<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v6.6.154</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hongling Zeng</name>
<email>zenghongling@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-28T07:43:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e99120b5944a16d0bc27e52b33de78bcdaaabf5c'/>
<id>e99120b5944a16d0bc27e52b33de78bcdaaabf5c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7eea80be25f3334f131d52982b3131aba77b97d upstream.

xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() accesses lentry/rentry fields (namelen,
valuelen) before checking if the entry pointer itself is within bounds.
If nameidx is crafted to point near the end of the buffer, these field
accesses can read out-of-bounds before the bounds check at
name_end &gt; buf_end is performed.

Add explicit bounds checks for entry pointers before accessing their
fields. Use offsetof() to check that the start of the flexible array
member (nameval/name) is within bounds, which ensures all preceding
fields are safe to access.

Fixes: c84760659dcf2 ("xfs: check attribute leaf block structure")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Hongling Zeng &lt;zenghongling@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b7eea80be25f3334f131d52982b3131aba77b97d upstream.

xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() accesses lentry/rentry fields (namelen,
valuelen) before checking if the entry pointer itself is within bounds.
If nameidx is crafted to point near the end of the buffer, these field
accesses can read out-of-bounds before the bounds check at
name_end &gt; buf_end is performed.

Add explicit bounds checks for entry pointers before accessing their
fields. Use offsetof() to check that the start of the flexible array
member (nameval/name) is within bounds, which ensures all preceding
fields are safe to access.

Fixes: c84760659dcf2 ("xfs: check attribute leaf block structure")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Hongling Zeng &lt;zenghongling@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: clear error before retrying inode xattr space fallback</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guanghui Yang</name>
<email>3497809730@qq.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-08T12:57:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46116f574be327081aa41035fe9ae83ab68f39ba'/>
<id>46116f574be327081aa41035fe9ae83ab68f39ba</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 409a7f12a0933ff2c617fa814c76cef0bd1d457a upstream.

When ext4_xattr_make_inode_space() returns -ENOSPC,
ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() can retry the expansion with
s_min_extra_isize.  If that retry succeeds by finding enough ibody free
space, control jumps directly to the shift label.

The previous -ENOSPC is still stored in error in that path, so the
function can update i_extra_isize but still return -ENOSPC to the
caller.  Clear error before retrying so a successful fallback expansion
returns success.

Reproduced with an ext4 image using 1 KiB blocks, project quota support,
256-byte inodes, and min_extra_isize/want_extra_isize set to 32.
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR failures dropped from 802 to 86 after the fix.

Fixes: 69f3a3039b0d ("ext4: introduce ITAIL helper")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang &lt;3497809730@qq.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_192F8A699EFD21126E02101131C9546F3C08@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 409a7f12a0933ff2c617fa814c76cef0bd1d457a upstream.

When ext4_xattr_make_inode_space() returns -ENOSPC,
ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() can retry the expansion with
s_min_extra_isize.  If that retry succeeds by finding enough ibody free
space, control jumps directly to the shift label.

The previous -ENOSPC is still stored in error in that path, so the
function can update i_extra_isize but still return -ENOSPC to the
caller.  Clear error before retrying so a successful fallback expansion
returns success.

Reproduced with an ext4 image using 1 KiB blocks, project quota support,
256-byte inodes, and min_extra_isize/want_extra_isize set to 32.
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR failures dropped from 802 to 86 after the fix.

Fixes: 69f3a3039b0d ("ext4: introduce ITAIL helper")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang &lt;3497809730@qq.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_192F8A699EFD21126E02101131C9546F3C08@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: stop retrying saturated xattr cache entries</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthias Goergens</name>
<email>matthias.goergens@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-02T06:59:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a40c45268f4358207aa9c53764fed2e05f62986a'/>
<id>a40c45268f4358207aa9c53764fed2e05f62986a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54b6bd40898de7906acb2bccc9a96d1b8e6b4323 upstream.

ext4_xattr_block_set() retries when a cache entry selected for reuse
has a saturated reference count after taking the buffer lock. The retry
returns to the mbcache lookup without making that entry ineligible, so
it can select the same unusable entry indefinitely. A task spinning
there can hold the parent directory's i_rwsem and leave concurrent
rmdir callers blocked.

Normally a reusable entry has a reference count below
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX because the count and MBE_REUSABLE_B are
updated under the same buffer lock. A corrupted filesystem can violate
that invariant. The syzbot reproducer reports allocator and xattr
corruption before triggering this retry loop.

Check the untrusted on-disk count before incrementing it, avoiding
overflow, and clear MBE_REUSABLE_B when it is already saturated. The
next lookup then skips the entry that was just proven unusable. This
mirrors the normal transition at EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX; the release
path marks the entry reusable again on the exact 1024-to-1023
transition.

