<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/fs, branch v6.3.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ext4: only check dquot_initialize_needed() when debugging</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-08T14:06:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ae9517ee037d8061b2f296828e2bb8fd9ea20b3d'/>
<id>ae9517ee037d8061b2f296828e2bb8fd9ea20b3d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dea9d8f7643fab07bf89a1155f1f94f37d096a5e upstream.

ext4_xattr_block_set() relies on its caller to call dquot_initialize()
on the inode.  To assure that this has happened there are WARN_ON
checks.  Unfortunately, this is subject to false positives if there is
an antagonist thread which is flipping the file system at high rates
between r/o and rw.  So only do the check if EXT4_XATTR_DEBUG is
enabled.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230608044056.GA1418535@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dea9d8f7643fab07bf89a1155f1f94f37d096a5e upstream.

ext4_xattr_block_set() relies on its caller to call dquot_initialize()
on the inode.  To assure that this has happened there are WARN_ON
checks.  Unfortunately, this is subject to false positives if there is
an antagonist thread which is flipping the file system at high rates
between r/o and rw.  So only do the check if EXT4_XATTR_DEBUG is
enabled.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230608044056.GA1418535@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting r/w until quota is re-enabled"</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-08T13:57:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e7469a611403d53d53d779e089fe3ee37aac14a7'/>
<id>e7469a611403d53d53d779e089fe3ee37aac14a7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1b29243933098cdbc31b579b5616e183b4275e2f upstream.

This reverts commit a44be64bbecb15a452496f60db6eacfee2b59c79.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/653b3359-2005-21b1-039d-c55ca4cffdcc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 1b29243933098cdbc31b579b5616e183b4275e2f upstream.

This reverts commit a44be64bbecb15a452496f60db6eacfee2b59c79.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/653b3359-2005-21b1-039d-c55ca4cffdcc@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: check the validation of pdu_size in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-30T14:10:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e9cb7be2fcbaee9e808b729e92948d38d52e5add'/>
<id>e9cb7be2fcbaee9e808b729e92948d38d52e5add</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 368ba06881c395f1c9a7ba22203cf8d78b4addc0 upstream.

The length field of netbios header must be greater than the SMB header
sizes(smb1 or smb2 header), otherwise the packet is an invalid SMB packet.

If `pdu_size` is 0, ksmbd allocates a 4 bytes chunk to `conn-&gt;request_buf`.
In the function `get_smb2_cmd_val` ksmbd will read cmd from
`rcv_hdr-&gt;Command`, which is `conn-&gt;request_buf + 12`, causing the KASAN
detector to print the following error message:

[    7.205018] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in get_smb2_cmd_val+0x45/0x60
[    7.205423] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880062d8b50 by task ksmbd:42632/248
...
[    7.207125]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    7.209191]  get_smb2_cmd_val+0x45/0x60
[    7.209426]  ksmbd_conn_enqueue_request+0x3a/0x100
[    7.209712]  ksmbd_server_process_request+0x72/0x160
[    7.210295]  ksmbd_conn_handler_loop+0x30c/0x550
[    7.212280]  kthread+0x160/0x190
[    7.212762]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[    7.212981]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 368ba06881c395f1c9a7ba22203cf8d78b4addc0 upstream.

The length field of netbios header must be greater than the SMB header
sizes(smb1 or smb2 header), otherwise the packet is an invalid SMB packet.

