<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h, branch v5.4.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Prevent .BTF section elimination</title>
<updated>2020-10-14T08:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tony Ambardar</name>
<email>tony.ambardar@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-20T05:01:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6440fb9bda91c7bddad15d5dc9b0dd7fec652174'/>
<id>6440fb9bda91c7bddad15d5dc9b0dd7fec652174</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65c204398928f9c79f1a29912b410439f7052635 upstream.

Systems with memory or disk constraints often reduce the kernel footprint
by configuring LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION. However, this can result in
removal of any BTF information.

Use the KEEP() macro to preserve the BTF data as done with other important
sections, while still allowing for smaller kernels.

Fixes: 90ceddcb4950 ("bpf: Support llvm-objcopy for vmlinux BTF")
Signed-off-by: Tony Ambardar &lt;Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/a635b5d3e2da044e7b51ec1315e8910fbce0083f.1600417359.git.Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 65c204398928f9c79f1a29912b410439f7052635 upstream.

Systems with memory or disk constraints often reduce the kernel footprint
by configuring LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION. However, this can result in
removal of any BTF information.

Use the KEEP() macro to preserve the BTF data as done with other important
sections, while still allowing for smaller kernels.

Fixes: 90ceddcb4950 ("bpf: Support llvm-objcopy for vmlinux BTF")
Signed-off-by: Tony Ambardar &lt;Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/a635b5d3e2da044e7b51ec1315e8910fbce0083f.1600417359.git.Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h: align ro_after_init</title>
<updated>2020-08-19T06:16:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Romain Naour</name>
<email>romain.naour@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-15T00:31:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e02c77edd9b015ab49d3ac882c9dd70103a8151b'/>
<id>e02c77edd9b015ab49d3ac882c9dd70103a8151b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7f897acbe5d57995438c831670b7c400e9c0dc00 upstream.

Since the patch [1], building the kernel using a toolchain built with
binutils 2.33.1 prevents booting a sh4 system under Qemu.  Apply the patch
provided by Alan Modra [2] that fix alignment of rodata.

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=ebd2263ba9a9124d93bbc0ece63d7e0fae89b40e
[2] https://www.sourceware.org/ml/binutils/2019-12/msg00112.html

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour &lt;romain.naour@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Alan Modra &lt;amodra@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Bin Meng &lt;bin.meng@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Chen Zhou &lt;chenzhou10@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz &lt;glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kuninori Morimoto &lt;kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://marc.info/?l=linux-sh&amp;m=158429470221261
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7f897acbe5d57995438c831670b7c400e9c0dc00 upstream.

Since the patch [1], building the kernel using a toolchain built with
binutils 2.33.1 prevents booting a sh4 system under Qemu.  Apply the patch
provided by Alan Modra [2] that fix alignment of rodata.

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=ebd2263ba9a9124d93bbc0ece63d7e0fae89b40e
[2] https://www.sourceware.org/ml/binutils/2019-12/msg00112.html

Signed-off-by: Romain Naour &lt;romain.naour@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Alan Modra &lt;amodra@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Bin Meng &lt;bin.meng@windriver.com&gt;
Cc: Chen Zhou &lt;chenzhou10@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert+renesas@glider.be&gt;
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz &lt;glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de&gt;
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski &lt;krzk@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kuninori Morimoto &lt;kuninori.morimoto.gx@renesas.com&gt;
Cc: Rich Felker &lt;dalias@libc.org&gt;
Cc: Sam Ravnborg &lt;sam@ravnborg.org&gt;
Cc: Yoshinori Sato &lt;ysato@users.sourceforge.jp&gt;
Cc: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://marc.info/?l=linux-sh&amp;m=158429470221261
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86, vmlinux.lds: Page-align end of ..page_aligned sections</title>
<updated>2020-07-29T08:18:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joerg Roedel</name>
<email>jroedel@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-21T09:34:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=697bd3e4aa4ba9c3ec10a4b43192b58b12e580dc'/>
<id>697bd3e4aa4ba9c3ec10a4b43192b58b12e580dc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit de2b41be8fcccb2f5b6c480d35df590476344201 upstream.

On x86-32 the idt_table with 256 entries needs only 2048 bytes. It is
page-aligned, but the end of the .bss..page_aligned section is not
guaranteed to be page-aligned.

As a result, objects from other .bss sections may end up on the same 4k
page as the idt_table, and will accidentially get mapped read-only during
boot, causing unexpected page-faults when the kernel writes to them.

This could be worked around by making the objects in the page aligned
sections page sized, but that's wrong.

Explicit sections which store only page aligned objects have an implicit
guarantee that the object is alone in the page in which it is placed. That
works for all objects except the last one. That's inconsistent.