Using the same QEMU harness and guest parameters, current unpatched
Linux hung in 6 of 8 420-second trials with the do_rmdir signature;
representative NMI backtraces caught the owner spinning in
ext4_xattr_block_set(). The patched kernel completed 28 of 28 trials
without a hung-task report; the final twelve trials exercised the
reviewed overflow-safe form of the change. syzbot's patch testing also
completed without reproducing the hang.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e68dbebd9617a9250e8d
Fixes: 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr blocks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Goergens &lt;matthias.goergens@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802065941.1726052-1-matthias.goergens@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 54b6bd40898de7906acb2bccc9a96d1b8e6b4323 upstream.

ext4_xattr_block_set() retries when a cache entry selected for reuse
has a saturated reference count after taking the buffer lock. The retry
returns to the mbcache lookup without making that entry ineligible, so
it can select the same unusable entry indefinitely. A task spinning
there can hold the parent directory's i_rwsem and leave concurrent
rmdir callers blocked.

Normally a reusable entry has a reference count below
EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX because the count and MBE_REUSABLE_B are
updated under the same buffer lock. A corrupted filesystem can violate
that invariant. The syzbot reproducer reports allocator and xattr
corruption before triggering this retry loop.

Check the untrusted on-disk count before incrementing it, avoiding
overflow, and clear MBE_REUSABLE_B when it is already saturated. The
next lookup then skips the entry that was just proven unusable. This
mirrors the normal transition at EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX; the release
path marks the entry reusable again on the exact 1024-to-1023
transition.

Using the same QEMU harness and guest parameters, current unpatched
Linux hung in 6 of 8 420-second trials with the do_rmdir signature;
representative NMI backtraces caught the owner spinning in
ext4_xattr_block_set(). The patched kernel completed 28 of 28 trials
without a hung-task report; the final twelve trials exercised the
reviewed overflow-safe form of the change. syzbot's patch testing also
completed without reproducing the hang.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e68dbebd9617a9250e8d
Fixes: 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr blocks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthias Goergens &lt;matthias.goergens@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+e68dbebd9617a9250e8d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260802065941.1726052-1-matthias.goergens@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix missing metadata reservation for large xattrs</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Bridges</name>
<email>icb@fastmail.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-24T04:57:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6a009f1e61b11d9e23d3c5aa1dacfb010945da45'/>
<id>6a009f1e61b11d9e23d3c5aa1dacfb010945da45</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0cdc7dde00ec63ac714271fa8b2918d630b8da1a upstream.

[BUG]
lsetxattr() panics the kernel when setting a large xattr value on a
fragmented filesystem where the file already has an external xattr
block.

[CAUSE]
ocfs2_calc_xattr_set_need() never reserves metadata blocks for a new
xattr value's extent tree when the file already has an external xattr
block. The not_found path leaves meta_add at zero, so meta_ac is NULL
when ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() runs.

A new value root has room for a single extent record. On a fragmented
filesystem, the allocator cannot satisfy the xattr value in one
contiguous run, so each non-contiguous run requires its own extent
record. When the value root's extent list is full and meta_ac is NULL,
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree() returns RESTART_META, and
ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() hits BUG_ON(why == RESTART_META).

[FIX]
The case where no xattr block exists yet already calls
ocfs2_extend_meta_needed(&amp;def_xv.xv.xr_list) to reserve value tree
metadata. Add the same reservation to the case where an xattr block
already exists, making the two cases consistent.

Replace the BUG_ON with a -ENOSPC return so that if RESTART_META is
returned despite the reservation, the error propagates to userspace
instead of panicking the kernel.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/amLwn3i9tET8yhG7@dev
Fixes: a78f9f466894 ("ocfs2: make xattr extension work with new local alloc reservation.")
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges &lt;icb@fastmail.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+e538032956b1157914a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e538032956b1157914a3
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Heming Zhao &lt;heming.zhao@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0cdc7dde00ec63ac714271fa8b2918d630b8da1a upstream.

[BUG]
lsetxattr() panics the kernel when setting a large xattr value on a
fragmented filesystem where the file already has an external xattr
block.

[CAUSE]
ocfs2_calc_xattr_set_need() never reserves metadata blocks for a new
xattr value's extent tree when the file already has an external xattr
block. The not_found path leaves meta_add at zero, so meta_ac is NULL
when ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() runs.

A new value root has room for a single extent record. On a fragmented
filesystem, the allocator cannot satisfy the xattr value in one
contiguous run, so each non-contiguous run requires its own extent
record. When the value root's extent list is full and meta_ac is NULL,
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree() returns RESTART_META, and
ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() hits BUG_ON(why == RESTART_META).

[FIX]
The case where no xattr block exists yet already calls
ocfs2_extend_meta_needed(&amp;def_xv.xv.xr_list) to reserve value tree
metadata. Add the same reservation to the case where an xattr block
already exists, making the two cases consistent.

