<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux/fs.h, branch v5.4.301</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mm: drop the assumption that VM_SHARED always implies writable</title>
<updated>2025-08-28T14:21:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Stoakes</name>
<email>lstoakes@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-30T00:58:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a8b539c3d4adb757af48158cd82912d4dc19c60'/>
<id>6a8b539c3d4adb757af48158cd82912d4dc19c60</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e8e17ee90eaf650c855adb0a3e5e965fd6692ff1 ]

Patch series "permit write-sealed memfd read-only shared mappings", v4.

The man page for fcntl() describing memfd file seals states the following
about F_SEAL_WRITE:-

    Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via
    mmap(2) will also fail with EPERM.

With emphasis on 'writable'.  In turns out in fact that currently the
kernel simply disallows all new shared memory mappings for a memfd with
F_SEAL_WRITE applied, rendering this documentation inaccurate.

This matters because users are therefore unable to obtain a shared mapping
to a memfd after write sealing altogether, which limits their usefulness.
This was reported in the discussion thread [1] originating from a bug
report [2].

This is a product of both using the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
atomic counter to determine whether writing may be permitted, and the
kernel adjusting this counter when any VM_SHARED mapping is performed and
more generally implicitly assuming VM_SHARED implies writable.

It seems sensible that we should only update this mapping if VM_MAYWRITE
is specified, i.e.  whether it is possible that this mapping could at any
point be written to.

If we do so then all we need to do to permit write seals to function as
documented is to clear VM_MAYWRITE when mapping read-only.  It turns out
this functionality already exists for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE - we can
therefore simply adapt this logic to do the same for F_SEAL_WRITE.

We then hit a chicken and egg situation in mmap_region() where the check
for VM_MAYWRITE occurs before we are able to clear this flag.  To work
around this, perform this check after we invoke call_mmap(), with careful
consideration of error paths.

Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion!

[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230324133646.16101dfa666f253c4715d965@linux-foundation.org/
[2]:https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217238

This patch (of 3):

There is a general assumption that VMAs with the VM_SHARED flag set are
writable.  If the VM_MAYWRITE flag is not set, then this is simply not the
case.

Update those checks which affect the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
field to explicitly test for this by introducing
[vma_]is_shared_maywrite() helper functions.

This remains entirely conservative, as the lack of VM_MAYWRITE guarantees
that the VMA cannot be written to.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d978aefefa83ec42d18dfa964ad180dbcde34795.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lstoakes@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres &lt;isaacmanjarres@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e8e17ee90eaf650c855adb0a3e5e965fd6692ff1 ]

Patch series "permit write-sealed memfd read-only shared mappings", v4.

The man page for fcntl() describing memfd file seals states the following
about F_SEAL_WRITE:-

    Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via
    mmap(2) will also fail with EPERM.

With emphasis on 'writable'.  In turns out in fact that currently the
kernel simply disallows all new shared memory mappings for a memfd with
F_SEAL_WRITE applied, rendering this documentation inaccurate.

This matters because users are therefore unable to obtain a shared mapping
to a memfd after write sealing altogether, which limits their usefulness.
This was reported in the discussion thread [1] originating from a bug
report [2].

This is a product of both using the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
atomic counter to determine whether writing may be permitted, and the
kernel adjusting this counter when any VM_SHARED mapping is performed and
more generally implicitly assuming VM_SHARED implies writable.

It seems sensible that we should only update this mapping if VM_MAYWRITE
is specified, i.e.  whether it is possible that this mapping could at any
point be written to.

If we do so then all we need to do to permit write seals to function as
documented is to clear VM_MAYWRITE when mapping read-only.  It turns out
this functionality already exists for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE - we can
therefore simply adapt this logic to do the same for F_SEAL_WRITE.

We then hit a chicken and egg situation in mmap_region() where the check
for VM_MAYWRITE occurs before we are able to clear this flag.  To work
around this, perform this check after we invoke call_mmap(), with careful
consideration of error paths.

Thanks to Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion!

[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230324133646.16101dfa666f253c4715d965@linux-foundation.org/
[2]:https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217238

This patch (of 3):

There is a general assumption that VMAs with the VM_SHARED flag set are
writable.  If the VM_MAYWRITE flag is not set, then this is simply not the
case.

Update those checks which affect the struct address_space-&gt;i_mmap_writable
field to explicitly test for this by introducing
[vma_]is_shared_maywrite() helper functions.