If `pdu_size` is 0, ksmbd allocates a 4 bytes chunk to `conn-&gt;request_buf`.
In the function `get_smb2_cmd_val` ksmbd will read cmd from
`rcv_hdr-&gt;Command`, which is `conn-&gt;request_buf + 12`, causing the KASAN
detector to print the following error message:

[    7.205018] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in get_smb2_cmd_val+0x45/0x60
[    7.205423] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880062d8b50 by task ksmbd:42632/248
...
[    7.207125]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    7.209191]  get_smb2_cmd_val+0x45/0x60
[    7.209426]  ksmbd_conn_enqueue_request+0x3a/0x100
[    7.209712]  ksmbd_server_process_request+0x72/0x160
[    7.210295]  ksmbd_conn_handler_loop+0x30c/0x550
[    7.212280]  kthread+0x160/0x190
[    7.212762]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[    7.212981]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix posix_acls and acls dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-30T12:42:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ed75e6a5a5b5dfed211054dbb2a18ffe05439838'/>
<id>ed75e6a5a5b5dfed211054dbb2a18ffe05439838</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25933573ef48f3586f559c2cac6c436c62dcf63f upstream.

Dan reported the following error message:

fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1296 smb_check_perm_dacl()
    error: 'posix_acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
fs/smb/server/vfs.c:1323 ksmbd_vfs_make_xattr_posix_acl()
    error: 'posix_acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
fs/smb/server/vfs.c:1830 ksmbd_vfs_inherit_posix_acl()
    error: 'acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()

__get_acl() returns a mix of error pointers and NULL. This change it
with IS_ERR_OR_NULL().

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 25933573ef48f3586f559c2cac6c436c62dcf63f upstream.

Dan reported the following error message:

fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1296 smb_check_perm_dacl()
    error: 'posix_acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
fs/smb/server/vfs.c:1323 ksmbd_vfs_make_xattr_posix_acl()
    error: 'posix_acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()
fs/smb/server/vfs.c:1830 ksmbd_vfs_inherit_posix_acl()
    error: 'acls' dereferencing possible ERR_PTR()

__get_acl() returns a mix of error pointers and NULL. This change it
with IS_ERR_OR_NULL().

Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in parse_lease_state()</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-27T15:23:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61dfe01204daf5469f21cc639f710f9e28e929c8'/>
<id>61dfe01204daf5469f21cc639f710f9e28e929c8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fc6c6a3c324c1b3e93a03d0cfa3749c781f23de0 upstream.

This bug is in parse_lease_state, and it is caused by the missing check
of `struct create_context`. When the ksmbd traverses the create_contexts,
it doesn't check if the field of `NameOffset` and `Next` is valid,
The KASAN message is following:

[    6.664323] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in parse_lease_state+0x7d/0x280
[    6.664738] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005c08988 by task kworker/0:3/103
...
[    6.666644] Call Trace:
[    6.666796]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    6.666933]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[    6.667167]  print_report+0xcc/0x620
[    6.667903]  kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[    6.668374]  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
[    6.668621]  parse_lease_state+0x7d/0x280
[    6.668868]  smb2_open+0xbe8/0x4420
[    6.675137]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x282/0x820

Use smb2_find_context_vals() to find smb2 create request lease context.
smb2_find_context_vals validate create context fields.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit fc6c6a3c324c1b3e93a03d0cfa3749c781f23de0 upstream.

This bug is in parse_lease_state, and it is caused by the missing check
of `struct create_context`. When the ksmbd traverses the create_contexts,
it doesn't check if the field of `NameOffset` and `Next` is valid,
The KASAN message is following:

[    6.664323] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in parse_lease_state+0x7d/0x280
[    6.664738] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005c08988 by task kworker/0:3/103
...
[    6.666644] Call Trace:
[    6.666796]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[    6.666933]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[    6.667167]  print_report+0xcc/0x620
[    6.667903]  kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[    6.668374]  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
[    6.668621]  parse_lease_state+0x7d/0x280
[    6.668868]  smb2_open+0xbe8/0x4420
[    6.675137]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x282/0x820

Use smb2_find_context_vals() to find smb2 create request lease context.
smb2_find_context_vals validate create context fields.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in deassemble_neg_contexts()</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:17:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Namjae Jeon</name>
<email>linkinjeon@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-27T15:23:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=205279b96b5c40c60c6de4f9342416e02ee279f1'/>
<id>205279b96b5c40c60c6de4f9342416e02ee279f1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f1a411873c85b642f13b01f21b534c2bab81fc1b upstream.