Replace the BUG_ON with a -ENOSPC return so that if RESTART_META is
returned despite the reservation, the error propagates to userspace
instead of panicking the kernel.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/amLwn3i9tET8yhG7@dev
Fixes: a78f9f466894 ("ocfs2: make xattr extension work with new local alloc reservation.")
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges &lt;icb@fastmail.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+e538032956b1157914a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e538032956b1157914a3
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Heming Zhao &lt;heming.zhao@suse.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ibrahim Hashimov</name>
<email>security@auditcode.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-24T00:09:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b7528b42813f02724a78fce1da24d69d1bfc4d38'/>
<id>b7528b42813f02724a78fce1da24d69d1bfc4d38</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 813f8136a2ce1fee266d02a7df73db6e8a541604 ]

xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:

	memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
		item-&gt;ri_buf[i].iov_base,
		nbits &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT);

The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the
buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and
otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),
which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a
small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer
drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent
kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone
who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat
model XFS already guards against elsewhere.

Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery
of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail
idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and
xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes
STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.

Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted
image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails
recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 813f8136a2ce1fee266d02a7df73db6e8a541604 ]

xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:

	memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
		item-&gt;ri_buf[i].iov_base,
		nbits &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT);

The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the
buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and
otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),
which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a
small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer
drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent
kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone
who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat
model XFS already guards against elsewhere.

Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery
of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail
idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and
xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes
STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.

Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted
image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails
recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: don't use a xfs_log_iovec for ri_buf in log recovery</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@lst.de</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-24T00:09:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2eca18dd026b2c2abe1e3580981d4c8f2bb1ae10'/>
<id>2eca18dd026b2c2abe1e3580981d4c8f2bb1ae10</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ded74fddcaf685a9440c5612f7831d0c4c1473ca ]

ri_buf just holds a pointer/len pair and is not a log iovec used for
writing to the log.  Switch to use a kvec instead.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cmaiolino@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 813f8136a2ce ("xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ded74fddcaf685a9440c5612f7831d0c4c1473ca ]

ri_buf just holds a pointer/len pair and is not a log iovec used for
writing to the log.  Switch to use a kvec instead.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cmaiolino@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 813f8136a2ce ("xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt_misc: use exe_file_deny_write_access() for the interpreter clone</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-10T09:33:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2fdf8b07bee5ef99ec77773a6be05fbb8ee5cdb9'/>
<id>2fdf8b07bee5ef99ec77773a6be05fbb8ee5cdb9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa5990ca8fd917003e526036bcc50413edb9722c upstream.

For MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE entries load_misc_binary() clones the
registered interpreter file and denies write access to the clone via
plain deny_write_access(). The clone is installed as
bprm-&gt;interpreter and later released by the exec machinery through
exe_file_allow_write_access() which skips the i_writecount increment
for files with FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM set.

The deny and allow side can therefore come to different conclusions
when pre-content watches are in play: if a pre-content watch is added
to the interpreter after registration every subsequent exec through
that entry takes a write denial on the clone that is never paired
with a write allowance, driving the interpreter inode's i_writecount
further down with each exec and leaving the interpreter unwritable
even after the entry and all its users are gone.

Take the write denial via exe_file_deny_write_access() so both sides
of the pairing base their decision on the same file mode, and
propagate failure instead of silently ignoring it: an interpreter
that is concurrently open for writing now fails the exec with
ETXTBSY, exactly like an interpreter freshly opened via open_exec()
would.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-2-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org
Fixes: 0357ef03c94e ("fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fa5990ca8fd917003e526036bcc50413edb9722c upstream.

For MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE entries load_misc_binary() clones the
registered interpreter file and denies write access to the clone via
plain deny_write_access(). The clone is installed as
bprm-&gt;interpreter and later released by the exec machinery through
exe_file_allow_write_access() which skips the i_writecount increment
for files with FMODE_FSNOTIFY_HSM set.

The deny and allow side can therefore come to different conclusions
when pre-content watches are in play: if a pre-content watch is added
to the interpreter after registration every subsequent exec through
that entry takes a write denial on the clone that is never paired
with a write allowance, driving the interpreter inode's i_writecount
further down with each exec and leaving the interpreter unwritable
even after the entry and all its users are gone.

