<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/linux/audit.h, branch linux-2.6.17.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Rework of IPC auditing</title>
<updated>2006-05-01T10:10:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-02T21:07:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=073115d6b29c7910feaa08241c6484637f5ca958'/>
<id>073115d6b29c7910feaa08241c6484637f5ca958</id>
<content type='text'>
1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different
functions:
        - audit_ipc_obj()
        - audit_ipc_set_perm()

There's a key shift here...  The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid,
mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object.  This
audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places.  Most notably, it
is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the
ipc code permforming a MAC check.  Additionally there are several places
where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being
performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby
ipcperms() call.  In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to
ensure that the information is captured by the audit system.

The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on
the ipc object changes.  In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded
(and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before
each instance).

2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type.  This allows
for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC
object and permissions changes.  Note that the same struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate
audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message.  Finally,
the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle
aux messages of this new type.  No more mem leaks I hope ;-)

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
1) The audit_ipc_perms() function has been split into two different
functions:
        - audit_ipc_obj()
        - audit_ipc_set_perm()

There's a key shift here...  The audit_ipc_obj() collects the uid, gid,
mode, and SElinux context label of the current ipc object.  This
audit_ipc_obj() hook is now found in several places.  Most notably, it
is hooked in ipcperms(), which is called in various places around the
ipc code permforming a MAC check.  Additionally there are several places
where *checkid() is used to validate that an operation is being
performed on a valid object while not necessarily having a nearby
ipcperms() call.  In these locations, audit_ipc_obj() is called to
ensure that the information is captured by the audit system.

The audit_set_new_perm() function is called any time the permissions on
the ipc object changes.  In this case, the NEW permissions are recorded
(and note that an audit_ipc_obj() call exists just a few lines before
each instance).

2) Support for an AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM audit message type.  This allows
for separate auxiliary audit records for normal operations on an IPC
object and permissions changes.  Note that the same struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl is used and populated, however there are separate
audit_log_format statements based on the type of the message.  Finally,
the AUDIT_IPC block of code in audit_free_aux() was extended to handle
aux messages of this new type.  No more mem leaks I hope ;-)

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] More user space subject labels</title>
<updated>2006-05-01T10:10:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-04-01T23:29:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ce29b682e228c70cdc91a1b2935c5adb2087bab8'/>
<id>ce29b682e228c70cdc91a1b2935c5adb2087bab8</id>
<content type='text'>
Hi,

The patch below builds upon the patch sent earlier and adds subject label to
all audit events generated via the netlink interface. It also cleans up a few
other minor things.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Hi,

The patch below builds upon the patch sent earlier and adds subject label to
all audit events generated via the netlink interface. It also cleans up a few
other minor things.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] support for context based audit filtering</title>
<updated>2006-05-01T10:06:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrel Goeddel</name>
<email>dgoeddel@trustedcs.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-02-24T21:44:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=376bd9cb357ec945ac893feaeb63af7370a6e70b'/>
<id>376bd9cb357ec945ac893feaeb63af7370a6e70b</id>
<content type='text'>
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance).  These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module.  It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel &lt;dgoeddel@trustedcs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit
system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type,
sensitivity, and clearance).  These interfaces will allow the selinux
module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs,
rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within
the audit module.  It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion
of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel &lt;dgoeddel@trustedcs.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] drop task argument of audit_syscall_{entry,exit}</title>
<updated>2006-05-01T10:06:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2006-03-30T01:23:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5411be59db80333039386f3b1ccfe5eb9023a916'/>
<id>5411be59db80333039386f3b1ccfe5eb9023a916</id>
<content type='text'>
... it's always current, and that's a good thing - allows simpler locking.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
... it's always current, and that's a good thing - allows simpler locking.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] promiscuous mode</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2005-12-03T13:39:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5bdb98868062c1b14025883049551af343233187'/>
<id>5bdb98868062c1b14025883049551af343233187</id>
<content type='text'>
Hi,

When a network interface goes into promiscuous mode, its an important security
issue. The attached patch is intended to capture that action and send an
event to the audit system.

The patch carves out a new block of numbers for kernel detected anomalies.
These are events that may indicate suspicious activity. Other examples of
potential kernel anomalies would be: exceeding disk quota, rlimit violations,
changes to syscall entry table.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Hi,

When a network interface goes into promiscuous mode, its an important security
issue. The attached patch is intended to capture that action and send an
event to the audit system.

The patch carves out a new block of numbers for kernel detected anomalies.
These are events that may indicate suspicious activity. Other examples of
potential kernel anomalies would be: exceeding disk quota, rlimit violations,
changes to syscall entry table.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] add/remove rule update</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-09T14:48:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d3301088f7e412992d9e61cc3604cbdff3090ff'/>
<id>5d3301088f7e412992d9e61cc3604cbdff3090ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Hi,

The following patch adds a little more information to the add/remove rule message emitted
by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Hi,

The following patch adds a little more information to the add/remove rule message emitted
by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amy Griffis</name>
<email>amy.griffis@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-02-07T17:05:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93315ed6dd12dacfc941f9eb8ca0293aadf99793'/>
<id>93315ed6dd12dacfc941f9eb8ca0293aadf99793</id>
<content type='text'>
Updated patch to dynamically allocate audit rule fields in kernel's
internal representation.  Added unlikely() calls for testing memory
allocation result.

Amy Griffis wrote:     [Wed Jan 11 2006, 02:02:31PM EST]
&gt; Modify audit's kernel-userspace interface to allow the specification
&gt; of string fields in audit rules.
&gt;
&gt; Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from 5ffc4a863f92351b720fe3e9c5cd647accff9e03 commit)
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Updated patch to dynamically allocate audit rule fields in kernel's
internal representation.  Added unlikely() calls for testing memory
allocation result.

Amy Griffis wrote:     [Wed Jan 11 2006, 02:02:31PM EST]
&gt; Modify audit's kernel-userspace interface to allow the specification
&gt; of string fields in audit rules.
&gt;
&gt; Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis &lt;amy.griffis@hp.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
(cherry picked from 5ffc4a863f92351b720fe3e9c5cd647accff9e03 commit)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] SE Linux audit events</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Steve Grubb</name>
<email>sgrubb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2006-01-04T14:08:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af601e4623d0303bfafa54ec728b7ae8493a8e1b'/>
<id>af601e4623d0303bfafa54ec728b7ae8493a8e1b</id>
<content type='text'>
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit
system. Please Apply.

Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb &lt;sgrubb@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Woodhouse</name>
<email>dwmw2@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2005-12-15T18:33:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fe7752bab26a9ac0651b695ad4f55659761f68f7'/>
<id>fe7752bab26a9ac0651b695ad4f55659761f68f7</id>
<content type='text'>
This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall
auditing isn't enabled.

[AV: folded followup fix from the same author]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This fixes the per-user and per-message-type filtering when syscall
auditing isn't enabled.

[AV: folded followup fix from the same author]

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.</title>
<updated>2006-03-20T19:08:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dustin Kirkland</name>
<email>dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2005-11-03T17:15:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8c8570fb8feef2bc166bee75a85748b25cda22d9'/>
<id>8c8570fb8feef2bc166bee75a85748b25cda22d9</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.

These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.

This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).

[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]

Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context
information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and
tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the
item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver
of an action.

These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the
appropriate record in the audit code.

This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled
Security Protection Profile (LSPP).

[AV: fixed kmalloc flags use]
[folded leak fixes]
[folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)]
[folded audit_inode_context() leak fix]
[folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT]

Signed-off-by: Dustin Kirkland &lt;dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
