPU for debugging
   - Emulate smaller MAXPHYADDR in the guest than in the host
   - .noinstr and tracing fixes from Thomas
   - nested SVM page table switching optimization and fixes

  Generic:
   - Unify shadow MMU cache data structures across architectures"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (127 commits)
  KVM: SVM: Fix sev_pin_memory() error handling
  KVM: LAPIC: Set the TDCR settable bits
  KVM: x86: Specify max TDP level via kvm_configure_mmu()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Rename max_page_level to max_huge_page_level
  KVM: x86: Dynamically calculate TDP level from max level and MAXPHYADDR
  KVM: VXM: Remove temporary WARN on expected vs. actual EPTP level mismatch
  KVM: x86: Pull the PGD's level from the MMU instead of recalculating it
  KVM: VMX: Make vmx_load_mmu_pgd() static
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add separate helper for shadow NPT root page role calc
  KVM: VMX: Drop a duplicate declaration of construct_eptp()
  KVM: nSVM: Correctly set the shadow NPT root level in its MMU role
  KVM: Using macros instead of magic values
  MIPS: KVM: Fix build error caused by 'kvm_run' cleanup
  KVM: nSVM: remove nonsensical EXITINFO1 adjustment on nested NPF
  KVM: x86: Add a capability for GUEST_MAXPHYADDR &lt; HOST_MAXPHYADDR support
  KVM: VMX: optimize #PF injection when MAXPHYADDR does not match
  KVM: VMX: Add guest physical address check in EPT violation and misconfig
  KVM: VMX: introduce vmx_need_pf_intercept
  KVM: x86: update exception bitmap on CPUID changes
  KVM: x86: rename update_bp_intercept to update_exception_bitmap
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>entry: Provide infrastructure for work before transitioning to guest mode</title>
<updated>2020-07-24T13:03:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-22T21:59:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=935ace2fb5cc49ae88bd1f1735ddc51cdc2ebfb3'/>
<id>935ace2fb5cc49ae88bd1f1735ddc51cdc2ebfb3</id>
<content type='text'>
Entering a guest is similar to exiting to user space. Pending work like
handling signals, rescheduling, task work etc. needs to be handled before
that.

Provide generic infrastructure to avoid duplication of the same handling
code all over the place.

The transfer to guest mode handling is different from the exit to usermode
handling, e.g. vs. rseq and live patching, so a separate function is used.

The initial list of work items handled is:

    TIF_SIGPENDING, TIF_NEED_RESCHED, TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME

Architecture specific TIF flags can be added via defines in the
architecture specific include files.

The calling convention is also different from the syscall/interrupt entry
functions as KVM invokes this from the outer vcpu_run() loop with
interrupts and preemption enabled. To prevent missing a pending work item
it invokes a check for pending TIF work from interrupt disabled code right
before transitioning to guest mode. The lockdep, RCU and tracing state
handling is also done directly around the switch to and from guest mode.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.833296398@linutronix.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Entering a guest is similar to exiting to user space. Pending work like
handling signals, rescheduling, task work etc. needs to be handled before
that.

Provide generic infrastructure to avoid duplication of the same handling
code all over the place.

The transfer to guest mode handling is different from the exit to usermode
handling, e.g. vs. rseq and live patching, so a separate function is used.

The initial list of work items handled is:

    TIF_SIGPENDING, TIF_NEED_RESCHED, TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME

Architecture specific TIF flags can be added via defines in the
architecture specific include files.

The calling convention is also different from the syscall/interrupt entry
functions as KVM invokes this from the outer vcpu_run() loop with
interrupts and preemption enabled. To prevent missing a pending work item
it invokes a check for pending TIF work from interrupt disabled code right
before transitioning to guest mode. The lockdep, RCU and tracing state
handling is also done directly around the switch to and from guest mode.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200722220519.833296398@linutronix.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Move x86's MMU memory cache helpers to common KVM code</title>
<updated>2020-07-09T17:29:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-03T02:35:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6926f95accee3f8ceb5f69dbecd880687028ae70'/>
<id>6926f95accee3f8ceb5f69dbecd880687028ae70</id>
<content type='text'>
Move x86's memory cache helpers to common KVM code so that they can be
reused by arm64 and MIPS in future patches.

Suggested-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon &lt;bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703023545.8771-16-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move x86's memory cache helpers to common KVM code so that they can be
reused by arm64 and MIPS in future patches.

Suggested-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon &lt;bgardon@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20200703023545.8771-16-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