Take the write denial via exe_file_deny_write_access() so both sides
of the pairing base their decision on the same file mode, and
propagate failure instead of silently ignoring it: an interpreter
that is concurrently open for writing now fails the exec with
ETXTBSY, exactly like an interpreter freshly opened via open_exec()
would.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-2-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org
Fixes: 0357ef03c94e ("fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>erofs: fix EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS on some UP platforms</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gao Xiang</name>
<email>xiang@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-12T13:11:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74365aef5bf226259608093c318cb4029c026329'/>
<id>74365aef5bf226259608093c318cb4029c026329</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a64d500b0078e16e9abb25baca4dee1dbc9054fc ]

CONFIG_NR_CPUS doesn't define on some UP platforms (e.g.  arm), so this
can cause make oldconfig to loop indefinitely when CONFIG_SMP=n:

  $ make ARCH=arm allmodconfig
  $ sed -i "/CONFIG_SMP=y/d" .config
  $ sed -i "/CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS.*/d" .config

  EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
  EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
  ...

Let's guard NR_CPUS with SMP instead of using a hardcoded arbitrary CPU
uplimit here, similar to commit a3344078101c ("mm: make SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS
depend on SMP").

The initial report from SJ Park was for m68k [1] (m68k is the only arch
without NR_CPUS in Kconfig), and that got fixed in commit 1fd495ef09ee
("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")

Reported-by: SJ Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/anuyFHLUGDjZWY4K@XiangdeMacBook-Pro.local/T/#u [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260728065447.91511-1-sj@kernel.org
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck7@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87853c96-cc8f-49e6-81b1-02bfe409e372@roeck-us.net
Fixes: c9b47e6b2311 ("erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size")
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang &lt;xiang@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: SJ Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a64d500b0078e16e9abb25baca4dee1dbc9054fc ]

CONFIG_NR_CPUS doesn't define on some UP platforms (e.g.  arm), so this
can cause make oldconfig to loop indefinitely when CONFIG_SMP=n:

  $ make ARCH=arm allmodconfig
  $ sed -i "/CONFIG_SMP=y/d" .config
  $ sed -i "/CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS.*/d" .config

  EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
  EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
  ...

Let's guard NR_CPUS with SMP instead of using a hardcoded arbitrary CPU
uplimit here, similar to commit a3344078101c ("mm: make SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS
depend on SMP").

The initial report from SJ Park was for m68k [1] (m68k is the only arch
without NR_CPUS in Kconfig), and that got fixed in commit 1fd495ef09ee
("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")

Reported-by: SJ Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/anuyFHLUGDjZWY4K@XiangdeMacBook-Pro.local/T/#u [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260728065447.91511-1-sj@kernel.org
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck &lt;groeck7@gmail.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87853c96-cc8f-49e6-81b1-02bfe409e372@roeck-us.net
Fixes: c9b47e6b2311 ("erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size")
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang &lt;xiang@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: SJ Park &lt;sj@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>brauner@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-12T00:09:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dd9ba32169e73a3c3ba595cf1de1f4c69ceafb3c'/>
<id>dd9ba32169e73a3c3ba595cf1de1f4c69ceafb3c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit db1856ea9196cf6e015d12199a34c0b9313c7bfa ]

Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the
interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as
long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter
file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the
inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter
for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone
until the inode is evicted from the inode cache.

Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before
closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the
error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has
been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag.

Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the
interpreter file.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-1-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org
Fixes: 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit db1856ea9196cf6e015d12199a34c0b9313c7bfa ]

Registering an entry with the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag opens the
interpreter via open_exec() which denies write access to it for as
long as the entry exists. Removing the entry closes the interpreter
file via filp_close() but never restores write access, leaving the
inode's i_writecount permanently negative. Opening the interpreter
for writing keeps failing with ETXTBSY long after the entry is gone
until the inode is evicted from the inode cache.

Commit 90f601b497d7 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access before
closing files opened by open_exec()") fixed the same imbalance in the
error path of bm_register_write() but the actual removal path has
been leaking the write denial since the introduction of the flag.

Restore write access in put_binfmt_handler() before closing the
interpreter file.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-work-binfmt_misc-locking-v3-1-a162f7cb58d6@kernel.org
Fixes: 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files</title>
<updated>2026-08-23T12:20:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-12T00:09:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bf5ed2ef5cdb7b47ce606e3d48ea6eb803b31503'/>
<id>bf5ed2ef5cdb7b47ce606e3d48ea6eb803b31503</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ]

Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.

This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.

We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.

To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.

This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0357ef03c94ef835bd44a0658b8edb672a9dbf51 ]

Commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") removed
the legacy behavior of getting ETXTBSY on attempt to open and executable
file for write while it is being executed.

This commit was reverted because an application that depends on this
legacy behavior was broken by the change.

We need to allow HSM writing into executable files while executed to
fill their content on-the-fly.

To that end, disable the ETXTBSY legacy behavior for files that are
watched by pre-content events.

This change is not expected to cause regressions with existing systems
which do not have any pre-content event listeners.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241128142532.465176-1-amir73il@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: db1856ea9196 ("binfmt_misc: restore write access when removing an entry")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