Enforcing page sized objects for these sections would wreckage memory
sanitizers, because the object becomes artificially larger than it should
be and out of bound access becomes legit.

Align the end of the .bss..page_aligned and .data..page_aligned section on
page-size so all objects places in these sections are guaranteed to have
their own page.

[ tglx: Amended changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721093448.10417-1-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit de2b41be8fcccb2f5b6c480d35df590476344201 upstream.

On x86-32 the idt_table with 256 entries needs only 2048 bytes. It is
page-aligned, but the end of the .bss..page_aligned section is not
guaranteed to be page-aligned.

As a result, objects from other .bss sections may end up on the same 4k
page as the idt_table, and will accidentially get mapped read-only during
boot, causing unexpected page-faults when the kernel writes to them.

This could be worked around by making the objects in the page aligned
sections page sized, but that's wrong.

Explicit sections which store only page aligned objects have an implicit
guarantee that the object is alone in the page in which it is placed. That
works for all objects except the last one. That's inconsistent.

Enforcing page sized objects for these sections would wreckage memory
sanitizers, because the object becomes artificially larger than it should
be and out of bound access becomes legit.

Align the end of the .bss..page_aligned and .data..page_aligned section on
page-size so all objects places in these sections are guaranteed to have
their own page.

[ tglx: Amended changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel &lt;jroedel@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721093448.10417-1-joro@8bytes.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Support llvm-objcopy for vmlinux BTF</title>
<updated>2020-06-17T14:40:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Fangrui Song</name>
<email>maskray@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-18T22:27:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f04d1e880f17b935b5a181d446ff82b4193eee85'/>
<id>f04d1e880f17b935b5a181d446ff82b4193eee85</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 90ceddcb495008ac8ba7a3dce297841efcd7d584 upstream.

Simplify gen_btf logic to make it work with llvm-objcopy. The existing
'file format' and 'architecture' parsing logic is brittle and does not
work with llvm-objcopy/llvm-objdump.

'file format' output of llvm-objdump&gt;=11 will match GNU objdump, but
'architecture' (bfdarch) may not.

.BTF in .tmp_vmlinux.btf is non-SHF_ALLOC. Add the SHF_ALLOC flag
because it is part of vmlinux image used for introspection. C code
can reference the section via linker script defined __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF. This fixes a small problem that previous .BTF had the
SHF_WRITE flag (objcopy -I binary -O elf* synthesized .data).

Additionally, `objcopy -I binary` synthesized symbols
_binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_start and _binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_stop (not
used elsewhere) are replaced with more commonplace __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF.

Add 2&gt;/dev/null because GNU objcopy (but not llvm-objcopy) warns
"empty loadable segment detected at vaddr=0xffffffff81000000, is this intentional?"

We use a dd command to change the e_type field in the ELF header from
ET_EXEC to ET_REL so that lld will accept .btf.vmlinux.bin.o.  Accepting
ET_EXEC as an input file is an extremely rare GNU ld feature that lld
does not intend to support, because this is error-prone.

The output section description .BTF in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
avoids potential subtle orphan section placement issues and suppresses
--orphan-handling=warn warnings.

Fixes: df786c9b9476 ("bpf: Force .BTF section start to zero when dumping from vmlinux")
Fixes: cb0cc635c7a9 ("powerpc: Include .BTF section")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song &lt;maskray@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/871
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200318222746.173648-1-maskray@google.com
Signed-off-by: Maria Teguiani &lt;teguiani@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Matthias Maennich &lt;maennich@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 90ceddcb495008ac8ba7a3dce297841efcd7d584 upstream.

Simplify gen_btf logic to make it work with llvm-objcopy. The existing
'file format' and 'architecture' parsing logic is brittle and does not
work with llvm-objcopy/llvm-objdump.

'file format' output of llvm-objdump&gt;=11 will match GNU objdump, but
'architecture' (bfdarch) may not.

.BTF in .tmp_vmlinux.btf is non-SHF_ALLOC. Add the SHF_ALLOC flag
because it is part of vmlinux image used for introspection. C code
can reference the section via linker script defined __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF. This fixes a small problem that previous .BTF had the
SHF_WRITE flag (objcopy -I binary -O elf* synthesized .data).

Additionally, `objcopy -I binary` synthesized symbols
_binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_start and _binary__btf_vmlinux_bin_stop (not
used elsewhere) are replaced with more commonplace __start_BTF and
__stop_BTF.

Add 2&gt;/dev/null because GNU objcopy (but not llvm-objcopy) warns
"empty loadable segment detected at vaddr=0xffffffff81000000, is this intentional?"