The check in the beginning is
`clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) &lt;= len_of_ctxts`,
but in the end of loop, `len_of_ctxts` will subtract
`((clen + 7) &amp; ~0x7) + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)`, which causes
integer underflow when clen does the 8 alignment. We should use
`(clen + 7) &amp; ~0x7` in the check to avoid underflow from happening.

Then there are some variables that need to be declared unsigned
instead of signed.

[   11.671070] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610
[   11.671533] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005e86cf2 by task kworker/0:0/7
...
[   11.673383] Call Trace:
[   11.673541]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   11.673679]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[   11.673913]  print_report+0xcc/0x620
[   11.674671]  kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[   11.675171]  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
[   11.675412]  smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610
[   11.676217]  ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common+0x526/0x770
[   11.676795]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x274/0x810
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f1a411873c85b642f13b01f21b534c2bab81fc1b upstream.

The check in the beginning is
`clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) &lt;= len_of_ctxts`,
but in the end of loop, `len_of_ctxts` will subtract
`((clen + 7) &amp; ~0x7) + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)`, which causes
integer underflow when clen does the 8 alignment. We should use
`(clen + 7) &amp; ~0x7` in the check to avoid underflow from happening.

Then there are some variables that need to be declared unsigned
instead of signed.

[   11.671070] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610
[   11.671533] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005e86cf2 by task kworker/0:0/7
...
[   11.673383] Call Trace:
[   11.673541]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[   11.673679]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
[   11.673913]  print_report+0xcc/0x620
[   11.674671]  kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
[   11.675171]  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
[   11.675412]  smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610
[   11.676217]  ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common+0x526/0x770
[   11.676795]  handle_ksmbd_work+0x274/0x810
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang &lt;cc85nod@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon &lt;linkinjeon@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steve French &lt;stfrench@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ceph: fix use-after-free bug for inodes when flushing capsnaps</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:16:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiubo Li</name>
<email>xiubli@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-01T00:59:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=888c56409ac423d5bdf45aa8bd32fbde5a59752b'/>
<id>888c56409ac423d5bdf45aa8bd32fbde5a59752b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 409e873ea3c1fd3079909718bbeb06ac1ec7f38b upstream.

There is a race between capsnaps flush and removing the inode from
'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list' list:

   == Thread A ==                     == Thread B ==
ceph_queue_cap_snap()
 -&gt; allocate 'capsnapA'
 -&gt;ihold('&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode')
 -&gt;add 'capsnapA' to 'ci-&gt;i_cap_snaps'
 -&gt;add 'ci' to 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'
    ...
   == Thread C ==
ceph_flush_snaps()
 -&gt;__ceph_flush_snaps()
  -&gt;__send_flush_snap()
                                handle_cap_flushsnap_ack()
                                 -&gt;iput('&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode')
                                   this also will release 'ci'
                                    ...
				      == Thread D ==
                                ceph_handle_snap()
                                 -&gt;flush_snaps()
                                  -&gt;iterate 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'
                                   -&gt;get the stale 'ci'
 -&gt;remove 'ci' from                -&gt;ihold(&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode) this
   'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'           will WARNING

To fix this we will increase the inode's i_count ref when adding 'ci'
to the 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list' list.

[ idryomov: need_put int -&gt; bool ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2209299
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Milind Changire &lt;mchangir@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 409e873ea3c1fd3079909718bbeb06ac1ec7f38b upstream.

