linux-stable.git/include/crypto/public_key.h, branch linux-4.7.y

KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()

2016-04-11T21:43:43+00:00

Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells

KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c

2016-04-11T21:41:28+00:00

Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be
generalised.

Signed-off-by: David Howells

KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content

2016-04-06T15:14:24+00:00

Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback.  This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.

If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function.  If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.

The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells

KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct

2016-04-06T15:13:33+00:00

Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can
be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the
signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509.

Signed-off-by: David Howells

KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key

2016-04-06T15:13:33+00:00

Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.

For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells

X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum

2016-03-03T21:49:27+00:00

Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of
enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu

akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layer

2016-03-03T21:49:27+00:00

Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key
subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template.  This means that the
public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type.

To make this work, the following changes have been made:

 (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys.  This strips off the
     padding and returns just the message hash.

 (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second
     parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used.  We now give this,
     and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5
     encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present.

 (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to
     something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does
     and and has been merged into public_key.c.

 (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone.  Module signing must set
     CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead.

Thoughts:

 (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to
     the padding template?  Should there be multiple padding templates
     registered that share most of the code?

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu

crypto: public_key: remove MPIs from public_key_signature struct

2016-02-18T14:52:32+00:00

After digsig_asymmetric.c is converted the MPIs can be now
safely removed from the public_key_signature structure.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David Howells

crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher api

2016-02-10T10:13:27+00:00

This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk 
Acked-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: David Howells

KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data

2015-10-21T14:18:36+00:00

Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
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