This remains entirely conservative, as the lack of VM_MAYWRITE guarantees
that the VMA cannot be written to.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d978aefefa83ec42d18dfa964ad180dbcde34795.1697116581.git.lstoakes@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes &lt;lstoakes@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) &lt;willy@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Mike Kravetz &lt;mike.kravetz@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Muchun Song &lt;muchun.song@linux.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres &lt;isaacmanjarres@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fuse: don't truncate cached, mutated symlink</title>
<updated>2025-04-10T12:29:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-20T10:02:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=34468b2e39b1c9871ed644e27713e57c3136877a'/>
<id>34468b2e39b1c9871ed644e27713e57c3136877a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b4c173dfbb6c78568578ff18f9e8822d7bd0e31b ]

Fuse allows the value of a symlink to change and this property is exploited
by some filesystems (e.g. CVMFS).

It has been observed, that sometimes after changing the symlink contents,
the value is truncated to the old size.

This is caused by fuse_getattr() racing with fuse_reverse_inval_inode().
fuse_reverse_inval_inode() updates the fuse_inode's attr_version, which
results in fuse_change_attributes() exiting before updating the cached
attributes

This is okay, as the cached attributes remain invalid and the next call to
fuse_change_attributes() will likely update the inode with the correct
values.

The reason this causes problems is that cached symlinks will be
returned through page_get_link(), which truncates the symlink to
inode-&gt;i_size.  This is correct for filesystems that don't mutate
symlinks, but in this case it causes bad behavior.

The solution is to just remove this truncation.  This can cause a
regression in a filesystem that relies on supplying a symlink larger than
the file size, but this is unlikely.  If that happens we'd need to make
this behavior conditional.

Reported-by: Laura Promberger &lt;laura.promberger@cern.ch&gt;
Tested-by: Sam Lewis &lt;samclewis@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220100258.793363-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert &lt;bschubert@ddn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b4c173dfbb6c78568578ff18f9e8822d7bd0e31b ]

Fuse allows the value of a symlink to change and this property is exploited
by some filesystems (e.g. CVMFS).

It has been observed, that sometimes after changing the symlink contents,
the value is truncated to the old size.

This is caused by fuse_getattr() racing with fuse_reverse_inval_inode().
fuse_reverse_inval_inode() updates the fuse_inode's attr_version, which
results in fuse_change_attributes() exiting before updating the cached
attributes

This is okay, as the cached attributes remain invalid and the next call to
fuse_change_attributes() will likely update the inode with the correct
values.

The reason this causes problems is that cached symlinks will be
returned through page_get_link(), which truncates the symlink to
inode-&gt;i_size.  This is correct for filesystems that don't mutate
symlinks, but in this case it causes bad behavior.

The solution is to just remove this truncation.  This can cause a
regression in a filesystem that relies on supplying a symlink larger than
the file size, but this is unlikely.  If that happens we'd need to make
this behavior conditional.

Reported-by: Laura Promberger &lt;laura.promberger@cern.ch&gt;
Tested-by: Sam Lewis &lt;samclewis@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250220100258.793363-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert &lt;bschubert@ddn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount: warn only once about timestamp range expiration</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anthony Iliopoulos</name>
<email>ailiop@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T21:39:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e2e113f9474796a0f6fceeced535e94d9290fe8'/>
<id>7e2e113f9474796a0f6fceeced535e94d9290fe8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a128b054ce029554a4a52fc3abb8c1df8bafcaef ]

Commit f8b92ba67c5d ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp
expiry") introduced a mount warning regarding filesystem timestamp
limits, that is printed upon each writable mount or remount.

This can result in a lot of unnecessary messages in the kernel log in
setups where filesystems are being frequently remounted (or mounted
multiple times).

Avoid this by setting a superblock flag which indicates that the warning
has been emitted at least once for any particular mount, as suggested in
[1].

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/CAHk-=wim6VGnxQmjfK_tDg6fbHYKL4EFkmnTjVr9QnRqjDBAeA@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220119202934.26495-1-ailiop@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos &lt;ailiop@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4bcda1eaf184 ("mount: handle OOM on mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a128b054ce029554a4a52fc3abb8c1df8bafcaef ]

Commit f8b92ba67c5d ("mount: Add mount warning for impending timestamp
expiry") introduced a mount warning regarding filesystem timestamp
limits, that is printed upon each writable mount or remount.

This can result in a lot of unnecessary messages in the kernel log in
setups where filesystems are being frequently remounted (or mounted
multiple times).

Avoid this by setting a superblock flag which indicates that the warning
has been emitted at least once for any particular mount, as suggested in
[1].