There is a race between capsnaps flush and removing the inode from
'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list' list:

   == Thread A ==                     == Thread B ==
ceph_queue_cap_snap()
 -&gt; allocate 'capsnapA'
 -&gt;ihold('&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode')
 -&gt;add 'capsnapA' to 'ci-&gt;i_cap_snaps'
 -&gt;add 'ci' to 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'
    ...
   == Thread C ==
ceph_flush_snaps()
 -&gt;__ceph_flush_snaps()
  -&gt;__send_flush_snap()
                                handle_cap_flushsnap_ack()
                                 -&gt;iput('&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode')
                                   this also will release 'ci'
                                    ...
				      == Thread D ==
                                ceph_handle_snap()
                                 -&gt;flush_snaps()
                                  -&gt;iterate 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'
                                   -&gt;get the stale 'ci'
 -&gt;remove 'ci' from                -&gt;ihold(&amp;ci-&gt;vfs_inode) this
   'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list'           will WARNING

To fix this we will increase the inode's i_count ref when adding 'ci'
to the 'mdsc-&gt;snap_flush_list' list.

[ idryomov: need_put int -&gt; bool ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2209299
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li &lt;xiubli@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Milind Changire &lt;mchangir@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov &lt;idryomov@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>afs: Fix setting of mtime when creating a file/dir/symlink</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T09:16:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-07T08:47:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2f77eb2f02cc33513e57f636165c38fab3136940'/>
<id>2f77eb2f02cc33513e57f636165c38fab3136940</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a27648c742104a833a01c54becc24429898d85bf ]

kafs incorrectly passes a zero mtime (ie. 1st Jan 1970) to the server when
creating a file, dir or symlink because the mtime recorded in the
afs_operation struct gets passed to the server by the marshalling routines,
but the afs_mkdir(), afs_create() and afs_symlink() functions don't set it.

This gets masked if a file or directory is subsequently modified.

Fix this by filling in op-&gt;mtime before calling the create op.

Fixes: e49c7b2f6de7 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a27648c742104a833a01c54becc24429898d85bf ]

kafs incorrectly passes a zero mtime (ie. 1st Jan 1970) to the server when
creating a file, dir or symlink because the mtime recorded in the
afs_operation struct gets passed to the server by the marshalling routines,
but the afs_mkdir(), afs_create() and afs_symlink() functions don't set it.

This gets masked if a file or directory is subsequently modified.

Fix this by filling in op-&gt;mtime before calling the create op.

Fixes: e49c7b2f6de7 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept")
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: enable the lazy init thread when remounting read/write</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:48:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Theodore Ts'o</name>
<email>tytso@mit.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2023-05-27T03:57:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9ca777c1ef9a20953aa252923f53fe42b5b986c0'/>
<id>9ca777c1ef9a20953aa252923f53fe42b5b986c0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit eb1f822c76beeaa76ab8b6737ab9dc9f9798408c upstream.

In commit a44be64bbecb ("ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting
r/w until quota is re-enabled") we defer clearing tyhe SB_RDONLY flag
in struct super.  However, we didn't defer when we checked sb_rdonly()
to determine the lazy itable init thread should be enabled, with the
next result that the lazy inode table initialization would not be
properly started.  This can cause generic/231 to fail in ext4's
nojournal mode.

Fix this by moving when we decide to start or stop the lazy itable
init thread to after we clear the SB_RDONLY flag when we are
remounting the file system read/write.

Fixes a44be64bbecb ("ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting r/w until...")

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527035729.1001605-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit eb1f822c76beeaa76ab8b6737ab9dc9f9798408c upstream.

In commit a44be64bbecb ("ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting
r/w until quota is re-enabled") we defer clearing tyhe SB_RDONLY flag
in struct super.  However, we didn't defer when we checked sb_rdonly()
to determine the lazy itable init thread should be enabled, with the
next result that the lazy inode table initialization would not be
properly started.  This can cause generic/231 to fail in ext4's
nojournal mode.

Fix this by moving when we decide to start or stop the lazy itable
init thread to after we clear the SB_RDONLY flag when we are
remounting the file system read/write.

Fixes a44be64bbecb ("ext4: don't clear SB_RDONLY when remounting r/w until...")