We use a dd command to change the e_type field in the ELF header from
ET_EXEC to ET_REL so that lld will accept .btf.vmlinux.bin.o.  Accepting
ET_EXEC as an input file is an extremely rare GNU ld feature that lld
does not intend to support, because this is error-prone.

The output section description .BTF in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
avoids potential subtle orphan section placement issues and suppresses
--orphan-handling=warn warnings.

Fixes: df786c9b9476 ("bpf: Force .BTF section start to zero when dumping from vmlinux")
Fixes: cb0cc635c7a9 ("powerpc: Include .BTF section")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fangrui Song &lt;maskray@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Tested-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andriin@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt; (powerpc)
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/871
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200318222746.173648-1-maskray@google.com
Signed-off-by: Maria Teguiani &lt;teguiani@google.com&gt;
Tested-by: Matthias Maennich &lt;maennich@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2019-09-28T15:14:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-28T15:14:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d'/>
<id>aefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current-&gt;comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current-&gt;comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Support early LSMs</title>
<updated>2019-08-20T04:54:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>matthewgarrett@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-20T00:17:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6b1db98cf4d54d9ea59cfcc195f70dc946fdd38'/>
<id>e6b1db98cf4d54d9ea59cfcc195f70dc946fdd38</id>
<content type='text'>
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).

(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).

(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Cc: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rzhang/linux</title>
<updated>2019-07-17T20:13:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-17T20:13:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aac09ce27556f79f20a860ae89d790d7bfbf1747'/>
<id>aac09ce27556f79f20a860ae89d790d7bfbf1747</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull thermal management updates from Zhang Rui:

 - Convert thermal documents to ReST (Mauro Carvalho Chehab)

 - Fix a cyclic depedency in between thermal core and governors (Daniel
   Lezcano)

 - Fix processor_thermal_device driver to re-evaluate power limits after
   resume (Srinivas Pandruvada, Zhang Rui)

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rzhang/linux:
  drivers: thermal: processor_thermal_device: Fix build warning
  docs: thermal: convert to ReST
  thermal/drivers/core: Use governor table to initialize
  thermal/drivers/core: Add init section table for self-encapsulation
  drivers: thermal: processor_thermal: Read PPCC on resume
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull thermal management updates from Zhang Rui:

 - Convert thermal documents to ReST (Mauro Carvalho Chehab)

 - Fix a cyclic depedency in between thermal core and governors (Daniel
   Lezcano)

 - Fix processor_thermal_device driver to re-evaluate power limits after
   resume (Srinivas Pandruvada, Zhang Rui)

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rzhang/linux:
  drivers: thermal: processor_thermal_device: Fix build warning
  docs: thermal: convert to ReST
  thermal/drivers/core: Use governor table to initialize
  thermal/drivers/core: Add init section table for self-encapsulation
  drivers: thermal: processor_thermal: Read PPCC on resume
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>thermal/drivers/core: Add init section table for self-encapsulation</title>
<updated>2019-06-27T13:22:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Lezcano</name>
<email>daniel.lezcano@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-12T20:13:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=980af75ede4f36107b98aa5c247359b87c6afc30'/>
<id>980af75ede4f36107b98aa5c247359b87c6afc30</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently the governors are declared in their respective files but they
export their [un]register functions which in turn call the [un]register
governors core's functions. That implies a cyclic dependency which is
not desirable. There is a way to self-encapsulate the governors by letting
them to declare themselves in a __init section table.

Define the table in the asm generic linker description like the other
tables and provide the specific macros to deal with.

Reviewed-by: Amit Kucheria &lt;amit.kucheria@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano &lt;daniel.lezcano@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui &lt;rui.zhang@intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently the governors are declared in their respective files but they
export their [un]register functions which in turn call the [un]register
governors core's functions. That implies a cyclic dependency which is
not desirable. There is a way to self-encapsulate the governors by letting
them to declare themselves in a __init section table.

Define the table in the asm generic linker description like the other
tables and provide the specific macros to deal with.

Reviewed-by: Amit Kucheria &lt;amit.kucheria@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano &lt;daniel.lezcano@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui &lt;rui.zhang@intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>parisc: add dynamic ftrace</title>
<updated>2019-06-08T10:56:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Schnelle</name>
<email>svens@stackframe.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-05T20:32:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6ca6366220ed285e29ee22f4cf5c68a0397cb005'/>
<id>6ca6366220ed285e29ee22f4cf5c68a0397cb005</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch implements dynamic ftrace for PA-RISC. The required mcount
call sequences can get pretty long, so instead of patching the
whole call sequence out of the functions, we are using
-fpatchable-function-entry from gcc. This puts a configurable amount of
NOPS before/at the start of the function. Taking do_sys_open() as example,
which would look like this when the call is patched out:

1036b248:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b24c:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b250:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b254:       08 00 02 40     nop

1036b258 &lt;do_sys_open&gt;:
1036b258:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b25c:       08 03 02 41     copy r3,r1
1036b260:       6b c2 3f d9     stw rp,-14(sp)
1036b264:       08 1e 02 43     copy sp,r3
1036b268:       6f c1 01 00     stw,ma r1,80(sp)

When ftrace gets enabled for this function the kernel will patch these
NOPs to:

1036b248:       10 19 57 20     &lt;address of ftrace&gt;
1036b24c:       6f c1 00 80     stw,ma r1,40(sp)
1036b250:       48 21 3f d1     ldw -18(r1),r1
1036b254:       e8 20 c0 02     bv,n r0(r1)

1036b258 &lt;do_sys_open&gt;:
1036b258:       e8 3f 1f df     b,l,n .-c,r1
1036b25c:       08 03 02 41     copy r3,r1
1036b260:       6b c2 3f d9     stw rp,-14(sp)
1036b264:       08 1e 02 43     copy sp,r3
1036b268:       6f c1 01 00     stw,ma r1,80(sp)

So the first NOP in do_sys_open() will be patched to jump backwards into
some minimal trampoline code which pushes a stackframe, saves r1 which
holds the return address, loads the address of the real ftrace function,
and branches to that location. For 64 Bit things are getting a bit more
complicated (and longer) because we must make sure that the address of
ftrace location is 8 byte aligned, and the offset passed to ldd for
fetching the address is 8 byte aligned as well.

Note that gcc has a bug which misplaces the function label, and needs a
patch to make dynamic ftrace work. See
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=90751 for details.

Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@stackframe.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch implements dynamic ftrace for PA-RISC. The required mcount
call sequences can get pretty long, so instead of patching the
whole call sequence out of the functions, we are using
-fpatchable-function-entry from gcc. This puts a configurable amount of
NOPS before/at the start of the function. Taking do_sys_open() as example,
which would look like this when the call is patched out:

1036b248:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b24c:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b250:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b254:       08 00 02 40     nop

1036b258 &lt;do_sys_open&gt;:
1036b258:       08 00 02 40     nop
1036b25c:       08 03 02 41     copy r3,r1
1036b260:       6b c2 3f d9     stw rp,-14(sp)
1036b264:       08 1e 02 43     copy sp,r3
1036b268:       6f c1 01 00     stw,ma r1,80(sp)

When ftrace gets enabled for this function the kernel will patch these
NOPs to:

1036b248:       10 19 57 20     &lt;address of ftrace&gt;
1036b24c:       6f c1 00 80     stw,ma r1,40(sp)
1036b250:       48 21 3f d1     ldw -18(r1),r1
1036b254:       e8 20 c0 02     bv,n r0(r1)

1036b258 &lt;do_sys_open&gt;:
1036b258:       e8 3f 1f df     b,l,n .-c,r1
1036b25c:       08 03 02 41     copy r3,r1
1036b260:       6b c2 3f d9     stw rp,-14(sp)
1036b264:       08 1e 02 43     copy sp,r3
1036b268:       6f c1 01 00     stw,ma r1,80(sp)

So the first NOP in do_sys_open() will be patched to jump backwards into
some minimal trampoline code which pushes a stackframe, saves r1 which
holds the return address, loads the address of the real ftrace function,
and branches to that location. For 64 Bit things are getting a bit more
complicated (and longer) because we must make sure that the address of
ftrace location is 8 byte aligned, and the offset passed to ldd for
fetching the address is 8 byte aligned as well.

Note that gcc has a bug which misplaces the function label, and needs a
patch to make dynamic ftrace work. See
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=90751 for details.

Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@stackframe.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller &lt;deller@gmx.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'modules-for-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux</title>
<updated>2019-05-14T17:55:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-14T17:55:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=280664f558c9d973315d48f125eb664cc607d089'/>
<id>280664f558c9d973315d48f125eb664cc607d089</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull modules updates from Jessica Yu:

 - Use a separate table to store symbol types instead of hijacking
   fields in struct Elf_Sym

 - Trivial code cleanups

* tag 'modules-for-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
  module: add stubs for within_module functions
  kallsyms: store type information in its own array
  vmlinux.lds.h: drop unused __vermagic
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull modules updates from Jessica Yu:

 - Use a separate table to store symbol types instead of hijacking
   fields in struct Elf_Sym

 - Trivial code cleanups

* tag 'modules-for-v5.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
  module: add stubs for within_module functions
  kallsyms: store type information in its own array
  vmlinux.lds.h: drop unused __vermagic
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