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/CAHk-=wim6VGnxQmjfK_tDg6fbHYKL4EFkmnTjVr9QnRqjDBAeA@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220119202934.26495-1-ailiop@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos &lt;ailiop@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Alexander Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Deepa Dinamani &lt;deepa.kernel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4bcda1eaf184 ("mount: handle OOM on mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: explicitly unregister per-superblock BDIs</title>
<updated>2024-11-08T15:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-11-05T20:36:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=92738aab2f2441be056c89148157cffd58deabd0'/>
<id>92738aab2f2441be056c89148157cffd58deabd0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0b3ea0926afb8dde70cfab00316ae0a70b93a7cc ]

Add a new SB_I_ flag to mark superblocks that have an ephemeral bdi
associated with them, and unregister it when the superblock is shut
down.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021124441.668816-4-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra &lt;vigneshr@ti.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4bcda1eaf184 ("mount: handle OOM on mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0b3ea0926afb8dde70cfab00316ae0a70b93a7cc ]

Add a new SB_I_ flag to mark superblocks that have an ephemeral bdi
associated with them, and unregister it when the superblock is shut
down.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021124441.668816-4-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Cc: Miquel Raynal &lt;miquel.raynal@bootlin.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra &lt;vigneshr@ti.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4bcda1eaf184 ("mount: handle OOM on mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: Don't evict inode under the inode lru traversing context</title>
<updated>2024-09-04T11:14:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhihao Cheng</name>
<email>chengzhihao1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-08-09T03:16:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3525ad25240dfdd8c78f3470911ed10aa727aa72'/>
<id>3525ad25240dfdd8c78f3470911ed10aa727aa72</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2a0629834cd82f05d424bbc193374f9a43d1f87d upstream.

The inode reclaiming process(See function prune_icache_sb) collects all
reclaimable inodes and mark them with I_FREEING flag at first, at that
time, other processes will be stuck if they try getting these inodes
(See function find_inode_fast), then the reclaiming process destroy the
inodes by function dispose_list(). Some filesystems(eg. ext4 with
ea_inode feature, ubifs with xattr) may do inode lookup in the inode
evicting callback function, if the inode lookup is operated under the
inode lru traversing context, deadlock problems may happen.

Case 1: In function ext4_evict_inode(), the ea inode lookup could happen
        if ea_inode feature is enabled, the lookup process will be stuck
	under the evicting context like this:

 1. File A has inode i_reg and an ea inode i_ea
 2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // i_ea is added into lru // lru-&gt;i_ea
 3. Then, following three processes running like this:

    PA                              PB
 echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
  shrink_slab
   prune_dcache_sb
   // i_reg is added into lru, lru-&gt;i_ea-&gt;i_reg
   prune_icache_sb
    list_lru_walk_one
     inode_lru_isolate
      i_ea-&gt;i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
     inode_lru_isolate
      __iget(i_reg)
      spin_unlock(&amp;i_reg-&gt;i_lock)
      spin_unlock(lru_lock)
                                     rm file A
                                      i_reg-&gt;nlink = 0
      iput(i_reg) // i_reg-&gt;nlink is 0, do evict
       ext4_evict_inode
        ext4_xattr_delete_inode
         ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all
          ext4_xattr_inode_iget
           ext4_iget(i_ea-&gt;i_ino)
            iget_locked
             find_inode_fast
              __wait_on_freeing_inode(i_ea) ----→ AA deadlock
    dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
     wake_up_bit(&amp;i_ea-&gt;i_state)

Case 2: In deleted inode writing function ubifs_jnl_write_inode(), file
        deleting process holds BASEHD's wbuf-&gt;io_mutex while getting the
	xattr inode, which could race with inode reclaiming process(The
        reclaiming process could try locking BASEHD's wbuf-&gt;io_mutex in
	inode evicting function), then an ABBA deadlock problem would
	happen as following:

 1. File A has inode ia and a xattr(with inode ixa), regular file B has
    inode ib and a xattr.
 2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // ixa is added into lru // lru-&gt;ixa
 3. Then, following three processes running like this:

        PA                PB                        PC
                echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
                 shrink_slab
                  prune_dcache_sb
                  // ib and ia are added into lru, lru-&gt;ixa-&gt;ib-&gt;ia
                  prune_icache_sb
                   list_lru_walk_one
                    inode_lru_isolate
                     ixa-&gt;i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
                    inode_lru_isolate
                     __iget(ib)
                     spin_unlock(&amp;ib-&gt;i_lock)
                     spin_unlock(lru_lock)
                                                   rm file B
                                                    ib-&gt;nlink = 0
 rm file A
  iput(ia)
   ubifs_evict_inode(ia)
    ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ia)
     ubifs_jnl_write_inode(ia)
      make_reservation(BASEHD) // Lock wbuf-&gt;io_mutex
      ubifs_iget(ixa-&gt;i_ino)
       iget_locked
        find_inode_fast
         __wait_on_freeing_inode(ixa)
          |          iput(ib) // ib-&gt;nlink is 0, do evict
          |           ubifs_evict_inode
          |            ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ib)
          ↓             ubifs_jnl_write_inode
     ABBA deadlock ←-----make_reservation(BASEHD)
                   dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
                    wake_up_bit(&amp;ixa-&gt;i_state)

Fix the possible deadlock by using new inode state flag I_LRU_ISOLATING
to pin the inode in memory while inode_lru_isolate() reclaims its pages
instead of using ordinary inode reference. This way inode deletion
cannot be triggered from inode_lru_isolate() thus avoiding the deadlock.
evict() is made to wait for I_LRU_ISOLATING to be cleared before
proceeding with inode cleanup.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/37c29c42-7685-d1f0-067d-63582ffac405@huaweicloud.com/
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219022
Fixes: e50e5129f384 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
Fixes: 7959cf3a7506 ("ubifs: journal: Handle xattrs like files")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240809031628.1069873-1-chengzhihao@huaweicloud.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2a0629834cd82f05d424bbc193374f9a43d1f87d upstream.

The inode reclaiming process(See function prune_icache_sb) collects all
reclaimable inodes and mark them with I_FREEING flag at first, at that
time, other processes will be stuck if they try getting these inodes
(See function find_inode_fast), then the reclaiming process destroy the
inodes by function dispose_list(). Some filesystems(eg. ext4 with
ea_inode feature, ubifs with xattr) may do inode lookup in the inode
evicting callback function, if the inode lookup is operated under the
inode lru traversing context, deadlock problems may happen.

Case 1: In function ext4_evict_inode(), the ea inode lookup could happen
        if ea_inode feature is enabled, the lookup process will be stuck
	under the evicting context like this:

 1. File A has inode i_reg and an ea inode i_ea
 2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // i_ea is added into lru // lru-&gt;i_ea
 3. Then, following three processes running like this:

    PA                              PB
 echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
  shrink_slab
   prune_dcache_sb
   // i_reg is added into lru, lru-&gt;i_ea-&gt;i_reg
   prune_icache_sb
    list_lru_walk_one
     inode_lru_isolate
      i_ea-&gt;i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
     inode_lru_isolate
      __iget(i_reg)
      spin_unlock(&amp;i_reg-&gt;i_lock)
      spin_unlock(lru_lock)
                                     rm file A
                                      i_reg-&gt;nlink = 0
      iput(i_reg) // i_reg-&gt;nlink is 0, do evict
       ext4_evict_inode
        ext4_xattr_delete_inode
         ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all
          ext4_xattr_inode_iget
           ext4_iget(i_ea-&gt;i_ino)
            iget_locked
             find_inode_fast
              __wait_on_freeing_inode(i_ea) ----→ AA deadlock
    dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
     wake_up_bit(&amp;i_ea-&gt;i_state)

Case 2: In deleted inode writing function ubifs_jnl_write_inode(), file
        deleting process holds BASEHD's wbuf-&gt;io_mutex while getting the
	xattr inode, which could race with inode reclaiming process(The
        reclaiming process could try locking BASEHD's wbuf-&gt;io_mutex in
	inode evicting function), then an ABBA deadlock problem would
	happen as following:

 1. File A has inode ia and a xattr(with inode ixa), regular file B has
    inode ib and a xattr.
 2. getfattr(A, xattr_buf) // ixa is added into lru // lru-&gt;ixa
 3. Then, following three processes running like this:

        PA                PB                        PC
                echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
                 shrink_slab
                  prune_dcache_sb
                  // ib and ia are added into lru, lru-&gt;ixa-&gt;ib-&gt;ia
                  prune_icache_sb
                   list_lru_walk_one
                    inode_lru_isolate
                     ixa-&gt;i_state |= I_FREEING // set inode state
                    inode_lru_isolate
                     __iget(ib)
                     spin_unlock(&amp;ib-&gt;i_lock)
                     spin_unlock(lru_lock)
                                                   rm file B
                                                    ib-&gt;nlink = 0
 rm file A
  iput(ia)
   ubifs_evict_inode(ia)
    ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ia)
     ubifs_jnl_write_inode(ia)
      make_reservation(BASEHD) // Lock wbuf-&gt;io_mutex
      ubifs_iget(ixa-&gt;i_ino)
       iget_locked
        find_inode_fast
         __wait_on_freeing_inode(ixa)
          |          iput(ib) // ib-&gt;nlink is 0, do evict
          |           ubifs_evict_inode
          |            ubifs_jnl_delete_inode(ib)
          ↓             ubifs_jnl_write_inode
     ABBA deadlock ←-----make_reservation(BASEHD)
                   dispose_list // cannot be executed by prune_icache_sb
                    wake_up_bit(&amp;ixa-&gt;i_state)

Fix the possible deadlock by using new inode state flag I_LRU_ISOLATING
to pin the inode in memory while inode_lru_isolate() reclaims its pages
instead of using ordinary inode reference. This way inode deletion
cannot be triggered from inode_lru_isolate() thus avoiding the deadlock.
evict() is made to wait for I_LRU_ISOLATING to be cleared before
proceeding with inode cleanup.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/37c29c42-7685-d1f0-067d-63582ffac405@huaweicloud.com/
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219022
Fixes: e50e5129f384 ("ext4: xattr-in-inode support")
Fixes: 7959cf3a7506 ("ubifs: journal: Handle xattrs like files")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng &lt;chengzhihao1@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240809031628.1069873-1-chengzhihao@huaweicloud.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Suggested-by: Mateusz Guzik &lt;mjguzik@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add a vfs_fchmod helper</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:51:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-14T06:55:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=13b2d815057e2732e8b3a0b8a00126652a0ff985'/>
<id>13b2d815057e2732e8b3a0b8a00126652a0ff985</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9e96c8c0e94eea2f69a9705f5d0f51928ea26c17 ]

Add a helper for struct file based chmode operations.  To be used by
the initramfs code soon.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4624b346cf67 ("init: open /initrd.image with O_LARGEFILE")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9e96c8c0e94eea2f69a9705f5d0f51928ea26c17 ]

Add a helper for struct file based chmode operations.  To be used by
the initramfs code soon.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4624b346cf67 ("init: open /initrd.image with O_LARGEFILE")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add a vfs_fchown helper</title>
<updated>2024-04-13T10:51:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-14T06:47:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8eba8d11459240e5a8132e4e50ae00a9a41954f4'/>
<id>8eba8d11459240e5a8132e4e50ae00a9a41954f4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c04011fe8cbd80af1be6e12b53193bf3846750d7 ]

Add a helper for struct file based chown operations.  To be used by
the initramfs code soon.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4624b346cf67 ("init: open /initrd.image with O_LARGEFILE")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c04011fe8cbd80af1be6e12b53193bf3846750d7 ]

Add a helper for struct file based chown operations.  To be used by
the initramfs code soon.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 4624b346cf67 ("init: open /initrd.image with O_LARGEFILE")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket</title>
<updated>2024-03-26T22:22:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2024-03-14T00:33:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2692b8a01667275717b6737a0cbdf938c3018868'/>
<id>2692b8a01667275717b6737a0cbdf938c3018868</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit a4104821ad651d8a0b374f0b2474c345bbb42f82 upstream.

Since we no longer allow sending io_uring fds over SCM_RIGHTS, move to
using io_is_uring_fops() to detect whether this is a io_uring fd or not.
With that done, kill off io_uring_get_socket() as nobody calls it
anymore.

This is in preparation to yanking out the rest of the core related to
unix gc with io_uring.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit a4104821ad651d8a0b374f0b2474c345bbb42f82 upstream.

Since we no longer allow sending io_uring fds over SCM_RIGHTS, move to
using io_is_uring_fops() to detect whether this is a io_uring fd or not.
With that done, kill off io_uring_get_socket() as nobody calls it
anymore.

This is in preparation to yanking out the rest of the core related to
unix gc with io_uring.

Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/aio: Restrict kiocb_set_cancel_fn() to I/O submitted via libaio</title>
<updated>2024-03-01T12:13:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bart Van Assche</name>
<email>bvanassche@acm.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T20:47:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b4eea7a05ee0ab5ab0514421e6ba8c5d249cf942'/>
<id>b4eea7a05ee0ab5ab0514421e6ba8c5d249cf942</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b820de741ae48ccf50dd95e297889c286ff4f760 upstream.