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527035729.1001605-1-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: verify buffer contents when we skip log replay</title>
<updated>2023-06-09T08:48:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Darrick J. Wong</name>
<email>djwong@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-12T05:49:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=69ebe82c73f4f9f4b49ed3b35ce347af20716d0a'/>
<id>69ebe82c73f4f9f4b49ed3b35ce347af20716d0a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 22ed903eee23a5b174e240f1cdfa9acf393a5210 upstream.

syzbot detected a crash during log recovery:

XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791
XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200.
XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074

CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
 xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913
 xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713
 xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953
 xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946
 xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930
 xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493
 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829
 xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933
 xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666
 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282
 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca
Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca
RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10
RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d
R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage
agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item
for that AGF.  The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log
item.  xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the
LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be
newer.

Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the
buffer with no buffer ops specified:

	error = xfs_buf_read(mp-&gt;m_ddev_targp, buf_f-&gt;blf_blkno,
			buf_f-&gt;blf_len, buf_flags, &amp;bp, NULL);

Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified.  This sets
us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers
reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read
verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32.  This is
impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash.

Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting
log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt.  It might be smarter to
force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the
write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the
conservative option where we stop immediately.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994e
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 22ed903eee23a5b174e240f1cdfa9acf393a5210 upstream.

syzbot detected a crash during log recovery:

XFS (loop0): Mounting V5 Filesystem bfdc47fc-10d8-4eed-a562-11a831b3f791
XFS (loop0): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x180. Truncating head block from 0x200.
XFS (loop0): Starting recovery (logdev: internal)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807e89f258 by task syz-executor132/5074

CPU: 0 PID: 5074 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 xfs_btree_lookup_get_block+0x15c/0x6d0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1813
 xfs_btree_lookup+0x346/0x12c0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:1913
 xfs_btree_simple_query_range+0xde/0x6a0 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4713
 xfs_btree_query_range+0x2db/0x380 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:4953
 xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers+0x2d1/0xa60 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:1946
 xfs_reflink_recover_cow+0xab/0x1b0 fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:930
 xlog_recover_finish+0x824/0x920 fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493
 xfs_log_mount_finish+0x1ec/0x3d0 fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:829
 xfs_mountfs+0x146a/0x1ef0 fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:933
 xfs_fs_fill_super+0xf95/0x11f0 fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1666
 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282
 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f89fa3f4aca
Code: 83 c4 08 5b 5d c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fffd5fb5ef8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00646975756f6e2c RCX: 00007f89fa3f4aca
RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 0000000020009640 RDI: 00007fffd5fb5f10
RBP: 00007fffd5fb5f10 R08: 00007fffd5fb5f50 R09: 000000000000970d
R10: 0000000000200800 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000555556c6b2c0 R14: 0000000000200800 R15: 00007fffd5fb5f50
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

The fuzzed image contains an AGF with an obviously garbage
agf_refcount_level value of 32, and a dirty log with a buffer log item
for that AGF.  The ondisk AGF has a higher LSN than the recovered log
item.  xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2 reads the buffer, compares the
LSNs, and decides to skip replay because the ondisk buffer appears to be
newer.

Unfortunately, the ondisk buffer is corrupt, but recovery just read the
buffer with no buffer ops specified:

	error = xfs_buf_read(mp-&gt;m_ddev_targp, buf_f-&gt;blf_blkno,
			buf_f-&gt;blf_len, buf_flags, &amp;bp, NULL);

Skipping the buffer leaves its contents in memory unverified.  This sets
us up for a kernel crash because xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers
reads the buffer (which is still around in XBF_DONE state, so no read
verification) and creates a refcountbt cursor of height 32.  This is
impossible so we run off the end of the cursor object and crash.

Fix this by invoking the verifier on all skipped buffers and aborting
log recovery if the ondisk buffer is corrupt.  It might be smarter to
force replay the log item atop the buffer and then see if it'll pass the
write verifier (like ext4 does) but for now let's go with the
conservative option where we stop immediately.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7e9494b8b399902e994e
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner &lt;dchinner@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner &lt;david@fromorbit.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