If kiocb_set_cancel_fn() is called for I/O submitted via io_uring, the
following kernel warning appears:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 368 at fs/aio.c:598 kiocb_set_cancel_fn+0x9c/0xa8
Call trace:
 kiocb_set_cancel_fn+0x9c/0xa8
 ffs_epfile_read_iter+0x144/0x1d0
 io_read+0x19c/0x498
 io_issue_sqe+0x118/0x27c
 io_submit_sqes+0x25c/0x5fc
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x104/0xab0
 invoke_syscall+0x58/0x11c
 el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf4
 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
 el0_svc+0x2c/0xa4
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xb4
 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8

Fix this by setting the IOCB_AIO_RW flag for read and write I/O that is
submitted by libaio.

Suggested-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Avi Kivity &lt;avi@scylladb.com&gt;
Cc: Sandeep Dhavale &lt;dhavale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kent.overstreet@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bvanassche@acm.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215204739.2677806-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bvanassche@acm.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b820de741ae48ccf50dd95e297889c286ff4f760 upstream.

If kiocb_set_cancel_fn() is called for I/O submitted via io_uring, the
following kernel warning appears:

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 368 at fs/aio.c:598 kiocb_set_cancel_fn+0x9c/0xa8
Call trace:
 kiocb_set_cancel_fn+0x9c/0xa8
 ffs_epfile_read_iter+0x144/0x1d0
 io_read+0x19c/0x498
 io_issue_sqe+0x118/0x27c
 io_submit_sqes+0x25c/0x5fc
 __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x104/0xab0
 invoke_syscall+0x58/0x11c
 el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf4
 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
 el0_svc+0x2c/0xa4
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xb4
 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8

Fix this by setting the IOCB_AIO_RW flag for read and write I/O that is
submitted by libaio.

Suggested-by: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Cc: Avi Kivity &lt;avi@scylladb.com&gt;
Cc: Sandeep Dhavale &lt;dhavale@google.com&gt;
Cc: Jens Axboe &lt;axboe@kernel.dk&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Kent Overstreet &lt;kent.overstreet@linux.dev&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bvanassche@acm.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215204739.2677806-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche &lt;bvanassche@acm.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: add mode_strip_sgid() helper</title>
<updated>2024-02-23T07:24:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yang Xu</name>
<email>xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-24T13:00:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0cb0093fd6a246e5a877ab958f31b3bc9e7277e1'/>
<id>0cb0093fd6a246e5a877ab958f31b3bc9e7277e1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2b3416ceff5e6bd4922f6d1c61fb68113dd82302 upstream.

[remove userns argument of helper for 5.4.y backport]

Add a dedicated helper to handle the setgid bit when creating a new file
in a setgid directory. This is a preparatory patch for moving setgid
stripping into the vfs. The patch contains no functional changes.

Currently the setgid stripping logic is open-coded directly in
inode_init_owner() and the individual filesystems are responsible for
handling setgid inheritance. Since this has proven to be brittle as
evidenced by old issues we uncovered over the last months (see [1] to
[3] below) we will try to move this logic into the vfs.

Link: e014f37db1a2 ("xfs: use setattr_copy to set vfs inode attributes") [1]
Link: 01ea173e103e ("xfs: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories") [2]
Link: fd84bfdddd16 ("ceph: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories") [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1657779088-2242-1-git-send-email-xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu &lt;xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[commit 347750e1b69cef62966fbc5bd7dc579b4c00688a upstream
	backported from 5.10.y, resolved context conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam &lt;mngyadam@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2b3416ceff5e6bd4922f6d1c61fb68113dd82302 upstream.

[remove userns argument of helper for 5.4.y backport]

Add a dedicated helper to handle the setgid bit when creating a new file
in a setgid directory. This is a preparatory patch for moving setgid
stripping into the vfs. The patch contains no functional changes.

Currently the setgid stripping logic is open-coded directly in
inode_init_owner() and the individual filesystems are responsible for
handling setgid inheritance. Since this has proven to be brittle as
evidenced by old issues we uncovered over the last months (see [1] to
[3] below) we will try to move this logic into the vfs.

Link: e014f37db1a2 ("xfs: use setattr_copy to set vfs inode attributes") [1]
Link: 01ea173e103e ("xfs: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories") [2]
Link: fd84bfdddd16 ("ceph: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories") [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1657779088-2242-1-git-send-email-xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu &lt;xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[commit 347750e1b69cef62966fbc5bd7dc579b4c00688a upstream
	backported from 5.10.y, resolved context conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam &lt;mngyadam@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
